although Congress had full power of control there were certain detail matters of such a local nature that Congress might permit the States to regulate them. One of these was the question whether pilots were necessary for ships entering and leaving a local port. So long as Congress permitted it, a State might require, as Pennsylvania had done for Philadelphia, that all ships coming into the local harbor must take on a pilot, for safety, and that this pilot must be paid at a fixed rate. The State might even impose a fine for the violation of this pilotage rule. Other similar matters of a local nature which are subject to State regulation until Congress acts, are the placing of harbor buoys, anchorage rules, harbor lights, etc. A further extension of State power took place in the case of the Escanaba Company v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, decided in 1882. Here the city of Chicago had provided for the closing of certain drawbridges over the Chicago River (a channel of interstate commerce), for ten minutes at a time in order to allow of street traffic across the river. The closing of these drawbridges interfered with the passage of boats of the Escanaba Company, engaged in interstate business, and was accordingly resisted by the company in the courts. The Supreme Court decided that the two currents of traffic which met at the Chicago River, one being the interstate traffic by boat through the river itself, and the other being the street traffic of a great city lying on both shores of this river, constituted a local question which might best be regulated by local ordinances in the absence of any action of Congress. As the city of Chicago lay on both sides of the river, it was only natural that the municipal government of Chicago, under authority from the State, should make such reasonable regulations as would best conduce to the forwarding of both the river and street traffic. This the city had apparently done by its rule closing the bridges every ten minutes. Since Congress had not regulated the matter, the rules provided by the city of Chicago were therefore held to be justifiable and constitutional even though they directly affected the interstate commerce in which the Escanaba Company's boats were engaged. Congress by its constitutional authority could at any time repeal these rules and supersede them by others of its own making. The Act of Congress of 1899 now provides that no bridges may be constructed across navigable interstate waterways without the express consent of the Federal authorities.

An excellent summary of the powers of the States as interpreted by the Supreme Court is given by Justice Field in Bowman v. Chicago Railway Company, 125 U. S. 507; 1888,-"Where the subject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide vessels in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers and docks, and the

hich can be properly regulated only by special

provisions adapted to their localities, the State can act until Congress interferes, and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free."

Proper and Improper Uses of the State Power over Interstate Trade. The care which the Court formerly exercised in allowing State regulation of local matters which affected national business may be seen in the Husen Case. In 1872, Missouri passed a law forbidding the driving, or conveying into the State, of any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle between March 1st and November 1st in each year. The ostensible purpose here was to protect the health of Missouri cattle from Texas, or Spanish fever. But the Supreme Court, in Railroad v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; 1877, decided that this prohibition was too general and absolute; that it did not offer a reasonable means of keeping out diseased cattle but rather, through eight months of the year, excluded the importation of all, and was for that cause an excessive regulation, or prohibition of interstate commerce. While a State may enact sanitary laws and for the purpose of self-protection establish quarantine and reasonable inspection regulations, and prevent persons and animals having contagious diseases from entering the State, it cannot, beyond what is absolutely necessary for self-protection, interfere with transportation into or through its territory.

State Regulations of Safety.-How far may the State go in protecting the safety of its people in matters of interstate commerce? The general principle now governing this question is that, until Congress has acted, a State may intervene even in interstate trade to protect the lives and safety of its people, unless its regulation is of an unreasonable nature. In New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; 1897, the State had passed an Act forbidding the use of coal or wood stoves on passenger coaches in the State and had sought to apply this act to the New Haven line. This the company protested, claiming that it was engaged in interstate traffic and that its through trains could not be interfered with by the State, but must be regulated only by Congress under Section 8 of Article 1. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the State authority when used in this way was constitutional; the purpose of the Act was to prevent the burning of coaches in train wrecks, and the consequent loss of life and property. For such a purpose, the State might, in the absence of action by Congress, make reasonable regulations to require the railways to use modern heating apparatus of a safer nature; and the New York Act was a reasonable rule of this kind which

might well be applied even to interstate trains, until Congress acted.

A similar ruling had already been made in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; 1888. Here the State had established a Board of Examiners to license locomotive engineers; it required all engineers to pass an eye examination to secure such a license before driving a train in the State. A fee of $5.00 was to be paid for the examination and the license; persons who were known to be negligent and incompetent were disqualified, as were also those who were intoxicated within six hours of going on duty. A penalty of fine or imprisonment was visited upon those who violated the Act. Smith was an engineer of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad who, it was shown, did not drive an intrastate train, but whose run was exclusively in interstate commerce; being approximately 60 miles within the State of Alabama and over 200 miles in Mississippi. For this reason he claimed immunity from the State rule, and contended that he could not be required to secure a State license to engage in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld the State statute and set forth that the purpose of the rule was clearly to protect passengers and property from careless and incompetent engineers and railway accidents. The fee of $5.00 was not a tax on interstate commerce, but was a proper charge for the expense of examination and license. The State might apply the requirements above described, even to engineers making an interstate run, part of which lay within Alabama, so long as the law was a reasonable and proper requirement in the interests of safety. The Act was not intended to, nor did it obstruct interstate commerce. It is to be observed that the Court would probably have declared the State law unconstitutional if it had imposed a heavy license fee, or onerous and burdensome restrictions on those who tried to secure a license; but as neither of these defects existed, the law was allowed to stand as a reasonable statute.

Again in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; 1878, a similar principle had been established in another field analogous to interstate commerce. Kentucky had passed an Act regulating the sale of illuminating oils in the State and providing that no oil which ignited at a temperature below 130 degrees Fahrenheit should be offered for sale within the State. All oils were to be inspected and the casks branded by a State official, as "standard," or "unsafe." Patterson sold an oil which ignited below the standard test and which had not been passed by the State inspectors. He claimed that the oil was manufactured under a Federal patent and that the patent right gave the inventor the privilege of selling his product without interference by a State law. He further argued that if a State could so interfere with the sale of a patented article, it might render valueless the patent and thereby defeat the national laws on patent rights. The Supreme Court overruled this contention and decided that the State law was a reasonable and proper measure to

prevent explosions and loss of life and property. A safety measure of this nature was not intended to defeat the national patent acts, but had the purpose and effect of protecting the local community from conditions that would otherwise be intolerable. The Court took occasion to point out that the national government had long possessed full control over interstate trade, yet the States were allowed to protect their people against dangerous conditions arising in such commerce while within their borders. "By the settled doctrines of this Court the police power extends, at least, to the protection of the lives, the health, and the property of the community against the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own rights. State legislation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes, does not, in the sense of the Constitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which has been confided, expressly or by implication, to the national government." Speaking of interstate commerce the Court said, "This court has never hesitated by the most rigid rules of construction, to guard the commercial power of Congress against encroachment in the form or under the guise of State regulation, established for the purpose and with the effect of destroying or impairing rights secured by the Constitution. It has nevertheless, with marked distinctness and uniformity, recognized the necessity growing out of the fundamental conditions of civil society, of upholding State police regulations which were enacted in good faith, and had appropriate and direct connection with that protection to life, health, and property, which each State owes to her citizens."

State Laws to Prevent Fraud.-In Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461; 1895, the State was allowed to prohibit the sale of oleomargarine imitations of butter, colored to represent the genuine article, even when such imitations were imported from another State and offered for sale in the original 10-lb. packages. This is the farthest limit of local regulation of national trade which has been permitted by the Court. It was based on what the Court considered to be the State's essential right to protect its citizens from fraud. The Court did not doubt the healthful qualities of the product, but held rather that persons who wished to buy butter should not be deceived by another product falsely colored to represent butter. "Now, the real object of coloring oleomargarine so as to make it look like genuine butter is that it may appear to be what it is not, and thus induce unwary purchasers, who do not closely scrutinize the label upon the package in which it is contained, to buy it as and for butter produced from unadulterated. milk or cream from such milk. The suggestion that oleomargarine is artificially colored so as to render it more palatable and attractive can only mean that customers are deluded by such coloration, into believing that they are getting genuine butter. If anyone thinks that oleomargarine, not artificially colored so as to cause it to look like butter is as palatable or as wholesome for purposes of food

as pure butter, he is, as already observed, at liberty under the statute of Massachusetts to manufacture it in that State or to sell it there in such manner as to inform the customer of its real character. He is only forbidden to practice, in such matters, a fraud upon the general public. The statute seeks to suppress false pretences and to promote fair dealing in the sale of an article of food. It compels the sale of oleomargarine for what it really is, by preventing its sale for what it is not. Can it be that the Constitution of the United States secures to anyone the privilege of manufacturing and selling an article of food in such manner as to induce the mass of people to believe that they are buying something which, in fact, is wholly different from that which is offered for sale? Does the freedom of commerce among the States demand a recognition of the right to practice a deception upon the public in the sale of any articles, even those that may have become the subject of trade in different parts of the country?" There was a strong dissenting opinion in this case by three of the Justices who contended vigorously that the State was interfering with sales in the original packages, a power which only Congress could exert. The decision, however, was followed subsequently in all regulations of oleomargarine up to the passage of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906. It is still important as showing the State's power over national trade to prevent fraud. But where the statute is more extended in its language, and excludes from sale within the State all oleomargarine (regardless of whether colored to imitate butter or not), the State clearly oversteps its authority. This was the ruling in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1; 1898. Here the State law prohibited all manufacture or sale of oleomargarine within the State. Schollenberger was a dealer who received a forty-pound tub of the product from a manufacturer in Rhode Island, and exposed it for sale as an original package. It was properly marked as required by the Act of Congress, and was not colored to imitate butter. When prosecuted under the Pennsylvania law Schollenberger contended that the product being a wholesome one, and one recognized and regulated by the Federal law, he had a right to deal in it in original packages in interstate commerce, so long as he practiced no fraud by misrepresenting it, and so long as it was not given a deceptive appearance to mislead any prospective purchaser of butter. This the Court upheld, declaring that oleomargarine, being an article of commerce, could be brought into a State in the original package and sold in that package, regardless of State prohibitions, so long as it was not deceptive or fraudulent in appearance. The essential difference between these two cases is that the Massachusetts law prohibited fraudulent sales or sales of an article intended by its appearance to deceive, while the Pennsylvania Act forbade all sales of a certain product, regardless of its wholesome quality and genuineness, or absence of deceit and fraud. The Massachusetts Law when applied to sales of goods in interstate