was not the kind of property the taking of which was a felony.

In State v. Wilson, 63 Ore. 344, Ann. Cas. 1912D 646, 127 Pac. 980, it was held that a railroad ticket, although yet in the possession of the company and unstamped, was the subject of larceny because it was comprehended within the general term of "any goods or chattels" as used in the statute defining larceny.

93. ANY GROSS NEGLECT.

In Schwartz v. Schwartz, 6 Ohio Dec. 525, 7 Ohio N. P. 194, in construing an Ohio statute (75 Ohio L. 747), providing that "any gross neglect" when proven was a ground for divorce, it was said that no well defined line could be laid down applicable to all cases, but that the question in every instance must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court further remarked that while there seemed to be a disposition among the Bar to consider extreme cruelty or habitual drunkenness as a gross neglect of duty, extreme cruelty or drunkenness was the commission of an act, while gross neglect was an omission or forbearance to perform an act which the highest ties of marital relation required should be performed.

94. ANY HARNESS.

In State v. Wortman, 78 Kan. 847, 98 Pac. 217, in defining the term "any harness" as used in a statute enumerating articles subject of larceny, it was said that the legislature employed the phrase "any harness" as descriptive of the class of articles forming the gear by which a vehicle was drawn, as it might have covered all wearing apparel by the use of the phrase "any clothing," and that to commit the interdicted offense, it was not necessary to take a substantially complete harness, or what was known as a "set" of harness.

95. ANY HEIR OR CREDITOR.

An Ohio statute (Lanning R. L. 9637, Rev. St. § 6098) provides as follows: "If any heir or creditor of a deceased person, or any person who has purchased, or claims to hold, by purchase or otherwise, from such heir, any lands or other property inherited by such heir from such decedent, shall file in the probate court of the county in which administration is taken out on any estate, a written requisition on the administrator or executor, to disallow and reject any claim presented for allowance," etc. In Todd v. Todd, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 224, it was held that an heir was none the less entitled to object, although he was also interested as a

devisee or legatee, and further that the words "any heir or creditor" in the statute included devisees and legatees or any other person whose property was or might be affected by the recovery of a judgment.

96. ANY HOLDER OF THIS OBLIGATION.

In Marsden v. Soper, 11 Ohio St. 503, with respect to a warrant of attorney to confess judgment on a promissory note "in favor of any holder of this obligation," the court said that it was questionable whether the warrant of attorney authorized a judgment in favor of an indorsee of the note. In Watson v. Paine, 25 Ohio St. 340, the court said: "I am still wholly unable to find a reason why a power to confess judgment in favor of any holder of the note may not as well be used in favor of an indorsee as in favor of the payee." It was, however, said that the court was not agreed on the point and it was not decided.

97. ANY ILLEGAL OFFICIAL ACT.

In Hicks v. Eggleston, 105 App. Div. 73, 93 N. Y. S. 909, construing a statute of New York (Laws 1892, ch. 30), providing that an action may be maintained "to prevent any illegal official act, .. or to prevent waste or injury to, or to restore and make good," any public property, funds or estate, it was held that any action on the part of a sheriff, by which he procured the audit of a bill for thousands of dollars in excess of the amount which the statutes permitted him to exact of the taxpayers, was an illegal official act within the contemplation of the statute, both on his part and on the part of the members of the board of supervisors making such audit.

98. ANY INCORPORATED COMPANY.

The expression "any incorporated company" as used in a Texas statute (Rev. St. art. 223), providing that in suits against any incorporated company or joint stock association the citation may be served on the president, secretary, or treasurer of the company or association, or on the local agent representing the company or association in the county in which suit is brought, or by leaving a copy of the same at the principal office of the company during office hours, has been held to cover all incorporated companies, whether created under the laws of the state of Texas or those of any other state or of a foreign country. Angerhoefer v. Bradstreet Co. 22 Fed. 305.

Under the Missouri constitution (Art. XII, § 4) providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be held inviolate in all trials of claims for compensation, when in the ex

ercise of said right of eminent domain, any incorporated company shall be interested either for or against the exercise of the said right," it has been held that a municipal corporation is not an incorporated company within the purview of the constitutional provision. Kansas City v. Vineyard, 128 Mo. 75, 30 S. W. 326; Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 272, 30 S. W. 773; St. Louis v. Roe, 184 Mo. 324, 83 S. W. 435.

99. ANY INCORPORATED MEDICAL SOCIETY.

A New York statute (Laws 1895, c. 398) provides that "when any prosecution under this article is made on the complaint of any incorporated medical society of the state, or any county medical society entitled to representation in a state society, the fines, when collected, shall be paid to the society making the complaint," etc. In New York County Medical Assoc. v. New York, 32 Misc. 116, 65 N. Y. S. 531, it was said that if the legislature had intended to limit the act for the exclusive benefit of three societies, the Medical, Homeopathic and Eclectic, because they were named in certain prior acts and possessed certain rights which the plaintiff did not possess, it should have expressed that intent by language referring in some manner to those three societies, instead of using the word "any," which meant an indefinite number or quantity.

100. ANY INCREASE THEREOF.

In Merchants Loan, etc. Co. v. Northern Trust Co. 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 411, it was held that a statutory power to trustees to hold "any increase" of the trust property authorized trustees to acquire and pay for their pro rata share of any increase of capital stock offered to them by the corporation at less than market value, by reason of their ownership of shares of stock which belonged to the testator at his death.

101. ANY INCUMBRANCE.

In Hershiser v. Ward, 29 Nev. 228, 87 Pac. 171, referring to an allegation in a complaint in an action against abstractors for furnishing a defective title, the court said: "The phrase 'without any incumbrances' means just what it says. It means there were no incumbrances. Indeed, it means there was not a single incumbrance. It could not possibly mean there were some incumbrances, or even there was a single incumbrance. So to hold would be a strange perversion of language."

102. ANY INDEBTEDNESS.

In Simons v. Union Springs First Nat. Bank, 93 N. Y. 269, it was held that a mort

gage, which after reciting the consideration, stated that it was "intended as collateral security for the payment of any indebtedness of the said first parties to the said party of the second part,” referred to existing debts only.

In State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260, in construing the provision of the Utah constitution that when the territorial indebtedness shall have been paid, "the state shall never contract any indebtedness, except as in the next section provided," etc., it was held that the phrase "any indebtedness" included any obligation which the state undertook or was obligated to pay or discharge out of future appropriations; that is, appropriations not made by the legislature creating the debt or obligation, and to be paid from moneys derived from levies other than those made by the then existing legislature, and which must necessarily be raised by levying a tax upon the property of the entire state, as contradistinguished from a mere city, county, or district levy. In other words, it was held that in order to constitute an indebtedness within the provisions of the constitutional limitation it was not necessary that the debt be evidenced by bonds, notes, or other usual evidences of indebtedness, but it was sufficient if in order to discharge the debt the state was obligated to pay it at some future time, and that it cast a future burden upon the taxpayer to the extent of a debt or obligation which must be paid by the state of Utah with funds derived from general taxation.

103. ANY INDICTMENT.

In People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385, under a New York statute (Act March 22, 1852), providing that "any judgment rendered in favor of any defendant, upon any indictment for any criminal offense (except where such defendant shall have been acquitted by a jury), may be reviewed on writ of error on behalf of the people," it was held that the phrase "upon any indictment" did not limit the reviewable judgments to judgments not on verdict.

104. ANY INDIVIDUAL OR COPARTNERSHIP.

In Com. v. Real Estate Trust Co. 26 Pa. Sup. Ct. 149, affirmed 211 Pa. St. 51, 60 Atl. 551, it was held that the words "any individual or copartnership" as used in a statute imposing a tax on real estate brokers did not include a corporation.

105. ANY INFAMOUS CRIME.

In Hess v. Hess, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 135, in construing a statute allowing a divorce if either spouse has been "convicted of forgery

or any infamous crime," the court declared that the term was to be construed in a broad and comprehensive, or popular sense and not in its technical sense, and that it was intended to include other crimes than those which make a convict incompetent to testify.

106. ANY INSTRUMENT OR MEANS.

In State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, Ann. Cas. 1915B 818, 133 Pac. 878, in construing a statute of Kansas (Gen. Stat. 1909, § 2532), providing that "every physician or other person who shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, or substance whatsoever, or shall use or employ any instrument or means whatsoever, with intent thereby to procure abortion or the miscarriage of any such woman, etc., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc., it was said that the phrase "any instrument or means whatsoever" indicated a legislative intent to cover all the criminal machinations and devices of the abortionist and that those words were not limited by the rule of ejusdem generis.

107. ANY INSURANCE COMPANY.

In Fort v. State, 92 Ga. 8, 18 S. E. 14, 23 L.R.A. 86, the words "any insurance company" as used in a statute relating to certificates of authority were held to apply to incorporated companies only.

108. ANY INSURANCE CORPORATION.

In Zell v. Herman Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. 75 Wis. 521, 44 N. W. 828, the words "any insurance corporation" as used in a statute (Rev. Stat. § 1977), relating to insurance agents, include a mutual insurance company.

109. ANY INTEREST.

In Storms v. Snyder, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 109, it was held that an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the plaintiff should open a road to its original width, and should move his fence, was held not to involve "any interest" in land within a statute relating to jurisdiction.

In Forbes v. Hamilton, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 356, under the Vermont statute (vol. 1, p. 189, § 4), providing that "no action shall be maintained upon any agreement hereafter to be made for the sale of lands, etc., or any interest therein, or concerning them," it was held that the words "any interest therein" involved the various tenures by which lands might be held.

110. ANY INTOXICATING BEVERAGE.

In Rush v. Com. (Ky.) 47 S. W. 586, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 775, it was held that a statute

prohibiting the sale of "any intoxicating beverage, liquid mixture or decoction" did not apply to spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or amend an act relating thereto, but was designed to prohibit the sale of other intoxicants, such as "bitters" and the like.

111. ANY JUDGE.

In City Bank v. Young, 43 N. H. 457, it was held that a statute by which "any judge" in any other state was empowered to take depositions to be used in the New Hampshire courts, did not limit the authority to a judge who was authorized in his own state to take depositions.

Under the Dominion Speedy Trials Act, 1888, providing that "in British Columbia the judge in a speedy trials court may be any judge of a county court," it has been held that the expression "any judge of a county court" must be taken to refer to any judge having, by force of the provincial law regulating the constitution and organization of county courts, jurisdiction in the particular locality in which he might hold a "speedy trial" and that this statute did not authorize a county court judge having no authority from the provincial legislature so to do to hold a "speedy trial" without the limits of his territorial jurisdiction; in other words that the expression "any judge of a county court" must be limited by the tacit condition "within his county," or words to that effect. Piel Ke-Ark-An v. Reg. 2 British Columbia 53; In re British Columbia County Courts, 21 Can. Sup. Ct. 446.

Under a New York statute (Laws 1848, p. 66, Act of 1848, § 2) providing that applications under the Act of April 26, 1831, and the acts amending the same, "may be made to any judge of a court of record in any county in which the judgment on which the complaint is grounded is docketed, and in which the defendant resides," it was held that the legislature meant by the words "any judge of a court of record" any judge of a court of record commonly called judge, and known and spoken of, as a judge of a court of record, and did not include a city recorder. People v. Goodwin, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 562.

112. ANY JUDGMENT.

The words "any judgment which may be rendered against him in his official capacity" in the Alabama Revenue Act (Act of Dec. 3, 1868, § 44) relating to liability on a tax collector's bond have been held not to be used in a technical or restricted sense as a judgment in an action at law, but as meaning "any judgment" of any court to which the state or county might properly resort for its coercive aid. Dallas County v. Timberlake, 54 Ala. 403.

.;

.

Under a Colorado statute (Gen. St. sec. 85) providing that "All attorneys and counselors at law shall have a lien upon any judgment they may have attained [obtained] belonging to any client, or for any fee. due, or any professional service rendered which said lien may be enforced by the proper civil action," it was held in Fillmore v. Wells, 10 Colo. 228, 15 Pac. 343, 3 Am. St. Rep. 567, that the attorney was given a lien on all kinds of judg ments obtained by him and belonging to his client, regardless of the subject-matter to which they related, as the statute recognized no distinction between judgments for money or personal property and decrees or judg. ments awarding the ownership or possession of land to the plaintiff, or preserving his interest therein.

In construing a statute of Connecticut (Gen. St. Conn. tit. 19, p. 415, c. 5, § 15) providing that "in all civil actions except those of summary process, brought before a justice of the peace, an appeal from any judgment rendered therein upon any issue may be had and allowed to either party," it has been held that the words "any judgment" do not include a judgment of respondeat ouster on a demurrer which has been overruled and therefore no appeal lies from such a judgment. Denton v. Danbury, 48 Conn. 368.

Where an Illinois statute (Rev. Stat. c. 77, § 6) provided that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment after the expiration of seven years from the time the same becomes a lien, except upon the revival of the same by scire facias," etc., it was held in Wilson v. Schneider, 124 Ill. 628, 17 N. E. 8, that the words "any judgment" included a probated claim, which was to be considered a judgment by the terms of section 27 of the same chapter.

In Byram v. Johnston, 29 N. Bruns. 572, under a Canadian statute (Consol. Stat. cap. 85), declaring that "no action or scire facias upon any judgment, recognizance, bond, or other specialty shall be brought but within twenty years after the cause of action," it was said by Allen, C. J., that while the words "any judgment" might by themselves include a judgment recovered in a justice's court, yet when read in connection with the words which followed them there was no doubt that they meant judgments of courts of record only.

A law of Wisconsin (Laws 1869, c. 40, § 1, 2 Tay. Sts. 1610, sec. 123) provided that "all deeds purporting to convey real estate or any interest therein, which are duly executed, acknowledged and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the lands described therein are situate, and purporting to be made and executed

by any sheriff, deputy sheriff, referee or other person in pursuance and by virtue of any judgment, order or decree of any court of record of this state, or in pursuance of any sale made under and in pursuance of any judgment, execution, or order or decree of any court of record of this state, shall be received in evidence in all courts and judicial proceedings in this state," etc. In Chase v. Whiting, 30 Wis. 544, it was held that the words "any judgment, order or decree of any court of record of this state" included the judgments, orders and decrees of a county

court.

113. ANY JUDGMENT CREDITOR.

It has been held that the phrase "any judgment creditor," used in section 18 of the Illinois act in regard to judgments and decrees as designating those entitled to redeem, means any creditor having a judgment on which execution might issue at the time he sought to redeem, without regard to the time when the judgment might have been recovered, and therefore includes every person who held a valid judgment, no matter when his cause of action accrued, and is not limited to one who secures a judgment on an indebtedness existing prior to the expiration of the debtor's period of redemption. Meier v. Hilton, 257 Ill. 174, 100 N. E. 520; Kerr v. Miller, 259 Ill. 516, 102 N. E. 1050.

114. ANY JUDICIAL OFFICER.

In construing the Georgia penal code (sec. 957) providing that "any judicial officer, or the sheriff of the county where the accusation was found," may receive bail, it has been held that the words "any judicial officer" mean any judicial officer of the county where the accusation is found. Weatherly v. Beavers, 139 Ga. 122, 76 S. E. 853.

115. ANY JUROR.

In State v. Williford, 111 Mo. App. 668, 86 S. W. 570, the words "any juror" as used in a statute relating to embracery were held to mean a qualified and acting juror, that is a man who has been summoned, sworn and impaneled and thus constituted and made a juror.

116. ANY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

In DuBignon v. Tufts, 66 Ga. 59, it was held that a statute permitting proceedings to dispossess a tenant to be instituted before "any justice of the peace" authorized proceedings before a justice of another county from that wherein the tenant resided.

117. ANY KIND.

The words "any kind" not preceded by an enumeration are to be given a broad and comprehensive meaning. Thus in Jolly v. U. S. 170 U. S. 402, 18 S. Ct. 624, 42 U. S. (L. ed.) 1085, a prosecution under the federal statute (Rev. St. U. S. § 5456, 4 Fed. St. Ann. 790) providing that every person who robs another of "any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States," or feloniously takes and carries away the same, shall be punished, etc., it was held that "any kind or description of personal property" was an exceedingly broad designation, including inter alia postage stamps in the possession of the government. So in People v. Fidelity, etc. Co. 153 Ill. 25, 38 N. E. 752, 26 L.R.A. 295, under the Illinois statute (Act of May 31, 1879) providing that on complying with certain conditions it shall be lawful for a foreign insurance company or association to take risks or transact "any kind of insurance business" in this state other than that of life insurance, applied to all kinds of insurance, the only implied limitation being that the insurance business transacted should be such as was authorized by the charter of the company, or by the articles of incorporation and law under which it was organized. Schnurr v. Quinn, 83 App. Div. 70, 82 N. Y. S. 468, it was held that a clause in an agreement of settlement with a pregnant woman that she agreed not to make "any further claim of any kind" on the putative father of the child, was sufficient to bar a bastardy proceeding.

In

But the words "any kind" though not used in connection with an enumeration may be restricted by the context. Colquhoun v. Brooks, 21 Q. B. (Eng.) 52, 57 L. J. Q. B. 439, 59 L. T. N. S. 661, 36 W. R. 657, affirmed 14 App. Cas. 493, 59 L. J. Q. B. 53, 61 L. T. N. S. 518, 38 W. R. 289.

Under an English statute (16 & 17 Vict. c. 34, s. 2, sched. D) by which duties were imposed "for and in respect of the annual profits or gains arising or accruing to any person residing in the United Kingdom from any kind of property whatever, whether situate in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and for and in respect of the annual profits or gains arising or accruing to any person residing in the United Kingdom from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation, whether the same shall be respectively carried on in the United Kingdom or elsewhere," it was held that the words "from any kind of property whatever" must be read with some limitation, and that the limitation to be inferred from those sections was that the duty was chargeable only on the amounts received in this country from the business carried on

abroad by the persons sought to be charged. Similarly in Industrial Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Hawkins, 94 Ark. 417, 21 Ann. Cas. 1029, 127 S. W. 457, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 635, in construing a provision of an insurance policy allowing benefits for total disability when the insured was prevented by an injury from the prosecution of "any and every kind of business," the court said: "The use of the word 'prosecution' indicates that the parties intended to mean that the insured was wholly disabled from doing that business which he had the capabilities to prosecute. Otherwise he could not recover unless he sustained an injury that rendered him absolutely helpless both mentally and physically. The plaintiff was an uneducated day laborer. He had no ability to do any business of any kind except that of manual work. He could not practice law or medicine or perform the duties of a banker or bookkeeper. He did not have the ability to follow these lines of business; and yet he was not so totally disabled that he could not follow these avocations if he had possessed the ability to do so. It is, in effect, contended by defendant that by the terms of the contract he could theoretically, if not practically, do some kind of business, and therefore he cannot recover. Such a construction of the contract would virtually make it ineffective for any purpose at its very execution. Under such an interpretation the insured would scarcely, if ever, be entitled to indemnity. But we are of opinion that it was the intention of the parties that the plaintiff should under some circumstances receive indemnity; for that protection he was making stated payments, and the defendant received such payments. It was manifestly the intention of the parties that he should receive indemnity when he was so injured that he was wholly and totally disabled and prevented from the prosecution of any business which, without the injury, he was able to do or capable to engage in; and we think this interpretation of the contract is not inconsistent with the above provision defining the nature of the disability as contemplated by the policy. We conclude that this is the reasonable and proper construction of the provision of the contract involved in this case."

When used following an enumeration of specific things the words "any kind" are restricted to things ejusdem generis. Thus under the Missouri statute (Rev. St. 1889, § 3854; 1899, § 2242) providing that "every person who shall be convicted of horse racing, cock fighting or playing cards or games of any kind, on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc., it has been held that the words, "or games of any kind," fell under the rule which prescribed that where general