ing on all parties mentioned in the writ. Any person disobeying this writ is liable to immediate arrest and punishment for contempt of court, either by fine or imprisonment or both. The injunction is often asked for by the Executive to compel obedience to a law, one of the most notable instances being the celebrated labor case In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, decided 1895, which arose in the Pullman strike in Chicago in 1894 already described above. In this case Eugene V. Debs, President of the American Railway Union, on the petition of the U. S. District Attorney was enjoined by the United States Circuit Court, from combining or conspiring with other persons to obstruct the rails, tracks, engines and trains of certain railways engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying United States mails. Debs and other members of the American Railway Union and "All other persons" were forbidden by the injunction from so conspiring to commit such damage to property and to the mails. After the injunction was issued the violence continued and Debs and four of his fellow officers in the Union accused of disobedience to the injunction, were brought before the Circuit Court, and on December 14, 1894, they were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for terms varying from three to six months. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which upheld the lower court in all respects and declared the injunction to have been properly issued in order to protect the property of the United States and to prevent interference with the postal laws.

The use of the courts to enforce Federal laws has now become the principal mainstay of the Executive when faced by serious opposition. The employment of the military inevitably creates a deep and painful impression on the public at large, while with those in resistance it leaves an irritation and a rankling hostility to the constituted government which require years to overcome. Rather than have direct resort to physical force, therefore, the Executive usually appeals directly to the courts and secures the added prestige of a court order, executed by the United States marshal. Should a weak Executive avoid the issue, and fail to enforce the laws, the private parties affected must then undertake the burden of securing a writ from the proper court. Many of the injunctions issued by our courts would be unnecessary if the proper executive officials took upon themselves the full powers and duties conferred by law.

V. Command of Military and Naval Forces. To many it may seem that the war powers of the President should be ranked first in importance; they are unquestionably the most extensive in scope and irresistible in sway, placing him in the position of a temporary dictator. Yet they are but temporary. What a striking proof of this is furnished by the wars of 1861 and 1898! From the command

1 The question of army administration is discussed in the Chapter on The War Power of Congress.

of hundreds of thousands of men this power fell within one or two years to the control of a handful in the regular army; from the unquestioned military sway over the lives, property and liberty of millions of people in 1861-65, the central authority shrank to a joint legislative and executive control over a few districts in the South, waiting to be re-incorporated in the Union. Great and irresponsible as are the military powers of the President, imminent as seems the possibility that he may in time of crisis violate even the Constitution itself, we must acknowledge that the tide of power ebbs even more swiftly than it rises, leaving the President with more prestige perhaps, but with no increase of authority. Public opinion demands the reduction of military expenses and the return to their homes of the men who have volunteered for the war. In the face of this demand no scheme for military dictatorship could survive.

Of the remaining powers of the President, three deserve special mention, his message to Congress, his veto power, and his duty to protect a State against invasion and domestic violence.

The Annual Message.-The President's influence on law-making has not developed along that line which at first glance seems to offer the most natural means of growth, that is, his annual message. The value of the message has even declined. The annual communications of earlier Presidents were documents of the highest importance. They were in very fact "information of the state of Union," to quote the words of the Constitution and as such received the grave consideration of the Congress, being answered and discussed ofttimes in detail. And to the people at large the President's message was "information.”

The roads and means of communication of the country at the time were so undeveloped that a large percentage of the people received their first official news of important national questions from the President's message; but the telegraph and the hourly newspaper edition have removed us far from this state of affairs and the message may now only be called "information" by courtesy. Not only is it devoid of news, but it is intentionally made so general in character as often to lose point; sometimes it does not even "recommend . . . such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," but simply calls the attention of Congress to a situation in such a tone as to imply that the legislature had the entire responsibility for the measures to be taken. This apparent anxiety to avoid any possible suggestion of interference with the prerogatives of the legislature might appear almost ironical in view of the attempts made by the Executive to influence legislation; but there is a certain consistency in the attitude. The legislative efforts of the President are often indirect and even secret. Individual Congressmen are willing and even

1 The military power to govern territories acquired by war is also only temporary.

glad to represent the views of the Executive, but Congress as a body immediately resents any open or public attempt to dictate laws; and while the whole substance of things now points to executive leadership in legislation, the form of Congressional independence and sovereignty must be scrupulously maintained. The real importance of a message is now to be seen not in the annual communication sent to Congress in December, but on occasions when a special session is called or when the President sends a special note to Congress, dealing with a single occurrence requiring immediate legislative action. Good recent examples of this are President McKinley's and Wilson's tariff messages at the special sessions in March, 1897 and 1913, and President Roosevelt's note to the Senate regarding the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty in the special Senate session early in 1903. In all these cases the communication led to action by the bodies addressed. Paradoxical as it seems, the reason for diminished value of the President's message lies in the increased influence of the Executive and his closer relations with Congress. So long as he remained in a position of "magnificent isolation," his formal communications with Congress must necessarily be important, signifying as they did his principal if not his sole positive means of touching the field of prospective law-making. But since the President has left this pedestal of isolation and now undertakes to participate freely and informally in the legislative program of the time, his authority can be made a thousandfold more effective by the personal "conference" at the White House than by a ponderous and formal message. Instead of addressing Congress from a distance each new President now sends for the party leaders and tells them politely but clearly what should be done. And it is done.

What then, is the real importance of the message to-day? Briefly, it is that of an annual proclamation to the country at large, setting forth what the President believes to be the principal problems of the time. President Wilson revived the business-like method of personally reading his communications on important subjects to the assembled House and Senate. If, as now seems probable, greater emphasis were put upon the special message, limited to a single subject and presenting a pointed definite suggestion on that subject, the legislative influence of the President's communications would be greatly enhanced.

The Veto.-As a bill passes each House of Congress it is signed by the presiding officer, the signature being attested by the clerk or secretary. Having passed both, it is sent to the President and signed and dated by him; the date which he gives it determines the time at which it becomes law unless the bill itself provides otherwise. If the President vetoes it, he writes upon it simply the word "veto" (I forbid) and returns it to the house in which it originated with a brief summary of his reasons. According to Article I, Section VII, Clause II, the President is given 10 days, not counting

Sundays, in which to sign or veto a bill. If he takes no action in that time and Congress is still in session the bill becomes a law without his signature but if Congress has adjourned within the ten-day period and thereby prevented him from returning it, the bill fails of enactment. This is the "pocket veto." Some of the earlier Presidents considered that the purpose of the veto was to prevent the passage of unconstitutional legislation, but our later executives have taken the broader view that the President may use his right on any ground of public policy that he sees fit, and that it is his duty to act as an independent factor in legislation. These same Presidents, notably Cleveland, Taft and Roosevelt, have frequently forced the amendment of pending bills in Congress by letting it be known that they would veto the measures unless changed to conform with the executive views. While the simple statement of this power seems arbitrary, it has not been so used by the executives in question but has rather been employed by them to hold the majority legislators to a stricter observance of the party's pledges.

Protection of States.-The duty of the President to protect the States against invasion and domestic violence is founded upon Section 4 of Article 4 of the Constitution which provides:

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the Executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.'

Under the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Congress may decide when a republican form of government exists in a State, by means of its power to admit the Senators and Representatives from that State to their seats in the respective Houses of Congress; the question as to who has the duty and power to interfere in a State to guarantee the republican form must also be answered in favor of Congress, as in the case of the Reconstruction of the Southern States. Congress has also provided by law for the occasion and manner in which the President may intervene to repel invasion and suppress domestic violence upon the application of the Executive or the legislature of the State.1

The Cabinet. The American Cabinet, like that of Great Britain, is not a formal legal body recognized by statute; it is a weekly gathering of the heads of the ten executive departments for report and conference with the President. The members meet in the President's office and are seated about a central table in the order in which their respective departments were created by law, and their reports are usually heard in this order unless events of special importance in one department should cause a deviation from the customary program. The Secretary of State is seated upon the

1A brief, interesting discussion of this subject is found in Chapter III of Woodburn's The American Republic and Its Government.

President's right, the Secretary of the Treasury upon the left of the President and so on, the order of precedence being as follows:

The affairs brought up for discussion are selected from the few most important matters in each department. Formal motions or resolutions are not made but a full and free expression of opinion is invited. At the close of the meeting a brief memorandum of the action agreed upon is usually communicated to the press. An interesting feature of the Cabinet is the combination of Business and Politics represented in its personnel. Our Presidents are obliged to enlist the political support of doubtful States and of doubtful factions in the party by allying the leaders with the administration. One of the best ways of doing this is by appointment to the Cabinet. But it is also necessary to have certain important departments headed by men with special administrative ability regardless of their prominence or insignificance in the party leadership. While it is conceivable that a group of capable business and professional men might administer national affairs so efficiently as to deserve general approval, the President's Cabinet must not only deserve but also secure approval; that is, some of its members must be skilled in the art of winning popular sympathy and support. The only regular organization for expressing this support is the party. In England this distinctly political phase of the Cabinet is even more pronounced than in the United States. All the leading English politicians of the majority party are necessarily made official members of "the Government." In America the President has developed the practice of securing political counsel from all sections of his party regardless of membership in the Cabinet; the latter body is gradually taking on more of an administrative character, and discusses distinctly executive rather than political questions. Another important difference between the American and British Cabinets is the custom of American department heads of managing their departments in fact as well as in theory, while the British chiefs rely almost entirely upon their assistants for the ordinary conduct of business. This partly explains the short term of service of most American officials. Such men as have the executive capacity and willingness required to manage a department are in great demand outside the public service.

In our own country the Cabinet takes no political responsibility for the acts of the President; if a department head does well or ill the praise or blame falls on the President. If the President makes a mistake he reaps the results. Nor is there any Cabinet unity or "solidarity" as the Europeans call it, that is our Cabinet does not stand or fall together as a body, each individual is appointed