a successor because the Senate, under the direction of the party leader, will refuse its approval; (c) the immense number of local officials in the counties, cities and townships are entirely exempt from his influence. A few States, such as Illinois and New York, have provided that the Governor may remove county sheriffs and district attorneys for cause after a public hearing but this is the exception rather than the rule. Many State constitutions also contain the harmless but useless provision that the Governor may, upon address by the State legislature, removed any State official. The value of such a clause is about equal to that of impeachment. Since the public interest lies in strengthening the Governor's hands in any contest which he may enter for the control of the State administration, it would seem wise to increase his power of removal and to extend it even over many of the elected officers in the municipalities with a proviso that such removal must be for cause and after a public hearing. If we brush aside the reasoning of the ultra-partisan and the extreme reformer, we must concede that it is as important that an officer be efficient as it is that he be honest. The mere placing in office of a respectable citizen is by no means a guarantee that the work entrusted to him will be satisfactorily done. On the contrary, we have too often found that the "respectable" man, in office, is content to allow his office to be used for purely partisan purposes and to turn a deaf ear to the urgent needs of the people for the enforcement of the law. In such cases the chief executive of the State should have the power to reach down into the locality and grant relief from intolerable conditions. It is no satisfactory answer to local needs to say that the people constantly have it in their power to better conditions by action at the polls. Every official elected in our local governments has sworn to obey and enforce the law of his State, and, regardless of party organizations or factions, he should be compelled to do so under pain of dismissal. The "Governor's Recall" of disobedient and neglectful officers would offer a powerful means of establishing new standards of service in all grades of public office.

General Executive Powers.-As chief executive of the State, the Governor is required "to see that the laws are faithfully administered." He receives complaints from citizens, supervises the work of the heads of departments, represents the State in its relations with the other commonwealths and with the National Government. As a rule, however, he is unable to watch the various departments as closely as he should, because of the loose and unsystematic way in which the offices are grouped, and, unless an official is guilty of serious maladministration or dishonesty he is not apt to attract the unfavorable notice of the chief. In fact, the executive having made his appointments largely for political reasons, is apt to retain officials in their places for the same reasons, regardless of their efficiency, as we have seen, unless public attention is called to some serious abuse in the office concerned. Removals for inefficiency

are almost unknown in State government, and since the power of removal can not be used, the supervision of the administration by its nominal chief does not exist. New York, Georgia, Montana and a few other States have authorized their Governors to conduct a thorough investigation into any State office at any time, an authority that may at least grow into further control and may be used to secure publicity and the aid of public opinion.

Although a Governor may not compel an elected official to perform his duties, nor force any fixed policy upon the great mass of boards and offices which make up the chaos of State administration, he does possess one power which is often used effectively to enforce the general regulative laws of the State; viz., his control over the attorney-generalship. That official is usually in closest personal and political association with the Governor and controls the prosecuting machinery of the central State government. In important conflicts between the State and the organized interests opposing regulation, his office can be used to enforce the laws in such a way as to command respect for the State administration. No corporation to-day enters such a conflict except as a last resort. In this way the chief law officer of the State has become a tower of strength to the executive.

A peculiar feature of the Governor's executive duties is his exofficio membership in a number of the chief administrative boards of the State; a large share of his time and attention is taken up with the work of these bodies. The reason for this custom is that the legislature, when regulating a new subject, may wish to avoid the additional expense incurred in a new office, and may assign the duty to a number of existing officers acting as a committee or board. Almost invariably the Governor is made a member of this new body. One of our commonwealth executives has calculated that he might devote his entire time to the duties of the boards of which he was officially a member. Yet most of these bodies have important work to perform and the fact that the Governor is unable to be present shows that a new arrangement should be made or new departments created. Following are some of the boards in which the Governor takes an active part when his other duties allow:

Board of Agriculture,

Trustee of State Library,

Commissioners of Public Grounds and Buildings,

Commission of Soldiers' Orphan Schools,

Armory Board,

College and University Council,

State Live Stock Sanitary Board,

Numerous Boards of Trustees of Colleges and Schools.

General Problems of State Administration. In the rapid increase of State powers the legislatures created large numbers of new offices, and the suddenness of the change made it difficult to

establish any harmonious organization between the newly established authorities, or to bring them into close relations with the chief executive. The most pressing, urgent needs were always satisfied by the simple creation of an office. The working out of a "system" was left to circumstances. We are now beginning to feel the need of some unity between the different parts. This shows itself in two features of our State administration:

1. The necessity of a systematic grouping of the offices in departments;

2. The need of a strong control by the Governor.

The lack of a systematic grouping of State offices has prevented successful management. In theory the Governor oversees all officials but in practice this is impossible. Modern governments are much like machinery, there is in each the same tendency to needless friction, the same necessity for accurate adjustment of the wearing parts, and even the same inert inclination to "run down' unless constantly impelled by that expansive force which in physics is called steam, in politics public opinion. But this force, to be effective, must be concentrated. It cannot be trivially or indiscriminately "squirted" at any or all parts of the governmental machine, causing them to work in unison; it must be guided and led along direct straight lines. This is the rightful function of the chief executive-he should represent the guiding force of public opinion, he must personify the people in their political feelings. If any part of the complicated structure is out of order, if any wheel is slowing down, then and there his influence should make itself felt. In order to do this, the administrative offices must be grouped and subordinated to each other as is done in any business organization. We are too prone to say that all depends on the personality of the chief, that if he is an energetic, capable and honest man, his spirit will in some measure dominate the whole administrative force, while if he is incapable, no amount of "system" will produce results. Such a statement is only half true, for a "system" is the means through which the influence of the chief makes itself steadily and regularly felt. Can we imagine the President of a great railway company appointing thousands of officials, all of them independent of each other, when by choosing a cabinet of six, and subordinating all the others to these, he can secure greater efficiency? The business plan of organization has its weaknesses, but it also has one indispensable feature of modern management-definite responsibility. We have completely ignored this principle in our State administration.

One hundred men may be necessary to govern a small community, but much depends upon the way in which this personnel is grouped. If the entire hundred are divided into ten separate groups each completely independent of the other and performing its duties regardless of the others, the administration of the community is doomed to failure. Nor is it otherwise with the State govern

ments. With each decade the government of the commonwealth must respond to demands of greater scope and importance. To this end the Governor must stand in the same relation to the executive force of his State as does the President towards the Federal administration. This is possible only where the offices are so arranged that he may hold a few heads of departments responsible for the action of the entire force. But the Governors of some States are now charged with the appointment and direct supervision of thirty to fifty important, independent officers and boards, besides which some of the most prominent officials are elected by the people and are therefore not subordinate to the Governor at all. Under such a plan the Governor cannot control the State administration. His dilemma is increased by his abject dependence on the party leader, as we shall see. Yet a personnel two hundred times as great is directed by the President of the United States through the agency of ten responsible heads. There is never any doubt as to who is the real chief of the national administration.

Several of the commonwealths are now devoting serious attention to this problem. The Wisconsin board of public affairs has been authorized to examine in detail the powers of the various State offices to ascertain duplications and conflicts of authority and to recommend a regrouping and reorganization of State offices. Many proposals have been made looking toward the unifying and concentration of reponsibility. The simplest and most effective plan would be to abandon the method of electing administrative officers and make them all appointive by the Governor; to reorganize the State offices under a few department heads as in the National Government, making these heads the Governor's cabinet. Such departments should be grouped to include every State office now in existence. For example:

State and internal affairs, including public works.
Justice.

Treasury, including all State finances and the supervision of banks, insurance companies, etc.

Manufacturing and commerce.

Labor, including arbitration, factory inspection and other labor matters.

Education, comprising public schools, universities, colleges, etc. Public service, including public utility companies.

Agriculture.

Public safety, including health, State police, militia.

Charities and correction.

Political Position of the Governor.-If the Governor ruled his party he would be the strongest influence in the State, for the control of the party and of the government are inseparable; no one can be the real head of the latter unless he is also the party leader. Glancing over the principal States we find that only in the rarest

exceptions does the Governor occupy this position; almost invariably he is under the thumb of a great party chieftain who is "the power behind the throne" and who either prefers to occupy a seat in the United States Senate or not to hold office at all. This man is the State administration; all appointments are made after consultation with him, and he also determines which bills shall pass the State legislature. Naturally he prefers to place in the Governor's chair a person who will be agreeable to his wishes, who will consider the party interests and, especially, help to build up the leader's influence within the party. It is clear that a Governor who is young, ambitious and determined to seek power for himself is not desired by "the chief" who much prefers a man advanced in years, or of satisfied ambitions, and amiable qualities— in short, a man of the "honored citizen" type. Such was for many years the political position and influence of the State Executivea nominal authority controlled by a "king maker," who was the real head of the State.

The Struggle Between the Governor and the Party Leader.-Into this peculiar political situation a new factor has entered in the shape of the demand for greater State activity. The first effect was apparently to strengthen the party leader; all classes of the people desiring legislation must first secure his consent and aid. But little by little the desired laws are being enacted and it is now seen that their efficacy depends on the executive. The Governor springs into greater prominence after every legislative attempt at regulation; with the adoption of factory, health, pure food, corporation laws, and a host of other measures his nominal power increases, until a point is reached where he can no longer withstand the temptation to assert some slight degree of independence and feel himself indeed, as in name, the chief executive. If he is a strong man, or a consummate politician, or if the conditions of the moment prove especially favorable, he subordinates the State executive offices, one after the other, to his own control, and even reaches out towards the legislature to form a mutual understanding or alliance with the party leaders; in short, to become the real head of his party. In all this long struggle he is opposed by the forces of the old party system and supported by the strength of popular demands for government efficiency. These demands are growing stronger but they are still unsteady and spasmodic; the struggle results now in favor of the executive, now in favor of the old leaders. In spite of temporary set-backs, the conflict is gradually coming out into the open, and the real power tends to pass slowly into the hands of the Governor. This is the significance of the constant turmoil and political unrest in our commonwealth administration; we are evolving a responsible form of State government.

Military. The Governor is Commander in Chief of the State militia and appoints the commanding officers, the Adjutant General and a staff of aides, whose duties as a rule are not onerous.