of genius spits men of talent by the score;" this illustration is exceedingly nasty, and exceedingly faulty: there is no excuse for it. P. 146, vol. i., "The moment our heroines, who, in that desperation which is one of the forms of cowardice, had hurled themselves on the foe, saw they had caught a Chinese and not a Tartar, flash-the quick-witted poltroons exchanged a streak of purple lightning over the abashed and drooping head, and were too lionesses of valour and dignity in less than half a moment." Was ever bombast equal to this bombast? A rather longer passage is the following description of Laure after she had claimed the child :

These were not words-they were electric shocks. The two arms that gripped Laure's arms were paralyzed, and dropped off them: and there was silence.

Then the thought of all she had done with those three words began to rise and grow and surge over her. She stood, her eyes turned downwards, yet inwards, and dilating with horror.

Silence.

Now a mist came over her eyes, and in it she saw indis,

tinctly the figure of Raynal darting to his wife's side, and raising her head.

She dared not look round on the other side. She heard feet stagger on the floor. She heard a groan, too but not a word.

Horrible silence.

With nerves strung to frenzy and trembling, acute ears, she waited for a reproach, a curse- either would have been some little relief. But no! a silence far more terrible.

Such specimens might be multiplied very considerably. We cannot flatter ourselves that Mr. Reade will pay much attention to our remarks. But we cannot fail to regret seeing a good writer throw himself away so lamentably. Mr. Reade probably fancies that all this spatterdash is a sign of energy, and strength, and truth. It is a far greater sign of weakness, and sometimes seems to indicate an unconscious fear on his own part, that if he were not disagreeable he might possibly be dull. We do not think he would; and therefore do heartily beseech him to lay aside this offensive and impertinent manner, and adopt the literary garb of ordinary English authors.

13th George III., c. 63

21st George III., c. 65 26th George III., c. 16 28th George III., c. 8 39th & 40th George III., c. 79... 53rd George III., c. 155 55th George III., c. 84 7th George IV., c. 37 3rd & 4th William IV., c. 85... 2nd & 3rd Victoria, c. 34 IT has now been formally announced by the Chairman of the Court of Directors, to the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, that it is the intention of her Majesty's Ministers to propose to Parliament, as soon as it meets again, a bill for the purpose of placing the British East Indian dominions under the

direct authority of the Crown. This being so, it will be expected that a Review which has taken so active a part hitherto as this has done, in the discussion of Indian affairs, should express its views upon the subject of the proposed change. This we purpose therefore doing, in the present article, at as great length as our limits will allow. At the same time we shall endeavour, as much as possible, to avoid mixing up in the discussion any thing that relates to personal or party questions. We shall not consider whether, if the Double Government is to be abolished, the present premier is the fittest person to whose hands the abolition of it could be intrusted. Nor shall we go into the objections that have been raised to the conferring greater powers on an Indian minister

of the calibre of Mr. Vernon Smith. We shall

not think it necessary to guard the public against the fallacy of supposing the Company alone to be responsible for the present state of India; or of thinking that, by the extinction of its authority, the past acts of all concerned in the administration of it will be condoned. These are points which may be safely left to the Legislature, and we have not the slightest doubt they will receive ample treatment at its hands. It is not to be supposed that either House of Parliament will feel disposed to abdicate its functions, because the principle of transferring the government of India wholly to the Crown, be one that in itself may be deserving of assent. But our duty we conceive, in reference to the subject, is bounded by narrower limits. The late mismanagement of India under the system of a Double Government has been largely exposed by us, and the principle of a single responsible executive has been strenuously advocated by us throughout. What we intend therefore to do, is to confine ourselves to explaining how the system of Double Government arose, and the wisdom,

20th George III., c. 56.
24th George III., c. 25.
26th George III., c. 57.
37th George III., c. 142.
51st George III., c. 75.
55th George III., c. 64.

6th George IV., c. 85.
3rd & 4th William IV., c. 41.
7th William IV. & 1st Vic., c. 70.
16th & 17th Victoria, c. 95.

the justice, the necessity of it, at the period when it commenced. We shall further show that the general principles of polity followed by the ministers who first established it, must have induced them now, had they been now living, to propose a transfer of the whole powers singly to the Crown. The reasons which justified the introduction of a system of Double Government in the outset, are precisely the reasons why it now should cease.

The Double Government is, by many in this country, supposed to be a mysterious plan of ruling India, and devised in a Machiavellian spirit, after the miscarriage of Fox's India bill, by Mr. Pitt. But nothing can be more incorrect than the supposition. The principle of the Double Government, or, in other words, of a mixed action of the Crown and of the Company in the affairs of India, was a plain and simple necessity, arising naturally out of circumstances, and did not originate with Mr. Pitt at all. He it was who first erected the separate department called the Board of Control; but the principle on which that Board was established, had been introduced and acted upon some years before, under the premiership of Lord North. Nor were Mr. Pitt's alterations in all cases improvements; for Lord North's scheme had the advantage of much greater simplicity, while it gave powers to the Crown in respect to a most essential point, which the act of Mr. Pitt resigned. This was the making the appointment of the governor-general and council subject to the King's consent, and reserving to his Majesty alone the power of recall. It would be impos

sible to overrate the beneficial influence which these provisos must have exercised over the proceedings of the Company, if they had only been maintained; they were very ill supplied by the more complex, but less effective, machinery contained in the bill of Mr. Pitt. Indeed, the more we contemplate the legislation of Lord North upon the subject of India, the more we are struck by the vast superiority of it, as far as it went, over every thing that has emanated from the Government or from Parliament since. It preserved all the legitimate rights of the Directors, while it secured a proper control over them in regard to nearly

all matters in respect to which control over them had then become legitimate on the part of the Crown; and, at the same time, the simplicity of the arrangement was such as to leave hardly any thing to desire, but that it should be fully and fairly carried out. The only fault in it was, that it made no effectual provision for meeting the obstructions that in practice the Directors were sure to raise up; though such power of obstruction would have been greatly limited in a system which left the nomination of the governors and councils, and the power of recalling them, almost exclusively to the King. It is not too much to say that in all else-in all that relates to the government of India, and the administration of justice there— the acts passed in Lord North's time were far more in accordance with the true principles of government than any that have been enacted in later times.

The legislation of Lord North upon India was confined to, as it arose from, the necessity of the case. The monstrous proceedings of the Company's servants in India, had made it essential to restrain them within the limits of the law; a supreme court of judicature, therefore, was established at Calcutta for the purpose, on the model of the courts at Westminster Hall. The transformation of the Company from a mere trading corporation into a body holding considerable dominions, had rendered it necessary to make a corresponding change in the position of the persons to whom it had delegated its rule. They now exercised sovereign powers, and these they could only exercise fittingly as the representatives of the supreme head of the state. A governor general and council therefore were appointed, consisting, in the first instance, partly of servants of the Company, and partly of men selected by the Crown, who were all named in the act; and it was ordered that, while future governors-general and councillors were to be chosen by the Company, the appointment was in each case to be subject to the consent of the King. They were also made irremovable except by his Majesty, upon representation of the Court of Directors for the time being. But while a veto was thus given to the Crown over the political appointments of the Company (to which, if no names that were satisfactory to the King were submitted to him, he might appoint himself); and, while the great officers so appointed were irremovable except by the Crown, the nomination of all the Company's other servants was left exclusively to the Directors, without any claim to interference on the part of the king or his ministers in any shape.

Throughout the whole of the law of 1773,

the first of those standing in the list of acts at the head of this article, the same sagacious and discriminating spirit reigns. It was necessary to give the governor-general and council the power of framing regulations, and inflicting fines and forfeitures for the breach of them; but it was at the same time requisite to place due checks upon the exercise of a power so vast. It was therefore ordained that it should not extend to making any rules, or ordinances, or regulations that were repugnant to the laws of the realm; and it was further enacted that no regulation whatever should be valid until it had been registered and published with the approbation of the judges in his Majesty's supreme court. Then, again, it was essential that due control should be exercised by the Crown, not only over the political appointments of the Directors, but over the political acts of their nominees, and themselves as well. And this, too, was provided for by the new law, the distinction between the Company as a political body and as a trading body being still preserved. Thus, all the letters and advices of the Company on the subject of its commerce were left to be dealt with as the Directors pleased; but it was enacted that copies of all received by them, relating in any way to its revenue, should be forwarded to the lords commissioners of the Treasury, and all relating in any way to its civil or military affairs, or government, to one of the principal Secretaries of State. The germ thus formed of the Double Government found further expansion in the subsequent act, introduced by the same minister in 1781. For the 21st of George III., c. 65, enacted, that not only were copies of all letters and advices received by the Directors to be forwarded to the King's ministers, when they related in any way to the revenue and civil or military affairs or government of the Company, as well as copies of all their replies, but that they should be governed by such instructions as they should receive from his Majesty by one of his principal Secretaries of State, in so far as related to their transactions, or those of their several governors and councils, with the country powers in India, and the levying war, and making peace. By this clause the same absolute power was conferred on the Crown, over the acts of the Directors in relation to these matters, as was afterwards given by the act of Mr. Pitt to the Board of Control.

By this latter act passed in 1784, a Board was formally established, to whom copies of all those letters and advices received by the Directors were to be transmitted, which had, under Lord North's bills, been sent to the lords and commissioners of the Treasury, and

to one of the principal Secretaries of State. But while this Board was directed to be formed of six privy councillors, the principle of Lord North's legislation was adhered to, by its being enacted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as representative of the Treasury, and one of the principal Secretaries of State, should always be of the body; in their absence only the senior remaining member was to sit as president of the Board. In practice, however, the two former ministers ceased to take any further part in Indian matters than necessarily appertains to the Cabinet at large; and the president of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, or, as it is popularly called, of the Board of Control, exercised thenceforth solely those powers which had heretofore been divided between the Treasury and the Secretaries of State.

The change rendered necessary a corresponding change in the forms under which the duties were to be conducted; and many details had to be provided for which will be found set forth in the act. With these, however, we have no concern at present, as they have little or no bearing on the present question; for this regards not so much the mode and form of the Crown's interference in the affairs of India at the period, as the extent to which it lawfully went.

The act of Mr. Pitt, besides altering these details, proceeded somewhat further than the previous acts of Lord North had done, though still in the same direction, except in relation to the point before alluded to, and another which we shall shortly mention. The distinction between the Company's rights and functions as a political body, and its rights and functions as a mercantile corporation, was still kept up. In regard to the former, interference was carried further to this extent, that while the power of the minister was continued absolute in respect of matters concerning the levying of war or the making of peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or states, he was also intrusted with the right of altering, to any extent he saw fit, the despatches proposed to be sent by the Directors to their governments abroad, in reference to all other affairs in any way relating not to their commerce, but to the civil or military government or revenue of the British territorial possessions there. As regards the former class of cases, the Board of Control had merely to send secret orders and instructions to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, ordered by the same bill to be appointed by them, and these the Secret Committee were compelled at once to transmit to India, with orders for the execution of them,

As

but without disclosing them to the Court of Directors itself. And the replies of the governments of India were to be sent in the same manner, sealed to the Secret Committee, who were to transmit them to the Board. regards the ordinary class of cases touching the civil or military government or revenue, the despatches received from, and proposed to be sent to India, were to be submitted to the Board by the Directors at large, who were required to pay due obedience to, and be governed and bound by, the orders and directions which they might from time to time receive from the Board. In the event of the Board's sending any orders and instructions to the Directors, to be by them transmitted to India, which in their opinion did not relate to the civil or military government or revenue of India, then they might apply by petition to his Majesty in Council, who was to decide whether such orders or instructions did or did not relate to the civil or military government or revenue of India, and the decision thus given was to be final and conclusive.

So far the tendency of Mr. Pitt's bill was to affirm and extend the principle that had been inaugurated by Lord North; but in the two points in which he deviated from the policy of that statesman, he opened the door to much of the mischief that has attended the working of the Indian government in later times. Under Lord North's plan, as we have explained, the nomination of the governors and councillors by the Directors had been made subject to the consent of the Crown, and the Crown alone had the power of recall. All that the Directors could do, if dissatisfied with them, was to submit a representation, applying for their removal to the King. But under Mr. Pitt's bill the exclusive power of appointing the governor-general and governors and councillors was vested in the Directors, and they had, concurrently with the King, the power of recall. His Majesty and the Court of Directors were equally empowered, each without consulting the other, to recall or remove the existing or any future governor-general or members of his council, or any of the governors and members of the councils of the other presidencies or settlements in India, or any other military or civil servants of the Company whatever. The other material point in which Mr. Pitt deviated from the principle laid down by Lord North was, that, instead of making the Crown's instructions final, and directing them to be at once obeyed, he required the commissioners for the affairs of India, in regard to all matters saving those disposed of through the Secret Committee, to furnish the Directors with their reasons in writing for differing with them as

to the despatches to be sent; and in the same way authorized the Directors to make further representations to the Board, with a view of removing its objections if they pleased. Thus was laid the foundation for that eternal circumlocution, in reference to Indian affairs, which brings every thing to a stand-still to which the Directors are opposed; that is, every thing relating to improvement and reform.

The system introduced by Mr. Pitt, of allowing the Directors to name their governors and council without making the nomination subject to the consent of the King, continued till the renewal of the charter in 1813, when the approval of the Crown was made a necessary preliminary to the appointment of governorgeneral and governors; but the Directors had still the absolute nomination of all the councillors, till the "Act to provide for the Government of India" passed in the year 1853. The power of recall has never been taken from them, and was exercised, greatly to the indignation of the Duke of Wellington, in Lord Ellenborough's case. Nor is the force of the Duke's objection to such a power resting in such hands to be by any sophistry removed. For, as his Grace justly observed, the Directors were thus enabled to pass sentence on a great public functionary, in respect of acts, all the most important of which had been founded on instructions which had been sent to him from the Board of Control through the Secret Committee, and not through themselves. Thus, of all these instructions, and the correspondence and documents relating to them, the Directors were necessarily wholly ignorant. They made themselves therefore the judges of conduct, the reasons for which they could know nothing of, unless on the supposition that the Secret Committee had violated their oaths. If, in all save its commercial functions, the Company was to be placed strictly under the control of the Crown, it followed surely that the nomination of all the great political officers of India should be made, as Lord North had made it, subject to the approval of the King. It also followed that they should only be removable, as the same minister's bill had enacted, on the representation of the Directors, by the Crown.

In the same way, the other principle adopted in Mr. Pitt's act, was a most unwise one, of requiring the Indian minister to give his reasons in writing for any alteration he might order in a Directorial despatch; and still more unwise was it to allow the Directors to question the propriety of the alterations he so ordered, in a similarly written representation, to be returned to him with the despatch. The result has been eternal correspondence between the Directors and the

Indian Board, which successive legislation has rather encouraged than checked; till at last the Indian minister has become practically almost powerless when the Directors choose to raise obstructions in his way, except in regard to the business falling within the scope of the Secret Committee, where he is absolute still.

As to other matters, they may write him endless papers in defence of their opinions, and compel him to do the same in defence of his own; thus wasting the time in words that ought to be devoted to action, instead of complying, as they ought to do, with his instructions on the spot. Nay, more, they have now especial means of thwarting him whenever they may affect to consider his instructions to relate to acts beyond his proper province to control; though nothing ought really now to be so, seeing that the Company's whole despatches now relate to its civil and military government and revenue only (the subjects in respect to which control was specially vested in the minister), its commerce having long since ceased. In such case of supposed excess of authority, the successive acts of Lord North and Mr. Pitt afforded a ready solution of the difficulty, by leaving it to the decision of the King in council, whether the minister was acting within his powers or not. But modern legislation has thrown additional difficulties in the way of speedy or harmonious action on any other terms thau a complete surrender of his opinions by the president of the India Board, whenever the question is one in which the personal feelings or interests of the Directors are at all mixed up. For by the Act 3rd and 4th William IV., passed on the expiration of the charter in 1833, it was enacted that whenever such difference arose it should be decided, not by the King in council, but by a special case, as agreed on by the president of the India Board and the Directors, being sent to three or more of the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench for their opinion, whose decision was to be final.

It would be difficult to imagine how any two branches of the executive administration could work together efficiently, under such an ingenious invention for giving vitality to the obstructive powers of each towards the other, when they happened to disagree. But if the result would necessarily be so injurious to the progress of public business between any two separate departments of the administration, where the nature of the duties brought them often into collision, how completely must it fetter all independent action, when the departments are wholly independent of each other, as these are; the head of one being a servant of the Crown, and the head of the other the