for six months, and these sentences were immediately carried into effect.

From that time until his death, the denunciations by Terry and his wife of Mr. Justice Field were open, frequent and of the most vindictive and malevolent character, and they made violent threats against his personal safety. It was on account of these facts that Neagle had been detailed to attend Justice Field and to care for his personal safety.

On the 14th day of August, 1889, while Justice Field and Neagle were on their way to Los Angeles, to hold the Circuit Court of the United States at that place, the train stopped at Fresno, the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Terry, and they got on the train. The train stopped for breakfast at Lathrop, and Justice Field and Neagle got out of the car and went into the eating room for breakfast. Shortly afterwards Mr. and Mrs. Terry came into the breakfast room.

As soon as Mrs. Terry recognized Justice Field she hurried back to the car and took from it a satchel, containing a revolver. Before she returned to the reading room Terry sneaked up behind Judge Field and, before he was observed, struck him first on one side of his face and then on the other. Neagle, who was sitting next to him, rose from his seat with a revolver in his hand, and shouted out, "Stop! Stop! I am an officer." Upon this Terry started to draw a bowie-knife; and Neagle fired two shots from his revolver into the body of Terry, who immediately sank down and died in a few minutes.

Mrs. Terry went before a California magistrate and swore out a warrant for Neagle upon a charge of murder. Thereupon, upon a proper petition, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, to deliver Neagle from the custody of the

California sheriff on that charge. The United States Circuit Court discharged Neagle from custody upon the ground that, having been in the performance of his duty as an officer of the United States, he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts, and this decision was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States. Re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1.

OF THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO ENACT CRIMINAL LAWS.

The national government in the United States is a government of limited powers, or, as it is sometimes expressed, a government of "conferred" powers. It is, in other words, a created or artificial sovereignty, and possesses only such powers as are, expressly or impliedly, conferred upon it by the constitution of the United States. This doctrine is formally enunciated in the tenth amendment to the constitution, which reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." From this it results that there is no inherent general power in the Congress to enact criminal laws. The general power to enact criminal laws remains with the states, each acting within its own territory. There is, it is true, a general power in the United States to enact criminal laws which shall be in force in those portions of the national territory over which it has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. But as to those portions of the national territory which are subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the several states, the power of the national government to enact criminal laws is a limited one.

By the sixteenth subdivision of Section 8 of Article I. of the Constitution, it is provided that the

Congress shall have power: "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States," and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings."6

This exclusive territorial legislative power also exists in the territories of the United States except in so far as local legislative powers have been conferred on territorial legislatures.

The authority of the Congress to pass criminal laws which shall be in force within the territorial limits of the several states is limited by the functions of the national government. There is an inherent power in every government to enact all laws necessary to enable it to execute its functions and to punish all acts which interfere with its full and complete exercise of those functions. The criminal statutes of the United States which are in force in the territory of the several states are exclusively of this character. An act done within the territorial jurisdiction of any state must impinge somewhere upon the national government in the exercise of some one of its governmental functions or it cannot be punished as a crime by the United States.7

From a consideration of the functions of the national government it results that common law crimes are not punishable in the courts of the United

"The District of Columbia.

State vs. Kelly, 76 Me., 331; 5 Am. Cr., 393.

"The student will find the statutes governing offenses against which the Federal Government has legislated, com

States, or, in other words, the common law is not a source of jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in criminal matters, except, perhaps, where it has exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and this is the settled law. The same reasoning, by virtue of which it has been held that the common law is a source of jurisdiction to punish crime in the several states, applies with equal force to the courts of the United

mencing at Section 5323 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

Under that statute the offenses are classified as follows: I. Crimes against the existence of the government, such as treason, misprision of treason, seditious conspiracy, etc. II. Crimes arising within the maritime or territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, such as murder within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, and on the high seas or any arm of the sea, within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States. There are also provisions similar to those in different states against all the common and usual offenses when committed on the high seas or in any place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, such as larceny, inciting revolt or mutiny, breaking and entering vessels, piracy, arson of dwelling house within any fort, arson of vessels of war, etc.

III. Crimes against justice, such as perjury in any case in which the law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, corruption of jurors, etc.

IV. Crimes against the operation of the government, such as forging United States securities, letters patent, public records, counterfeiting national bank notes, bribery of United States officers or congressmen, larceny of personal property of the United States, counterfeiting gold or silver coin, robbery of the mails, breaking and entering postoffices, etc.

V. Official misconduct, such as the extortion of money by an officer under color of his office, the acceptance of bribes by judges or members of Congress.

VI. Crimes against the elective franchise and civil rights of citizens, such as the prevention of citizens from voting, the prevention or intimidation of voters by bribery or threats, the depriving of citizens of civil rights under color of state laws, frauds in voting, etc.

'U. S. vs. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U. S. vs. Coolidge, 1 Wheat., 415; U. S. vs. Lancaster, 2 McLean, 431.

States in places where the nation has exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 1 Bishop Cr. Law., Sec. 201.

OF THE CONCURRENT LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SEVERAL STATES.

There are many acts which may be punished criminally, both by the several states and by the United States. The mere fact that an act is within the legislative power of the general government does not exclude state jurisdiction over the same act. For a full discussion of the principles involved in this question the reader is referred to the cases cited below. There is a United States statute which undertakes to exclude the jurisdiction of the states over certain classes of offenses, and this has been given effect in a Michigan case.10 But being a state decision, and apparently in conflict with many decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, its authority is doubtful.

The common law is a source of jurisdiction to punish common law crimes in some but not all of the States.

On this subject every lawyer must consult the authorities of his own State. The modern tendency is to cover the whole body of the criminal law by statute, and even in States where it has been held that common law crimes were punishable this may be the law no longer. A few illustrative cases are cited in the note.11

'People vs. McDonell, 80 Cal., 285; 8 Am. Cr., 147; re Murphy, 5 Wyo.; 9 Am. Cr., 122.

10 People vs. Fonda, 62 Mich., 41.

"In Massachusetts it was held that a libel was criminally punishable, although there was no statute prescribing its punishment. Com. vs. Chapman, 13 Metc., 68. In Maine it