to the same effect see In re National Min. Exploration Co., (D. C. Mass. 1911) 193 Fed. 232; In re Britannia Min. Co., (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1913) 203 Fed. 450, 121 C. C. A. 395, reversing (W. D. Wis. 1912) 197 Fed. 459. So it has been held that a court of bankruptcy is not limited in its sales of assets of bankrupts by this Act; but the Bankruptcy Act confers upon such courts full equitable powers in the administration of estates, and they may, for good cause shown, order either real or personal property sold at private sale. In re Edes, (1905) 135 Fed. 595. The Act of March 3, 1893, seems to relate to judicial sales pursuant to some order or decree creating or declaring a right to sell, which right could not be SEC. 2. [Personal property.] That all personal property sold under any order or decree of any Court of the United States shall be sold as provided in the first section of this act, unless in the opinion of the court rendering such order or decree, it would be best to sell it in some other manner. [27 Stat. L. 751.] SEC. 3. [Publication.] That hereafter no sale of real estate under any order, judgment, or decree of any United States Court shall be had without previous publication of notices of such proposed sale being ordered and had once a week for at least four weeks prior to such sale in at least one newspaper printed, regularly issued and having a general circulation in the county and State where the real estate proposed to be sold is situated, if such there be. If said property shall be situated in more than one county or state, such notice shall be published in such of the counties where said. property is situated, as the court may direct. Said notice shall, among other things, describe the real estate to be sold. The court may, in its discretion, direct the publication of the notice of sale herein provided for to be made in such other papers as may seem proper. [27 Stat. L. 751.] "For at least four weeks" means four weeks of seven days each, and a "publication of a notice of sale once a week for only twenty-seven days before the day of sale is not a 'previous publication of such a notice once a week for at least four weeks prior to such sale' as required by" this statute, and by the decree of the court. Wilson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 65 Fed. 38, 27 U. S. App. 526, 12 C. C. A. 505. Debtor may waive statutory requirements." The provision of the statute of the United States requiring that in all cases four weeks' notice should be given of the time of sale was intended for the benefit and protection of the judgment debtor, and created a privilege and right which the judgment debtor in any case may insist upon or waive." Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. National Nickel Co., (1900) 103 Fed. 399. Provisions of state statute.- Where there was a newspaper printed in the county in which the property was situated, and the notice was published in that newspaper, in compliance with the provisions of the state statute and this section, it is sufficient though the notice of the sale of the property was not posted on the door of the courthouse and in five other public places, as directed by the state statute in the case of execution sales of property situated in the counties in which no newspaper is printed. Elgutter v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 1898) 86 Fed. 500, 58 U. S. App. 643, 30 C. C. A. 218. EXECUTIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS R. S. 158. Application of Provisions of This Title, 245. R. S. 159. R. S. 160. Word "Department," 249. Salaries of Heads of Departments, 249. R. S. 161. Departmental Regulations, 250. R. S. 162. Hours of Business, 253. R. S. 173. Chief Clerks to Supervise Subordinate Clerks, 253. R. S 175. Duty of Chief on Receipt of Report, 253. R. S. 176. Disbursing Clerks, 254. R. S. 177. Vacancies; How Temporarily Filled, 255. R. S. 178. Vacancies in Subordinate Offices, 256. R. S. 179. Discretionary Authority of the President, 256. R. S. 180. Temporary Appointments Limited to Thirty Days, 257. R. S. 181. Restriction on Temporary Appointments, 257. R. S. 182. Extra Compensation Disallowed, 257. R. S. 189. Employment of Attorneys or Counsel, 258. R. S. 192. Expenditure for Newspapers, 259. Act of March 3, 1883, ch. 128, 260. Sec. 1. Rented Buildings to be Annually Reported by Heads of Departments, 260. Act of Feb. 16, 1889, ch. 171, 260. Useless Papers in Departments to be Reported to Congress - Examination and Sale, 260. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 211, 260. Sec. 4. Closing Departments for Deceased Ex-Officials Prohibited, 260. 5. Monthly and Quarterly Reports as to Condition of Business — Bringing up Arrears, 261. Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 189, 261. Sec. 1. Disposition of Useless Papers - Further Provisions, 261. Act of Feb. 24, 1899, ch. 187, 261. Sec. 1. Recording Clocks Not to be Used, 261. Act of June 22, 1906, ch. 3514, 262. Sec. 5. Employees to Serve Three Years in One Department Before Transfer to Another, 262. 6. Details of Civil Employees to Departments from Outside of District of Columbia Restricted, 262. Act of May 22, 1908, ch. 186, 263. Sec. 4. Annual Reports of Traveling Expenses of Department Employees at Washington, 263. Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 141, 263. Sec. 1. Detail of Employees to Office of President, 263. 5. Subscriptions to Periodicals Payment in Advance, 263. CROSS-REFERENCES Salaries of Heads of Departments, see CONGRESS. Care of Public Property and Seat of Office, see PUBLIC PROPERTY, BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS. See generally AGRICULTURE; CIVIL SERVICE; COMMERCE DEPARTMENT; INTERIOR DEPARTMENT; JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF; LABOR DEPARTMENT; NAVY; POSTAL SERVICE; STATE DEPARTMENT; TREASURY DEPARTMENT; WAR DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. Sec. 158. [Application of provisions of this Title.] The provisions of this Title shall apply to the following Executive Departments: First. The Department of State. Second. The Department of War. Third. The Department of the Treasury. Sixth. The Department of the Navy. Seventh. The Department of the Interior. [R. S.] "This title" to which reference is here made comprises R. S. secs. 158–198. The Department of Agriculture was established as an executive department by an Act of Feb. 9, 1889, ch. 122, given under the title AGRICULTURE, and the above section amended so as to include the same. The Department of Commerce and Labor was established by an Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 1, given under the title COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, and the foregoing section amended to include said department. The Department of Labor was established and the foregoing section amended to include said Department by an Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 141, § 1, given under the title LABOR DEPARTMENT. Executive departments. The term "executive departments " in the federal statutes refers only to those departments specified in this section. The heads of these departments compose the Cabinet of the Executive. No board, commission, bureau or office which is not expressly or by implication under the control of the head of one of these departments can be considered as belonging properly to an executive department. (1898) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 62; (1912) 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. 410. The terms " departments," or executive departments," as used in the Acts of Congress and in the Revised Statutes, invariably apply to one or more of the several executive departments mentioned in this section, or included within its terms by subsequent enactments, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 209. 66 The term "department," as used in laws relating to the civil service, is distinguished from "office," "bureau," and "branch;" and subordinates of the several executive departments are distinguished from employees of the last-mentioned gov ernmental agencies. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.Gen. 209. The several executive departments are by law established at the seat of government; they have no existence elsewhere. Only those bureaus and offices can be deemed bureaus or offices in any of these departments which are constituted such by the law of its organization. The department, with its bureaus or offices, is in contemplation of the law an establishment distinct from the branches of the public service and the offices thereof which are under its supervision. Thus the office of postmaster, or of collector of internal revenue, or of pension agent, or of consul, is not properly a departmental officenot an office in the department having supervision over the branch of the public service to which it belongs. True, an official relation exists here between the office and the department, one, moreover, of subordination of the former to the latter; but this does not make the office a part of the department. (1877) 15 Op. Atty.Gen. 262. Exposition of the establishment of the executive departments of the United States. The Constitution does not specify the subordinate, ministerial, or administrative functionaries, by whose agency or counsels the details of the public business 66 66 are transacted. It recognizes the existence of such official agents and advisers, but leaves the number and the organization of those departments to be determined by Congress. In the exercise of this duty, the constitutional Congress proceeded at an early day of its first session (July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. L. 28, ch. 4) to establish the department of foreign affairs," with а principal officer therein " to be called the secretary for the department of foreign affairs. This Act was the commencement of the organization of executive departments under the Constitution. On Sept. 15, 1789, by Act of Congress (1 Stat. L. 68, ch. 14, § 1), the department denominated the "department of foreign affairs" was changed to that of the " department of state." Next after establishing the department of foreign affairs and at the same session (Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. L. 49, ch. 7), Congress established the " department of war," with its chief officer therein to be called the secretary for the department of war. Following, at the same session, came a department of treasury (not the treasury), the head of this department, however, being called the secretary of the treasury. At the same session (Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. L. 73) followed "An Act to establish the judicial courts of the United States," wherein, by section 35 of said Act, provision was made for the appointment of an attorney-general, and by another Act of the same session (Sept. 22, 1789, 1 Stat. L. 70) a postmaster-general was temporarily appointed, but not to be in the same high official relation to the government as that officer occupies at the present time. Such was the original basis of the executive organization of the government. The Secretary of State for political and foreign affairs, the Secretary of War for military and naval matters, the Secretary of the Treasury for those of finance, and the Attorney-General for judicial and legal affairs- these were the immediate superior ministerial officers of the President, as well as his constitutional counselors during the whole period of the administration of the first President of the United States. (1854) 6 Op. Atty.-Gen. 326. Threefold relation of executive department. The Attorney-General, in a communication addressed to the President in 1854, in defining the relations of the executive department, declared that "heads of departments have a threefold relation, namely: 1st, to the President, whose political or confidential ministers they are, to execute his will, or rather to act in his name and by his constitutional authority, in cases in which the President possesses a constitutional or legal discretion; 2d, to the law, for where the law has directed them to perform certain acts, and where the rights of individuals are dependent on those acts, then in such cases a head of department is an officer of the law, and amenable to the laws for his conduct; and 3d, to Congress, in the conditions contemplated by the Constitution. This latter relation, that of the departments to Congress, is one of the great elements of responsibility and legality in their action. They are created by law; most of their duties are prescribed by law; Congress may at all times call on them for information or explanation in matters of official duty, and it may, if it sees fit, interpose by legislation concerning them, when required by the interests of the Government.' (1854) 6 Op. Atty.-Gen. 326. Scope of authority of heads of departments. Holding that the Secretary of War had no authority to accept bills of exchange on behalf of the government and that such authority must be sought for mainly in the Acts of Congress, in The Floyd Acceptances, (1868) 7 Wall. 666, 19 U. S. (L. ed.) 169, the court said: "We have no officer in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the President, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to the fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law." Relation of Chief Executive to the various departments.-The President's duty in general requires his superintendence of the administration; yet this duty cannot require of him to become the administrative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform in person the numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws required and expected to perform. This cannot be, because, if it were practicable, it would be to absorb the duties and responsibilities of the various departments of the government in the personal action of the one chief executive officer. Williams v. U. S., (1843) 1 How. 290, 11 U. S. (L. ed.) 135, affirming (1839) 5 Cranch C. C. 619, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,715. The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties. So a reservation of lands made at the request of the Secretary of War, for purposes in his department, was considered as being, in legal contemplation, the act of the President. Wilcox v. Jackson, (1839) 13 Pet. 498, 10 U. S. (L. ed.) 264; U. S. v. Farden, (1878) 99 U. S. 10, 25 U. S. (L. ed.) 267; Wolsey v. Chapman, (1879) 101 U. S. 755, 25 U. S. (L. ed.) 915; Scott v. Carew, (1904) 196 U. S. 100, 25 S. Ct. 193, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 403; U. S. v. Tichenor, (C. C. Ore. 1882) 12 Fed. 415; U. S. v. Cutler, (1856) 2 Curt. 617, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,911; McCollum v. U. S., (1881) 17 Ct. Cl. 92. The acts of the heads of departments, within the scope of their powers, are in law the acts of the President. In legal contemplation the head of a department is an arm of the executive. Wolsey v. Chapman, (1879) 101 U. S. 755, 25 Ú. S. (L. ed.) 915; Runkle v. U. S., (1886) 122 U. S. 543, 7 S. Ct. 1141, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 1167; Medkirk v. U. S., (1909) 44 Ct. Cl. 469. The President may act through the heads of the different departments, and if the head of one of the executive departments acts it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that he acted by direction of the President. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mitchell, (E. D. Wash. 1913) 208 Fed. 469. But no such power has been delegated to other subordinate officers of the government, whether civil or military, and the acts of such officers without authorization from the President or from Congress, are ineffectual for any purpose. U. S. v. Tichenor, (C. C. Ore. 1882) 12 Fed. 415; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mitchell, (E. D. Wash. 1913) 208 Fed. 469. There can be no doubt that the President, in the exercise of his executive power under the Constitution, may act through the head of the appropriate executive department. heads of departments are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. Runkle v. U. S., (1886) 122 U. S. 543, 7 S. Ct. 1141, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 1167; (1854) 6 Op. Atty.-Gen. 583; (1854) 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 680; (1855) 7 Op. Atty.-Gen. 453; (1863) 10 Op. Atty.-Gen. 527. The Where the action required of the President is judicial in its character, not administrative, as, where as Commander-inChief of the Army he has been made by law the person whose duty it is to review the proceedings of courts-martial, it was held that it cannot be delegated to the head of a department. So a sentence by a court-martial of dismissal of a commissioned officer from service in time of peace, approved by the Secretary of War but not approved by the President, was held to be inoperative. Runkle v. U. S.; (1886) 122 U. S. 543, 7 S. Ct. 1141, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 1167. But in U. S. v. Fletcher, (1892) 148 U. S. 84, 13 S. Ct. 552, 37 U. S. (L. ed.) 378, the case of Runkle v. U. S., supra, was questioned upon the ground that the circumstances disclosed by the report of that case were so exceptional as to render it hardly a safe precedent in any other. And it was held that an order approving a sentence of court-martial signed by the Secretary of War was a sufficient authentication of the judgment of the President. Similarly the Attorney-General ruled that an order made and signed by the Secretary of War, announcing the approval by the President of a court-martial sentence, is sufficiently authenticated by the President, the presumption being that it was made at the direction of the President. (1877) 15 Op. Atty.-Gen. 290. Duties imposed by Congress. There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive departments the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But Congress may impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to the Constitution, and in such cases the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law and not to the direction of the President. This is emphatically the case where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character. Kendall v. U. S., (1838) 12 Pet. 524, 9 U. S. (L. ed.) 1181. Conclusiveness of decision of head of department.- Where a final decision has been made by the proper department against one who claims to be a public creditor, such decision cannot be opened after a change has taken place in the head of the department. (1857) 9 Op. Atty.Gen. 32; (1859) 9 Op. Atty.-Gen. 300. The head of a department cannot, in a matter involving judgment and discretion, reverse the decision and action of his predecessor, even in a matter relating to the general affairs and management of the business of the department. Lavalette v. U. S., (1864) 1 Ct. Cl. 147; Jackson v. U. S., (1884) 19 Ct. Cl. 504. The incumbent of a department may review a predecessor's decisions only as to mistakes in matters of facts arising from errors in calculation, and to cases of rejected claims, in which material testimony is afterward discovered and produced. But where a credit has been given or an allowance made by the head of a department, and it is alleged to be an illegal allowance, the courts must be resorted to, to settle the rights between the United States and the party to whom the credit was given. U. S. v. Bank of Metropolis, (1841) 15 Pet. 377, 10 U. S. (L. ed.) 774. See also (1831) 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 463; (1849) 5 Op. Atty.-Gen. 87; (1849) 5 Op. Atty.-Gen. 122; (1852) 5 Op. Atty.-Gen. 664; (1869) 13 Op. Atty.-Gen. 33; (1870) 13 Op. Atty.-Gen. 226; (1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 387; (1882) 17 Op. Atty.-Gen. 315. But in (1861) 10 Op. Atty.-Gen. 56, the "I know of no Attorney-General said: statute which prohibits the head of a department from examining and allowing a claim which has before been rejected by his predecessor, even where no new evidence is adduced, and without a statutory provision I presume that he would have |