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other persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment;

(15) "Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act."

And the section concludes by saying: "Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive a court of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific powers not herein enumerated."

Section 23a provides: "The United States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants."

And § 57k reads: "Claims which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and reallowed or rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities of the case, before but not after the estate has been closed."

We think it is a necessary conclusion from these and other provisions of the act that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in all "proceedings in bankruptcy" is intended to be exclusive of all other courts, and that such proceedings include, among others, all matters of administration, such as the allowance, rejection and reconsideration of claims, the reduction of the estates to money and its distribution, the determination of the preferences and priorities to be accorded to claims presented for allowance and payment in regular course, and the supervision and control of the trustees and others who are employed to assist them.

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The allegations of the bill, other than those relating to the actions brought against the complainant in Pennsylvania and to its contingent claim against the indemnitor banks, are intended to invoke (1) a reconsideration and modification of the referee's order of November 19, 1904, allowing certain claims as preferred claims for labor and materials, (2) a determination of the right of the present holders of those claims to have them rated and paid at their face value, (3) an inquiry into the charge that the trustee and others who were employed to assist him in the management of the estate have been speculating in claims against it and procuring or acquiescing in their improper allowance and classification, and (4) a direction that the just claims for labor and materials be accorded a preference in the distribution. These matters are rightly subjects for proceedings in bankruptcy and therefore fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy. A distinct purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to subject the administration of the estates of bankrupts to the control of tribunals clothed with authority and charged with the duty of proceeding to final settlement and distribution in a summary way, as are the courts of bankruptcy. Creditors are entitled to have this authority exercised, and justly may complain when, as here, an important part of the administration is sought to be effected through the slower and less appropriate processes of a plenary suit in equity in another court, involving collateral and extraneous matters with which they have no concern, such as the controversy between the complainant and the indemnitor banks.

Of the fact that the suit was begun in the Circuit Court with the express leave of the court of bankruptcy it suffices to say that the latter was not at liberty to surrender its exclusive control over matters of administration or to confide them to another tribunal.

The portions of the bill seeking an adjudication of the

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contingent liability of the indemnitor banks to the complainant, and an injunction against the prosecution of the actions against it in Pennsylvania, and against the institution of other like actions, must fall with the rest of the bill. They were brought into it in a secondary and dependent way, and could not then have been made the subjects of a separate bill in that jurisdiction. Further discussion of them is therefore unnecessary.

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. COLORADO ANTHRACITE CO.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 227. Argued April 25, 1912.-Decided May 27, 1912.

An assign within the meaning of § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, 21 Stat. 287, c. 244, is one who becomes invested with the entryman's right in the land through the voluntary act of the latter.

While a mere quitclaim deed does not pass after acquired title, the equitable title of one who was also trustee to acquire the title for the grantee will pass by such a deed.

Equity usually looks upon that as done which ought to have been done. The act of June 16, 1880, proceeds upon equitable principles and should be administered accordingly.

A remedial statute, such as § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, should be interpreted with appropriate regard to the spirit which prompted it; and that act is therefore construed so as to return money erroneously paid for an entry that cannot be confirmed to the party entitled to receive it.

One for whom an entryman initiates and obtains an allowance for an entry, and to whom the entryman gives a quitclaim deed is an assign within the meaning of § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, and entitled to recover the purchase price if the entry cannot be confirmed, provided the arrangement was not forbidden by law. Under § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, the assign of an entryman can

Opinion of the Court.

225 U.S.

not recover the purchase price paid if there was any fraud practiced by it in connection with the entry; an entry fraudulently obtained is not one erroneously allowed.

Under §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat., providing for coal-land entries, one cannot enter for another who has had the full benefit of the law; but, in the absence of evasion of restrictions as to quantity, there is no prohibition, express or implied, against an entry by a qualified person for the benefit of another person fully qualified to make the entry in his, or, if a corporation, in its, own name.

A corporation is an association of persons within the meaning of the coal-land entry provisions of §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat.

Where it does not appear that a corporation had previously entered its full amount of coal lands under §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat., an entry made on its behalf by a qualified entryman is not illegal; and an affidavit that the latter was not making the entry for another, the falsity of which is disclosed on a contest, becomes harmless and does not affect the right of the entryman or his assign to recover the price paid under § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880.

The rule that fraud is not presumed and that one basing his defense thereon should prove it, applies to the Government; and if the answer contains no allegation of fraud, silence in the findings of the court below will be taken as showing that none was proved, and an affirmative finding that there was no fraud is not necessary to sustain the judgment.

45 Ct. Cl. 614, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of an entry for coal land under § 2348, Rev. Stat., and the right of an assign of the entryman to recover the amount paid to the United States, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson for the United States.

Mr. Charles A. Keigwin, with whom Mr. E. W. Spalding was on the brief, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action, under the act of June 16, 1880, 21 Stat. 287, c. 244, § 2, for the repayment of the purchase

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price paid to the Government for 160 acres of public coal lands, the entry of which was subsequently canceled. The plaintiff prevailed in the Court of Claims, 45 C. Cl. 614, and the Government has appealed, claiming that on the findings the judgment should have been in its favor.

Briefly stated, the material facts shown by the findings are as follows: One Stoiber, who claimed a preference right of entry under Rev. Stat., § 2348, filed in the proper local land office the requisite declaratory statement, and thereafter made application to enter the land. Accompanying the application was an affidavit, made by his agent, stating that Stoiber was making the entry for his own use and benefit, and not directly or indirectly for another. Other applications for the same land resulted in a contest proceeding before the local land office, and after the hearing therein the register and receiver sustained Stoiber's application, accepted the purchase price of the land, which was $3,200, and issued to him the usual duplicate receipt. This, in the nomenclature of the public-land laws, was the allowance of an entry. The other parties to the contest appealed to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, who, upon the same evidence that was submitted to the local office, ruled that Stoiber's application ought not to have been sustained; that his entry had been erroneously allowed and could not be confirmed, and therefore that it must be canceled. That decision was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the entry was canceled accordingly. In filing the declaratory statement and making the entry Stoiber was not seeking to acquire the land for himself but for the Colorado Anthracite Company, the plaintiff here, to which he already had given a quitclaim deed. This was not denied or concealed at the hearing in the contest, but, on the contrary, was admitted and was affirmatively shown by the testimony of the witnesses for Stoiber, including the agent who made the affidavit before mentioned. The purchase price paid at the time of the

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