commerce was upheld, while the Pennsylvania Act when so applied was declared unconstitutional. These rulings show clearly the proper and improper uses of State regulation of Interstate Com

merce.

State Regulations for Public Convenience. In addition to State regulations of health, safety and fraud, which have been upheld as constitutional even when they affect interstate commerce, a State may also make rules for the public convenience and may promote the better service of public utility corporations, even though, in so doing, it touches on interstate traffic. This principle is best illustrated by two companion cases decided in 1899 and 1900. The first was the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; here the legislature of Ohio had passed a law requiring railways in the State to stop at least three trains daily, each way, at all cities and stations on the lines of the railway with a population of 3,000, or over. The Lake Shore refused to stop one of its fastest trains at a suburb of Cleveland which had the required population, and the local authorities claimed that, as the town was not given three trains daily each way, the railway had violated the Act. The company answered that its through train was an interstate affair which could not be regulated by the State government and that the local law was therefore unconstitutional as applied to trains passing to or from other States. The Supreme Court decided, however, that as the company did not furnish adequate or reasonable train service for the point in question it must stop a sufficient number of trains to give such service. The company was free to offer three trains daily from its local traffic, if it preferred; but failing to do this, it could be required by the State, for the convenience of the people, to stop through trains even though these latter were engaged in interstate trade. If the company had established a sufficient number of local trains, that is, three daily, the Court would doubtless have held that the interstate schedule could not be interfered with. This decision, therefore, establishes simply the rule that a State may require reasonable service for its larger towns and villages and that if a company fails to provide such service from its local trains, the interstate schedule may be called upon.

The companion case on this point brings out the question very clearly. In Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, which was decided the following year, the Illinois law required all regular passenger trains each way to stop at county seats on their line. The railway already furnished four regular trains stopping at the county town in question, Hillsboro, and these were sufficient to accommodate all the local traffic. The railway also operated a "Knickerbocker Special" from St. Louis to New York, passing through Illinois, but not stopping at the county seats. The State authorities having demanded that this through special should stop at county seats, the company

contended that such action would interfere with its connections and overturn its schedule, which would result in the loss of passenger traffic and drive the business to other competing railways. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court recognized the active competition between carriers, not only in the comfort, convenience and general excellence of through trains; but also in the running time of their schedules. It was essential that the interstate schedule be free from local interference unless the company was to lose a large part of its business to other lines which were not restricted in their running time. This was especially true where the local train service was adequate to the demands of the county seats. A State law regulating through trains, regardless of the interests of other States would be a serious burden on national commerce and defeat the commerce clause which granted the regulative power to Congress. "After all local conditions have been adequately met, railways have the legal right to adopt special provisions for through traffic, and legislative interference therewith is unreasonable and an infringement of the Constitution." In all such cases of local regulation it must be clear that the State is not setting up an unreasonable obstacle to interstate trade. This element of reasonableness is more clearly defined in the Atlantic Coast Line v. The Railroad Commissioners of South Carolina, 207 U. S. 328; 1907. Here the Supreme Court outlined sharply the limits of State interference with through trains in interstate commerce. The Atlantic Coast Line operated several through trains between New York and Tampa, Florida. These made connections with the steamers to Havana and were also in active competition with another through line to the South. During the winter season, the passenger traffic required high speed and high-class accommodations. A fast schedule was also required by the mail contracts. Notwithstanding these facts, the South Carolina Railroad Commission ordered the Coast Line to stop its fastest train each way at Latta, South Carolina, a hamlet of 453 persons. The railway protested against this order, the case came into the courts and eventually to the Supreme Court. It was shown in favor of the order, that besides the population of Latta, there were other persons in the surrounding districts which relied on Latta for their train service, amounting in all to about 1,200 souls. And it was argued that the convenience of this population required the stopping of an additional train and that several complaints had arisen because of the railway's failure to do so. In favor of the company, however, it was shown that there were numerous local trains stopping at Latta and one through train daily, each way. It was also possible to take a local train to a station twenty miles away, at which the fast train in question made a stop. Upon inquiry by the lower court as to the exact amount of inconvenience arising from the refusal of the company to stop its fastest train at such a small station, one witness replied that there were many complaints and a large number of persons

who wished to take the fast train at Latta; but, being pressed for exact figures, he said there were sometimes as many as four in one week. Upon this complete statement of facts, the Supreme Court ruled that, as long as the hamlet was well supplied with local train service and was already given one through train stop, a further order by the State to stop the fastest interstate train on the road would be an unwarrantable and unconstitutional interference with such traffic, under Section 8 of Article I. These cases show clearly the Court's willingness to ascertain all the facts of train service and accommodations, and upon the basis of these facts to judge of the reasonableness of a State rule which affects an interstate train.

State Wage Laws Applied to Interstate Companies.-In Erie Railroad v. John Williams, 233 U. S. 685; 1914, the State of New York was allowed to require the semi-monthly payment of the wages of railway employés, even when this applied to interstate railways employing persons wholly or partly within the State. The New York Act of 1907-8 was passed with the purpose of protecting employés from the practice of withholding wages for a considerable time. It aimed to secure a reasonable frequency of payment, and to this end it provided that railway and certain other companies must pay their employés in cash, that no part of the payment should be in store orders, and that payment should be made semi-monthly. Williams was the Factory Inspector charged with the enforcement of the Act. The Erie Company claimed that the interstate law could not apply to those of its employés who were engaged in duties connected with interstate commerce, and particularly not to those who were employed partly in New York and partly in other States. The company contended that such an application of the law would violate the commerce clause of the Constitution by interfering with the Federal power over interstate trade. The Supreme Court rejected the company's contention, and upheld the law on the ground that such a burden as it imposed upon interstate commerce was negligible and indirect. This slight burden, the Court commented, might be removed at any time if Congress chose to regulate the matter, but meanwhile the State might properly protect the interest of its residents by legislating on this question. "It is not necessary to review and compare the cases in which this court has pointed out the difference between a direct and indirect burden of state legislation upon interstate commerce, or the power of the states in the absence of regulation by Congress. It is enough to say in the present case that Congress has not acted, and there is not, therefore, that impediment to the law of the state; nor is there prohibition in the character of the burden. The effect of the provision is merely administrative, and so far as it affects interstate commerce, it does so indirectly."

State Prohibition Laws and Interstate Business.-Some of the

most interesting constitutional questions in this field have arisen from the liquor laws of the States when applied to shipments coming from other commonwealths. They have raised the problemWhere is the dividing line between national and State trade? Much depends upon the precise moment at which the large volume of goods flowing into a State ceases to be subject to the control of Congress and comes under the jurisdiction of the State government. An interesting example of this came up in 1890 in the case of Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 1890. The State of Iowa having adopted a prohibition law which forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors, and Leisy having brought beer in sealed packages into the State, the beer was seized under the Iowa State law. Leisy, the owner, contended that the beer was still a part of interstate commerce, and as such it was subject, not to State law, but to the Federal control. He claimed that the State action in seizing the beer was unconstitutional, because the State had no right to prohibit interstate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld the owner in this contention and declared that so long as goods transported from one State to another were still in the "original package" or bundle, unsold, in which they had been shipped into the State, they remained a part of interstate commerce and as such were subject only to Federal, not State, regulation. This is known as "the original package decision" because it adopts as the dividing line between State and interstate commerce the package of shipment. When this package or bundle is sold or broken or part of its contents taken out, it ceases to be the "original" package and immediately becomes part of State commerce and therefore subject to State regulation. Until this takes place it remains in national commerce and cannot be prohibited by a State.

The Wilson Act.-Naturally this decision was regarded as a defeat for the prohibition States and they immediately pressed for a Federal law which would remedy the situation by conferring upon each commonwealth the authority to regulate, regardless of the original package. To this end Congress in the same year, 1890, passed the Wilson Act providing that intoxicating liquors shipped into any State for use there, "shall upon arrival in such State or Territory, be subjected to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, . . . and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."

This law, passed in pursuance of the strong prohibition sentiment in the West, remained on the statute books for twenty-three years, during which time it was freely evaded with impunity. It raised some serious constitutional questions between the national and State governments, in deciding which, the Court established important new principles. The first problem was-can Congress in this way allow the States to regulate commerce in such a manner as to interfere with the free flow of national trade from State to State?

This question was presented in the case of Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; 1891. Rahrer was a liquor dealer in Topeka, Kansas, prohibition territory, acting as agent for a Missouri firm. He received from Missouri and sold in the original package a pony keg of beer and a pint of whiskey. Upon being arrested under the State prohibition law, he appealed from the decision of the Kansas courts to the national Supreme Court, and claimed immunity from conviction and punishment. He admitted having received the liquor from another State and having sold it in Kansas in violation of the State prohibition law. He further admitted that under the Wilson Act this would be a punishable offence, since the liquor having been received by him, it had "arrived within the State" and was therefore subject to the State police regulation under the Wilson law. But, claimed Rahrer, the Wilson Act itself is unconstitutional, in that it permits a State to interfere with national commerce. Article I, Section I, of the Constitution declares that-"All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." The undoubted meaning of this clause is that Congress, and Congress only, shall exercise the legislative power of the United States, subject to the President's veto. Any attempt by Congress to give or grant or delegate away to the States the legislative authority which the Constitution has conferred upon Congress itself, is therefore a violation of the Constitution, and is void. Does the Wilson Act commit this fault? In order to prove that it did Rahrer in his petition set forth that there were two kinds of interstate trade-first-local matters which the States in the absence of Congressional regulation might themselves provide for as we have already seen, but the second class was national not local in its nature, and could therefore be regulated only by Congress, and as the court had said in Bowman v. Chicago Railway Company, 121 U. S. 465; 1888, if Congress did not regulate this national type of trade, which necessarily required uniformity of treatment, then it must be understood that Congress wished this trade to be free from regulation and no State action was allowed. Pursuing this thought one step farther, Rahrer contended that under no circumstances could Congress give away to the States its control over this national class of trade which required uniformity, for in doing so, it would be delegating its legislative authority, and thereby violating the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court rendered by Chief Justice Fuller was that Congress could certainly not delegate its power but that the Wilson Act was not such a delegation of power.

"No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so." . . . "Congress did not use terms of permission to the State to act, but simply removed an impediment to