and payable at a place using the other, if the time is to be reckoned from the date it shall be computed according to the style of the place at which it was drawn, otherwise according to (a) the style of the place where it is payable; and in the former case the date (b) must be reduced or carried forward to the style of the place where the Bill is payable, and the time reckoned from thence.

Thus on a Bill dated the first of March, old style, and payable here one month after date, the time must be computed from the 19th of February, new style; and on a Bill dated the 19th of February, new style, and payable at Petersburgh one month after date, from the first of March, old style.

Where the time after the expiration of which a Bill or Note imports to be payable is limited by months, it is to be computed by (c) calendar, not lunar months.

Thus on a Bill or Note payable one month after date, and dated the first of January, the (d) month will not expire till the first of Feb

ruary.

Where the time is computed by days, the day on which the event happens, is to be (e) excluded.

(a) Vide Mar. 2d ed. p. 25, Beawes, § 251, 1st ed. p. 447.

(b) Mar. 2d ed. p. 22.

(c) Mar. 2d ed. p. 19.

Thus

(d) Vide Mar. 2d ed. p. 24. Beawes, § 253, 1st ed. p. 447. (e) Bellasis v. Hester, Lord Raym. 280. Lutw. 1591 Upon a Bill payable ten days after sight, Treby, C. J. was of opinion that the day on which the Bill was seen by the drawee was not to be reckoned one of the ten, because then a Bill payable one day after sight would be payable the day it was seen; but Powell and Neville, Js. held the conI

trary,

Thus on a Bill or Note payable ten days after date, dated the 1st of January, the time does not expire until the 11th.

Instead of an express limitation by years, months, or days, we continually find the time on Bills drawn or payable at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Altona, Paris, or any place in France, Cadiz, Madrid, Bilboa, Leghorn, Genoa, or Venice, limited by the usance, that is, the usage between those places and this country; because, in the infancy of Bills, all Bills between this country and any of those places respectively were usually made payable after the same interval..

An usance between this kingdom and Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Altona, Paris or any place in France, is one calendar month from the date of the Bill; an usance between us and Cadiz, Madrid, or Bilboa, two; an usance between us and Leghorn, Genoa, or Venice, three.

A double usance is double the accustomed time; an halfusance, half.

Where it is necessary to divide a month upon an half usance, which is the case where the usance is either one month or three, the (a) division not

trary, and judgment was given according to their opinion. However in May v. Cooper, Fort. 376, the Court seemed to consider a note payable ten days after date, and dated the 21st July as payable the 31st, (not allowing. however any days of grace) and in Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barnard. B. R. 303. In an action upon a Bill payable six days after sight, one question was whether the day of sight was to be reckoned one of the six, and Raymond, C. J. said it was not, and the modern practice is conformable to his opinion.

(a) Mar. 2d ed. p. 23.

withstanding

withstanding the difference in the length of months contains fifteen days.

The bankruptcy or known insolvency of the drawee or maker is no (a) excuse for a neglect to make a presentment, or to give notice.

Notice (b) must be given of a failure in the attempt to procure an acceptance, though the application for such acceptance might have been un

necessary.

So if the drawee offer a partial or conditional acceptance, or an acceptance at an extended

(a) In Russell v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 497, 515. Lee said arguendo, that it had frequently been ruled by Lord Mansfield at Guildhall, that it is not an excuse for not making a demand on a Note or Bill, or for not giving notice of non-payment, that the drawer or acceptor has become a bankrupt, as many means may remain of obtaining payment by the assistance of friends, or otherwise, and Lord Mansfield who was in court, did not deny the assertion: this dictum was also referred to arguendo in Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 Term Rep. 408.

[Esdaile & al. v. Sowerby & al. 11 East Rep. 114. In an action by the indorsees of a Bill drawn by Cheetham on Hill, in favour of the Defendants, and by them indorsed to the Plaintiffs; a verdict was found for the Plaintiffs, and a case reserved. The Bill, which was payable in London, became due on Saturday the 20th of February, when it was presented for payment, and dishonoured. By mistake, notice of non-payment was not given to the Defendants, who resided at Liverpool, until the 27th of February, whereas it ought to have been given on the 24th: and they refused payment on the ground of this laches. Before the Bill became due, the drawer had stopped payment and be. come bankrupt, and the acceptor was insolvent. The drawer had himself apprized the Defendants of his situation at the time of his stopping payment; and that this Bill would not be paid; and they knew that the acceptor had no funds but such as the drawer furnished him with: and on the 25th of February, they admitted, to the Plaintiffs' agent, that they knew of the insolvency of the drawer and acceptor: It was contended that notice of the dishonour was unnecessary. But the Court was clear that the insolvency of the drawer and acceptor, and the knowledge of it, did not dispense with the necessity of giving notice of the dishonour of the Bill to the Defendants. Postea to the Defendants. See also Smith v. Beckett, and Brown v. Massey, post.] (b) Vide Blesard v. Hirst, and Goodall v. Dolley, post p. 131, n. (a). I 2

period,

period, or if any other person offer an absolute one, though the holder may be willing to acquiesce in such acceptance, he must [1] give notice.

In that case however, if he wishes to have the power of availing himself of it, he should mention in his notice the acceptance offered, for a notice generally of non-acceptance shews (a) he did not acquiesce in such offer.

A neglect to give notice upon the refusal of any thing more than a conditional acceptance, is done away by the completion of those conditions before the Bill becomes payable; and a neglect upon the refusal of any thing more than a partial acceptance, discharges the persons intitled to it only from their responsibility on account of the non-payment of the residue.

The notice must come from the [2] holder, and though there is no prescribed form for it, ought to import that the holder looks on (b) the person to

[1] Vide Mar. 4th ed. p. 21. Beawes, § 221. 2d ed. p. 445. (a) Vide Sproat v. Matthews, ante p. 83, note (6).

whom

[2] Ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves. 597. Barclay was indorsee and holder of two bills drawn by Kemp upon Dearlow, and indorsed by Clay to Barclay. These bills were dishonoured, of which Clay gave notice to Kemp; and on petition by Barclay to be allowed to prove these bills under a commission of bankruptcy issued against Kemp; one question was, whether this notice from Clay, and not from Barclay the holder, were sufficient. And Lord Eldon, C. after referring to Tindal v. Brown, held that the notice ought to have come from the holder, and dismissed the petition. See Jameson v. Swinton, post. 128, n. [1].

(6) Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167. 186. A note which became due 5th October, was presented at ten in the morning, and the maker not being at home, word was left for him where it lay; the holder sent again the 6th, when the maker promised to take it up within the banking hours, which were from 9 to 4; on the 7th, the holder sent again to the maker, and the note not being paid, gave notice to the Defendant who was 'an indorser,

whom it is given as liable, and expects payment from him.

To give this notice, in the case of a foreign Bill, effect, it is (a) necessary that a minute of the

indorser, but the Defendant said he had made it his own; the maker had told him on the 6th, that he could not pay it, and desired the Defendant would all the parties lived at Bristol; the jury found for the Plaintiff, but upon a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial and cause shewn, the Court granted a new trial; Lord Mansfield said, "What is reasonable notice is a question partly of fact, and partly of law; it may depend in some measure on facts; such as the distance at which the parties live, the course of the post, &c.but whereever a rule can be laid down with respect to this reasonableness, that should be decided by the Court, and adhered to for the sake of certainty." Per Willes, J. "New credit was given to the maker, and I cannot consider notice from the maker equal to notice from the holder.” Ashhurst, J. "The reasonableness ought to be settled as a question of law; the next day at the most is as long as is necessary in a case like this; if the parties live at a small distance, this is a sufficient time; if at a greater, they should write by the next post. Notice means something more than knowledge, because it is competent to the holder to give credit to the maker: It is not enough to say that the maker does not intend to pay, but that the holder does not intend to give credit; the party ought to know whether the holder intends to give credit to the maker, or to resort to him." Per Buller, J. "When the post goes out, is a matter of fact; when that is established, it is a matter of law, what notice is reasonable; as to giving time, the holder does it at his peril, and that is enough to decide the case; the purpose of giving notice is to let the party know that he is looked to for payment, that he may have his remedy over by an early application; if it shews that the holder has given time, it discharges the party; it ought to purport that the holder looks to him for payment, and a notice from another person cannot be sufficient, it must come from the holder." Upon the 2d trial there was contradictory evidence whether the notice from the maker was on the 6th or the 7th, and the jury found again for the Plaintiff, but the Court said it was a verdict against law, and granted another new trial. [Vide post p. 123. n. [3].

(a) Rogers v. Stephens, 2d Term Rep. 713. In an action against the drawer of a Foreign Bill it appeared that the Bill had been noted for nonacceptance, but there was no protest, and this was pressed as a ground for a non-suit. Lord Kenyon admitted the objection, but upon the other circumstances thought this a case in which a protest was not necessary. See post p. 130. note (b).

Gale v. Walsh, 5 Term Rep. 239. In an action against the drawer

of