ment either approbatory or the reverse: according to the second, it is the specific difference of the moral faculty or faculties. Let the contradictory opposite of The Moral, viz. what is without Moralness, be known as the "preter-moral." An animus that per se is incapable of eliciting moral discernment is "pretermoral," e.g. Prudence, the mental quality that disposes us to provide for future exemption from pain.

CLXXII.

Moralness is divisible into that which does, and that which does not, interest the faculty of remorseful apprehension,-Conscience. It is essential to the

apprehensions of this faculty to refer to the imperative termed obligation, so that moralness which interests conscience might be correctly defined as moralness determined by the sentiment of obligation. This species of moralness I name impero-moralness, and the opposite species, as referring not to obligation but to a species of beauty, e.g. that of Generosity, Courage, and Fortitude, I term pulchro-moralness. Accordingly, moral goodness is either "impero-moral" or "pulchromoral;" and moral faculties are either "impero-moral or "pulchro-moral."

CLXXIII.

Obligation is a species of imperativeness. It manifests itself as a command, for the most part as a command of God; sometimes as impersonal. It is

essential to the command to be intuited in a sentiment involving a momentum towards obedience. This pressure or momentum causes it to be regarded as a species of compulsory force, and has procured for it the name, Obligation. Obligation is comprised by the two species, duty, and obligation in respect of what is not due.

CLXXIV.

Duty is for the most part confounded with obligation. It differs from one species of obligation as supposing something due, and therefore a relation of debtor and creditor between two or more persons. Obligation to conform to purity does not suppose such a relation. Duty and Right are correlatives, but not so Obligation and Right. No right corresponds to obligation to conform to purity. The confusion of obligation and duty is owing to this fact, that experience has been largely conversant about duty, and very little about obligation respecting what is not due. Right is the differentia of the meum and tuum determined by duty. It supposes that something morally belongs to its subject, e.g. land, money, a certain degree of immunity,-that there exists a free agent able to deprive him of what morally belongs to him, and that, if the free agent undergo a temptation to make use of the power, he owes a recusant volition to the owner. If a thing be owned by one person and possessed by another, the right of the owner supposes a duty in the possessor to restore the thing when required.

CLXXV.

1. Let us now examine the mental qualities—the qualities or elemental parts of mental structure-on which depend the affections and emotions that are of a nature to elicit moral approval.

2. Language is indebted to Comte for the useful term, Altruism. Regarding it as public property, I restrict it to a less comprehensive meaning than that annexed to it by Comte. I use it as denoting disposition to confer benefit on another. We may be sordidly disposed to confer benefit on another, as when a slave-owner, with venal self-regard, is disposed to promote the health of his slaves; or we may be disinterestedly disposed to confer benefit on others, as instanced in the good Samaritan. But disinterested altruism is not the contradictory opposite, it is merely the contrary, of sordid altruism. There is an altruism that is about equally remote from sordidness and disinterestedness, e.g. that of parental love, and that of patriotism. Knowledge of the relation of such or such a human being as "child" to the Ego is the pivot of parental love. An alien infant fraudulently presented as her own to a newly-made mother as soon as relief from the pain of parturition enables her to nurse, will elicit parental love, and her own might become to her an object of aversion. In like manner egotism is the pivot of patriotism. Knowledge, whether true or false, that such or such a country is in the relation of " native land" to the Ego, is the nucleus of patriotism. A love of country founded on a false knowledge might make a

Both affections

man the enemy of his native country. are equally remote from sordidness and disinterestedness. Both are of great, one of indispensable, utility. Both are teeming sources of self-sacrifice and injustice. Accordingly, Altruism is divisible into sordid and nonsordid altruism, and the latter into egotistic and nonegotistic altruism.

3. Heterogeneous sympathy is proper to non-sordid altruism. It tends, when it instigates or is the motive of behaviour that evinces extraordinary self-denial, to commend its subject to moral approval, but much more when it seems to proceed from that which is non-egotistic.

4. Non-sordid altruism is either reverential or benevolent.

5. The mental quality, Benevolence, is the inconcrete subject of non-sordid altruism, and, therein, of heterogeneous sympathy (§ xcii. 1). Its action is dependent on ascriptive emotion (§ xcii. 2). Owing to this dependence its sympathy is at first, for the most part, confined to objects of affection, such as those of the parental, filial, fraternal, conjugal, friendly affections; but it is capable of expanding beyond the sphere of affection, of developing into philanthropy ; and finally of embracing all conscious being. Let benevolence that is a constituent of affection be distinguished as "affectionate" and that which generates sympathy independent on affection as "super-affectionate." Sympathy with a stranger in distress is an emotion of super-affectionate benevolence. I mean the term, "super-affectionate" benevolence, to connote

not only non-dependence on affection, but also superiority, in the view of the moral faculty, over affectionate benevolence. The latter frequently incites to injustice in favour of its object; the former has no such tendency.1 Nearly nineteen hundred years ago a conspicuous example of what may be termed "adult" benevolence appeared in Palestine. In it was combined affectionate and super-affectionate benevolence, the latter in such ascendency, we must presume, as to exclude, at least under ordinary circumstances, temptation to be unjust. Let benevolence of this degree of development be distinguished as adult, and all beside as either embryonic or adolescent.

The division of Benevolence into " affectionate and "super-affectionate" detaches a species of benevolence from a connection that tends to hide disinterestedness or at least to prevent its appearing in sharp relief. The pretension of egotistic benevolence to be disinterested is not beyond reasonable question: that of non-egotistic affectionate benevolence, e.g. the benevolence involved in friendship, though in view of the moral faculty it excel the former, is not above suspicion that of super-affectionate benevolence does not admit of reasonable question. It is not reasonable to doubt the disinterestedness of pain caused by apprehension of a stranger's pain. Such an emotion, fraught with longing to relieve, excludes room for self-regard. I do not refer to any self-denying act which the sympathetic pain might instigate, because this would give opportunity for a sophistical rejoinder, whereas the example I propose paralyses the opposite

1 Christ exacts super-affectionate benevolence capable of embracing enemies, and makes small account of affectionate benevolence, as being a virtue not wanting even to Publicans.