He may order out any portion of the State militia or national guard which is required to maintain order in any district. The request for troops is usually made by the Sheriff of the county, although the Governor may act without such a request. Some of the commonwealths have also established a force of State police to avoid delays, expense and political antagonisms incident to calling out the militia; the officers of the police are in such cases chosen by the Governor and the force is under his orders.

A State Police.-Pennsylvania, by Act of May 2, 1905, has provided a State constabulary for this purpose. At the head is a superintendent of State police appointed for four years. His office is at the capitol and he is assisted by a deputy and a small office force. The superintendent appoints the members of the four companies or platoons, each with a captain, lieutenant, five sergeants and fifty men. Applicants are required to pass a physical and mental examination based on the rules of the police force of large cities. All the members are mounted. The force is distributed through the State in local headquarters, usually in the mining districts. Its members are given the usual authority of policemen to make arrests without warrants for violation of law which they witness and to serve and execute warrants issued by the proper authorities. They are also authorized to act as forest, fire and game wardens and are directed to co-operate with the local authorities in detecting crime, apprehending criminals and preserving order. The expenses are born by the State.

The results of this plan have been such as to commend it strongly to other commonwealths. The State police inspire respect, they are non-political, and their efficiency is far greater than either the militia or the local police forces.

The Governor may in most States suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times of disorder. By doing so he enables the militia to protect life and property and to avoid the many grounds on which judicial interference with military action may be invoked. Martial law, however, is only proclaimed for those sections immediately affected by hostilities and only so long as the hostilities exist. The State executive is loth to make use of this power because of the great unpopularity which it entails. For the same reason most of the sheriffs are unwilling to call for State troops, preferring to cope with riots and disorders by the aid of local police forces and posses.

Judicial. The Governor possesses the power to pardon for offences against the State laws, in some States upon the recommendation of a board of pardons, which board is composed of heads of departments such as the Attorney General, Secretary, etc. Clemency extends only to offences against the State laws. The Governor also grants extradition of fugitive criminals and requests extradition from other State executives. Though the Federal Constitution, in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2, requires the delivery of such

criminals by the authorities of the State to which they have fled, to the Governor of the State where the crime was committed, there is no way fixed by the Constitution to compel such delivery, consequently the extradition cannot be forced but is entirely a matter of courtesy between the two executives.1

In Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 Howard, 66; 1860, the above cited clause of the Constitution came to the Supreme Court for interpretation. A resident of Kentucky had assisted a slave to escape and had himself fled to Ohio. Such an act was a crime under the laws of Kentucky, and the Governor of that State accordingly demanded of Governor Dennison of Ohio that the fugitive be delivered up to the Kentucky authorities. The demand being refused, Kentucky brought suit against Dennison, as Governor of Ohio, and required him to deliver up the fugitive according to the Federal Constitution. In order to hasten the execution of Section 2 of Article 4, Congress had passed an Act in 1793 declaring "It shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, and notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demands, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear." These words in the Act, "it shall be the duty," the Supreme Court said in ordinary legislation, imply the assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience. But looking to the subject-matter of this law, and the relations which the United States and the several States bear to each other, the court is of the opinion, the words 'It shall be the duty' were not used as mandatory and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty which this compact created, when Congress had provided the mode of carrying it into execution. The Act does not provide any means to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a power would place every State under the control and dominion of the General Government, even in the administration of its internal concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the State, and might impose upon him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by the State.

1 "A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."

"It is true that Congress may authorize a particular State officer to perform a particular duty; but if he declines to do so, it does not follow that he may be coerced or punished for his refusal. And we are far from supposing, that in using the word 'duty' the statesmen who framed and passed the law, or the President who approved and signed it, intended to exercise a coercive power over State officers not warranted by the Constitution."

This is a plain statement of the fact that there is no means to compel a State authority to grant extradition. The decision has been strictly followed since 1860, and in all too numerous instances the State executives have used their discretion in granting extradition even when such serious crimes as murder were involved. This practice points to a serious defect in our Constitutional law. There is no longer any reason why a criminal or a person accused of crime should be free from prosecution because of the unwillingness of an executive officer to deliver him to the proper authorities for trial. An enlargement of the Federal jurisdiction to cover such cases would inspire greater respect for the law.

The Legislature.-Probably no body of men in America exerts legal powers of such vital importance to the business community as those wielded by the State legislature. Our form of government makes the State the great reservoir of authority; the legislature therefore possesses practically every power which has not been forbidden in the State or National Constitution. Originally the State legislatures were looked upon with great favor and confidence by the people because they were the legitimate successors of those colonial assemblies which had so valiantly and faithfully protected the rights of the colonists. But the turnpike, canal and railroad companies which were floated in the first half of the 19th century persuaded many of the legislatures to guarantee dividends on the company stock. Other similar ventures and mistakes soon destroyed the popular confidence, and brought a strong reaction of distrust and suspicion against the legislature, which unfortunately continues with cause, to the present day. The real difficulty lies in the ease with which secret intrigues and deals may be consummated in the law-making bodies of the State, because of the large number of members and the methods of transacting and concealing the transaction of legislative business. In the bewildering mass of bills and resolutions and from the way in which they are shuffled like cards in a pack, it is impossible for the public to distinguish the good from the bad and unless a measure is conspicuously good or bad there is small chance of its attracting attention. The occupations, pursuits, and even the education and general training of the members are neither above nor below that of the people. This single fact, which has been pointed out by Professor Reinsch, in his excellent work on the American Legislatures, explodes two political theories, first, the belief of the fathers of the government that the legislative bodies of the commonwealths

would be composed of men far above the average in wisdom, judgment, discretion and qualities of leadership; and second, the modern critical thought that because of the inferior type of laws which are turned out by these bodies, they must be composed of the lower elements of the people. Neither of these assumptions is correct. In truth, as we shall see later, the vital essential need is for greater responsibility, and it is upon this principle that we must build, in order to strengthen our legislative bodies.

but

Houses of the Legislature. The upper House or Senate usually consists of about fifty members while the lower or House of Representatives has from one hundred to two hundred members.1 The qualifications for office and for voters are usually the same in both and even the term of office is sometimes identical. The members are paid in most of the States, $1,500 being the salary in New York and Pennsylvania. The regular sessions as a rule are held every two years and there is often a limit placed by the State constitution upon the length of the session. The purpose of this limit is to prevent the legislature from doing any more harm than is necessary it has acted in the opposite direction in countless instances. Little legislation is enacted at the outset of any session because the bills have not yet been considered in committee nor have they been molded into form to secure legislative approval. The first half of the session usually goes by without any important legislation whatsoever. This means that if there is a sixty-day limit set by the Constitution, all action is taken in the last thirty days, so that in this brief period an immense mass of private and public bills are technically "considered" but really are rushed through both Houses, oftentimes under the suspension of the rules and without any knowledge by the members as to the real purpose and effect of the measures which they have passed. Like so many other constitutional limitations on the legislature the sixty or ninety-day clause has done more harm than good.

Procedure. The procedure is modelled on that of Congress, but the control of the Speaker, floor leaders, and caucus over all bills and over the members themselves, is far more tyrannical than in Congress. This control is corruptly and flagrantly abused, because of the lack of public attention and understanding. In the obscurity of State procedure the manipulator finds his protection. The State party "organization" is even more intolerant of opposition than in

1 Here is the weak spot in the legislatures. They are too large to be responsible. Delaware has the smallest Senate-15 members; Minnesota the largest63. New Hampshire is able to get along with 24 Senators but has 402 members in the lower House! New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois have 50 or 51 in the Senate and 150 (N. Y.) to 207 (Pa.) in the House. There is no need either for the two Houses or for a large number of members in any State.

2 In many of the States it is customary to have the Senate term double that of the House. In New York where there are annual sessions the House is elected for one year, the Senate for two; in most of the other commonwealths the terms are two and four years respectively.

the national body; it ignores the rules, or changes or violates them at will, and its officers and committeemen in control of the legislature use their powers directly and openly in favor of the leaders whom they represent. Measures which lack a majority vote are declared "passed," words and whole clauses are added to or dropped from bills, after they have been passed, by clerical "mistakes." The courts take the ground that such changes are validated by the signatures of the presiding officers attesting the passage of the bills. Committee meetings are called suddenly or when the opposition are not present, bills are smothered in committee or "lost" and the whole gamut of trickery and chicanery is run in the attempt to block and thwart popular measures opposed by the "organization" and to force through laws in behalf of some private interest. The members of the legislature may fairly represent the average honesty and intelligence of the people, but without the stimulus of individual responsibility and public attention we cannot expect them to enact laws of a high standard nor to withstand the pressure of powerful special interests. Restrictions on Legislative Powers.-The recklessness of party control of the legislature has led all the States to impose an extensive series of limits and restrictions on legislative powers and procedure:

(a) The strict prohibition of special legislation where a general Act will cover the subject, and a detailed setting forth of the kinds of special and local laws which may be passed.1

(b) The enactment in the Constitution itself of much ordinary legislation on important subjects, such as corporations, local option, public service utilities, etc.

(c) Every bill must relate to one subject only, which must be clearly expressed in the title of the bill. The purpose of this provision is to block the practice formerly prevalent of attaching snake clauses and riders to meritorious provisions with which they were in no way connected. The friends of the meritorious measure were then obliged to defeat their own bill or to accept the obnoxious amendments dealing with other subjects.

(d) A majority of the members elected to each House, not a simple majority of those present, must vote in favor of a bill to insure its passage.

(e) On finance bills involving appropriations or taxation, twothirds of the members elected must approve.

(f) On the final reading of a measure the "ayes" and "noes" must be entered in the journal.

(g) In all except six of the States the legislature is allowed to meet only once in two years except at the call of the Governor.

Yet these severe constitutional restrictions have not prevented the legislature from sacrificing public welfare to special interest

1 Prof. Reinsch mentions the interesting fact that in California and Ohio the constitutions specify over thirty subjects on which special laws may not be enacted. American Legislatures, p. 150.