the idea of necessity in the latter. The cause of the difference, as it appears to us, is simply this, that the one would contradict my experience, the other would contradict my reason; the former axiom being an empirical induction, the latter being an à priori judgment.

We have brought forward these few theories from the work above mentioned, in order that they may serve as examples of the nature and spirit of Mr. Mill's sensationalism. Upon the whole, however, the sensational doctrines do not appear with nearly the same intensity, which they exhibit in the "Analysis of the Human Mind." In one passage particularly, the author very clearly expresses his doubt, whether the attempt at explaining all our abstruser sentiments, emotions, volitions, &c., by the laws of association, has been at all successful, and controverts the corresponding theory of, belief which is maintained in the Analysis." Although, as we have seen, there are some points in the work to which we cannot agree, yet we cheerfully allow, that it must be placed among the very first efforts of philosophical thinking in our own country. We believe that the "System of Logic" is yet destined to bring forth beneficial results, which years to come will in all probability fail to exhaust.

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We might just mention, before concluding this part of the section, that there have been many pleasing, though by no means profound writers,

who have from time to time grounded upon these sensational principles valuable works of a practical kind, adapted more especially to guide us aright in estimating the influence of circumstances over the human mind. As a specimen of these I might mention Dr. Henry M'Cormac's volume, entitled "The Philosophy of Human Nature, in its Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Relations." We find here the same theory of causation as we have already noticed, the same dogma respecting the origin of our ideas, the same fundamental principle respecting the nature of the moral faculty, as arising from experience and association, all asserted and reasoned upon, with only the very feeblest attempt at analysing or proving them. Notwithstanding this, however, the work is practically a useful one for general readers, and points out many facts in the constitution of man, which it is highly beneficial for us both to observe and to act upon.

As a whole, then, we might say, that this school of philosophy has borne much good fruit in its own peculiar department; for, although it is by no means adapted to cultivate the deeper religious feelings, nor to raise the mind to enthusiasm in the pursuit either of the beautiful or the good; yet it is well calculated to point out the mutual action and reaction of matter and mind, of the man and the outward world upon each other, and thus to advance that species of education, which consists

in so adapting our circumstances, as to aid us in our intellectual advancement, and in the performance of our moral duties. All the varied systems we shall bring under review, are, in fact, but pulsations of the great mind of humanity. They are all based upon some true idea, and each takes up some one department, which, owing to the concentration of mind upon it thus produced, is analyzed far more completely than could otherwise have been the case. The defect which one. system labours under is soon supplied by the exertions of another, and the next age reaps the fruit, which they have both conspired to produce and We come now to consider the class of philosophers which we have termed

to mature.

(B.) SENSATIONAL MORALISTS.

Although ethics do not, generally speaking, afford so much scope for speculative philosophy as those branches of mental analysis, to which we have just referred, yet it would occasion a considerable blank in our historical survey, were we to pass by the attempts, which have been made to philosophize on man's moral and practical life. That moral systems should be founded upon sensational principles is, perhaps, less to be wondered at, than that such principles should be employed in explaining the more complex phenomena of our intellectual being. Our actions are external, and refer for the most part to some or other of our

outward circumstances; hence, probably, arises the great tendency there is, to make the whole science of ethics turn upon outward laws or relationships, rather than upon any of our inward feelings or conceptions; and hence, too, the great importance of tracing our moral sentiments to that true and incontrovertible source of them, which exists in the primary elements of our constitution.

In studying moral philosophy speculatively, there are two different methods in which we may commence and carry on our investigations. First, we may begin by the study of actions, analyzing their qualities, and attempting to discover what it is which gives them the peculiarity, that we designate by the word moral; or, secondly, we may begin by studying our inward emotions, and endeavour from thence to detect the precise nature and ground of the moral feelings. The former of these we may term the objective, the latter the subjective method, and we shall have ere long to point out two distinct schools of sensational moralists, who have followed respectively one of these two methods in their philosophical speculations.

The influence of sensational principles upon both methods is at once obvious. First, consider their bearing upon the discussion, which has taken place, respecting the qualities of actions. One philosopher affirms, that by the exercise of his higher or rational faculty, he perceives in actions

certain moral distinctions, which are quite separate from any immediate tendency they may have to produce pleasure or pain; while another contends that we possess a moral sense, which distinguishes ethical properties in actions, just as the natural senses distinguish material properties in objects. To the sensationalist, however, both these theories are totally inadmissible. As to our reason, he would argue, it can do nothing more than work up the matter which experience affords, and therefore, can discover no qualities distinct from those which come to us through the channels of sensation; and as to the moral sense, it cannot be generically different from natural sense or sensation, but like all other emotions, is merely a particular form in which the latter is found to exist. Actions, therefore, morally speaking, can have only one set of qualities when viewed by the light of sensationalism, namely, those, by virtue of which we receive profit or loss, pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.

Again, if we look to the subjective side of the question, it is equally evident, that, in studying the moral faculty, sensationalism at once puts its veto upon any theory, that implies the spontaneous action of the human mind; that it makes every impulse come from without; and that when carried to its legitimate conclusion, it merges human liberty entirely in an iron fate, consequent upon the supremacy of external circumstances. We shall now, therefore, briefly trace the influence of