a notice of hearing before the Secretary or before a designated agent, at a place therein fixed, not less than ten days after the serving of said complaint. Any such complaint may be amended by the issuing officer or the designated agent conducting the hearing at any time prior to the issuance of a final order based thereon. An employer upon whom such complaint has been served shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the time and place fixed in the complaint and, where the complaint alleges violations of an order issued under section 7 (c) of this Act, shall have the right, by a timely pleading, to assert any defense which he may have against the application of such order to him. In the discretion of the issuing officer or the designated agent conducting the hearing, any other person or organization having a substantial interest may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. In any such proceeding the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling.

(c) If, upon all the testimony taken, the Secretary shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair wage practice in violation of this Act or any order issued thereunder, he shall state his findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such violation and to take such affirmative action, including reinstanement of employees with or without payment of back pay, as will effectuate the purposes of this Act. Such order may further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which he has complied with the order. If, upon all the testimony taken, the Secretary shall be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has not engaged and is not engaging in such an unfair wage practice, he shall state his findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint as to him.

(d) The Secretary shall have power to petition any circuit court of appeals (including the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) or, all the circuit courts of appeals to which application might be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States (including the United States District Court for the District of Columbia), within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair wage practice in question occurred, or wherein the person in violation resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief of restraining order, and shall certify and file in the court to which petition is made a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and testimony upon which such order was entered and the findings and the order of the Secretary.

Upon such filing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Secretary. No objection that has not been urged before the Secretary or his duly authorized agent shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Secretary or his duly authorized agent, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary or his duly authorized agent, and to be made a part of the transcript. The Secretary may modify his findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and he shall file such modified or new findings, which, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and shall file his recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of his original order. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district court as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347).

(e) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Secretary granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit court of appeals of the United States in the circuit wherein the unfair wage

practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Secretary, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, certified by the Secretary, including the pleading and testimony upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings and order of the Secretary. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Secretary under subsection (d), and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the Secretary such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Secretary; and the findings of the Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive.

(f) The commencement of proceedings under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Secretary's order. The court shall not grant any stay of the order unless the person complaining of such order shall file in court an undertaking with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the court for the payment to the employees affected by the order, in the event such order is affirmed, of the amount by which the compensation such employees are entitled to receive under the order exceeds the compensation they actually receive while such stay is in effect.

INDUSTRY COMMITTEES

SEC. 7. (a) With a view to eliminating unfair wage practices in violation of section 2 of this Act, the Secretary or his duly authorized agent may appoint an industry committee for each industry or subdivision thereof in which such practices may exist. The provisions of section 5 (b), (c), and (d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act shall govern the establishment, functioning, and procedure of such industry committees.

(b) The appropriate industry committee in the designated industry or subdivision thereof shall consider the problem of eliminating wage-rate differentials based on sex in the industry as well as any particular questions relating to this problem that the Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, may propound. The Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, may require such industry committee to study and report on practices related to the training for employment of persons of either sex, as such practices affect their ability to qualify for and obtain jobs in such industry at wages rates customarily paid to the opposite sex. To this end the committee may conduct investigations and may hear witnesses and receive evidence. It shall report findings and make recommendations to the Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, which in its judgment will eliminate or tend to eliminate wage-rate differentials based on sex. Such findings and recommendations may include evaluations of job content, job classifications, standards for training and employment, and appropriate wage-rate ratios between job classifications or defined units of work.

(c) The industry committee shall report to the Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, its findings and recommendations with respect to the matters referred to it. On the basis of the report and recommendations of the industry committee and subject to section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Public, Numbered 404, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session), the Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, may frame one or more orders to carry out the purpose of this Act in the industry or subdivision thereof, which may include provisions prohibiting employers in the industry or subdivision thereof to which the orders may be applicable, from engaging in any practices which the Secretary finds may result in the commission of an unfair wage practice as defined in section 2 of this Act. The Secretary or his duly authorized agent may reconvene the industry committee or appoint a new industry committee in the same industry at any time.

(d) Due notice of any hearings before an industry committee may, and before the Secretary, or his duly authorized agent, shall, be given in the Federal Register and may be given by such other means as the Secretary deems reasonably likely to give general notice to interested persons.

CRIMINAL PENALTIES

SEC. 8. Any person who shall (a) willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Labor in the performance of his duties prescribed by this Act or (b) willfully violate section 5 thereof, or

who shall make any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order thereunder knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in any material respect, shall, upon conviction therefor, be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

SEC. 9. Unless the Secretary shall otherwise determine and permit in an order issued by him, no contract shall be awarded by the United States or any agency thereof to any person found to have violated any of the provisions of this Act or to any firm, corporation, partnership, or association in which such person has a controlling interest, until‍ three years have elapsed from the date when it is determined that such violation has occurred. The Comptroller General is authorized and directed to distribute a list to all agencies of the United States containing the names of such persons.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 10. When used in this Act

(a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers:

(b) The term "employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to eight or more employees, but shall not include the United States, or any State or political subdivision thereof, and shall not include any labor organization, except when acting in the capacity of employer. (c) The term "employee" includes any individual employed by an employer. (d) The term "wages" means all remuneration for the performance of service for an employer by an employee whether paid by the employer or another, including the cash value of all remuneration paid therefor in any medium other than cash.

(e) The term "wage rate" means the basis of remuneration for the performance of services by an employee for an employer and includes time, piece, commission, or any other basis of remuneration.

(f) The term "unfair wage practice" means a practice in violation of the provisions of section 2 or an order of the Secretary issued under the authority of section 7 of this Act.

(g) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.

(h) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce, or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of

commerce.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 11. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. I hope that this committee will act immediately to remedy a condition which has long been recognized as unjust and harmful, not only to the welfare of women, but to men also.

For over half a century there have been widespread efforts to obtain for women economic rights which are their due. In 1920, with the passage of the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution women became first-class citizens politically. It is now up to us in the Eightieth Congress, it seems to me, to make women first-class citizens economically.

The idea of equal work for equal pay isn't new. The Federal Government supported this principle as far back as 45 years ago.

In World War I and World War II, it was recognized that to get our war production out we had to endorse this principle. Surely it is high time we should recognize this principle is also essential in peacetime, in order to have the kind of production where you don't have unfair industrial competition which endangers our whole standard of living.

It was certainly recognized by the Civil Service Commission when it ruled in November 1919 that all examinations were open to men and women alike. Following this up, salary grades for Federal employees fixed in the Classification Act of 1923 are not differentiated according to the worker's sex. Ratings are based on the component elements in the job.

The principle of the rate for the job, regardless of the sex of the worker, has had the support of trade unions and management as well as government, so this isn't a new idea-this isn't revolutionary. In the Seventy-ninth Congress bills were introduced in the House and in the Senate for equal pay for equal work. In hearings on these bills no evidence in opposition was offered. Both the House and Senate Committees on Education and Labor favorably reported out the bills. The Seventy-ninth Congress, however, failed to act and to make them laws. We hope that the Eightieth Congress will do better.

H. R. 4273 provides essentially the same features as its predecessors. As a matter of fundamental justice, it calls for the prohibition of wagerate differentials based solely on sex.

Under the terms of H. R. 4273, it would be deemed an unfair wage practice for any employer to discriminate in the payment of wages on the basis of sex for comparable quantity and quality of work on the same or similar operations, or for work of comparable character on jobs requiring comparable skills.

It would also be deemed an unfair practice for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any employee who might file charges under the terms of the bill.

H. R. 4273 makes full provision for administration and enforcement of its provisions, and for the creation of industry committees to study and evaluate the problems of wage differentials based on sex.

Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee to treat this bill as an emergency measure. The elemental justice for enacting this legislation has always existed, but never so urgently as right now.

Prices today are inflated to a point where women are digging into their savings for the vital necessities of life. The Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price index for the week of January 17, 1948, is within two points of the inflationary peak reached in May of 1920, which, you will remember, was followed by a 43-percent drop in prices in the next year.

Under present inflationary conditions it is completely unfair to continue to let the working women of America carry the added burden of wage discrimination. She is carrying it at the expense of the health of herself and her family.

When a woman buys bread, she pays the asking price the same to all persons. No baker reduces the price of his bread because a woman is buying it. There are no price differentials based on sex when a woman buys cigarettes.

Meat and potatoes, milk and eggs-whatever she needs-she has to pay for at exactly the same rate the man does whether she is buy

ing for herself alone or for her family, or whether she has to pay all her living expenses or whether she shares them with her husband.

It is essential that immediate action be taken to relieve this wholly untenable situation.

Mr. Chairman, around 28 percent of our labor force today is made up of women. That is the figure estimated for 1950. There are over three times as many women working today as there were in 1900. The number of women seeking work or working has steadily increased from 2,000,000 in 1870 to over 16,500,000 today.

What we have been witnessing in the past four decades is not a fly-by-night phenomenon of a few women deciding to go out and make a little pin money, but an ever-expanding growth of industrial and commercial opportunities for women.

The relationship between the steady growth in the employment of women, greater production, fuller employment, and greater consumer demand, isn't just coincidental. July 1944 saw the peak wartime employment of women. They made up one-third of our labor force. One out of every three laborers was a woman.

Today, 16,500,000 are working. There isn't any reason to believe that this figure will drop very greatly.

Studies made by the Women's Bureau indicate that from 75 to 80 percent of women war workers wished to continue to work. Large proportions of these women must continue to work to support themselves or to support themselves and dependents.

A survey made by the Women's Bureau, Bulletin 209, based on information gathered in 1944 and 1945, in 10 war areas, has some interesting facts.

In 8 out of 10 war areas the employment of women had doubled or more than doubled over what employment had been in 1940. In the other two areas employment had increased by one-half. Threequarters of the women in these areas planned to continue working after the war was over. Why? Because 84 percent of them supported themselves and others, and had no alternative. Eight percent had special reasons for continuing to work, such as buying a home or sending their children to school and only 8 percent reported they would remain in the labor force because they liked working or because they liked having their own money.

Virtually all the single women in this survey worked to support themselves or to support themselves and others. Ninety-six percent of the widowed women and 98 percent of all divorced women were self-supporting or were self-supporting and had dependents, and 57 percent of the married wartime workers who expected to remain at work gave as their reason the need to support themselves or to support themselves and others.

Ninety percent of those in each of the marital groups contributed regularly to family expenses. Some in addition contributed outside the family. So it is no good saying to women, "You better stop working and go home." There are too many who will not have any home to go to unless they continue working, because they either have to support it themselves or they have to contribute to its support.

When there is full employment and industry is begging for workers, there is a greater willingness to pay a woman what she is worth, to pay her for the work she does. The Federal Government ought to