in the smallest particles) is equally unknown; and yet, unless the two matters we have mentioned be explored and brought to light, no great effect can be produced in Nature. Again, the very nature of common air, and all bodies of less density (of which there are many) is almost unknown. For the senses are weak and erring, nor can instruments be of great use in extending their sphere or acuteness; all the better interpretations of Nature are worked out by instances, and fit and apt experiments, where the Senses only judge of the experiment, the experiment of Nature and the thing itself.

li. The human Understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better to dissect than abstract Nature ; such was the method employed by the School of Democritus, which made greater progress in penetrating Nature than the rest. It is best to consider Matter, its Conformation, and the Changes of that Conformation, its own Action, and the law of this Action or Motion: for Forms are a mere Fiction of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of Action by that name.

lii. Such are the Idols of the Tribe, which arise either from the uniformity of the constitution of man's spirit, or its prejudices, or its limited faculties, or restless Agitation, or from the interference of the passions, or the incompetency of the Senses, or the mode of their impressions. liii. The Idols of the Den derive their origin from the peculiar Nature of each individual's mind and body; and also from education, habit, and accident. And although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat of some that require the greatest Caution, and exert the greatest power in polluting the Understanding.

liv. Some men become attached to particular Sciences and Contemplations, either from supposing themselves the Hence to Aphorism lix treats of the Idols of the Den.

authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become most habituated to them. If men of this description apply themselves to Philosophy and Contemplations of an universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived Fancies; of which Aristotle affords us a signal instance, who made his Natural Philosophy completely subservient to his Logic, and thus rendered it little more than useless and disputatious. The Chemists, again, have formed a fanciful Philosophy with the most confined views, from a few experiments of the furnace. Gilbert, too, having employed himself most assiduously in the consideration of the Magnet, immediately established a system of Philosophy to coincide with his favourite pursuit.

lv. The greatest and, perhaps, radical distinction between different men's dispositions for Philosophy and the Sciences is this; that some are more vigorous and active in observing the differences of things, others in observing their resemblances. For a steady and acute Disposition can fix its thoughts and dwell upon and adhere to a point, through all the refinements of differences, but those that are sublime and discursive recognise and compare even the most delicate and general resemblances. Each of them readily falls into excess, by catching either at nice distinctions or shadows of resemblance.

lvi. Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of Antiquity, others eagerly embrace Novelty; and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the Ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the Moderns. But this is very prejudicial to the sciences and Philosophy, and instead of a correct judgment, we have but the factions of the Ancients and Moderns. Truth is not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular conjuncture of time, which is uncertain, but in the light of Nature and experience, which is eternal. Such

factions therefore, are to be abjured, and the understanding must not allow them to hurry it on to assent.

lvii. The Contemplation of Nature and of bodies in their individual form distracts and weakens the understanding but the Contemplation of Nature and of bodies in their general composition and formation stupefies and relaxes it. We have a good instance of this in the school of Leucippus and Democritus compared with others for they applied themselves so much to particulars as almost to neglect the general structure of Things, whilst the others were so astounded whilst gazing on the structure that they did not penetrate the simplicity of Nature. These two species of contemplation must therefore be interchanged, and each employed in its turn, in order to render the Understanding at once penetrating and capacious, and to avoid the inconveniences we have mentioned, and the Idols that result from them.

lviii. Let such, therefore, be our Precautions in contemplation, that we may ward off and expel the Idols of the Den which mostly owe their birth either to some prominent pursuit ; or, secondly, to an excess in synthesis and analysis; or, thirdly, to a party zeal in favour of certain ages; or, fourthly, to the extent or narrowness of the subject. In general he who contemplates Nature should suspect whatever particularly takes and fixes his Understanding, and should use so much the more caution to preserve it equable and unprejudiced.

lix. The Idols of the Market are the most troublesome of all, those namely which have entwined themselves round the Understanding from the association of words and names. For men imagine that their reason governs words, whilst, in fact, words re-act upon the Understanding; and this has rendered Philosophy and the Sciences Sophistical and inactive. Words are generally formed in a popular sense, Hence to Aphorism lxi treats of the Idols of the Market.

and define things by those broad lines which are most obvious to the vulgar mind; but when a more acute Understanding, or more diligent observation is anxious to vary those lines, and to adapt them more accurately to nature, words oppose it. Hence the great and solemn disputes of learned men often terminate in controversies about words and names, in regard to which it would be better (imitating the caution of Mathematicians) to proceed more advisedly in the first instance, and to bring such disputes to a regular issue by definitions. Such definitions, however, cannot remedy the evil in Natural and material objects, because they consist themselves of words, and these words produce others; so that we must necessarily have recourse to particular instances, and their regular series and arrangement, as we shall mention when we come to the mode and scheme of determining Notions and Axioms.

lx. The Idols imposed upon the Understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either the names of things which have no existence (for as some objects are from inattention left without a name, so names are formed by fanciful imaginations which are without an object), or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things. Fortune, the Primum Mobile, the Planetary Orbits, the Element of Fire, and the like fictions, which owe their birth to futile and false theories, are instances of the first kind. And this species of Idols is removed with greater facility, because it can be exterminated by the constant refutation or the desuetude of the theories themselves. The others, which are created by vicious and unskilful abstraction, are intricate and deeply. rooted. Take some word for instance, as Moist; and let us examine how far the different significations of this word are consistent. It will be found that the word Moist is nothing but a confused sign of different actions admitting of no settled and defined uniformity. For it means that

which easily diffuses itself over another body; that which is indeterminable and cannot be brought to a consistency; that which yields easily in every direction; that which is easily divided and dispersed; that which is easily united and collected; that which easily flows and is put in motion; that which easily adheres to and wets another body; that which is easily reduced to a liquid state though previously solid. When, therefore, you come to predicate or impose this name, in one sense flame is moist, in another air is not moist, in another fine powder is moist, in another glass is moist; so that it is quite clear that this Notion is hastily abstracted from water only, and common ordinary liquors without any due verification of it.

There are, however, different degrees of distortion and mistake in words. One of the least faulty classes is that of the names of substances, particularly of the less abstract and more defined species (those then of chalk and mud are good, of earth, bad); words signifying actions are more faulty, as to generate, to corrupt, to change; but the most faulty are those denoting qualities (except the immediate objects of sense), as heavy, light, rare, dense. Yet in all of these there must be some Notions a little better than others, in proportion as a greater or less number of things come before the senses.

Ixi. The Idols of the Theatre are not innate, nor do they introduce themselves secretly into the understanding; but they are manifestly instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules of Demonstration. To attempt, however, or undertake their confutation would not be consistent with our declarations. For since we neither agree in our Principles nor our Demonstrations, all argument is out of the question. And it is fortunate that the Ancients are left in possession of their honours. We detract nothing from them, seeing our whole doctrine relates only to the

Hence to Aphorism lxviii treats of the Idols of the Theatre.