The point has been raised about the inadvisability, as it has been put, of moving from the so-called value theory over to the tonnage theory. Well, actually, gentlemen, we have recognized the inadequancy of the value theory some 20-odd years ago when we put in the Sirovich amendment. We had a value theory, and then when we saw the weakness in it we stopgapped it.

But the Sirovich amendment was only a stopgap. This is a far sounder approach.

As has been mentioned by previous speakers, it takes a great deal of this unnecessary and time-consuming matter out and saves a great deal of money for the claimant, because I personally have seen some of these valuation cases as part of a limitation case drag on for months, and they are a very expensive type of litigation.

Now, I would like to submit some figures that I have prepared in connection with different types of vessels on this difference in tonnage figure.

Frankly, I do not have much sympathy for the way they have used this formula. I tried to find out. I think the first formula used was the formula they used when ships were going through the Suez Canal in order to charge them for pilotage. It would have been an awful lot easier for everybody concerned if we used gross tonnage or registered tonnage or something that we could all go to book for without having to go to an engineer to calculate it every time.

Why you find this difference in the two tonnage figures is under general principles when you go from gross tonnage to net tonnage or in the reverse order there are three ingredients in between there— engineroom spaces, the living spaces, and the miscellaneous spaces. By miscellaneous spaces that includes the pilothouse, chartroom, radio shack. On a tanker that would include the pump room,

the dead forepeak space.

some of Unfortunately, in our law we started at the top figure, gross tonnage, and we took out the living spaces. The new one starts with the bottom figure, adds in engine room. The gap is this third category which was never recognized in either one of them.

But actually, for example, in a T-2 tanker it is 340 tons difference. In the United States it is 209 tons difference the biggest ship we have in this country.

On some of the new tankers we are building I had some figures calculated on Standard Oil's new 47,500-ton class. It is a little over 400 tons difference.

On a big 106,000-ton tanker it is 800 tons difference.

So that as a practical matter it is one of those arbitrary things that somebody had to pick some kind of a formula. It is very small in the overall picture.

An inference was made in the presentation this morning about why should not these people put up all their insurance money. Well, a bill was introduced along that line some years ago, and I think it is inherent absurdity. It sounded its own death knell.

I can see no greater way for abuses in the marine industry than to ask people to put up their insurance money.

What about the companies that are not insured? Some of our biggest fleets under the American flag do not have a penny of insurance on them. He does not give up anything.

What about the man that is underinsured? What about the fellow that is overinsured?

I think the facts of attempting, the mechanics of attempting to have insurance money surrendered to establish a fund with are just insurmountable and will lead to many, many forms of abuse.

Objection has been made to the fact that the proponents of this bill are adding additional beneficiaries in the form of master, charterer, and that.

Looking at it on a long-range proposition, in view of the fact our basic laws are over a hundred years old in this country, we are not really adding beneficiaries. We are just trying to come back to where we started.

A hundred years ago the running of a ship was a fairly simple operation. There was not much chartering other than maybe a bareboat charter now and again.

Now we have all forms of chartering, voyage chartering, consecutive voyage charters, time charters, general AA agreements. Business has become more complex. People have more kinds of names and titles and designations and categories.

All we are trying to do is cover the same group that was covered in one or two words a hundred years ago. Now it is going to take us 15 or 20 words to cover the same type of people.

To refer for a moment-and I will only take a moment or twoto this collision bill, I can officially go on record as chairman of the Maritime Law Association committee that we are in principle in favor of the redraft of the collision bill as introduced during the course of Mr. Colby's testimony.

I am not attempting to hedge when I say "in principle" because I fully realize that we are not wedded to these words. It is going to take some more editing and no doubt as the matter moves through committees there will be other people wanting changes.

But in principle in its basic concept, in the policies that it sets forth, we are fully in accord with this revised bill.

Just one or two points on this collision bill. I will state them very categorically and fast.

The 2-year statute of limitations as prescribed in this bill which is adopted from the convention and which must be in the bill if we want to be an adherent to the convention does not in any way affect a Jones Act case-period.

The suggestion that we throw out times and go back to laches must be advanced by people who have not been experienced with laches. Heaven knows what you have when you go into foreign countries, but we have enough trouble right in our own backyard.

The same type of accident, in Delaware I have 6 years, but if I go to my friend Mr. Rault's State, Louisiana, I have 1 year.

The chaos that comes from laches is absolutely ridiculous.

The statement that the vessel is out of the United States and she would not be back for heaven knows when is no hardship. We do it every day in the week. We go in and we file the lawsuit. That stops the time. I have had lawsuits lying up in the courthouse for 3 and 4

years. Then as soon as the vessel comes back in you prefer your

process.

It is a simple matter to protect yourself on that.

Also this word "casualty." I can certainly say that we had nothing motivating us that we are trying to slip something through. We are still talking about collisions and that is all we are talking about, and not Mr. Freedman's poor seaman that slipped on the oil. We are not trying to do that.

The reason for changing the word from "collision" to "casualty" was simply because we were afraid that the word "collision" is too restrictive in our concept of what should be covered here.

dock

Years ago "collision" might have satisfied because then the admiralty jurisdiction of our district courts only pertained and had jurisdiction over an actual collision between two ships. If you ran into that was something different. But now the extension of the admiralty theory goes a little bit beyond. I can do an awful lot of damage to a dock and never touch her as I go along a narrow stream with my wash. Yet there may be contributory fault on the part of that dock if it is not built properly or something of that order.

That is why we have deliberately changed the word from "collision" to "casualty," not with the idea of trying to put something over on anybody, but the idea of conforming with our own basic concept of the extension of the admiralty theory.

I apologize for my presentation. I think it has been kind of jumpy. I know I have had a devil of a job trying to follow it myself. But the time has been short, and I have been trying to cover just a few of the highlights.

On behalf of the entire Maritime Law Association, Mr. Chairman, I certainly thank this committee for the excellent reception and hearing we have had.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Greene and Mr. Burke. (The remarks in question were not received.)

Senator BARTLETT. Just before the recess, Mr. Shapiro made a statement as to that which he regarded as allegations or accusations or charges against the AMMI. After the recess had been concluded others were on their feet undoubtedly to speak on this same subject.

The chairman thought we ought to proceed with the testimony in normal course and will now say that if anyone wants to make answer of any kind on that subject the record is open for a written statement only. And also any other supplementary statements.

Mr. MATTESON. Mr. Chairman, in hastening to a conclusion I omitted to do one thing, which I intended to do.

Yesterday I think it was Mr. Singman introduced into the record an opinion letter of counsel for the Department of State supporting the collision convention.

I have an opinion letter to the Secretary of Commerce from Mr. John M. Woolsey, later U.S. district judge in the southern district of New York, which I would like to introduce in the record.

Senator BARTLETT. All right. That goes in too. And a copy of the comparative analysis of S. 2313 and the substitute proposals submitted by backers of these bills.

(The documents referred to follow :)

FEBRUARY 26, 1962.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF S. 2313 AND SUBSTITUTE PROPOSALS

To unify the law relating to apportionment of liability in cases of collision and other casualties [between vessels, and related casualties] and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That where a collision occurs between vessels, the compensation due for damages arising from death or injury of persons or from loss or damage to vessels or their cargoes or freights or to other property [caused] shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions, in whatever waters the collision takes place.

SEC. 2. If a casualty [the collision] occurs without fault, if it is caused by force majeure, or if the causes of the casualty [collision] cannot be determined, the damages shall be borne by those who have suffered them.] and no liability shall attach to any vessel, or its owners or operators, unless its fault has contributed to the casualty. [There shall be no statutory presumptions of fault in regard to liability for collision.] This provision [section] shall be applicable notwithstanding the fact that the vessels, or any one of them, may be at anchor (or otherwise made fast) at the time of the casualty.

SEC. 3. If a casualty [the collision] is caused by the fault of only one of the vessels, liability to make good the damages shall attach only to the vessel, and its owners or operators, which has committed the fault. [to the one which has committed the fault.]

SEC. 4. (a) If a casualty is caused by the fault of two or more vessels, [two or more vessels are in fault] the liability of each vessel and its owners or operators shall be in proportion to the degree in which the [their] faults of each vessel have respectively contributed. If it is not possible to establish the degree in which [of] the respective faults[] have contributed, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be apportioned equally.

(b) In respect to damages caused by death or personal injury, the vessels at [in] fault and their owners or opreators shall be jointly as well as severally liable to third parties. When any [a] vessel and its owners or operators pays a larger part than the proportion in which that vessel was at fault there shall be a right of contribution or recourse against the other vessel or vessels and their owners or operators to the extent such other vessels were respectively at fault. [that which in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) hereof she ought ultimately to bear she shall have the right of recourse for the excess against the other vessel.]

(c) The damages to the vessels or to their cargoes, or freights or to other property or to the effects [or other property] of their [the] crews, passengers, or other persons on board shall be borne by the vessels at [in] fault and their owners or operators in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) hereof without joint and several liability toward third parties and without any right of contribution or [of] recourse against the other vessels[.] or party.

SEC. 5. The liability imposed by the preceding sections shall attach[] in cases where a casualty [the collision] is caused by the fault of the [a] pilot even when the carrying of the pilot is compulsory.

SEC. 6. The right of action for the recovery of damages resulting from the casualty [a collision] shall not be conditioned [conditional] upon the entering of a protest or the fulfillment of any other special formality.

SEC. 7. (a) [8.] Actions for the recovery of damages shall be barred after an interval of two years from the date of the casualty.

(b) The interval [time] within which the action to enforce the right of contribution or recourse may be brought allowed by subsection (B) of section 4 must be instituted] shall be one year. This limitation shall run only from the date of payment.

(c) The court in which the action is brought may extend either of the foregoing [such intervals if it shall be satisfied that during such period there had not been any reasonable opportunity of arresting the vessel involved within the jurisdiction of the court or within the territorial waters of the country in which the libelant resides or has his principal place of business.

[SEC. 9. This Act shall apply to the liability to make good the damages caused or contributed to by any fault of a vessel even if no collision has actually taken place.]

SEC. 8. [10. This act] The foregoing provisions shall apply to the liability to make good the damages however caused or contributed to by any fault of a vessel or her owners or operators in all cases to which the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends, whether such damages are done or consummated on navigable waters or on land. [has been extended notwithstanding such damages are done or consummated on land.] In all [such] cases the liability to make good the damages in proportion to the degree that [of] the faults respectively contributed [committed] shall apply [in the same manner] between [any vessel or] vessels and their owners or operators and any other party or parties at fault or between such other parties, including the owners, operators or possessors of any land structure, facility[,] or other property, or any other person or persons involved, in the same manner as the provisions are applied between vessels and their owners or operators. [as the rule is applied between vessels.]

SEC. 9. [11.] The foregoing provisions shall apply to actions brought in personam against the owners or operators of a vessel or against other parties responsible, including the owners, operators or possessors of a land structure, facility or other property as well as to actions brought in rem against a vessel, cargo or other property. [This Act shall apply to actions brought against the owners or operators of a vessel or of such a land structure, facility, or other property in personam as well as to actions in rem.]

SEC. 10. [7.] The foregoing provisions [of this Act] shall not affect in any way the liability of any vessel or person under a contract of carriage or any other contract nor be construed as imposing any liability upon any vessel or person from which such vessel or person is exempted by any contract or any provision of law, nor as affecting the right of any vessel or person to limit liability in the manner provided by law. [scope and effect of any statutory or contractual provisions which limit or otherwise affect any liability of the owner of a vessel toward persons or property.] The last sentence of section 1 of the Act of September 4, 1890, 26 Stat. 425 (33 U.S.C. 367), is hereby repealed.

SEC. 11. [12.] This Act may be cited as the "Collision Liability Apportionment Act, 1962 [1961]". It shall become effective on the last day of the sixth month following the month in which is is enacted. [apply only to causes of action arising after the date of its approval.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Petition of Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, for Exemption From or Limitation of Its Liability as Owner of the S.S. “MANDU” Report prepared by the Honorable John M. Woolsey (before elevation to the Federal bench) giving reasons for recommending that the Brussels Convention remain unratified by the United States

Your File No. 45,475N.

Hon. WALTER F. BROWN,

Assistant Secretary of Commerce,

Washington, D.C.

FEBRUARY 14, 1928.

MY DEAR MR. BROWN: I am exceedingly sorry that I have not been able sooner to answer your letter of December 10th inquiring as to the advisability of submitting the International Convention Relating to Collisions which was signed at Brussels on September 23, 1910, to the Senate for ratification.

This delay has been due to professional engagements which I could not postpone or control.

During this period of delay I have been able to give the matter very careful consideration and am prepared now to give you my considered views on this subject.

I do not think it would be advisable to submit the Convention to the Senate. I believe

First, That to attempt to modify our Municipal Law by treaty is wrong in method and probably unconstitutional in the case of Maritime Law.

Second, That the Convention is wrong in some of the important changes it seeks to effect in our laws.

My reasons for this belief follow.

I. A Treaty is not a proper method by which to modify our maritime law. The ratification by the Senate, of a Convention such as the one under discussion, unless immediately followed by a statute embodying the terms of the Convention and making them the uniform law of the Admiralty Courts of the United