to remain a member of the force he was amenable to the discipline of the board for dereliction of duty; and the board had the right to inflict the punishment provided for by law for such dereliction until he was removed from his membership in the force by a resolution duly passed by the board. In view of the fact that it was optional with the person entitled to a pension to apply after he had become entitled thereto, it certainly was not the intention of the legislature to relieve him from the rights of discipline which the board had over the members of the force. The construction contended for would virtually place every member of the police force who had served the requisite time to entitle him to a pension beyond all discipline; for all that would be necessary for such an officer to do in order to escape after having committed the most gross breach of discipline would be to file his application for a pension. Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Van Brunt, P.J.; Brady and Daniels, JJ., concur in result. EXCISE. HOTELS. Excise commissioners cannot insert in a license a limitation or condition which is repugnant to the statute, and if they do so it is void. Certiorari to review orders of Lawrence, J., dismissing writs of habeas corpus and certiorari and remanding petitioners. The petitioners, who are hotel keepers in the city of New York, were arrested on the charge of having sold to certain of their guests, on Sunday, intoxicating liquors to be used with their meals. The cases were brought before Lawrence, J., on habeas corpus, and were dismissed on the ground that both defendants were prevented from selling on Sunday by the terms of the license. R. G. Ingersoll and E. L. Andrews, for defts. E. Henry Lacombe, for city. Held, Error. That the keeper of an inn or hotel is not prohibited from selling to his guests intoxicating liquors to be used with their meals on Sunday. A distinction has been made, and particularly in the later acts, between the seller of liquors eo nomine and the inn keeper or hotel keeper, who as such furnishes them for his guests. The Revised Statutes provided that no keeper of an inn or tavern authorized to retail spirituous N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL liquors should, on Sunday, sell or TERM. FIRST DEPT. In re James H. Breslin. Decided June 24, 1887. The keeper of an inn or hotel is not prohibited by the Excise Laws from selling to his guests intoxicating liquors to be used with their meals on Sunday. Vol. 26-No. 22b. dispose of them or any of them, except to lodgers in such inns or taverns, to persons actually traveling on that day in the cases allowed by law, and by the 21st section of the act of 1857 it was provided that no tavern or hotel keeper or person licensed to sell any intoxicating liquors or wines on Sunday, or upon any day on which a general or special election or meeting should be held within one-quarter of a mile from the place where such general or special election or town meeting should be held, in any of the cities, villages or towns of this State, to any person whatsoever as a beverage. liquors should sell or give away that there intoxicating liquors, drinks or beverages were to be obtained during the day without reference to meals. These were the chief sources of intoxication, because of the readiness with which the appetite could be appeased or gratified, and if the drinker felt so disposed the ease with which he could go from one inn to another and vary while he increased the number of his drinks. Thus it was that the beverage was obtained which is alluded to in the statute. The lexicographers give us as the primary meaning of the word beverage, "liquor to be drunk, drink," although there are other meanings, but all involving the proposition that it is a drink. There seems to be little doubt that the prohibition against it on the days named, as a beverage, was aimed at the bar or drinking saloon already referred to, where drinks were indiscriminately retailed and from which unfortunate results were often manifest. It will be perceived, on reading this statute, that the prohibition is against selling or giving away intoxicating liquors as a beverage, there being no prohibition in express terms against providing it for guests to be taken with meals. In other words, the design of the statute was to prevent the indiscriminate sale of intoxicating liquors as a drink upon the days named to the public generally. The statutes are to be construed with reference to existing things for the purpose of ascertaining what was the good which would result or the evil that was to be overcome by their passage; and the evil to be overcome was the sale of liquors during the day without reference to meals, and by which it was hoped that there would be no intoxication and consequently no riot or disturbance or interference in any way with the peace, which was regarded as indispensable upon the days named. See 6 Wis., 581. It is perfectly notorious that when the act of 1857 was passed, the existence of a bar or drinking saloon as a part of the hotel was a distinguishing characteristic and In the act of 1873, amendatory of the acts of 1857 and 1870, which indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to preserve the distinction suggested between the hotel and its bar room or drinking saloon, it is provided that nothing contained in the fifth section, which relates to the sale of liquors between one and five o'clock in the morning, shall be construed to prevent hotels from receiving and entertaining travelers at any time, subject to the restrictions contained in the act and the act amended. The word "entertaining" directly expresses the intention to make view expressed of the effect of this phraseology of the statute is strengthened by the suggestion that the legislature were dealing with the subject of intoxicating drinks and no other; and that the word "entertaining" could not have meant the mere service of food, for which no legislation was required, it being the undoubted right of a hotel keeper, with which even the legislature itself could not interfere, to receive persons for that purpose as well as for lodgment. Since the passage of the act of 1857, and until a very recent date, a period extending over thirty years, the practical construction of the act has been such as is herein stated; and it must be assumed that this construction has been known to every legislature which has assembled since 1857, and yet no act has been passed interfering with it in any way. "Such a construction presents itself to a court with a force that is not easy to resist," says Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, page 81, and cases cited. And in the cases of Stewart v. Laird, 1 Wheat., 352; Cohens v. Virginia, 1 Wheat., 418; Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass., 144; In re War field, 22 Cal., 59; and Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis., 663; and in Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Laws, 212, 213 and 214 (2d Am. Ed.), the doctrine is asserted and maintained that in construing an act the court may properly refer to the history of the times and situation of the people when it was passed for the purpose of determing its meaning, scope and intention, and that that a contemporaneous is generally the best construction of a statute, giving, as it does, the sense of the community to the terms made use of by the legislature. These conclusions are not at all affected by the form of the license. A critical examination, assisted by the deliberate and mature consideration and comparison of the act of 1857 and the several amendments thereof suggested by the argument of the General Term, demonstrate that the power of the Board of Excise is limited to the granting or refusing of licenses. If the license be granted the statute regulates the rights acquired by it, the restriction to be observed and the punishment for each violation of its provisions. It cannot, therefore, either enlarge or diminish these rights and obligations or interfere with them in any way. The officers composing it cannot insert in the license a limitation, restriction or condition which is repugnant to the statute, and if they do so it is void, and hence the clause in the relator's license absolutely prohibiting the sale of liquor upon certain days named in it is, as the result of our construction and interpretation of the statute, the taxes for those years. This unauthorized. It follows that the arrest of the relators was unwarranted, and they should be discharged. Order reversed and defendants discharged. Opinion by Brady, by Brady, J.; Van Brunt, P.J., concurs with an opinion; Bartlett, J., concurs in result on the ground that the long and uniform construction of the excise law should be deemed controlling in the determination of these appeals. CORPORATIONS. TAXATION. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. FIRST DEPT. The Chesebrough Mfg. Co., v. Michael Coleman et al., comrs. of taxes, et al. Decided May 13, 1887. The location for taxation of personal property of a manufacturing corporation is the place designated in its certificate as that where its operations are to be carried on. Submission of controversy. Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the Act of 1848. It duly filed a certificate of incorporation in the office of the county clerk of New York and also with the Secretary of State, which certificate contained a statement that "the operations of the said corporation shall be carried on in the city of New York." In the years 1878 and 1879 plaintiff was assessed for taxation on its personal property both in the city of New York and in Brooklyn, and both cities claim action is brought to determine the respective rights of the two cities. It appears that in those years the financial business of plaintiff was largely transacted in Brooklyn, but that director's meetings were held in New York; that deposits were made in the Chemical Bank in said city; that some checks were signed and the mail received there. Coudert Bros., for plff. E. Henry Lacombe and Almet F.. Jenks, for defts. Held, It is provided by statute that "all the personal estate of every incorporated company liable to taxation on its capital, shall be assessed in the town or ward where the principal office or place for transacting the financial concerns of the company shall be, or if such company have no principal office or place for transacting its financial concerns, then in the town or ward where the operations of such company shall be carried on." R. S., Part 1, Chap. 13, Tit. 2, Art. 1, § 6. That under the Act of 1848 and the acts amendatory thereof the certificate is conclusive evidence that the legal residence of plaintiff was in New York City. See Laws of 1848, Chap. 40, §§ 1, 9, 11. No subsequent certificate seems to have been filed designating any other place than the city of New York in which plaintiff should carry on its business. In the case of the Western Transportation Co. v. Scheu, 19 N. Y., 408, it was held that under the act for the incorporation of companies to navi gate the lakes and rivers, Chap. 232, Laws of 1854, requiring the designation in their organic certificate of the city or town and county in which their principal office for managing the affairs of such company is to be situated, the certificate is conclusive as to the location therein designated as that of the principal office of the tioned in that act the assessors Judgment for comrs. of the city of New York. Opinion by Lawrence, J.; Van Brunt, P.J., and Bartlett, J., con cur. N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. In re sale of real estate of Dodge. Dodge et al., applts., v. Stevens, respt. Decided June 7, 1887. company. See also Oswego Starch DECEDENT'S ESTATES. SALE. Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y., 449. In that case the corporation was organized under the general act of 1848 and it was held that the location for the purposes of taxation of a manufacturing corporation is the place designated in its certificate as that where the operations of the company are to be carried on. It was also held that it is immaterial that the principal office or place for transacting the financial concerns of the company is located in a different town. See also 82 N. Y., 351. These cases seem to conclusively establish that plaintiff having declared by its certificate of incorporation that the operations of said corporation shall be carried on in the city of New York, its liability to taxation was in the city of New York. The second section of Chap. 170, Laws of 1861, is not in point, for the reason that it is expressly admitted in the submission that the duplicate certificates thereby provided for were never filed, either in the city of New York or in the city of Brooklyn. That the contention of the counsel for the city of New York that in the absence of the duplicate certificates men Testator devised real estate to his wife, but in case of her remarriage to his daughter. The daughter's interest was sold and a mortgage given to the special guardian, who afterward foreclosed it and bid in the property and thereafter gave a mortgage thereon for a debt of testator. The daughter procured a judgment canceling the latter mortgage and for conveyance of the title acquired on the foreclosure. In a proceeding after the widow's remarriage to sell for debts, Held, That the daughter's title stood not only on the will, but on the foreclosure of a mortgage which was valid; that more than three years having elapsed the premises are not liable to sale under these proceedings, and that having at one time vested in a bona fide purchaser were at that moment freed from liability for testator's debts. Reversing S. C., 24 W. Dig., 3. In proceedings for the sale of real estate of D., deceased, instituted by one S., a creditor, the title to the property was claimed by C., an infant. It appeared that the premises in question were devised by one J. P. D., who died in May, 1869, to his wife so long as she remained his widow, and in |