been filed, such liens shall be discharged. Suit may be brought on said bond by any person interested. [G. S. 1915, § 7568.] The foregoing section contains the same general provisions as section 638d of the Old Code printed in the General Statutes of 1901 as section 5129. Said section 5129 of the General Statutes of 1901 was amended by chapter 183 of the Laws of 1909, which took effect March 20, 1909, printed in the General Statutes of 1909 on page 1364 without a section number. Section 755 of the Code of 1909, which took effect May 29, 1909, is as follows: "Chapter 80 of the General Statutes of 1901, entitled 'An act to establish a code of civil procedure,' and all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, are hereby repealed, save and except such as are or may be passed at the Session of 1909." Said chapter 183 of the Laws of 1909 was amendatory of an act supplemental to the act mentioned in the foregoing paragraph and was passed at the session of 1909. The foregoing section, being section 660 of the Code of 1909, contains the same general provisions as said chapter 183 of the Laws of 1909 and is a later enactment than said chapter 183. It is thought, therefore, to be less confusing to make this reference to said chapter 183 of the Laws of 1909 than to reprint the same herein. Action upon bond; real party in interest; evidence. Shores v. Surety Co., 84 K. 592. Practice where bond set up as defense to foreclosure action. Lumber Co. v. Miles, 85 K. 363. Surety not released because materialman applied payments on old accounts. v. Douglas, 89 K. 308. Rules of suretyship not applicable to corporations issuing indemnity bonds. v. Douglas, 89 K. 308. Lumber Co. Lumber Co. Sufficiency of petition in action on bond, considered. Sheahan v. Guaranty Co., 99 K. 704. Bond prevents liens from attaching irrespective of failure of public officers to comply with terms of bond given under § 283. Surety Co. v. Hudson, 98 K. 775. Annotations to similar section of Old Code: Bond must be approved; all lots must be included. Kille v. Bentley, 6 K. A. 804. Bond is substitute for statutory liens; liens do not attach. Risse v. Planing Mill Co., 55 K. 518. Sureties not relieved by slight departure from plans and specifications. Risse v. Planing Mill Co., 55 K. 518. Surety not relieved by broken promise of principal. Risse v. Planing Mill Co., 55 K. 518. Lien accruing under former statute not divested by statutory bond. Hotel Co. v. Hardware Co., 56 K. 448. § 283. Contract relating to public improvements in sum exceeding one hundred dollars; public officer to take bond from contractor; amount and conditions of bond. That whenever any public officer shall, under the laws of the state, enter into contract in any sum exceeding one hundred dollars, with any person or persons for the purpose of making any public improvements, or constructing any public building or making repairs on the same, such officer shall take from the party contracted with a bond with good and sufficient sureties to the state of Kansas, in a sum not less than the sum total in the contract, conditioned that such contractor or contractors shall pay all indebtedness incurred for labor or material furnished in the construction of said public building or in making said public improvements. [G. S. 1915, § 7569.] Bond given after work completed; valid; rights of laborers, etc. Griffith v. Stucker, 91 K. 47. Interpretation of bond given under statute; liability of surety company. Abrams, 98 K. 26. Hensley v. Shannon V. Bridge contracts; failure to carry out contracts; county authorized to complete work and recover for labor and expenses from bonding company. Kanzius v. Jenkins, 98 K. 94. Obligation held to be unconditional promise to answer for defaults of the contractors. City of Topeka v. Brooks, 99 K. 643. Effect of release of judgment against one joint debtor, considered. City of Topeka v. Brooks, 99 K. 643. Annotations to similar section of Old Code: Laborer or materialman may claim lien on public building. Manufacturing Co., 52 K. 253. Comm'rs of Jewell Co. v. Failure of officer to take bond; public corporation not liable. Lumber Co. v. Elliott, 59 K. 42; Freeman v. Chanute, 63 K. 573. Bond is for benefit of public, not for corporation. Freeman v. Chanute, 63 K. 573. Surety not liable where contract void; notice of illegal proceedings. Surety Co. v. Brick Co., 73 K. 196. Bond of contractor to city deemed taken by public officer. Bonding Co. v. Dickey, 74 K. 791. § 284. Such bond subject to approval of clerk of district court; filed in office of such clerk; liens not to attach after bond approved and filed; liens already filed discharged; claimant for labor or material may sue on such bond; limitation of actions on such bond. That such bond shall be subject to the approval of the clerk of the district court of the county in which such public improvement is to be made or such public building is to be erected and shall be filed in the office of said clerk. When such bond is so approved and filed, no lien shall attach under this act, and if when such bond is filed liens have already been filed, such liens shall be discharged. Any person to whom there is due any sum for labor or material furnished, as stated in the preceding section, or his assigns, may bring an action on said bond for the recovery of said indebtedness: Provided, That no action shall be brought on said bond after six months from the completion of said public improvements or public buildings. [G. S. 1915, § 7570.] Limitation of actions; abandonment by contractor not deemed completion. Hull v. Bonding Co., 86 K. 342. Bond given after work completed; valid; rights of laborers, etc. Griffith v. Stucker, 91 K. 47. Annotations to similar section of Old Code: Laborer or materialman entitled to mechanic's lien upon public building. Comm'rs of Jewell Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 52 K. 253. Mistake in pleading; amendment after six months; action not barred. v. Dickey, 74 K. 791. Bonding Co. AN ACT requiring safeguards for the protection of all persons employed or laboring in manufacturing establishments, and providing civil remedies for all persons so engaged, or their personal representatives, in cases where any such person may be killed or injured while employed or laboring in any manufacturing establishment which is not properly provided with the safeguards required by this act. § 285. Elevators, hoisting-shafts or well-holes in manufacturing establishments to be inclosed or secured to protect employees. Every person owning or operating any manufacturing establishment which may contain any elevator, hoisting-shaft or well-hole shall cause the same to be properly and substantially inclosed or secured, in order to protect the lives or limbs of those employed in such establishment. [G. S. 1915, § 5886.] Failure properly to inclose elevator, prima facie evidence of negligence. Fowler v. Enzenperger, 77 K. 406. * Concerning factory inspection, see ch. 14, Department of Labor and Industry. Purpose of statute is to insure general protection. Alkire v. Cudahy, 83 K. 373. 90 K. 365. This act applies to all classes of employees. Smith v. Bowersock, 95 K. 96. All sides of the elevator shaft should be inclosed. Myrick v. Manufacturing Co., 96 K. 17. § 286. Hand-rails to be provided in stairways; stairs to be properly secured; doors to open outwardly and not be fastened during working hours. Proper and substantial hand-rails shall be provided in all stairways in manufacturing establishments. The stairs shall be properly secured at the sides and ends, and all doors leading into such establishments shall be so constructed as to open outwardly, and shall be neither locked, bolted nor fastened during working hours. [G. S. 1915, § 5887.] § 287. Fire-escapes in manufacturing establishments; number and construction of such fire-escapes. In all manufacturing establishments three or more stories high, at least one fire-escape, and as many more as may be reasonably necessary, shall be provided on the outside of said establishment, connecting with each floor above the first, well fastened and secured, and of sufficient strength. Each of said fire-escapes shall have landings or balconies not less than six feet in length and three feet in width, guarded by iron railings not less than three feet in height, and embracing at least two windows at each story, and connecting with the interior by easily accessible and unobstructed openings, and the balconies or landings shall be connected by iron stairs not less than eighteen inches wide, the steps not to be less than six inches tread, placed at a proper slant, and protected by a well-secured hand-rail on each side, with twelve-inch dropladder from the lower platform reaching to the ground. [G. S. 1915, § 5888.] § 288. Belt-shifters or other safe contrivance to be supplied; safety appliances and safeguards required in manufacturing establishments; duty of owner or operator to furnish same. Every person owning, or operating any manufacturing establishment in which machinery is used shall furnish and supply for use therein belt-shifters, or other safe mechanical contrivance, for the purpose of throwing on or off belts or pulleys; and wherever it is practicable, machinery shall be operated with loose pulleys. All vats, pans, saws, planers, cog gearing, belting, shafting, set-screws and machinery of every description used in a manufacturing establishment shall, where practicable, be properly and safely guarded, for the purpose of preventing or avoiding the death of or injury to the persons employed or laboring in any such establishment; and it is hereby made the duty of all persons owning or operating manufacturing establishments to provide and keep the same furnished with safeguards as herein specified. [G. S. 1915, § 5889.] Madison v. Clippinger, Defense of contributory negligence not excluded by this act. This act simply requires that employees be protected from machinery. Brick Co. v. Stark, Henschell v. Rail Employee injured while resting, by direction of company, may recover. "Assumed risk" no defense; "contributory negligence" a proper defense. This statute applicable to any person performing duty for factory. 82 K. 604. Brick Co. v. Lewis v. Bar Caspar v. Lewin, Contributory negligence no defense under this act. Caspar v. Lewin, 82 K. 604. Practicability of guarding machinery need not be pleaded. Gambill v. Bowen, 82 K. 840. "Assumption of risk," good defense, as applied to common-law charge. Sibley v. Cottonmills Co., 85 K. 256. Practicability of guarding knives of planer; device used as guard. Slater v. Railway Co., 91 K. 226. Safeguard against belts and pulleys extends beyond mere belt-shifting. Death caused by explosion in powder-mill; "factory act" not applicable. Rank v. Packing Byland v. Pow Act applicable to railroad car-repair shop, where railroad has elected not to come under workmen's compensation act. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 K. 761. Unguarded circular saw; burden of proof upon employer to show impracticability of attaching safeguard. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 K. 761. § 289. Action for damages for death or injury of employee in manufacturing establishment where absence of safegaurds, etc., contributed to such death or injury; action by personal representative of deceased; place of bringing action. If any person employed or laboring in any manufacturing establishment shall be killed or injured in any case wherein the absence of any of the safeguards or precautions required by the act shall directly contribute to such death or injury, the personal representatives of the person so killed, or the person himself in case of injury only, may maintain an action against the person owning or operating such manufacturing establishment for the recovery of all proper damages. In cases where the action is brought by the personal representative of the deceased, said action shall be governed in all respects not herein provided for by the provisions of the statutes now in force which authorize and regulate the bringing of actions to recover damages in cases where the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another: Provided, Action shall be commenced in the county where the accident occurred. [G. S. 1915, § 5890.] Where noncompliance only contributes among other causes, company held liable. Alkire v. Act gives father no rights in addition to common-law rights. Gibson v. Packing Co., 85 K. 346; Howell v. Cement Co., 86 K. 450. § 290. Sufficient for plaintiff to prove in such action in the first instance that such death or injury resulted from failure to provide safeguards or that such failure contributed to such death or injury. In all actions brought under and by virtue of the provisions of this act, it shall be sufficient for the plaintiff to prove in the first instance, in order to establish the liability of the defendant, that the death or injury complained of resulted in consequence of the failure of the person owning or operating the manufacturing establishment where such death or injury occurred to provide said establishment with safeguards as required by this act, or that the failure to provide such safeguard directly contributed to such death or injury. [G. S. 1915, § 5891.] Violation of duty imposed prima facie sufficient to establish liability. Brick Co. v. Stark, 77 K. 648. Evidence showing necessity of guard, establishes negligence of defendant. Fisher, 79 K. 576. Brick Co. v. Liability established, by showing failure to establish safeguards. Caspar v. Lewin, 82 K. 604; Bubb, Adm'x, v. Railway Co., 89 K. 303. Unguarded circular saw; burden of proof on employer to show impracticablity of attaching safeguard. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 K. 761. § 291. Manufacturing establishments, as used in this act, defined; smelters, oil refineries, cement works, mills of every kind, machine and repair shops, etc., included. Manufacturing establishments, as those words are used in this act, shall mean and include all smelters, oil refineries, cement works, mills of every kind, machine and repair shops, and, in addition to the foregoing, any other kind or character of manufacturing establishment, of any nature or description whatsoever, wherein any natural products or other articles or materials of any kind, in a raw or unfinished or incomplete state or condition, are converted into a new or improved or different form. [G. S. 1915, § 5892.] Place where old iron is sorted, comes within definition. Caspar v. Lewin, 82 K. 604. "City waterworks" not within meaning of this section. Ward v. City of Norton, 86 K. 906. "Grain elevator" held to be a "manufacturing establishment." 420. Buchanan v. Blair, 90 K. Railroad car-repair shop held within provisions of this act. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 K. 761. § 292. "Person," as used in certain connections in this act, defined. Wherever the expression occurs in this act in substantially the following words, "Every person owning or operating any manufacturing establishment," or where language similar to that is used, the word “person” in that connection shall be held and construed to mean any person or persons, partnership, corporation, receiver, trust, trustee, or any other person or combination of persons, either natural or artificial, by whatever name he or they may be called. [G. S. 1915, § 5893.] CHAPTER 25.-MILITIA. $293. Employer refusing permission to employee to attend drill or annual muster, etc., guilty of misdemeanor; penalty for employer discharging or punishing employee for being absent in performance of military duty. PART OF LAWS OF 1901, CH. 255, AS AMENDED BY LAWS OF 1903, CH. 359. § 293. Employer refusing permission to employee to attend drill or annual muster, etc., guilty of misdemeanor; penalty for employer discharging or punishing employee for being absent in performance of military duty. There shall be an annual muster and camp of instruction of the Kansas national guard at such time and place or places as the commander-in-chief may designate, at which time the several organizations of the Kansas national guard shall be drilled, inspected and reviewed and exercised in military tactics and maneuvers in accordance with the orders of the officer in command of the camp. When under exclusive state jurisdiction, said camp of instruction shall continue for a period of not less than five days nor more than ten days, and shall be governed by such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by the military board and approved by the commander-in-chief. When such camp of instruction shall be in connection with and a part of an encampment of militia and the regular army of the United States, it may be extended beyond the limit of ten days, and shall be under the control and jurisdiction of the officer of the United States army in command. It shall be the duty of each commissioned officer and enlisted man of the Kansas national guard to be present and perform all duties required of him at each annual muster and camp of instruction, unless regularly excused by competent authority; and it shall be a misdemeanor for any employer to refuse permission to any employee who is a member of the Kansas national guard to attend drill or annual muster, or perform active service, when so ordered by the commander-in-chief; and any employer who shall refuse, or shall discharge an employee from his service or shall in any way punish an employee for being absent in the performance of military duty, when so ordered by competent authority, shall on conviction be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars nor more than fifty dollars for each offense. [G. S. 1915, § 6199.] |