Canada. See Magrath v. Todd, 26 U. C. Q. B. 87. Connecticut.-Benedict v. Everard, 73 Conn. 157, 46 Atl. 870. Illinois. Babcock v. Scoville, 56 Ill. 461; St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ill. 361, 46 N. E. 1105, 38 L.R.A. 624; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing-Mach. Co. 25 N. E. 669. Indiana.-Edmonds v. Mounsey, 15 Ind. App. 399, 48 N. E. 196. Kentucky.-Trabue v. McAdams, 8 Bush 74. Minnesota.-Weide v. St. Paul Boom Co. 92 Minn. 76, 99 N. W. 421. See also Trask v. Graham, 47 Minn. 571, 50 N. W. 917. Missouri. Smith v. Brinker, 17 Mo. 148; 57 Am. Dec. 265; St. Louis Public Schools v. Boatmen's Ins. etc. Co. 5 Mo. App. 91; Grinzburg v. Claude, 28 Mo. App. 258; Hynes v. Ecker, 34 Mo. App. 650. See also Willi v. Dryden, 52 Mo. 319; Lindsley v. Joseph Schnaide Brewing Co. 50 Mo. App. 271. Nebraska.-Dewey v. Payne, 19 Neb. 541, 26 N. W. 248. New Hampshire.-Dartmouth College v. Clough, 8 N. H. 29. See also Trustces of Donations v. Streiter, 64 N. H. 106, 5 Atl. 845. New York.--Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. 52, 49 Am. Dec. 164; Journeay v. Brackley, 1 Hilt. 447; Marshall v. Lippman, 16 Hun 110; Tate v. Neary, 52 App. Div. 78, 65 N. Y. S. 40; Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 166 App. Div. 684, 152 N. Y. S. 52; Ayen v. Schmidt, 80 Misc. 670, 141 N. Y. S. 938. See also Siefke v. Koch, 31 How. Pr. 383. Oklahoma.-See Tyler Commercial College v. Stapleton, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 837. Oregon.-Johnson v. Seaborg, 69 Ore. 27, 137 Pac. 191; Moline v. Portland Brewing Co. 73 Ore. 532, 536, 144 Pac. 572. Pennsylvania.--Weidner v. Foster, 2 Pen. & W. 23; Berry v. McMullen, 17 Serg. & R. 84; Hannen v. Ewalt, 18 Pa. St. 9; Fennell v. Guffey, 155 Pa. St. 38, 25 Atl. 785. See also Oil Creek, etc. Branch Petroleum Co. v. Stanton Oil Co. 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 153. Vermont.-Pingry v. Watkins, 17 Vt. 379; Vermont University v. Joslyn, 21 Vt. 52. Thus in St. Louis Public Schools v. Boatmen's Ins. etc. Co. 5 Mo. App. 91, the court said: "There can be no question that the assignee of a lease is liable only by the priv ity of estate between himself and his landlord. It has not, we believe, ever been held that an actual entry under the assignment is necessary to make the assignee liable in respect of assignments by deed, which are regarded as effecting a transfer, not only of title, but also of the legal possession. The acceptance of the assignment creates the liability, and the legal possession which ownership implies is all that is required. The lessor looks for his rent, not to the person in possession, but to the lessee; and if he rents to two, and by agreement between themselves, or otherwise, one of them has exclusive possession, or if they choose to keep the premises vacant, this in no way concerns the lessor. The relation of landlord and tenant does not exist between the landlord and the mere occupier; nor can one merely occupying land be sued for rent in an action of debt or covenant. On the other hand it is nowhere intimated in the books that the assignee is liable on a quantum meruit, as for use and occupation. He is liable at the rate fixed by the lease of which he is the assignee. What is the privity of estate out of which alone, as all the cases hold, the liability of the assignee of a leasehold springs? It is the title and possessory right. If these pass, the assignee becomes possessed, in law, of the term, and the actual possession is not a question in the case." And in Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 166 App. Div. 684, 152 N. Y. S. 52, the court, in passing on the question of the necessity of possession by an assignee of a lease in order to render him liable for the rents reserved, said: "The appellant contends that it, being a mere assignee of the lease, and never having assumed or agreed to carry out any of its covenants, was liable only for the rent while it remained in possession, or, in other words, it was liable only by reason of the privity of estate created by the assignment of the lease to it, which liability was dependent upon its remaining in possession. This contention finds support in the case of Fechter v. Schonger, 53 Misc. 648, 103 N. Y. S. 738, which held that the assignees of a lease were liable for rent only for the period during which they remained in possession. This view of the law is contrary to the view of the appellate term. from which the present appeal is taken, and in my opinion is erroneous. When an assignee accepts an assignment of a lease of real property, he thereupon, by virtue of the assignment, becomes liable to the lessor for the rent stipulated to be paid. The acceptance of the assignment creates a privity of estate between the lessor and the assignee, and it is not material that such acceptance be followed by the assignee's entering into possession of the premises." In Chicago Attachment Co. V. Davis Sewing-Mach. Co. (Ill.) 25 N. E. 669, it was said: "We understand that the liability of the assignee to the lessor or reversioner is by reason of the privity of estate, which, by the assignment, has been transferred from the lessee to the assignee. The fact of actual possession is frequently of vital importance as affording a link which, in connection with the further 73 W. Va. 427. fact such possession is derived from the lessee, will raise the presumption that there is privity of estate between the party in possession and the lessor, or even estop such party from denying such privity; but, after all, it is the privity of estate which imposes the liability." In Hannen v. Ewalt, 18 Pa. St. 9, Chambers, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The liability of the assignee is created by the acceptance of an assignment and the taking possession of the premises, or having the right of possession, where there was no actual possession by another. The privity of estate which induces personal liability is the actual or beneficial enjoyment of the premises, or the right of possession; where there is neither, no personal liability can arise. Under an absolute assignment the assignee is liable for the rent before actual possession, for by the assignment the title and possessory right pass, and the assignee becomes possessed in law." In Massachusetts it has been held that a person who accepts an assignment of a lease, under seal, becomes liable for the rent subsequently accruing whether he enters into possession or not. Collins v. Pratt, 181 Mass. 345, 63 N. E. 946. See also Blake v. Sanderson, 1 Gray 332. However, the contrary rule seems to obtain where the assignment of a term is not under seal. See Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 556. In passing on the question of the necessity of entry into possession in order to render the assignee liable the court in Collins v. Pratt, supra, said: “The right of the plaintiff to recover in this action depends upon whether the lessor of the plaintiff could have maintained an action against the defendant's intestate, who was the assignee of the lessee by an assignment under seal, and who did not enter upon the land. It must be considered as settled law in England that an assignee of a lease who has accepted it is liable for rent, whether he has entered into possession or not. The English rule seems generally to have been followed in this country. In this Commonwealth, the precise question in the case before us has not been much considered; but we find nothing in the cases in which the liability of an assignee for rent has been discussed which leads us to suppose that an entry is necessary. Thus in Howland v. Coffin, 12 Pick. 125, where an action of debt for rent was brought by an assignee of the lessor against one who had 'purchased' all the rights which the lessee had in the premises, it was said by Mr. Justice Wilde: 'The action is founded on a privity of estate between the parties. The defendant took the term subject to all the advantages and disadvantages attached to it by the terms of the lease. The covenant for the payment of rent ran with the land and by the assignment of the term became binding on the defendant.' In Blake v. Sanderson, 1 Gray 332, the action was by the lessors against the assignee of a lease, and it was said by Mr. Justice Thomas: 'By such assignment and acceptance of the lease, the defendant is bound to the performance of its conditions; and his liability for rent is to be governed by the terms of the lease, and not restricted to actual occupation.' Simonds v. Turner, 120 Mass. 328, is cited in some textbooks as authority for the position that an entry by the assignee is not necessary. The action was brought by the lessor against an assignee to recover a betterment assessment paid by the lessor. It does not appear from the case as reported nor from the plaintiff's exceptions, which we have examined, whether the assignee had made an entry or not. The defendant took the point on his brief, that, as this fact did not appear, the defendant was not liable. The opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice Gray, who, after holding that the betterment assessment was included in the covenant of the lease, and that the assignment had been accepted, held the assignee liable, citing Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. & B. 238 [5 E. C. L. 72] and Weidner v. Foster, 2 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 23, in both of which cases an entry by the assignee was held not necessary to be proved in order to bind him. We are of opinion that these cases show that an entry by an assignee need not be proved; and we should reach the same result, were the question an entirely new one here. An examination of the English cases shows that the difficulty there arose from the fact that the old forms of a declaration in such a case set forth an entry, and the question was whether this must be proved. We do not think, after the long discussion of this question in Williams v. Bosanquet, ubi supra, that the matter is one of substance. The case on which the defendant chiefly relies is Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 556. But in that case the assignment was not under seal, and while this was held to operate as a transfer of the lease, and to render the assignee liable for rent during possession, it was further held that he could not escape liability by making a formal assignment without changing possession. The case differs essentially from the one at bar." In some instances, however, entry and pos session has been held necessary to render the assignee of a lease liable for the rent reserved and accruing subsequent to the assignment. But the cases so holding usually have in them some other controlling circumstance which dominates the decision. Thus in Tate v. Neary, 52 App. Div. 78, 65 N. Y. S. 40. Spring, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said. "So far as I have been able to find, the cases which make the liability of the assignee of a lease dependent upon possession have in them some other controlling circumstance. There exists either a reservation of part of the demised estate in the assignor, the inability of the assignee to obtain possession, or the instrument was merely designed as collateral security, or a kindred significant fact dominates the decision. I have been unable to find any authority to the effect that where there is an assignment of the entire estate ratified by the lessor, and where actual occupancy rests wholly with the lessee, he must in fact go into possession before he can be made to pay rent to the lessor. The moment he accepts an absolute assignment of the entire estate, he is liable to the lessor on the covenants in the original lease." So in Damainville v. Mann, 32 N. Y. 197, 88 Am. Dec. 324, it was held that the assignee of an undivided two-thirds interest in a term was liable for the entire rent of the premises, where it appeared that he had been in exclusive possession of the premises, while the assignee of the other undivided third was held to be under no obligation to pay the rent as the material element of possession was wanting in respect to him. Brown, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "I am led to the following conclusions: That there is no privity of estate, where the assignee is not in the actual possession; constructive possession is not enough." In commenting on that decision the court in Tate v. Neary, 52 App. Div. 78, 65 N. Y. S. 40, said: "In that case the defendant, Mann, was the assignee of an undivided two-thirds of the demised premises, while one Hatch was the assignee of the remaining one-third, but had never been let into possession. The assignee of the larger share occupied the entire leased land to the exclusion of Hatch, enjoying all the fruits of the premises, and the court held that the occupant alone was chargeable with the payment of the rent. In that case Hatch got a mere naked right, and the possession which it was incumbent upon his assignor to vest in him did not accompany the assignment. He could not oust the occupant, as he was confessedly in lawful possession, for his tenancy extended to an undivided two-thirds of the land. An important distinction in the present case lies in the fact that here the assignment was for the entire term, and where that is its character possession is not essential for liability to be incurred on the part of the assignee. He stands for his predecessor in interest, and that creates the requisite privity." In La Dow v. Arnold, 14 Wis. 458, it was held that where there are no covenants by the lessee, a complaint in an action to recover rent from an assignee of the term is insufficient unless it alleges that the assignee entered the prem ises under and by virtue of the lease. And in McKeon v. Whitney, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 452. the court held that in the old action of debt for use and occupation brought by the lessor against the assignee of a lease not under seal, the defendant is charged in respect to his occupation merely. Also in Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 556, stated supra, it was held that an assignee of a lease not under seal was liable only for the rent reserved during his actual possession of the premises. (5) Necessity that Lessor Consent to The fact that a lease has been assigned without the consent of the lessor or that an assignment is forbidden by the express terms of the lease is no defense in an action for rent brought against the assignee. Devereux v. Barlow, 2 Saund. (Eng.) 181; Webster v. Nichols, 104 Ill. 160; Blake v. Sanderson, 1 Gray (Mass.) 332; Saylis v. Kerr, 4 App. Div. 150, 38 N. Y. S. 880; Oil Creek, etc. Branch Petroleum Co. v. Stanton Oil Co. 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 153; McGhee v. Cox, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 842. Compare Hynes v. Ecker, 34 Mo. App. 650. Thus in Saylis v. Kerr, 4 App. Div. 150, 38 N. Y. S. 880, the court said: "The single question presented is whether the plaintiff, who be came the assignee of the lease of the premises of which the defendant was the lessor. was liable to pay the rent during the time for which he was in actual possession of the premises under the assignment. That question must be answered in the affirmative. The rule is well settled that the assignee of the lease, who enters under the assigninent, becomes liable to pay the rent, and that liability arises by reason of the privity of the estate which is created because of his taking possession under the assignment. . . . It seems that this lease contained a provision that the lessee should not assign or sublet without the consent of the lessor; and the plaintiff insists that, that covenant being in the lease, no privity arose between himselt and the landlord, because the landlord refused to recognize him as tenant, lest that should release the lessors. But that fact is of no importance. The liability to pay rent arose by operation of law, and from the fact of possession as assignee under the lease: and, as long as that existed, the liability to pay rent followed as a necessary incident." (6) Effect of Holding Over. Assignees of a term, who continue to occupy the premises after the expiration of the lease, in the absence of a new agreement are bound by the same terms under which they 78 W. Va. 427. formerly occupied the premises. Webster v. Nichols, 104 Ill. 160. An assignee of a lease, containing a provision giving to the lessee an option to extend the term, who remains in possession of the premises after the fixed term has expired, paying the rent thereafter as it becomes due, is liable to the lessor for the rent reserved for the full period of the extended term. And he cannot escape such liability by a subsequent assignment as he is bound not only by privity of estate but also by privity of contract for the renewed term. Probst v. Rochester Steam Laundry Co. 171 N. Y. 584, 64 N. E. 504. (7) Effect of Abandonment. In accord with the principle that the assignee's liability to the lessor for rent rests on his right to enjoy, as distinguished from his actual possession of the premises (see supra, the subdivision Necessity that Assignee Take Possession), it is generally held that the mere abandonment of the premises does not relieve an assignee of his liability to the lessor for rent. Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 27 Pac. 612, 14 L.R.A. 151; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing-Mach. Co. (Ill.) 25 N. E. 669; Blake v. Sanderson, 1 Gray (Mass.) 332; Dewey v. Payne, 19 Neb. 540, 26 N. W. 248; Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 166 App. Div. 684, 152 N. Y. S. 52; Tyler v. Commercial College v. Stapleton, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 837; Moline v. Portland Brewing Co. 73 Ore. 532, 144 Pac. 572; McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138, 64 S. W. 16. See also Muller's Estate, 14 W. N. C. (Pa.) 308. Compare Pascal v. Slavin, 144 N. Y. S. 354; Fechter v. Schonger, 53 Misc. 648, 103 N. Y. S. 738 (disapproved in Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 166 App. Div. 684, 152 N. Y. S. 52). Thus in McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138, 64 S. W. 16, the court said: "As a general rule, the assignee of a lease is only liable for rents while in possession, provided he reassigns the lease to the lessor or any other person; and it does not matter that such assignment is made to a beggar, a minor, a married woman, a prisoner, or an insolvent, or to one hired to take the assignment, or made, expressly, to rid himself of liability. The reason is that such reassignment and surrender of possession terminates the privity of estate existing between him and the landlord. If the assignee, to whom such second or later assignment is made, takes possession, the relation of privity in estate with the assigning assignee is transferred to him, and the assignment, with surrender or transfer of possession, ends it in the acting assignee. It therefore follows that the assignee can always make his liability continue only during his possession. But it does not follow that he cannot by his own acts or omissions make it extend beyond actual possession. If he wishes it to extend only during possession, he must reassign his lease, as well as abandon possession. And he can only thus escape liability for subsequent, but not for previous, breaches. If he omit such reassignment he continues liable. 'He cannot escape liability by merely abandoning possession, however brief.' . . Such an abandonment during the term does not release the lessee, nor work a surrender of the premises unless it is assented to by the lessor, and such acceptance must be shown by words or acts." In Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing-Mach. Co. (Ill.) 25 N. E. 669, the court, in passing on the effect of the abandonment of leased premises by the assignee of a term without a reassignment, said: "The title and the absolute ownership of the leasehold estate and the right of immediate possession were vested in the assignee; and, moreover, here the assignee was for a year in the actual and undisturbed possession of the premises. The legal title was vested in appellant, and it could not, by voluntarily abandoning the actual possession of the leased premises, and leaving them vacant and unoccupied, without at the same time divesting itself of its legal title and ownership, release itself of its liability as assignee." And in Moline v. Portland Brewing Co. 73 Ore. 532, 144 Pac. 572, the court said: "The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability." (8) Effect of Reassignment. (a) Generally. An assignee of a lease may relieve himself from all subsequent liability to the lessor for the rent of the premises by reassigning the term and thereby terminating the privity of estate. England.-Valliant v. Dodemede, 2 Atk. 546, 26 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 728; Taylor v. Shum, 1 B. & P. 21, 4 Rev. Rep. 759, 15 Eng. Rul. Cas. 503; Odell v. Wake, 3 Campb. 394, 14 Rev. Rep. 763; Wolveridge v. Steward, 1 Cromp. & M. 644, 3 Tyrw. 637, 3 Moo. & S. 561, 30 E. C. L. 521, 3 L. J. Exch. 360; Barnfather v. Jordan, 2 Dougl. 452; Chancellor v. Poole, 2 Dougl. 764; Walker v. Reeve, 3 Dougl. 19, 26 E. C. L. 19, 2 Dougl. 461, note; Fagg v. Dobie, 2 Jur. 681, 3 Y. & C. Exch. 96; Rowley v. Adams, 3 Jur. 1069, 2 Jur. 915, 9 L. J. Ch. 34, 4 Myl. & C. 534, 41 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 206; Onslow v. Corrie, 2 Madd. 330, 56 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 357; Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486, 15 E. C. L. 273, 2 M. & R. 525, 7 L. J. K. B. 12; Pitcher v. Tovey, 4 Mod. 71, 1 Salk. 81, 12 Mod. 23. See also Richmond v. London, 1 Bro. P. C. 516, 1 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 727. United States.-McBee v. Sampson, 66 Fed. 416. California.-Johnson v. Sherman, 15 Cal. 287, 76 Am. Dec. 481; Dengler v. Michelssen, 76 Cal. 125, 18 Pac. 138. See also Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 27 Pac. 612, 14 L.R.A. 151. Colorado.-Wilson v. Lunt, 11 Colo. App. 56, 52 Pac. 296. Illinois.-St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ill. 361, 46 N. E. 1105, 38 L.R.A. 624, reversing 59 Ill. App. 595; Readey v. American Brewing Co. 60 Ill. App. 501. See also Voigt v. Resor, 80 Ill. 331; Hoover v. Weber, 154 Ill. App. 263. Kentucky.-Muldoon v. Hite, 6 Ky. L. Rep. (Abstract) 663. See also Trabue v. MeAdams, 8 Bush 74. Maryland.--Reid v. John F. Wiessner Brewing Co. 88 Md. 234, 40 Atl. 877; Hartman v. Thompson, 104 Md. 389, 10 Ann. Cas. 92, 65 Atl. 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 422. See also Donelson v. Polk, 64 Md. 504, 2 Atl. 824; Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 Atl. 1086. Massachusetts.-Mason v. Smith, 131 Mass. 510; Donaldson v. Strong, 195 Mass. 429, 81 N. E. 267. See also Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray 325. Minnesota.-Cohen v. Todd, 130 Minn. 227, 153 N. W. 531, L.R.A. 1915E 846. Missouri.-Dougherty v. Matthews, 35 Mo. 520, 88 Am. Dec. 126. See also St. Louis Public Schools v. Boatmen's Ins. etc. Co. 5 Mo. App. 91; Tyler v. Giesler, 85 Mo. App. 278. New York.-Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. 52, 49 Am. Dec. 164; Stoppani v. Richard, 1 Hilt. 509; Van Schaick v. Third Ave. R. Co. 25 How. Pr. 446; Siefke v. Koch, 31 How. Pr. 383; Stern v. Florence Sewing Mach. Co. 53 How. Pr. 478; Tate v. McCormick, 23 Hun 218; Johnston v. Bates, 48 Super. Ct. 180; Dassori v. Zarek, 71 App. Div. 538, 75 N. Y. S. 841; Adams v. Koehler, 136 App. Div. 623, 121 N. Y. S. 390, reversing 65 Misc. 192, 119 N. Y. S. 761; Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 92 Misc. 178, 155 N. Y. S. 259; Durand v. Curtis, 57 N. Y. 7. See also Armstrong v. Wheeler, 9 Cow. 88; Welsh v. Schuyler, 6 Daly 412; Journeay v. Brackley, 1 Hilt. 447: Wright v. Kelley, 4 Lans. 57; McKeon v. Wendelken, 25 Misc. 711, 55 N. Y. S. 626: Ayen v. Schmidt, 80 Misc. 670, 141 N. Y. S. 938: Seventy-Eighth St. etc. Co. v. Purssell Mfg. Co. 166 App. Div. 684, 152 N. Y. S. 52. Ohio. See Sutliff v. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. 186. Oklahoma.-See Tyler Commercial College v. Stapleton, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 837. Pennsylvania.-Wickersham v. Irwin, 14 Pa. St. 108; Goss v. Woodland F. Brick Co. 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 167. See also Walker v. Physick, Pa. St. 193: Hannen v. Ewalt, 18 Pa. St. 9. Tennessee.-McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138, 64 S. W. 16. Vermont.-See Sharon Cong. Soc. v. Rix, 17 Atl. 719. Washington.-Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 Pac. 102. See also Harvard Invest. Co. v. Smith, 66 Wash. 429, 119 Pac. 864. Thus in Cohen v. Todd, 130 Minn. 227, 153 N. W. 531, L.R.A. 1915E 846, the court said: "This is an action to recover from an assignee of a lease rent which accrued after he had made a reassignment and delivered up possession to a second assignee. The action cannot be maintained. The assignment to defendant was a naked assignment. Neither by the terms of the assignment, nor in any other manner, did defendant assume any contract obligation to pay rent. As long as he held the property under his assignment the law required him to pay rent according to the terms of the lease. But when he again assigned the term and delivered up possession to a second assignee, his liability for rent thereafter to accrue ceased. This has been the rule of the common law consistently followed for more than 200 years. The rule is founded on sound reason. The assignee having assumed no contract obligation cannot be sued on contract. His liability during the time he holds under the lease is founded on privity of estate. After he has surrendered the premises either to the lessor or to another assignee there is no longer privity of estate. There is then no principle of law or equity upon which to predicate liability for rent to accrue, and liability no longer exists. This is but an application of the general principle that an assignee of a lease is liable on covenants running with the land, but, being liable solely in privity of estate, he is liable only for obligations maturing or breaches occurring while he holds that estate as assignee, and for those which occurred before he became assignee or after he ceased to be such." And in St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ill. 361, 46 N. E. 1105, 38 L.R.A. 624, it was said: "Where there are express covenants in a lease which run with the land, such as to pay rent, the lessee is bound to their performance by reason of his being both in privity of contract and privity of estate with the lessor, and the privity of contract continues to the end of the term, but by an assignment of the term he terminates |