upon the Government. Out of these and other considerations has grown the maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi, the reason for which Broom thus

states:

"For the time and attention of the sovereign must be supposed to be occupied by the cares of Government, nor is there any reason that he should suffer by the negligence of his officers, or by their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party." (Broom, Legal Max., 65.)

It is contrary to human experience, and would require a reversal of human nature, to suppose that claimants would sleep upon their rights, if they had any, for so long a period as in this case. Especially is this incredible in the case of great firms like those connected with this claim, whose careful vigilance, extensive operations, and high character have become a part of the history of civilization and nations. (Ram., Facts, passim.) It would seem unjust to ascribe to them that degree of negligence which would be implied in the admission, that for sixty years they had omitted to demand payment of a claim overdue against a debtor during all the time able and ready to pay every just demand. An isolated case of negligence is not to be presumed, nor is that which is unusual. The wonderful success of the great firms alluded to is the highest evidence that neither of them could justly be accused of negligence in any respect. It is a fact of great force, too, that though the claimants held other certificates of the issue now in question, yet such other certificates have all been paid; and the one now under consideration is the only one which the claimants have omitted to present until now.* A refusal by the United States now to make payment does not impute to the claimants any want of integrity, nor does it justify any imputation of bad faith against the Government, whose credit is unsullied. Those who were cognizant of all the facts in relation to the certificate in question at the time it was paid, and who then and subsequently represented the claimants in the transaction, made no such demand as that now presented. It is evident that time has not only brought a change in partnership firms, but has also introduced new parties in interest, and new agents, who can have no knowledge of the facts connected with the payment of the certificate; and it has doubtless been very properly deemed a duty to present it to the United States, for the application thereto of the evidence, shown by the records of the Treasury Department, and the law arising thereon. It would not be just to the United States to make payment now, when *It seems, from the recorded correspondence in the Treasury Department, that the firm of Francis Baring and Company did business, as such, to about January 1, 1806, since which the firm of Baring Brothers and Company has been in operation to this time. In the "Post-Office London Directory, 1881,” p. 1716, this latter firm is placed under the head of "Merchants"; it is not to be found in this volume under the head of "London Bankers who have been registered at Somerset House pursuant to the statute 7 & 8 Vic., cap. 32."

In "An Almanack for the Year of our Lord 1882, by Joseph Whitaker, F. S. A., London," the firm of Baring Brothers and Company is placed under the caption of "Banks and Bankers in London."

it may be presumed that the evidence of the circumstances under which payment has already been made, is lost. Nor is it reasonable at this late day to require proof of such circumstances, in view of the loss and destruction of evidence by lapse of time, of the impossibility, arising from vast accumulations of papers, of finding even such evidence as may exist, and of the known fact that many valuable records of the Treasury Department have been destroyed by accidental fires.* 5. The common law, whose foundation is reason, and the wisdom and justice of whose precepts are sanctified by experience, raises a presumption of payment. Thus, it is said: "Where a debt due by specialty has been unclaimed, and without recognition, for twenty years, in the absence of any explanatory evidence, it is presumed to have been paid.” (1 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 39).†

And in the valuable English work on the Law of Evidence, by Best (vol. 2, 1st Am. ed., from 6th London ed., 689, sec. 406), it is said:

"Of the presumptive proofs of payment, the most obvious is, that no demand has been made for a considerable time; and previous to the 3 and 4 Will., 4, c. 42, s. 3, the courts had, by analogy to the statute of limitations, established the artificial presumption, that where payment of a bond or other specialty was not demanded for twenty years, and there was no proof of payment of interest, or any other circumstance to show that it was still in force, payment or release ought to be presumed. (Oswald v. Legh, 1 T. R., 270; Washington v. Brymer, Peake, Ev., Appx., XIX.) Thus in Colsell v. Budd (1 Camp., 27), it was laid down by Lord Ellenborough, that, after a lapse of twenty years, a bond will be presumed to be satisfied; but there must either be a lapse of twenty years, or a less time coupled with some circumstance to strengthen the presumption. So the fact of payment may be presumed from any other circumstance which renders the fact probable." (3 Starkie, Evidence, 3d

* Prior to 1836, valuable papers connected with the issue and redemption of our national securities were lost. The first loss, of which we have any official account, was caused by the fire which occurred on the evening of January 20, 1801. (See American State Papers, Miscellaneous, vol. 1, 247-252.) The second was caused by the incursion of the British on the 24th of August, 1814. An attempt was made to remove all the valuable archives of the Government belonging to the several Executive Departments, in order to preserve them from destruction by the soldiery; but, such was the confusion at the time, many of the original records were lost; and, not being considered as of any special importance at the time, or as involving any material evidence upon which to found any new claim upon the Government, no effort appears to have been made to secure duplicate copies of such as were found to be missing after the departure of the troops. (See American State Papers, Miscellaneous, vol. 2, 248-252.) The third serious loss was occasioned by the fire which took place on the morning of March 31, 1833, and which resulted in a complete destruction of the Treasury building; and hence the difficulty of the task of obtaining a complete record of what papers and records were lost, as shown by the official reports of the employés in the investigation immediately ordered by the President. (See Ex. Doc., No. 22, H. of R., 2d sess., 23d Congress.)

+ This presumption of the common law has been made absolute in England by statute. (1 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 39, citing Mathews, Presumpt. Ev., chs. 19, 20, p. 379; Best, Presumptions, Part 1, chs. ii, iii; Stat. 3 and 4 W., 4, ch. 42, sec. 3. See Stats. 3 and 4 W., 4, ch. 27; 7 W., 4; and 1 Vic., c. 28.)

ed., 823; Cooper v. Turner, 2 Starkie, Evidence, 497; Lucas v. Novosilieski, 1 Esp., 296; Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. and P., 80; Pfiel v. Vanbatenberg, 2 Camp., 439.)

The rule of presuming payment after the lapse of twenty years* *Dunlop v. Ball, 2 Cranch, 180; Higginson v. Mein, 4 Id., 415; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat, 497; Oaksmith's Lessee v. Johnston, 92 U. S.,343; Flemming v. Reed, 37 Tex., 152; Scott r. Hickox et al., 7 Ohio St., 94; Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich., 510.

The presumption has in some cases been held conclusive. (Didlake v. Robb, 1 Woods, 680.) And, certainly, after a period of sixty years, in reason and justice the presumption should be conclusive when there has been no recognition of the debt by the debtor. In Maryland, by statute of 1715, ch. 23, sec. 6, the lapse of twelve years is made a conclusive presumption of payment in all cases of bonds, judgments, recognizances, and other specialties. (1 Dorsey, Laws of Md., Part I, 11; Carroll v. Waring et al., 3 Gill & J., 491.)

The presumption of payment rests on the same principle by which courts presume a grant from persons apparently having title to land, in favor of those having had a long-continued possession adverse in law and fact. Many of the authorities on this subject are collected in House Mis. Doc. No. 10, 2d session, 47th Congress, and in Fitzpatrick's Heirs v. Forsythe, 7 American [Cincinnati] Law Record 411, January, 1879. Among the authorities on this subject are the following:

Elementary Books. American Law Register, Feb., 1874, p. 69, old series, vol. 22, N. S. 13; Angell on Limitations, sec. 38-3-4-9-10; Starkie, Ev., Part 4, p. 1222; 2 Green). Ev., sec. 539–541 n; 1 Greenl., Ev., 20-45 n. ; 2 Washburn Real Prop., 293 A [39]; 3 Idem, 51 [449]; Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, 2d ed. [72], 109 [68], 103, &c.; Best on Presumptions of Law and Fact, 87; Wood Civil Law, 123; Phillip's Jurisprudence, sec. 147; Maine Anc. L., 284; Tudor Leading Cases, 114; Perry on Trusts, sec. 866; 2 Greenl. Ev.; Cruse Dig., Book 3, p. 423 n.; Matthew's Presumptive Evidence, 1, 7, 271-277; 3 Dane's Abridgment, 55; Hoffman's Eccl. Law, 123, 126; Broom, Legal Max., 800-852; 3 Cruse Digest, 467; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 21 n.

It is the Doctrine of the Courts. (Lessee of Ludlow v. Barr, 3 Ohio, 408; Courcier v. Graham, 1 Ohio, 330; Blake v. Davis, 20 Ohio, 242; Duke v. Thompson, 16 Ohio, 48; Jarboe v. McAtee, 7 B. Monroe, 279; Berthelemy v. Johnson, 3 B. Monroe, 92; Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen, 568; McArthur v. Gallagher, 8 Ohio, 512; Roods v. Symes, 1 Ohio, 316; Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick., 93; Melvin v. Lock, 17 Pick., 255; Hill v. Crosby, 2 Pick., 466; Trustees Episcopal Church v. Trustees of Newburn Academy, 2 Hawks, 233; 16 Pick., 241; Ewans v. Trumbull, 2 Johns., 313; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp., 214; Oswald v. Leigh, 1 Term R., 270; Id., 399; Coolidge v. Leonard, 8 Pick., 504; Strickler v. Todd, 10 S. & R., 63-69; Rust v. Low, 6 Mass., 90; Mayor v. Horner, 1 Cowper, 102; Campbell r. Smith, 3 Halst., 141; Olney v. Fenner, 2 R. I., 211; Tinkburn v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. Ev., 120; Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Maine, 154; Farran v. Merrill, 1 Greenl. Ev., 17; Croker v. Pendleton, 10 Shepley, 339; Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige, 577; Townsend v. McDonald, 2 Kernan, 381; Hazard v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 272; Wilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev., 154; Gayette v. Bethune, 14 Mass., 51-53; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 402; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend., 309-315; Schauber v. Jackson, 2 Wend., 13; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend., 531; Hall v. McLeod, 2 Metc., Ky., 98; Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 434; Winnipiseogee Co. v. Young, 40 N. H., 420; Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vermont, 512; Townsend v. Downee, 32 Vermont, 183; Ingra. ham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn., 584; Balstour v. Bensted, 1 Campl., 465; Daniel v. North, 11 East., 371; Knight v. Halsey, 3 Bos. and Pul., 172-206; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East., 215; Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu., 203; Wallace v. Minor, 7 Ohio, Pt. 1, p. 249; 6 Ohio, 366; 5 Ohio, 456; 16 Ohio, 34; Miller's Heirs v. McIntire, 6 Peters, 61; Harpending v. Dutch Ch., 16 Peters, 455; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 22 Wend., 485; Dutch Ch. v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Stillman v. Whitebrook M. Co. v. 3 Woodb. & Minot, 538; Hussb. v. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. R., 70; Ransdale v. Grove, 4 McLean, 22; Baird v. Wolfe, 4 McLean, 549; Sargeant v. St. B. Ind., 12 How., 371; Hanson

has the sanction of the Supreme and other courts of high authority,

v. Eustace, 2 How., 208; Boulden v. Massie, 7 Wheat., 122; Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 262; Weatherhead v. Barkiesville, 11 How., 329; Archer v. Tanner, 2 Henning & Mun., 370; Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal., 1; Ingraham v. Hough, 1 Jones, N. C., 39; Callender v. Sherman, 5 Ired. N. C., 711; Stimfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harris), 299; Meanor v. Hamilton, 27 Pa. St., 137; Johnson v. Irwin, 3 S. & R., 291; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 170; Young v. Collins, 2 Brown, 28; Miller v. Bates, 3 S. & R., 63; Kingston v. Leslie, 10 S. & R., 391; Ewing v. Barton, 2 Yeates, 318; Cannon v. Philips, 2 Sneed, Tenn., 214; Lessee of Brock v. Burchell, 2 Swan Tenn., 31; Martin v. Stark, 10 Humph., 162.)

Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 14 Mass., 257.

Chamberlain v. Marshall and others [Saint Paul], Federal Reporter, September 20, 1881; s. C., House Mis. Doc. No. 42, first session Forty-seventh Congress, 9; Fussell v. Hughes, same Federal Reporter, 1; s. C., same Mis. Doc., 19.

Process Presumed. (Morgan r. Burnet, 18 Ohio, 535; Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb., 511; Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vermont, 503; Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat., 244; Wendell v. Jackson, 8 Wend., 183; People v. Dennison, 17 Wend., 312; People v. Trinity Church, N. Y. court of appeals, September, 1860; 3 P. F. Smith, 84; 1 Rawle, Penrose & Watts, Pa., 78; 4 W. & S., 336; Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R., 509; Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co., 5; Croker v. Pendleton, 10 Shepley, 339; Jackson v. McCall, 10 Johns, 377; Vandyck v. Van Buren, 1 Caines, 84; Burgess v. Bennett, 1 Caines, C., 1; Grote v. Grote, 10 Johns, 492; Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 7 Johns, 12; Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R., 509; Powell v. Millbank, 12 G., 3 B. R.; 1 T. R., 339; Williams v. Presby. Soct., 1 Ohio St., 492.)

The rule is so strong that in case of a possession adverse in law and in fact the presumption of a grant cannot be repelled by evidence. It is conclusive. (Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & R., 63-69; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass., 90; Mayor v. Horner, Cowp., 102; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 539; Wilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev., 154; Ingraham v. Hough, 1 Jones, N. C., 39, and cases collected; 22 [Philadelphia] American Register, 73.)

The doctrine was applied by courts of law to easements, because the statute of limitations did not apply to them. For the same reason, courts must apply it in cases of lands to which the statute does not apply. The reason of the law is the life of the law.

Courts of Equity apply the Doctrine. (Ridley v. Hettman, 10 Ohio, 524, commented on; 22 American Law Register, 69 [N. S., vol. 13]; Larrow v. Beam, 10 Ohio, 502; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St., 479; Matthews v. Rector, 24 Ohio St., 444-5; Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 446; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Peters, 61-65; Rhodes v. Symmes, 1 Ohio, 281. Fussell v. Hughes alone cited per Matthews, Justice.) The doctrine originated with courts of equity in 1707, and was adopted by courts of law in 1761. (Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 446.)

In Tax Sales the courts presume the proceedings regular after a long possession, even less than twenty years. (Bierce v. Pierce, 15 Ohio, 547-533-543; Wallace v. Seymour, 7 Ohio, Pt. 1, p. 156; Matthews v. Rector, 24 Ohio St., 445; Burnly v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St., 474; Ward v. Barrows, 2 Ohio St., 241; Coombs v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 112; Ridley v. Hettman, 10 Ohio, 524; Read v. Goodyear, 17 S. & R., 350; Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Maine, 76; Farrar v. Eastman, 5 Greenl. Me., 345; Brown v. Connelly, 5 Blackf'd, 391; Keane v. Cannovan, 21 Cal., 300; Coleman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105; Gray ». Gardner, 3 Mass., 399; Bank U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat., 70; 2 Ohio St., 241-246; 4 Ohio St., 112-148.)

It is not intended to say that a presumption of payment will arise so long as the debtor acknowledges the debt. (Police Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d. ed., 74 Ashton's Case, Id., 167; 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d. ed., App., ch. xiv, 589, note). There is issued monthly a Public Debt Statement, which shows the outstanding matured debt. The following is from the statement of the public debt of the United States for the month of December, 1882, and does not include the certificate now in question:

and, in principle, applies as well to simple contract debts as to special

Registered.

Coupon.

Total.

Title of loan.

Authorizing act.

Rate.

When re-
deemable.

Interest pay.
able.