acts are non-significant assertions respecting what is in question. They are types of a kind of mental event that is entitled to the greatest possible distinction. No better disposition can be made of the familiar term, judgment, than to confine it to the denotement of individuals of this kind. The popular tendency as regards the use of the term has been to apply it in this way, but the tendency has been thwarted by philosophers who would have the term to be the common name of mental events that are expressible by credited propositions,—a kind as real and of as much importance as the kind, Men with a mole on the cheek. Logic originated the perversion. Overlooking the fact that propositions express objects of simple apprehension as well as objects of judgment, and excite simple apprehension as well as judgment, e.g. the proposition, It rains, uttered without question, or the propositions that constitute a narrative, they accounted every mental event that is expressible by a proposition a judgment. They thus put in relief a kind to which the indolence of philosophy could refer a great and perplexing variety of mental events the sorting of which might otherwise cost toilsome study and long delay; and the temptation prevailed. According to Sir William Hamilton, to be conscious is to judge: to see, hear, smell, fetc., is to judge. "The fourth condition of consciousness," he tells us, "which may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, that it involves judgment. A judgment is the mental act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This fourth condition is in truth only a necessary consequence of the third, for it is impossible to discriminate without judging,—discrimination or contradistinction being in fact only the denying one thing

of another. It may to some seem strange that consciousness, the simple and primary act of intelligence, should be a judgment, which philosophers in general have viewed as a compound and derivative operation. This is however altogether a mistake. A judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judgment. Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, in the act, the external or internal existence of the object? Now these fundamental affirmations are the affirmations, in other words the judgments,-of consciousness."1. Accordingly, we are required to believe that the first perception of the infant involves a synthesis of the perceived appearance with the mental symbol or idea of reality, and that the appearance and the symbol present themselves disjoined, but as candidates for union, to the judging faculty, which, without a reason for the synthesis, unites them. Is it not a needless invoking of prodigy to demand that the infant, at the very beginning of conscious life, generates an idea of existence unconnected with a symbol of an existent somewhat? What hinders our supposing that the reality of the appearance is given without any mental act that could be accounted a synthesis and, for that reason, classed with the judgments of those who are specially known as judges? That analysis can detect, in the infant's apprehension, what is expressible by a proposition, is surely no reason for diluting the valuable common meaning of the term, judgment, of which Sir William Hamilton remarked, "the name has been exclusively limited to the more varied and elaborate comparison of one notion with another and the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement."

1 Lectures on Metaphysics. Lecture XI.

XXX.

A judgment may be either a certitude or a strong opinion. Judgments that involve certitude may be distinguished as cognitive, and those that involve strong opinion as incognitive.

XXXI.

There is a species of apprehension which so resembles judgment that the difference between them seems at first sight scarcely important enough to be specific. The exigencies of a battle elicit, as they occur, from the inventive faculty of either general commanding, ideas of means which he at once applies without having referred to their opposites, without assertion. He does not affirm that the measures symbolised by the ideas are apt, he does not deny that they are deficient in aptness. The ideas are objects of apprehension, not of judgment. Although the aptness of the means which he invents and applies exhibits to him an aspect not of certainty but of probability, and the correlative opinion would seem to suppose a conscious reference to opposites, no such reference obtains. Conscious reference to opposites is not essential to conscious opinion. The chess-player opines that the move he is about to make is apt, but he does not always consciously refer to the opposite theses, it is apt, it is not apt; he does not judge that the move is apt. When occasion elicits from craft a satisfactory scheme, the schemer does not usually affirm the fitness of the scheme and deny the contrary; the scheme is appre

hended as apt, not judged to be apt. Now this kind. of apprehension resembles recollection, effort of memory consequent to question-as being apprehension consequent to question and to a corresponding attention in quest of an object, but it has an affinity with judgment which recollection does not possess. This affinity consists in a likeness for the peculiarity of which language has provided no name. Let apprehension having this affinity be known by the name "vice-judgment." Vice-judgment is conversant only about agenda.

XXXII.

Incommunicative question is divisiblé into several species which are respectively determined by the faculty addressed. Question addressed to memory, e.g. what is the name of the person approaching, is mnemonical; that addressed to will or intentional instinct, e.g. with what motive comply, is practical; that addressed to the faculty of judgment is judicial; that addressed to the faculty of vice-judgment is vice-judicial. Attention caused by judicial question is speculation. Reason is the faculty of judicial and vice-judicial question, of speculation, of judgment and vice-judgment. This definition seems to me to exhaust all the offices of Reason.

XXXIII.

1. A reason, according to a secondary signification of the term, is an objective and questioned incentive to either intentional action or belief. To be a reason,

an

incentive must be discerned and connected with question. An unobjective motive that instinctively causes action is not a reason. A condition or law of belief that latently determines a belief is not a reason. When Bakewell discovered the connection between a tendency to rapid fattening and a certain make of cattle, he had not in view the general principle, A thesis affirmative of a universal connection of certain subjects with certain attributes, if accredited by many instances of its truth and undiscredited by a contrary instance, is true. Although this principle contributed as law of belief to determine the induction, it bore latently on Bakewell's mind, and therefore not as a reason. To be a reason, an incentive to belief must be connected with question respecting the thesis to be believed. Beliefs that originate without questions are not caused by reasons.

2. Reasons that are incentives to action may be distinguished as practical, those that are incentives to belief as non-practical.

3. When a man, moved by a desire of a forbidden pleasure, and also by a counteracting sentiment of duty, deliberates what he shall do,—with which motive comply,—both motives are practical reasons, whereas a motive which bears without being in question or in any way objective, is not a reason. Action consequent to motives that are not reasons is, as I shall fully show in a subsequent chapter (xvii.), instinctive, not voluntary. By the way, a confusion of Will with intentional instinct,-instinct that begets intentional action, is the main cause of modern infidelity respecting the freedom of the will.

E