the necessity of imputing to discourse the genesis of the knowledge which I have termed quasi-inference, and of explaining the fact, that neither apperception nor memory is cognisant of any such discourse, by the hypothesis that, owing to its delicacy and rapidity, the discourse eludes experience.

CHAPTER IV.

WISDOM.

CLXIX.

I AM not aware that psychology has hitherto undertaken to answer the question, What is Wisdom? It seems to have ignored, as lying wholly without its province, the most precious of mental qualities. Who can at once say what is the differentia of Wisdom,what distinguishes it from knowledge, what from the sagacity of "the unjust steward"? Christ seems to refer to it as though it were mere sagacity. "The children of this world," he says, " are in their generation wiser than the children of light." But the word "wise" in this connection does not refer to the wisdom which St. John probably denotes by the word λóyos,—the wisdom that is at once an imperative and an alacrity to obey,—the wisdom that incurs the cross to save mankind. The nature of this wisdom I now proceed to explain. It is so related to Virtue or Moral Goodness that I must first explain what the latter is,-a task by no means made easy by actual public knowledge.

CLXX.

In proportion as the progress and spread of science makes words more frequently and exclusively the immediate objects of thought, violations of etymological connotation become more sensibly obstructive. The perfection of language makes etymological and received connotation identical. We are approaching a time when experience of obstruction will directly acquaint the learned with the full meaning and importance of the deliverance of Condillac, Un science est une langue bien faite, and that it behoves a French Institute to add to the humble office of registering and promulgating the enactments of the lingual instinct the higher one of conforming language to a rule that may be termed the rule of right connotation. This law, I take it, was descried by Leibnitz when he imagined his scheme of a universal language, that of forming the whole of language, as the lingual instinct had already fashioned the numerical part of it, out of a few elemental signs combinable into terms connotative of the composition and general places of the things they denote. Chemistry has of late conformed its language to this law.

Now the word "Moral" and its cognates have been wrenched out of the order of right connotation and loaded with incompatible meanings. The primary and etymological meaning of the adjective "moral" is "pertaining to manners;" as qualifying the term "Science" it is applied in this sense, Moral Science being science that is conversant about manners. If this were the sole meaning of the adjective, the cognate term "Morality" should signify the specific attribute of manners.

But as qualifying the term, "sense," the adjective imports very differently. Its reference to manners in this connection is remote, and makes the name of which it is a constituent connote an attribute which may, for the nonce, be named "conversantness about virtue and vice." It is still more warped from its primary meaning when it qualifies the term "man." To say of a man that he is moral is to say that he is good. In this connection the word "moral" implies the identity of morality and goodness. As constituent of the term, "moral apprehension," it implies that all apprehensions of manners are not moral, but only those that approvingly refer to virtue and disapprovingly to vice; whereas there are bad approvals and reprobations of manners; approvals and reprobations which, according to the primary meaning of the word "moral,” are moral. The word "immoral" does not signify, as a law of language requires, the opposite of the word "moral" applied according to its primary meaning. The word "immoral" means "bad," and its cognate term "immorality" means "badness."

Such being the tangle of incompatible meanings in which the words moral, immoral, morality, immorality, are involved, I trust I am warranted to help myself to an instrument of exact expression by the coinage of even so uncouth a barbarism as the word "moralness." My need requires the coinage of still another word, but happily not one of such barbaric repugnancy,-the word "preter-moral."

CLXXI.

We say of agreeable and of what seem to be useful

things that they are "good." Does this imply that goodness is the differentia of the agreeable and seemingly useful? Shall we not rather say that goodness is the differentia of what is innocently agreeable and what is useful? This being allowed, goodness is divisible into two species, one differentiated by the property of eliciting a peculiar kind of approval, known as moral approval, the other not so characterised. Moral approval is undefinable. If the reader have not experienced it I am unable to make myself intelligible to him in respect of it. The species of goodness that is of a nature to elicit moral approval may be distinguished as Moral goodness, the opposite species as "pretermoral" goodness. The term "badness" denotes the differentia of what is hurtful. It is divisible into the two species, hurtful things that are, and hurtful things that are not, of a nature to elicit the peculiar kind of reprobation known as moral reprobation: the former may be distinguished as moral, the latter as preter-moral, badness. What moral goodness and moral badness have in common is the property of eliciting moral discernment. Moral discernments are individuals of a genus which comprehends and is comprised by the two species, approbatory and reprobatory moral discernments.

Now, by what name sonorously as well as significantly cognate to the word, Moral, shall we denote the property of eliciting moral discernment? Not by the name, Morality; for that is unchangeably committed to an incompatible meaning. Let "moralness" be the name, a name to which I annex a primary and a secondary meaning. According to the first, the term Moralness denotes the attribute by virtue of which an animus, or what passes for one, elicits moral discern