with which the cattle industry was menaced by the spread of that fatal and treacherous disease to a point so far in the interior as Chicago, or of the difficulties under our form of government of promptly and effectually meeting the emergency. Fortunately, although the cattle owners in the infected districts were not friendly, the State authorities cooperated in every case and supplied the power which was lacking in Federal legislation. And although there were many who questioned the existence of the European lung plague in this country, who did not believe in the success of the measures that were adopted, who were positive that the disease could not be eradicated, or who were certain that untold millions of money would be squandered before the end was reached, the result was accomplished with an expenditure of less than five years of time and of $1,500,000—a sum which is less than 5 per cent of the value of the beef exported in 1892.

When we consider that the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Germany all undertook the work of eradicating pleuro-pneumonia long before the establishment of our Bureau of Animal Industry, and that none of them have yet succeeded in freeing their territory from the plague, we can appreciate the fact that the completion of our task in a comparatively short time was a notable achievement.

TEXAS FEVER.

A disease, which was causing much heavier direct losses than pleuropneumonia, and which was almost equally feared by cattle owners, was known by the local name of Texas, or Spanish, fever. This disease, which has numerous popular and local names, has more recently been called by different writers splenetic fever, Southern fever, and tick fever.

When investigations of this disease were first entered upon by the Department of Agriculture there were the most profound ignorance and skepticism in regard to its nature and even its existence. Cattle owners in the Southwest and Middlewest asserted that the herds from the Gulf coast of Texas carried with them a poison that destroyed nearly all the cattle with which they came in contact. So virulent was this poison declared to be that cattle which were simply driven across the trail of the Gulf-coast herds, thirty, sixty, or even ninety days after they had passed, would still contract the disease in the same proportion and in as fatal a form as if they mingled directly with the Southern animals. To these assertions were added others to the effect that the Gulf-coast cattle were healthy, and that the susceptible cattle to which they conveyed a disease which they themselves did not have were, even when fatally affected, unable to transmit the malady or disseminate the virus to any other cattle.

A few observations of a similar nature had been made in the Eastern States. Cattle from North Carolina and South Carolina, though

apparently in good health, had caused outbreaks of disease among the cattle of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, which had mingled with them or grazed along the roads over which the Carolina animals had been driven.

The general features of this disease, as described by the various observers, were so unusual, so entirely different from what was seen in any other known communicable malady, that the correctness of the observations was not generally accepted by scientific men, and perhaps the majority of stockmen were of the opinion that the malady was the result of some local conditions, and was incorrectly attributed to poison disseminated by the Southern cattle. The cattle raisers of Texas were indignant at the charge brought against their herds, which they asserted were as healthy as any in the world, and, not having a disease, could not convey one.

The allegations and discussions in regard to this mysterious disease were almost forgotten, when, in 1867 and 1868, the herds of the Gulf coast had recovered from the destructive effects of the war and appeared upon the markets and feeding grounds of the Northern States in great numbers. With the warm weather of summer there appeared a remarkably acute and fatal disease among the native cattle in the sections where the Southern animals had been grazed and marketed, which threatened the utter destruction of the native herds, and even of the milch cows kept in the vicinity of the stock yards of the principal market cities.

These serious and widespread losses demonstrated conclusively the reality of the disease, while careful observations and elaborate reports made by Professor Gamgee for the Department of Agriculture, and by the boards of health of New York and Illinois, served to collate and record all that was then known of the symptoms, mode of transmission, the general characteristics, and the changes found in the several organs upon post-mortem examination.

The problem presented to the country was a most important one. There were millions of cattle in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi seeking a market, and other millions of cattle in the more Northern States liable to destruction by this fatal infection which they carried. The ranges of the West and Northwest needed these Southern animals to consume their grass, and vast herds were driven through Kansas and Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming to the most northern limits of our territory. The owners of cattle along these trails were heavy losers from disease, and hence there was an effort to confine these infectious herds to narrow trails, or oven to close the trails entirely. This action was resented by the Southern men, who still were not convinced that their cattle caused disease, and who looked upon these restrictions as efforts to avoid competition and prevent the marketing of the herds from the prolific ranges of the South. The time had come when it was necessary for the Federal Government to assist both parties. It

was essential to protect the Northern herds from destruction and scarcely less important to provide for the marketing of the Southern cattle.

Another danger threatened the cattle industry in connection with this disease. Our export trade in live cattle, which was giving an important outlet for our surplus stock, was looked upon by foreign governments with suspicion. It was feared that Texas fever might be introduced among the cattle of Europe and added to the numerous plagues that they had struggled with from time immemorial. limitation to the spread of the disease, due to the failure of the sick animals to transmit the infection, and the eradication of the disease in newly infected districts by the frosts of winter, were characteristics so unusual that they were not accepted as correct. As a great cattleproducing nation, we could not afford to allow the foreign markets to be closed against us. The Texas fever question was, consequently, one of the most momentous ones which confronted the Bureau at the time of its organization.

The first step toward the control of this disease was evidently to ascertain the exact extent of the district from which cattle carried infection. To determine this, three classes of facts were available: First, the history of the cattle which had caused outbreaks of disease could be traced, and it could be learned where they originated; second, by diligent inquiry many sections could be discovered where cattle taken from the North were affected with the disease called "acclimation fever," a disease which we had found was identical with Texas fever; and, third, it could be determined by observation and experiment whether the cattle of any particular section were susceptible to the disease, and if they contracted Texas fever upon exposure to cattle from the known infected district, that fact was evidence that the district in which they were raised was not infected. By a diligent collation and study of such facts the border line of the infected district was traced from the Atlantic Coast in Virginia to the Pacific Coast in the vicinity of San Francisco, a distance, allowing for the departures from a direct course, of about 4,000 miles.

The scientific study of the disease had not been neglected, and it was found that the infectious cattle could be shipped to market without endangering other animals, provided separate pens were set apart for them at the stock yards where they were unloaded, and provided the cars in which they were shipped were properly cleaned and disinfected. The settling of the Western States and the construction of railroads led to the marketing of cattle from the infected district without much driving, and the trail was gradually abandoned except during the winter months.

The regulations of the Bureau hastened this solution of the difficulty. The border line of the infected district was made a quarantine line. No cattle were permitted to cross this line between February

15 and November 15, except for immediate slaughter. The cars carrying such cattle and the waybills accompanying them were marked to show the origin of the stock, and when the destination was reached the animals were unloaded into quarantine pens and the cars were disinfected under the supervision of an inspector. From November 15 to February 15 (changed to January 15 for 1898) the movement of cattle was allowed without restriction. By these comparatively simple measures the dissemination of the disease was almost entirely prevented, and the cars and stock yards used for Northern and export cattle were kept free from the contagion.

In this manner the most urgent problems in connection with the disease were solved, but others of great economic importance still remained. Buyers took advantage of the fact that the Southern cattle must be sold for immediate slaughter, and would not pay as much for cattle in the quarantine pens as they would for the same class of stock in the free pens. Hence, the regulations were more or less of a hardship to those who produced cattle within the infected district. Again, cattle taken from the Northern States to the infected district for breeding purposes and to improve the native stock were subject to the disease, and from 75 to 100 per cent would die the first year. This was very discouraging to the breeders of that section, who desired to produce the most improved varieties of cattle, but who were prevented from doing so by the presence of this infection.

The peculiarities of Texas fever made it a most difficult disease to investigate, and it seemed at times as though its mysteries could never be fathomed. By diligent and persevering observations the Pathological Division discovered in the blood of diseased animals a microscopic animal parasite which lives within and destroys the red blood corpuscles, and is evidently responsible for the causation of the malady. It was also discovered that the Southern cattle tick (Boophilus bovis) carried this microorganism from the infectious cattle of the South to the Northern susceptible animals, and that when free from the tick the Southern cattle were harmless.

It is impossible in this paper to enter into all of the interesting details, but it may be said, without attempting any demonstration of the statements, that these discoveries made it possible to mark out the lines of investigation by which alone any further progress could be made. Investigators were put to work to discover a mixture in which Southern cattle might be dipped to free them from the tick: also to work out a method of inoculation or vaccination by which Northern stock might be made immune to the disease before they were shipped South for breeding or other purposes; and, finally, to ascertain whether it was possible to eradicate the tick in the infected district, and by what means.

These great questions have been patiently studied, and it is now possible to state that these studies appear to be reaching a successful

conclusion. A cheap and comparatively efficient dip has been made by floating paraffin oil upon the surface of water. This has some disadvantages, but these apparently are not serious, and improvements will undoubtedly be made after the system of dipping is put into practical operation. Again, it has been proved that if young Northern cattle are inoculated by injecting under the skin late in the fall or in the winter from 5 to 10 cubic centimeters of blood from an infectious Southern bovine animal they contract a mild form of Texas fever and recover. Afterwards they may be taken to the infected district without much danger from subsequent attacks. The eradication of the tick, although a serious problem, is not so hopeless as a first impression might lead one to suppose. Some farms have been freed from this insect by picking all of the ticks off the cattle and allowing none to mature. In a year or two they disappear entirely. A number of counties in Virginia, which prohibit cattle from running at large, have apparently been freed from ticks by that measure. It would appear that this tick can only mature and reproduce its kind by passing a portion of its existence upon bovine animals, and that the whole species will die out within a year or two if they can not reach such animals. If this supposition is correct, then it is only necessary to fence up a piece of ground so that no cattle can get upon it for the period of time mentioned, in order to rid it from infection. From this brief statement of the case it is plain that cattle raisers may congratulate themselves that the most difficult problems connected with this disease are solved, and that it is only a matter of detail to put into effect measures which will obviate the hardships and losses that in the past have been so burdensome.

INSPECTION, TAGGING, AND CERTIFICATION OF EXPORT CATTLE.

The fear expressed by foreign governments of the introduction of pleuro-pneumonia and Texas fever with cattle from the United States made it necessary to adopt some method by which the history of the animals exported could be ascertained and the animals inspected, numbered, and recorded, so that a certificate could be issued showing freedom from contagion. Occasionally it was alleged by the English inspectors that some of our cattle were suffering from pleuro-pneumonia when landed at the British ports. In two cases German inspectors reported our cattle affected with Texas fever when they reached Hamburg. The German reports plainly show that the two lots of cattle were not affected with the same disease, and that the diagnosis in one case at least must have been incorrect. Such occurrences, however, emphasize the importance of supervising the trade, as our live cattle and fresh beef have been entirely excluded from Germany since this alleged discovery of disease.

It was found at first to be by no means a simple matter to obtain the history of the cattle purchased for export and to mark them for 7204- -3