Title. Of particular persons. Copyholder. Heir. Grantee of the lord. Surrenderee. fendant or conusor, may enter or bring ejectment, without a scire facias, but when land is extended on a statute merchant, statute staple, or recognisance in the nature of a statute staple, the conusor cannot enter though the conusee has received the whole debt, damages and costs, but must sue out a scire facias ad computandum et rehabendam terram. (a) Although a copyholder must in general sue in the lord's court, by plaint, yet his lessee has a warrantable estate by the rules of the common law, and may, therefore, maintain ejectment in the king's courts. (b) According to several old cases, a copyholder could not maintain ejectment on a demise for more than one year, unless such demise were shewn to be by licence of the lord (e); but by the modern practice, the common consent rule is sufficient evidence of the lease. (d) The heir of a copyholder may maintain ejectment against a stranger before admittance (e); and he need not tender himself to be admitted at the lord's court, if the steward has refused to admit him. (f) The grantee of the reversion of a copyhold from the lord, has a good and perfect title by the grant, and may maintain ejectment without admittance. (g) The title of a surrenderee is not complete until admittance, and therefore, before that time, he can neither enter nor maintain ejectment. (h) But after admission, his title has relation to the time of the surrender against all persons but the lord; and, therefore, a surrenderee may recover in ejectment against his surrenderor, or a stranger, upon a demise laid between the time of the surrender and admittance, provided he be admitted before trial. (i) Where the devisee of a copyhold estate dies before admittance, his devisee, though afterwards admitted, cannot recover in ejectment, for the legal estate is in (a) 2 Sannd. 72, u, note. See the cases collected Gilb. Ten. (e) Rummey v. Eves, 1 Leon. 100. (f) Doe d. Burrell v. Bellamy, 2 M. and S. 87. It is now held, that a mandamus will lie to admit the heir, R. v. Brewers' Comp. 3 B. and C. 172. (g) Doe d. Cosh v. Loveless, 2 B. and A. 453. (h) Co. Copyh, s. 39. Berry v. Greene, Cro. Eliz. $49. (i) Holdfast d. Woollams v. Clapham, 1 T. R. 600. Doe d. Bennington v. Hall, 16 East, 208. the heir of the first testator. (a) The admittance of tenant for life is the admittance of him in remainder (b); and, therefore, on the death of tenant for life, the remainderman may bring ejectment, and lay the demise at any time after the death of tenant for life. Where the widow takes the whole of the lands as her freebench, she may enter immediately into them, and may consequently maintain ejectment before admittance, for the law casts the possession on her, as it does on the heir in cases of descent. But when the widow takes a portion only of the lands, it should seem, that the possession is not cast upon her any more than at common law; and, consequently, that she will not be warranted in entering without assignment. It should seem also, that the regular mode for her to obtain assignment, is by plaint in the lord's court. (c) Title. Of particular persons. Widow for her free-bench. tenant in com As the possession of one coparcener, jointenant, or tenant in Coparcener, common, is the possession of the other or others (d), an eject- jointenant, and ment cannot be maintained by one of them against the other, unless an actual ouster has taken place. (e) The acts which amount to an actual ouster have been already stated. (ƒ) mon. A corporation, either aggregate or sole, may make a lease to Corporation. try a title in ejectment. (g) Thus the king may recover in this action (h); but in cases within the statutes, 8 H. 6, c. 16, and 18 H. 6, c. 6, which prohibit the granting to farm of lands seised into the king's hands, upon inquest before escheators, until such inquest be returned in the chancery or exchequer, and for a month afterwards, if the king's title be not found of record, no ejectment will lie on the demise of the crown before office found. (i) (e) Anon, 7 Mod. 39. Johnson v. (g) St. John's College v. Norris, 1 (h) Lee v. Norris, Cro. Eliz. $31. Title. Of particular persons. Devisee and legatee. Grantee of a rent charge. Guardian. Where overseers of the poor, who before the statute, 59 G. 3, c. 12, were not a corporation so as to take lands in succession, brought ejectment on their own demise against a tenant, who came in under their predecessors, and who had done no act to recognise his holding under the lessors of the plaintiff, it was held that they were not entitled to recover. (a) The devisee of a freehold interest has the freehold in law cast upon him immediately upon the death of the devisor, and may consequently enter or maintain ejectment (b), but the legatee of a term of years must first obtain the assent of the executor (c), though by such assent the term is vested in the legatee from the death of the testator. (d) A very small matter shall amount to an assent to a legacy, an assent being a rightful act. (e) The grantee of a rent-charge, with a proviso, that if the rent be in arrear he may enter, and retain until satisfied, may maintain ejectment on the rent becoming in arrear (ƒ), but such a right of entry is always construed strictly. (g) A guardian in socage, or testamentary guardian, appointed pursuant to statute, 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8, may bring ejectment for the lands in ward. (h) A guardian by nurture has only the custody and government of the infant's person (i), and therefore cannot make a lease of the infant's lands so as to support an action of ejectment. In ejectment by a guardian in socage it seems that the demise should be laid at a time when the ward was under the age of fourteen. (k) (a) Doe d. Grundy v. Clarke, 14 East, 488. See Doe d. Churchwardens and Overseers of Orleton v. Harpur, 2 Dowl. and Ryl. 708. (ƒ) Jemott v. Cowley, 1 Saund. 112. 1 Lev. 170, S. C. Gilb. Rents, 139. See Fearne, Cont. Rem. 528. (g) Hassell d. Hodson v. Gouthwaite, (b) Co. Litt. 111, a. 240, b. Com. Willes, 500. Co. Litt. 203, a, note S. Dig. Administration, (C. 5). (c) Co. Litt. 111, a. Com. Dig. ubi sup. Young v. Holmes, 1 Str. 70. 1 Saund. 279, d. (n,) 5th edition. (d) Westwick v. Wyer, 4 Rep. 28, b. Saunders's case, 5 Rep. 12, b. Doe d. Ld. Say and Sele v. Guy, 3 East, 120. (e) Per Ld. Chancellor in Noel v. Robinson, 1 Vern, 94. (h) Shoplane v. Roydler, Cro. Jaa. 98. Wade v. Cole, 1 Ld. Raym. 151. Bedell v. Constable, Vaugh. 179. Roe d. Parry v. Hodgson, 2 Wils. 129. (i) Hargrave's note, Co. Litt. 88, b. (13). (k) Litt. s. 125. Doe d. Rigge v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471. 2 Phill. Evid. 250, 6th edit. An infant may make a lease to try his title in ejectment. (a) The committee of a lunatic is only a bailiff, and has no interest in the land; an ejectment therefore for such lands must be brought on the demise of the lunatic himself. (b) On the ceasing of the relation of landlord and tenant, the former may maintain an ejectment for the recovery of the premises demised. An ejectment may therefore be brought, 1. On the expiration of the tenancy either by effluxion of time, or the happening of a particular event. 2. On the determination of the tenancy by notice to quit; and thirdly, on the ceasing of the tenancy by forfeiture. 1. The expiration of the tenancy by effluxion of time, or the happening of a particular event (c), will depend on the stipulations of the lease. 2. With regard to an ejectment, brought on the determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit, it is necessary to inquire: 1st. In what cases an express or implied tenancy is created, so as to require a notice to quit. 2nd. At what time the notice must be given. 3rd. By whom. 4th. To whom. 5th. Its form. 6th. The service; and 7th. The waiver of notice. Title. Of particular persons. Lunatic. Landlord, Where a lease is made for a definite term, the tenancy will 1. In what cases expire with the term, and no notice to quit is necessary. (d) But notice to quit is in the case of a tenancy from year to year, the relation of land- necessary. lord and tenant must be determined by a notice to quit. (e) A demise, "not for one year only, but from year to year," has been held to constitute a tenancy for two years at least, not determinable by a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year (f); and so a demise "for a year, and afterwards from year to year," is a demise for two years (g), but where the demise was "for twelve months certain, and six months notice afterwards," Lord Ellenborough held that the tenant was at liberty to quit (a) Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, 1806. Maddon d. Baker v. White, 2 T. R. 159. (b) Drury v. Fitch, Hutt. 16. Cocks v. Darson, Hob. 215. Knipe v. Palmer, 2 Wils. 130. See 43 G. 3, c. 75, as to leases by the committee. (c) See Doe d. Waithman v. Miles, 1 Stark, N. P. C. 181. 4 Campb. N. P. C. 373, S. C. (d) Cobb. v. Stokes, 8 East, 358. (ƒ) Denn d. Jacklin v. Cartwright, (g) Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R. 380. Title. Of particular persons. Landlord. Notice to quit, where necessary. Instruments held to be leases. at the end of twelve months, giving six months previous notice. (a) Where the lease is to hold for three, six, or nine years, generally, without any stipulation as to the manner in which, or the party by whom the tenancy may be determined at the end of the third or sixth year, the tenancy is only determinable at those two periods, at the option of the lessee. (b) The necessity and effect of a notice to quit frequently depend upon the construction of instruments which bear the form of agreements for a lease, but which in fact operate as leases. It will therefore be necessary to state the decisions upon this subject, which, it has been observed, run upon very nice distinctions. The cases in which the instrument has been considered a lease will be first stated; and afterwards those in which it has been held to be merely an agreement for a lease. In an anonymous case in Moor (c), it was held, that if a man says, "I will that you shall have a lease for twenty-one years in my land, paying 10s. yearly rent; make a lease in writing, and I will seal it," this is a perfect lease by the words. In Harrington v. Wise (d), the instrument was in the following words:" It is covenanted and agreed between the parties, that J. H. doth let the said lands for and during five years, to begin at the feast of St. Michael next following, provided that the said W. shall pay to the said J. H. annually, during the term at, &c., 120l. Also, the said parties do covenant, that a lease shall be made and sealed, according to the effect of these articles, before the feast of All Saints, next ensuing." These words were held to make a good lease. In Tisdale v. Sir William Essex (e), a covenant, that T. should have, occupy, and enjoy certain lands, for seven years, from a future day, and that the covenantor would make him as good and perfect a demise of the premises, or security for the quiet enjoying of it, as his counsel should think fit, was adjudged to operate as a lease of the land. (a) Thompson v. Maberley, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 573. Whether the nature of the ground, or the course of husbandry, can be held to regulate the duration of 'a tenancy, see 2 Wm. Bl. 1171. (b) Dann v. Spurrier, 3 Bos. and Pal. 399, 442. Doed. Webb v. Dixon, 9 East, 15; and see Colton v. Lingham, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 39. (c) Anon. Moor, 8, cited in Maldon's case, Cro. Eliz. 33. (d) Cro. Eliz. 486. 1 Rol. Ab. 847, 1. 46. Noy, 57, S. C. (e) Hob. 34; and see Drake v. Monday, Sir W. Jones, 231. Cro. Car. 207, S. C. 5 T. R. 167. |