the enforcement of the State laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part. It imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction." Accordingly the Wilson Act was constitutional and the conviction under the State law was upheld.

The next question under the Act was-when have intoxicating liquors "arrived within the State?" This problem was solved by the decision in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; 1898. The Iowa law prohibits the transportation within the State, of intoxicating liquors without a permit or certificate from the county auditor. Rhodes was a station-agent of a railway company, and he knowingly received and cared for a shipment of intoxicating liquors sent from outside the State to a consignee in Iowa. He had not yet delivered the goods but had taken them from the train and stored them in the warehouse on the station platform. He had, therefore, assisted in their transportation. At this point, and before delivery they were seized by a constable, and Rhodes was fined $100 for violation of the State prohibition law. Upon appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court the question presented was whether under the Wilson Act the goods had "arrived within the State," and had therefore become subject to the State laws. The Court had already, in Bowman v. Chicago Railway Company, held that the Federal authority was exclusive so long as the goods were in course of shipment or in actual transit, that is, a State prohibition or police law could not take effect until the interstate shipment had been completed. The Federal Government could regulate them up to this point, but not the States. The Wilson Act, the court held, had simply made the State law apply one stage earlier, by divesting the commerce of its interstate nature when it "arrived." "Arrived" cannot mean at the State boundary for this would prohibit any transportation into the State. Yet the rest of the Wilson Act clearly shows that it was intended to apply to goods which were "transported into" a State. What was the purpose of the Wilson Act? Clearly not to authorize the States to stop interstate trains at their boundaries, but rather to remedy the Leisy v. Hardin decision of 1890. The emphasis, therefore, ruled the court, is to be placed upon the repeal of the "original package" part of that decision-shipments shall not be exempt from State laws by reason of having been introduced in original packages or otherwise,-showing that the goods were to be "introduced," not stopped at the boundary. As a result of this reasoning, the court concluded that "arrived" meant having reached the consignee, and that up to that point the goods had not "arrived," but were still in interstate commerce, were under the protection of the United States government, and were accordingly not subject to State regulation. The package having never been delivered to the consignee, but rather seized by the constable

before delivery, the goods in question had therefore not arrived within the State, and Rhodes could not be held for having violated the State law, since he handled the goods before their arrival and not after. This decision has been severely criticized in all the prohibition States, and it has been claimed that the Supreme Court should have taken the plain meaning of the Act and interpreted "arrived" to mean "reached the boundary," in order that each State might effectually prohibit the entrance into its territory of an article which it considered both obnoxious and dangerous. Undoubtedly the decision did open the way for a general violation of the State prohibitory laws. Notable instances of this are shown in the Kentucky Local Option Act of 1902, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Adams Express Company v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129; 1907. The Kentucky law provided that shipments of intoxicating liquors to be paid for on delivery, commonly called C. O. D. shipments, into any local option county, city or town, should be deemed sales of such articles at the place where such money was paid, or the goods delivered. Such sales were forbidden. In spite of this Act a package of one gallon of whiskey was shipped from Cincinnati, Ohio, to East Bernstadt, Kentucky, to G. W. Meece. Meece had not ordered the whiskey, and testified that he was not expecting any, but was informed that it was at the company's office, consigned to him. He accordingly requested the company's agent to hold it until the following Saturday, when he would call and pay for it. This he did. The company was prosecuted under the Kentucky Act, but appealed to the Supreme Court. It was held that an express company was a common carrier; that it was its duty to accept any recognized article of commerce in one State and ship it to another; that the company could be, and in fact had been in the past, forced to accept such shipments, and that intoxicating liquors being heretofore a recognized article of commerce, the company had a legal right to engage in such shipment from State to State. As a part of this right it could also legally carry goods which had been paid for or for which the payment was to be made, upon delivery. It was a customary part of the express company's business to deliver C. O. D. in all parts of the United States, and the company in shipping liquors C. O. D. and collecting the price of the same in prohibition territory, was not "selling" goods in such territory. Finally, following the decision in Rhodes' case, the Court held that until Meece, the consignee, actually received the goods, the interstate shipment had not been completed, that is, the goods had not arrived within the State, and were therefore not yet subject to the State prohibition law. A similar decision was rendered in another prosecution of the Adams Company, in Express Company v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218; 1909, where the company's agent knowingly delivered intoxicating liquors to an inebriate and was exempted from prosecution under the State law on the ground that the liquors had been shipped from another State.

Meanwhile, the prohibition sentiment had been growing steadily stronger. The area of the United States subject to local option laws had become larger than that in which the sale of liquor was allowed, and the Democratic party having secured a majority in two successive elections, the decision to amend the Wilson Act swept all before it. In February, 1913, the Webb Bill was passed, providing that the interstate transportation of intoxicants into any State in violation of its police laws, is prohibited. The bill was vetoed by the President on the ground of unconstitutionality, both President Taft and Attorney-General Wickersham holding that Congress could not delegate to the States the power to banish interstate trade in intoxicating liquors; but both Houses immediately passed the bill over the President's veto. The intended effect of the Act is to allow the States to stop and seize any shipment of intoxicating liquors which crosses their boundaries in violation of their police laws. The reasoning in favor of the law which seems strong, is that Congress has always allowed the States to protect themselves against disease, contamination and other dangers, even though these dangers exist in interstate commerce. A State, for example, may establish a quarantine at its boundaries to prevent the entrance from other States of persons with a dangerous contagious disease. Congress may supplant these State quarantines whenever it wishes, but it has thus far allowed them to exist, despite their regulative effect on interstate commerce. How much more then can Congress allow the States to protect their people against the ravages of drunkenness even though, in so doing, they may prevent the entrance of intoxicating liquor, an article which in the judgment of their legislators is dangerous in the extreme. If the act is held to be constitutional however, it may open the way for a host of other laws submitting interstate trade to State interference-a result that must prove most harmful.

State Regulation of Correspondence Schools. In the recent case of International Text Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; 1910, the Court attempted to set a limit to State regulation of national trade. The International Correspondence School through its text book company, employed agents in the various States to solicit scholars and to collect money due for courses and for text books. The Kansas agent of the company who maintained an office within the State at his own expense was required by the State to pay the usual license fee exacted from foreign corporations transacting business within the State, but he refused to do so. Later, Pigg, a student, having failed to pay his tuition fees, was sued by the agent of the company. He defended his non-payment of dues on the ground that the company's agent had failed to pay the legal license fee to the State, and was therefore transacting business in the State in violation of the law. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, a decision was rendered against Pigg, in favor of the company, on the important ground that its business was interstate commerce.

The

This opinion marks a noteworthy step in the decisions in that it holds business intercourse by mail from State to State to be free from State licensing, inasmuch as it is interstate commerce. Court ruled that the transfer of lessons and lesson papers, the imparting of knowledge, the return of corrected papers, and the interchange of communications necessary thereto all formed a species of intercourse between States which was in every sense a form of national commerce, and, as such, was not subject to interference by a State. Certain other regulations by the States have been approved, even where they affected interstate commerce, when they were of a local nature, such as health quarantine for both animals and persons to prevent the introduction of epidemic diseases from other States; local rules governing the lights to be displayed by vessels in a harbor,-The frigate Gray v. the ship Fraser, 21 Howard, 184; 1859. The construction of a dam across a small creek, even though that creek was sometimes entered by a sloop coming from another State,-Wilson v. The Marsh Co., 2 Peters, 245, etc. This line of division between State and national regulation is further considered in the chapters on the Police Power and Constitutional Protections of Business.

Federal versus State Regulation.-The consideration of these decisions, which have been selected from various fields of regulation, seems to point toward the remedy for our present conflicting State rules, viz., a more extended uniform regulation by Congress over every part of the field of national trade which is now in danger of State control. So long as Congress abstains from setting up its own rules over national business the States will necessarily be forced by local public opinion to attempt regulation. And State regulation means conflict and confusion, with serious hindrance of interstate trade. This is doubly important in the case of carriers such as the railways, the express companies, and the telephone and telegraph companies, which are themselves the very means of transmitting commerce. In all of the decisions which we have considered, the Court where it permitted a State regulation to stand has expressly declared that it could be superseded at any moment by a national act on the subject. Contrary to the popular opinion on this question, we need not less legislation but more Federal laws with less State regulation of affairs which are in their nature national.

REFERENCES

BARNES AND MILNER: Selected Cases.

JUDSON: Interstate Commerce, Second Edition.

CALVERT: Regulation of Commerce under the Constitution.
WILLOUGHBY: Constitutional Law of the United States.

QUESTIONS

I. What is the practical importance to business men of the dividing line between State and interstate trade?

2. Have the States any authority whatever over interstate commerce?

3. John Doe is given a monopoly of aerial navigation in the State of Illinois as a recognition of his services in perfecting the aeroplane. Richard Roe flies into the State from Indiana and is sued by John Doe under the rights granted in his monopoly. Decide the case with reasons. Cite an authority.

4. California makes rules governing pilotage in the harbor of San Francisco. The captain of a vessel entering from another State refuses to obey these rules on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce, and that until Congress acts, no State has authority to regulate the matter. Decide the case with reasons and cite a precedent.

5. Explain the general principle laid down in Bowman v. Chicago R. R. Co., on the extent of State power over interstate trade.

6. Can a State bar out from its territory persons or animals afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease?

7. Can it forbid the use of stoves which it considers dangerous, on all trains within the State, and apply this prohibition to trains coming in from another Commonwealth? Reasons.

8. A State requires all persons acting as locomotive engineers on any trains in the State to pass a test for color blindness for which test a fee of $5 is charged. Will this Act apply to locomotive drivers on interstate trains coming into the State? Reasons.

9. Massachusetts attempts to forbid the sale of oleomargarine prepared in imitation of butter. Can the oleo manufacturers of other States sell their goods in Massachusetts in violation of the Act? Reasons.

IO. Can a State regulate interstate railway trains for the convenience of a citizen?

II.

Ohio requires all railways in the State to furnish a given number of trains daily to all towns on their routes with a population of 3,000 or over. Will such a regulation apply to an interstate line running through Ohio?

12.

Would the law be valid if it provided that all trains on all lines must be stopped at all county seats on the line? Reasons.

13. The railroad commission of a State orders the stopping of a through express on an interstate railway at a small town of one thousand inhabitants. The railway claims that this will interfere with the speed of its service and drive patrons to another competing line, also that the town in question has abundant railway facilities. Decide the constitutional question at issue with reasons and cite an authority.

14. What is an "original package" of interstate commerce?

15. What was the importance of this package in the Leisy Hardin decision? 16. What were the chief provisions of the Wilson Act and why was it passed? 17. How was it possible to evade the State prohibition laws under the Wilson Act?

18. Explain the court interpretation which made these evasions possible. 19. What is the chief provision of the Webb Act and how does it affect such evasions?

20.

What was Attorney General Wickersham's view of its constitutionality in 1913?

21.

Frame an argument in favor of its constitutionality.

22. In violation of the State law, an Express Company delivers liquor sent from Boston in C. O. D. shipment, to John Doe of Portland, which he had not ordered. The company is convicted, and appeals to the U. S. Supreme Court. What would be decided under the Webb Act?

23. Can the Kansas agent of a correspondence school situated in another State be compelled to take out a local license and pay a fee for the privilege of transacting business in Kansas? Reasons.

24. What are your impressions as to the effect of State regulations of interstate business?