393, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 582; Bartley v. Marino (Tex.) 158 S. W. 1156; Chase v. Seattle Taxicab, etc. Co. 78 Wash. 537, 139 Pac. 499 Where the driver of a motor vehicle, because of excessive speed, careless driving or other negligent conduct, hits a pedestrian who is crossing a street there may be a recovery for injuries resulting therefrom. Goldring v. White, 63 Fla. 162, 58 So. 367; Schumacher v. Meinrath, 177 Ill. App. 530; Jenkins v. Goodall, 183 Ill. App. 633; Kuchler v. Stafford, 185 Ill. App. 199; Rasmussen v. Whipple, 211 Mass. 546, 98 N. E. 592; Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N. E. 237; Schock v. Cooling, 175 Mich. 313, 141 N. W. 675; Haake v. Davis, 166 Mo. App. 249, 148 S. W. 450; Hopfinger v. Young (Mo.) 179 S. W. 747; Lewis v. National Cash Register Co. 84 N. J. L. 598, 87 Atl. 345; Holmboe v. Morgan, 69 Ore. 395, 138 Pac. 1084; Curley v. Baldwin (R. I.) 90 Atl. 1; Prince v. Taylor (Tex.) 171 S. W. 826; Jaquith v. Worden, 73 Wash. 349, 132 Pac. 33, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 827; Franey v. Seattle Taxicab Co. 80 Wash. 396, 141 Pac. 890; Tooker v. Perkins, 86 Wash. 567, 150 Pac. 1138. See also Yarbrough v. Carter, 179 Ala. 356, 60 So. 833; Blackwell v. Renwick, 21 Cal. App. 131, 131 l'ac. 94; Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co. 159 Ia. 52, 140 N. W. 225; Walker v. Rodriguez (La.) 71 So. 499; Huggon v. Whipple, 214 Mass. 64, 100 N. E. 1087; Roach v. Hinchcliff, 214 Mass. 267, 101 N. E. 383 (pedestrian on sidewalk); Griffin v. Taxi Service Co. 217 Mass. 293, 104 N. E. 838; Levyn v. Koppin, 183 Mich. 232, 149 N. W. 993; Kurty v. Towrison, 241 Pa. St. 425, 88 Atl. 656; Coughlin v. Weeks, 75 Wash. 568, 135 Pac. 649. But in the absence of a showing of negligence there can be no recovery. Hyde v. Hubinger, 87 Conn. 704, 87 Atl. 790; Shaw v. Corrington, 171 Ill. App. 232; Carlin v. Clark, 172 Ill. App. 240; Havermarle v. Houck, 122 Md. 82, 89 Atl. 314; Sullivan v. Smith, 123 Md. 546, 91 Atl. 456; Williams v. Holbrook, 216 Mass. 239, 103 N. E. 633; Paul v. Clark, 161 App. Div. 456, 145 N. Y. S. 985; Dudley v. Raymond, 133 N. Y. S. 17; Shott v. Korn, 10 Ohio App. 458, 34 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 260. See also Sorrusca v. Hobson, 155 N. Y. S. 364 (car started by children); Barger v. Bissell (Mich.) 154 N. W. 107 (negligence not presumed from striking child in street).

In Haake v. Davis, 166 Mo. App. 249, 148 S. W. 450, the court said that it was negligence on the part of the operator of a motor vehicle to run his machine through a crowd of children at a speed of five or six miles per hour. And in Hopfinger v. Young (Mo.) 179 S. W. 747, it was held that the driver of an automobile was negligent in not seeing a child on roller skates and avoiding a collision. So in Lewis v. National Cash Register, 84

N. J. L. 598, 87 Atl. 345, the court said: "There was proof that the automobile was being propelled through a thickly populated public street at a high rate of speed and that the plaintiff, a child of seven years of age, who was then crossing the street, was run into and dragged a distance of about eight or ten feet." In Rasmussen v. Whipple, 211 Mass. 546, 98 N. E. 592, the court said that the plaintiff was obliged to show only ordinary negligence on the part of the driver. In Van Winckler v. Morris, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 142, wherein it appeared that a car skidded and injured a pedestrian on the sidewalk, the court said that the driver was negligent in driving too fast on a slippery pavement and the pedestrian could recover damages. In substantial accord is McGettigan v. Quaker City Automobile Co. 48 Pa. Super. Ct. 602. In American Exp. Co. v. Terry, 126 Md. 254, 94 Atl. 1026, it appeared that a driver left an automobile truck unattended in a street

and it ran away. In endeavoring to stop it the plaintiff was injured. Affirming a judgment in his favor the court said: "If the driv er failed to exercise due care, it cannot be doubted that he was guilty of negligence, and under the circumstances testified to by the plaintiff the jury may well have inferred that the driver Small had been careless in the management and control of the truck. The plaintiff's evidence was legally sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption of negligence, which the defendant was bound to rebut or overcome. The evidence precludes the theory that the truck was started by the intervening act of some third party, and had the machine been in good order and the current turned off and the brake properly applied, it is diffi cult to see how it could have been found running down the street in the manner described by the witnesses." In Oakshott v. Powell, 6 Alberta L. Rep. 178, 24 West. L. Rep. 654, 12 Dominion L. Rep. 148, the court said that swerving a car to keep from injuring one person would not excuse the driver from negligence in injuring another. Compare Moir v. Hartt, 189 Ill. App. 567 (skidding of car from sudden application of brakes to prevent accident). In Crawford v. McElhinney, 171 Ia. 606, 154 N. W. 310, the court said that if it was imprudent or dangerous to use a crossing then ordinary care would require an operator to stop the car or seek another crossing. And in Com. v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232, Ann. Cas. 1914A 682, 100 N. E. 362, the court said that "it would savor too much of refinement to hold that there is any practical inaccuracy in saying that one driving a highpowered automobile must exercise greater care toward others on a state highway than one plodding along a country road with an oxteam." In Burger v. Taxicab Motor Co. 66 Wash. 676, 120 Pac. 519, the court said that

an operator must use reasonable care not to injure a person working on a street. See to the same effect Cochran v. Pavise, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. 1. In Brown v. Des Moines Steam Bottling Works (Ia.) 156 N. W. 829, it was held that the operator of a heavy motor truck was guilty of negligence when his truck struck a frog on a track, running thereafter on the sidewalk where it struck the plaintiff. The court said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the movements of these heavy, fast-moving vehicles upon the street are required to be kept under reasonable control, to avoid having their course diverted by the intervention of obstacles upon the street, and that if not held under control, a slight obstacle will so divert them and imperil the safety of those rightfully upon the street, that, when diverted, they become a menace to those in the vicinity of their course, a menace from which it is difficult sometimes to escape. Therefore it becomes the duty of one upon a public highway in a thickly populated part of the large city to exercise reasonable care to see that he has the instrumentality under control, and to so manage it that it will not unreasonably or unnecessarily imperil the safety of others upon the public highway."

It is the duty of an operator of an automobile to keep a sharp lookout in order to avoid injury to pedestrians. Hartwig v. Knapwurst, 178 Ill. App. 409; Shields v. Fairchild, 130 La. 648, 58 So. 497; Hodges v. Chambers, 171 Mo. App. 563, 154 S. W. 429; Rowe v. Hammond, 172 Mo. App. 203, 157 S. W. 880; Clark v. General Motor Car Co. 177 Mo. App. 623, 160 S. W. 576; Eisenman v. Griffith, 181 Mo. App. 183, 167 S. W. 1142; Ginter v. O'Donoghue (Mo.) 179 S. W. 732; Smith v. Coon, 89 Neb. 776, 132 N. W. 535; Johnson v. Johnson, 85 Wash. 18, 147 Pac. 649. Thus in Shields v. Fairchild, supra, the court said: "To look too late to avert an accident is not to look at all. The conductor of the street car following saw the plaintiff and the girl get off the car and cross the neutral ground. The automobile was running along by the side of the car in the rear, yet the chauffeur saw nothing but the stop of the car in front. The rain and wind increased the danger of collisions with pedestrians at street crossings, and the situation demanded more than ordinary vigilance on the part of the operators of automobiles." To the same effect is Hartwig v. Knapwurst, 178 Ill. App. 409, wherein the court said: "There was nothing to prevent the driver from seeing them, and the conditions of weather against which pedestrians had to contend were such as to require greater vigilance on his part in approaching where pedestrians had the right and might be expected to cross." So in Toronto Gen. Trust Corp. v. Dunn, 20 Manitoba 412, 15 West. L. Rep. 314, the court

allowed a recovery where it appeared that the lights on a car were not strong enough to enable the operator to see pedestrians who were walking. And in Holderman v. Witmer, 166 Ia. 406, 147 N. W. 926, the court said that the operator of a car in attempting to pass over a crossing which was necessarily frequented by pedestrians was confronted with the duty to look, which duty "implied the duty to see what was in plain view, unless some reasonable explanation was presented for a failure to see." In Porter v. Hetherington, 172 Mo. App. 502, 158 S. W. 469, the court said that the driver of a car must stop for pedestrians if it is necessary to do so to avoid injuring them.

If the street is crowded the driver of an automobile must use care proportioned to the possibility of accident. Ratcliffe v. Sperth, 95 Kan. 823, 149 Pac. 740; Ostermeier v. Kuigman-St. Louis Impl. Co. 255 Mo. 128, 164 S. W. 218; Aronson v. Ricker, 185 Mo. App. 528, 172 S. W. 641; Moy Quon v. M. Furuya Co. 81 Wash. 526, 143 Pac. 99. See also Com. v. Hoskins, 23 Pa. Dist. Ct. 528.

If the blindness or other incapacity of a pedestrian is discoverable by the use of reasonable care, greater diligence is required to avoid injury to him than in the case of a person more able to care for himself. Brown v. Wilmington, 4 Boyce (Del.) 492, 90 Atl. 44. And see McLaughlin v. Griffin, 155 Iowa 302, 135 N. W. 1107.

Violation of a statute or ordinance regulating the operation of automobiles is negligence per se, rendering the violator liable to any person injured as a proximate result thereof. Grier v. Samuel, 4 Boyce (Del.) 74, 85 Atl. 759; Benson v. Larson (Minn.) 158 N. W. 426; Clark v. Wright, 167 N. Car. 646, 83 S. E. 775; Whaley v. Ostendorff, 90 S. Car. 281, 73 S. E. 186.

In Segerstrom v. Lawrence, 64 Wash. 245, 116 Pac. 876, the court said: "A person may lawfully use what is to him the left-hand side of the road, if there is no travel at that time upon that part of the way, or if the travel is not so heavy as to make his conduct a source of danger. But a person upon the wrong side of the way must always exercise a care commensurate with his position. This is usually a higher degree of care than that required of him while on the correct side of the way." In Winckowski v. Dodge, 183 Mich. 303, 149 N. W. 1061, it was held to be the duty of each driver to look out for pedestrians suddenly appearing from behind the other vehicles when two vehicles are passing. The court said: "If facts were shown warranting the driver in passing to the left, it then became his duty to observe that degree of caution and proceed with care at such reduced speed as was commensurate with the unusual conditions." In Forgy v. Rutledge,

167 Ky. 182, 180 S. W. 90 it was said that the fact that the speed of an automobile was within the limit fixed by law did not necessarily relieve the operator from the imputation of negligence.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

If the failure of a pedestrian to use reason and ordinary care contributes to cause an accident wherein he is injured by an automobile, he cannot recover. Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304, 58 So. 276; Carlin v. Clark, 172 Ill. App. 240; Rump v. Woods, 50 Ind. App. 347, 98 N. E. 369; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Ludorff (Ind.) 111 N. E. 447; McLaughlin v. Griffin, 155 Ia. 302, 135 N. W. 1107 (blir); Johnson v. Kansas City Home Tel. Co. 87 Kan. 441, 124 Pac. 528; Shipelis v. Cody, 214 Mass. 452, 101 N. E. 1071; Tolmie v. Woodward Taxicab Co. 178 Mich. 426, 144 N. W. 855; Fox v. Great Atlantic, etc. Tea Co. 84 N. J. L. 726, 87 Atl. 339; Baker v. Close, 204 N. Y. 92, 97 N. E. 501, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 487, affirming judgment 137 App. Div. 529, 121 N. Y. S. 1079; Marius v. Motor Delivery Co. 146 App. Div. 608, 131 N. Y. S. 357; Jessen v. J. L. Kesner Co. 159 App. Div. 898, 144 N. Y. S. 407; Citizens' Motor Car Co. v. Hamilton, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 407, judgment affirmed 83 Ohio St. 450, 94 N. E. 1103; Lewis v. Seattle Taxicab Co. 72 Wash. 320, 130 Pac. 341; Laughlin v. Seattle Taxicab, etc. Co. 84 Wash. 342, 146 Pac. 847. See also Braud v. New Orleans Taxa Cab Co. 129 La. 781, 56 So. 885; Moran v. Smith, 114 Me. 55, 95 Atl. 272; Mills v. Powers, 216 Mass. 36, 102 N. E. 912; Osgood v. Maxwell (N. H.) 95 Atl. 954; Conrad v. Green (N. J.) 94 Atl. 390; Larmer v. New York Transp. Co. 149 App. Div. 193, 133 N. Y. S. 743; Willis v. Harby, 159 App. Div. 94, 144 N. Y. S. 154; Harder v. Matthews, 67 Wash. 487, 121 Pac. 983; Daugherty v. Metropolitan Motor Car Co. 85 Wash. 105, 147 Pac. 655. Thus in Mills v. Powers, 216 Mass. 36, 102 N. E. 912, it was held that a boy was guilty of contributory negligence in jumping off of a wagon backwards and running in front of a machine. And in Osgood v. Maxwell (N. H.) 95 Atl. 954, the court said that a boy sliding down a hill in such manner that a collision could not be prevented, contributed to the collision and could not recover. So in Todesco v. Maas, 8 Alberta L. Rep. 187, 33 Dominion L. Rep. 417, 7 West. Wkly. Rep. 1373, the court said that a pedestrian leaving a sidewalk to cross a street and halting to let a street car pass was guilty of negligence in stepping back to the sidewalk and had no right of recovery. Compare Schneider v. Locomobile Co. 83 Misc. 3, 144 N. Y. S. 311. In Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, 152 N. W. 190, L.R.A.1915D 968, the court said that contributory negligence might

be a bar to one's recovery even though the automobile in question was operated over the speed limit of an ordinance.

In Fitzsimons v. Isman, 166 App. Div. 262, 151 N. Y. S. 552, wherein it appeared that a police officer recovered damages for being hit by an automobile, the court said that such an officer was required to use reasonable care though not as much as was necessary in the case of a pedestrian.

It is not necesasry for a pedestrian in using a highway to look and listen for the approach of an automobile. Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304, 58 So. 276; Bachelder v. Morgan, 179 Ala. 339, Ann. Cas. 1915C 888, 60 So. 815; Dozier v. Woods, 190 Ala. 279, 67 So. 283; O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220, 80 S. E. 36; Harker v. Gruhl (Ind.) 111 N. E. 457; Baker v. Close, 204 N. Y. 92, 97 N. E. 501, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 487, affirming judgment 137 App. Div. 529, 121 N. Y. S. 1079; Jessen v. J. L. Kesner Co. 159 App. Div. 898, 144 N. Y. S. 407; McNabb v. Gannaway, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 79; Vesper v. Lavender (Tex.) 149 S. W. 377; Aiken v. Metcalf (Vt.) 97 Atl. 669. Compare Lorah v. Rinehart, 243 Pa. St. 231, 89 Atl. 967. Thus in Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304, 58 So. 276, wherein it appeared that a pedestrian was injured by being struck by the automobile of the defendant, it was held that the "look and listen" law, as applicable to railroads, could not be applied to automobiles on streets, the court said: "There is no warrant in law for such application. A railroad acquires a right of way for the express purpose of running trains at a rapid rate of speed over the same, and travelers on the public highways, knowing this fact, are required to observe due caution in approaching the tracks. Even as to street railroads, the tracks mark the line of danger, so that the pedestrian knows just where to look and how to avoid the point of peril; but automobiles have no special privi. leges in the streets, more than other vehicles. They simply travel upon the streets with the same privileges and obligations as other vehicles, and the mere fact that they can run faster than other vehicles does not give them any right to run at a dangerous rate of speed, any more than the fact that one man drives a race horse gives him a right to travel the streets at a higher rate of speed than another who drives a plug. The simple rule is that drivers on the streets and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are required to exercise reasonable care." In Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co. 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941, L.R.A.1916A 943, the court said that it is not necessary for a pedestrian to look continually for the approach of a motor vehicle. See to the same effect Williams v. Benson, 87 Kan. 421, 124 Pac. 531. In Raymond v. Hill, 168 Cal. 473, 143 Pac. 743, the court

said that pedestrians are under no legal obligation to look back to see whether there is danger of being struck from behind by an automobile. See to the same effect McNabb v. Gannaway, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 79. In Ginter v. O'Donoghue (Mo.) 179 S. W. 732, the court said that the failure of a pedestrian continually to look behind for approaching cars was not negligence per se.

However in Davis v. John Breuner Co. 167 Cal. 683, 140 Pac. 586, it was held that the plaintiff, who was injured by the defendant's automobile while crossing a street, was guilty of contributory negligence barring a recovery. The court said: "It is the duty of a foot passenger to look both ways before starting to cross a street, particularly, when, as in this instance, the street over which he intends to pass is a busy thoroughfare in the heart of the business district of a great city."

A pedestrian has the right to assume that the operator of an automobile will not run his machine at an unlawful speed or otherwise violate any law or ordinance. Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App. 532; Trzetiatowski v. Evening American Pub. Co. 185 Ill. App. 451; Rump v. Woods, 50 Ind. App. 347, 98 N. E. 369; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Ludorff (Ind.) 111 N. E. 447; Aiken v. Metcalf (Vt.) 97 Atl. 669; Franey v. Seattle Taxicab Co. 80 Wash. 396, 141 Pac. 890; Johnson v. Johnson, 85 Wash. 18, 147 Pac. 649. Thus in Cole Motor Car Co. v. Ludorff, supra, the court said: "In the absence of knowledge to the contrary, one who is lawfully using a public street has the right to presume that others using it in common with him will use ordinary care to avoid injuring him, and, in the absence of information or notice to the contrary, may presume that persons driving upon the street will not in so doing violate any ordinance or law, but will conform thereto." And in Trzetiatowski v. Evening American Pub. Co. 185 Ill. App. 451, wherein it appeared that a boy crossing a street with a roller skate on one foot was struck and injured by an automobile truck running on the wrong side of the street, the court said that one crossing a street may reasonably expect that danger from vehicles will arise only from persons driving in conformity with the law of the road.

A pedestrian placed in a position of peril by the negligence of the driver of an auto mobile cannot be held to the exercise of the same degree of care that a person would use ordinarily. Feehan v. Slater, 89 Conn. 697, 96 Atl. 159; Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App. 532; Kuchler v. Stafford, 185 Ill. App. 199: Wescoat v. Decker (N. J.) 90 Atl. 290; Dougherty v. Davis, 51 Pa Super. Ct. 229. Compare Braud v. Taxa Cab Co. 129 La. 781, 56 So. 885. Thus in Feehan v. Slater, supra, it appeared that the plaintiff while walking

along the highway was overtaken by the defendant's automobile. Plaintiff not knowing of the approach of the car until it was a few feet away dashed to the left-hand side of the road where he was run into and injured. Affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court said: "The fact that there was a general statute that provided that a person overtaking another on a highway 'shall pass on the left side of the person overtaken, and the person overtaken shall, as soon as practicable, turn to the right so as to give half of the traveled road and a free passage on the left to the other,' did not in itself prevent a recov ery. It should have also appeared that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury sustained." And in Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App. 532, the court said: "It is clear from the evidence that appellee was called upon to act instantly, when, as he says, the flash of the light from the automobile was in his eyes. Having suddenly found himself in a place of peril, he could not be expected to act with the deliberate judgment of a man under no apprehension of danger. Persons in positions of great peril are not required to exercise all the presence of mind and care of a prudent and careful man; the law makes allowance for them and leaves the circumstances of their conduct to the jury." So in Wescoat v. Decker (N. J.) 90 Atl. 290, the court said: "If this testimony were true, the woman was clearly in imminent danger from the on-rushing automobile, charging down upon her when she looked up and stepped first back and then forward, as indicated in the evidence claimed to show contributory negligence. If so, her action may have resulted from natural uncertainty in a moment of extreme danger as to just what was best to do in order to escape, and under such circumstances the law is well settled that, while what she did may not in fact have been the best thing she could have done, the court cannot decide as a court question that it constituted contributory negligence." See to the same effect Kuchler v. Stafford, 185 Ill. App. 199.

As to Another Automobile. Where one automobile is run into by another automobile traveling in another direction, if the collision resulting is due solely to the negligence of one of the vehicles, a cause of action for damages arises in favor of the owner of the other. Pilgrim v. Brown, 168 Ia. 177, 150 N. W. 1; Barton v. Faeth (Mo.) 186 S. W. 52; McClung v. Pennsylvania Taximeter Cab Co. (Pa.) 97 Atl. 694; Verral v. Dominion Automobile Co. 24 Ont. L. Rep. 551, 20 Ont. W. Rep. 178, 3 Ont. W. N. 108. See also Withey v. Fowler Co. 164 Ia. 377, 145 N. W. 923; Brown v. Mitts (Mich.) 153 N. W.

714. In Barton v. Faeth, supra, the court said that it was negligence per se for an autoist to run his car in excess of the speed fixed by an ordinance. And in McClung v. Pennsylvania Taximeter Cab Co. (Pa.) 97 Atl. 694, the court in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff said: "It is the duty of one approaching the crossing of a street intersection to have his vehicle under control, and to ob serve what is or may be approaching on the other street. And where another vehicle is first at the crossing to give it an opportunity to clear the same, and to use due care to avoid a collision."

In B. & R. Co. v. McLeod, 5 Alberta 176, 22 West. L. Rep. 274, 7 Dominion L. Rep. 579, wherein it appeared that both automobiles were running in excess of the speed limit at the time of the collision, the court in dismissing the action said that the cause of the accident was not the negligence of one any more than of the other. But in Thomas v. Ward, 7 Alberta 79, 24 West. L. Rep. 250, 11 Dominion L. Rep. 231, it was held that the defendant was liable for negli gence although the plaintiff was also negligent. The court said: "My view of the case is, that the real cause of the accident was the defendant's negligence in being on the wrong side of the road. I think that constitutes negligence; not that there is an absolute law that you must always be on the right-hand side of the road; but, when an automobile driver is going along the road, and knows, as this man must have known, that he was going to meet another man, although there is no penalty for not being at all times on the righthand side of the road, yet it is negligent, it seems to me, for him to be on the left-hand side, which is not the usual side according to the common practice in this country. It is then negligent for him, without any excuse, not to be on the right-hand side of the road. More than that, in this case the defendant broke the statute in not turning to the right in seasonable time, which, I think, is what the statute means. Therefore, although I think that the plaintiff was himself guilty of some negligence in going at an excessive rate of speed down that hill, yet I think the defendant might have avoided the accident if he had not been himself negligent, and that the real cause of the accident was the defendant's being on the wrong side of the road, where he did not need to be at all, and his not turning out as soon as he should have done, and his embarrassing the plaintiff by staying there too long, and putting the plaintiff to the difficulty of making a decision on a sudden whether he should run in between an apparently very narrow space or whether he should turn to the left, which was his wrong side of the road. Now I do not think the defendant can blame the plaintiff for being

embarrassed and taking what ultimately turned out to be a wrong course. His doing so is due to the defendant's action in being on the wrong side of the road."

In Trout Auto Livery Co. v. People's Gas Light, etc. Co. 168 Ill. App. 56, the court said that the law did not require an operator of a motor vehicle to anticipate that the chauf feur on another car would violate the law of the road by driving his machine on the wrong side of the street. In Skene v. Graham (Me.) 95 Atl. 950, the defendants contended that the plaintiff did not seasonably turn to the right and that the chauffeur driving the defendants' car was obliged to decide quickly whether to continue his course and collide with plaintiff's car, or turn to the left and avoid a collision. Granting a new trial on motion of the defendants the court said. "It is manifest that the collision was due to the fact that both cars swerved from their course at the same instant, the car of the defendants swerving from its lawful position to one of supposed safety in order to avoid an accident, the other leaving its unlawful position and course for the same reason. That the swerving of defendants' car was imperative is apparent; that an emergency existed, not only justifying, but authorizing, the defendants' chauffeur in so swerving, is equally apparent. That his act was not due to his unlawful use of the road is shown by an overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that the defendants are not liable for any damage arising in the circumstances is a principle firmly estab lished. When two alternatives are presented to a traveler upon the highway as modes of escape from collision with an approaching traveler, either of which might fairly be chosen by an intelligent and prudent person, the law will not hold him guilty of negligence in taking either."

In House v. Fry (Cal.) 157 Pac. 500, it was held that the defendant was guilty of negligence in endeavoring to pass in front of an auto truck before his automobile. The court said: "This negligence was the proximate and sole effective cause of the collision. No warning having been given to House of the approach of the automobile, he did not learn of its presence until it was too late for him to avoid the collision by turning to the right (which under section 8 would have been his duty), and his failure to turn to the right was not, under the circumstances, negligence causing or contributing to the occurrence of the collision." In Hubbard v. Bartholomew, 163 Ia. 58, 144 N. W. 13, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 443, it appeared that the plaintiff was riding in the car of another. In an endeavor to pass the defendant's car in order to avoid a collision the car in which the plaintiff was riding struck a tree. Sustaining a verdict for the defendant, the court said: