"The object of a free civil government," says Chief Justice Parsons, "is the promotion and security of the happiness of the citizens. These effects cannot be produced, but by the knowledge and practice of our moral duties, which comprehend all the social and civil obligations of man to man, and of the citizen to the state. If the civil magistrate in any state, could procure, by his regulations, a uniform practice of these duties, the government of that state would be perfect. To obtain that perfection, it is not enough for the magistrate to define the rights of the several citizens, as they are related to life, liberty, property, and reputation, and to punish those by whom they may be invaded. Wise laws, made to this end, and faithfully executed, may leave the people strangers to many of the enjoyments of civil and social life, without which their happiness will be extremely imperfect. Human laws cannot oblige to the performance of the duties of imperfect obligation; as the duties of charity and hospitality, benevolence and good neighbourhood; as the duties resulting from the relation of husband and wife, parent and child; of man to man, as children of a common parent; and of real patriotism, by influencing every citizen to love his country, and to obey all its laws. These are moral duties, flowing from the disposition of the heart, and not subject to the control of human legislation.

"Neither can the laws prevent, by temporal punishment, secret offences committed without witness, to gratify malice, revenge, or any other passion, by assailing the most important and most estimable rights of others. For human tribunals cannot proceed against any crimes unless ascertained by evidence; and they are destitute of all power to prevent the commission of offences, unless by the feeble examples exhibited in the punishment of those who may be detected. Civil government, therefore, availing itself only of its own powers, is extremely defective; and, unless it could derive assistance from some superior power, whose laws extend to the temper and disposition of the human heart, and before whom no offence is secret, wretched indeed would be the state of man under a civil constitution of any form." *

* Massachusetts Reports, Vol. VI. p. 404.

As a guide to the conscience, therefore, the law of the land is imperfect, inasmuch as, 1. It omits many moral duties which ought to be performed. 2. It gives permission to some things, of which no good man ought to avail himself. 3. It sometimes enjoins obedience, when it has no way of enforcing such obedience; and, also, it has sometimes commanded what is wrong, while it has prohibited what is right. Still, as the law of the land is, in general, binding on the conscience, the citizen is not justifiable in refusing compliance with its requisitions, unless the grievance which it inflicts is severely burdensome, and the wrong which it requires is palpable and unquestionable. In all doubtful cases, the doubt should be given in favor of the requirements of the law.

The law deserves our obedience, because it alone can reconcile the jarring interests of all, secure each against the rashness or malignity of others, and blend into one harmonious union the discordant materials of which society is composed. The law throws its broad shield over the rights and the interests of the humblest and the proudest, the poorest and the wealthiest, in the land. It fences around what every individual has already gained, and it insures to him the enjoyment of whatever his industry may acquire. It saves the merchant against ruinous hazards, provides security for the wages of the mechanic and the day-laborer, and enables the husbandman to reap his harvest without fear of plunder. The sanctity of the marriage tie, the purity of virgin modesty, the leisure of the student, the repose of the aged, the enterprise of the active, the support of indigence, and the decencies of divine worship, are all under its guardian care. It makes every man's house his castle, and keeps watch and ward over his life, his name, his family, and his property. It travels with him by land and by sea; watches while he sleeps; and arrays, in defence of him and his, the physical strength of the entire state. Surely, then, it is worthy of our reverence, our gratitude, and our affection. Surely, obedience to its mandates is among the highest of our duties.*

* See Address by William Gaston, before the College of New Jersey, 29th September, 1835.

II. The consequences which may result from actions, is another test by which their moral character may be judged. Every man is bound by his duty to use forecast, and to look, as far as possible, into the consequences of his conduct. This test is subordinate and imperfect, and acts upon the conscience chiefly through the reason; still, in a large class of cases, it is highly effectual and valuable. If we habitually inquire, what would be the consequences to ourselves and to mankind, if every one were to act as we are acting, or as we propose to act, we shall not very often decide wrong in respect to our course of conduct. It is our duty at all times to act with prudence, discretion, and after full reflection; and there may, unquestionably, be a degree of rashness, recklessness, and disregard of consequences in our conduct, by which the conscience may be scarcely less violated, than by a positive willingness, not to say inclination, to do wrong.

This test supposes, that the welfare of ourselves and others is the great design of our existence, and that virtue consists in doing good to mankind. It makes usefulness and expediency the measure and standard of rectitude. Some of the ancient moralists used this standard, by which to determine the moral nature of an action; but they used it in a sense too unqualified, and perverted its just meaning and application. They taught, without just discrimination, that whatever was useful (utile) was right. Cicero combats this principle, which seems to have been very mischievously applied in his time, at great length and with great earnestness, and maintains, that an action, to be worthy of approbation, must unite the useful and the right. * He maintains, against the licentious writers of his time, that the usefulness of an action can never conflict with its rectitude, because no action can ever be truly useful which is not also right. † He makes the rectitude of an action the test of its usefulness, and not the usefulness the test of its rectitude. Reduced to practice, it is the question which continually presents itself to every man, when he is tempted by the allurements of pleasure,

"Utile atque honestum "; see his Offices, and particularly lib. iii. c. 3. +"Quidquid honestum est, idem utile; nec utile quidquam, quod non honestum." De Officiis, lib. iii. c. 4.

of profit, or of fame, to do an act which he knows to be unjustifiable and wrong; and Cicero says, his habitual decision, on the one side or on the other, determines him to belong to the class of good or bad, of honest or dishonest, of upright or wicked

men.

In applying this standard to practice, we must not satisfy ourselves with looking at the immediate and particular consequences of our actions only; to give it any considerable practical value, we must also look to the remote and distant consequences of our conduct. To satisfy this test, an action must be useful in the long run, as well as near by; "in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct;" since, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way, or at what distance, they arrive.

It has before been observed, that Dr. Paley made the usefulness or expediency of an action the standard of its rectitude. He says, "It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it." And, however mistaken he may have been, in making "expediency" the corner-stone of his system, still, the very circumstance of his doing this, led him to state, illustrate, and qualify it with peculiar care. I should do wrong, therefore, if I were not to avail myself freely of his illustrations.

The bad consequences of actions, he says, are twofold, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action is the mischief, which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is the violation of some necessary or useful general rule. In many cases, the particular consequences are comparatively insignificant, while the general consequences are so injurious as to call for the greatest severity of punishment.

The particular consequence of counterfeiting the current coin of a country, is the loss of a dollar, or of a few dollars, to the person, or persons, who may receive it; the general consequence, that is, the consequence which would ensue if the same practice were generally permitted, would be to abolish the use

* Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 42.

of money. The particular consequence of forgery may be a damage of fifty, or a hundred dollars, to the man who accepts the forged bill; the general consequence would be the destruction of paper currency. The particular consequence of horsestealing is a loss to the owner of the value of the horse stolen ; the general consequence would be, that no man's horses would be safe. The particular consequence of breaking into a house without inhabitants may be the loss of some clothing, or of a few spoons; the general consequence would be, that no one could safely leave his house unoccupied. The particular consequence of smuggling may be a diminution of the national income, almost too minute for estimation; the general consequence would be, the destruction of one entire branch of the public revenue, a proportionate increase of the burthen upon other branches, and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the kind of merchandise smuggled. The particular consequence of an officer's breaking his parole may be the loss of a prisoner, who may, perhaps, not have been worth detaining; the general consequence would be, that this mitigation of captivity must be refused to all other prisoners. The particular consequence of assassination, or suicide, may be the death of an individual, whose life may be of little or no importance to himself, or to any one else; the general consequence would be, that, in the one case, every man would be under constant apprehensions for his life, and that, in both cases, no man's life, however valuable, would be safe. In all cases, the particular consequence is of so small importance, compared with the general consequence, that, in the enactment and administration of criminal laws, the particular consequence is entirely disregarded and left out of sight. The crime and the fate of the forger is the same, whether he has forged to the value of five or fifty dollars. The crime is regarded the same, as the general consequences are the same.

It has before been said, that the rule of expediency, by which to estimate and guide our moral conduct, however valuable, is still imperfect. 1. It is imperfect, because sometimes men with

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Book II. chap. 8.