for the naturalization of an alien is in a certain sense a judicial proceeding, being conducted in a court of record and made a matter of record therein, yet it is not in any sense an adversary proceeding. It is the alien who applies to be admitted, who makes the necessary declaration and adduces the requisite proofs, and who renounces and abjures his foreign allegiance, all as conditions precedent to his admission to citizenship of the United States. He seeks political rights to which he is not entitled except on compliance with the requirements of the act. But he is not required to make the Government a party nor to give any notice to its representatives. The act of June 29, 1906, in § 11 (34 Stat. 599), declares that the United States shall have the right to appear in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of crossexamining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition, and shall have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to the granting of naturalization. No such provision was contained in the act as it formerly stood. For present purposes we assume, however, that the Government had such an interest as entitled it, even without express enactment, to raise an issue upon an alien's application for admission to the privileges of citizenship. What may be the effect of a judgment allowing naturalization in a case where the Government has appeared and litigated the matter does not now concern us. (See 2 Black, Judgts., § 534, a.) What we have to say relates to such a case as is presented by the present record, which is the ordinary case of an alien appearing before one of the courts designated by law for the purpose, and, without notice to the Government and without opportunity, to say nothing of duty, on the part of the Government to appear, submitting his application for naturalization with ex parte proofs in support thereof, and thus procuring a certificate of citizenship. In view of the great numbers of aliens thus Opinion of the Court. 225 U.S. applying at irregular times in the various courts of record of the several States and in the Federal Circuit and District Courts throughout the Union, and bringing their applications on to summary hearing without previous notice to the Government of the United States or to the public, it is of course impossible that the public interests should be adequately represented, and in our opinion the sections quoted from the Revised Statutes are not open to any construction that would give a conclusive effect to such an investigation when conducted at the instance of and controlled by the interested individual alone. The foundation of the doctrine of res judicata, or es toppel by judgment, is that both parties have had their day in court. 2 Black, Judgts., §§ 500, 504. The general principle was clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for this court in Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 48: "That a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.' Sound reason, as we think, constrains us to deny to a certificate of naturalization, procured ex parte in the ordinary way, any conclusive effect as against the public. Such a certificate, including the "judgment" upon which it is based, is in its essence an instrument granting political privileges, and open like other public grants to be revoked if and when it shall be found to have been unlawfully or fraudulently procured. It is in this respect closely analogous to a public grant of land (Rev. Stat., § 2289, etc.), or of the exclusive right to make, use and vend a new and useful invention (Rev. Stat., § 4883, etc.). Judicial review of letters patent, looking to their cancellation when issued unlawfully or through mistake or when procured by fraud, is very ancient-possibly antedating the establishment of the court of equity in England. 3 Black. Com. 47, 48. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for this court in United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 535; the original mode was by writ of scire facias, the bill in equity being afterwards adopted as a more convenient remedy. In United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 281; previous cases were reviewed and the practice discussed. In United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 342; Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for this court, said: "It may now be accepted as settled that the United States can properly proceed by bill in equity to have a judicial decree of nullity and an order of cancellation of a patent issued in mistake or obtained by fraud, where the Government has a direct interest, or is under an obligation respecting the relief invoked." See also Noble v. Union River Logging R. R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 175, and cases cited. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, is not opposed in principle, for, as pointed out in United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 241, the patent was issued on the confirmation of a Mexican grant after judicial proceedings, where there were pleadings and parties, and witnesses were examined on both sides, with the right to appeal. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514, 519, was likewise a contested case in the Land Department, as the report shows. The doctrine that a patent issued ex parte may be annulled for fraud has been repeatedly applied to patents for inventions. United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 361; Same v. Same, 167 U. S. 224, 238. Whether the judicial review of a certificate of naturalization should be conducted in one mode or another is a matter plainly resting in legislative discretion. Section 15 of the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 601), provides for a proceeding in a "court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing the suit," upon fair Opinion of the Court. 225 U.S. notice to the party holding the certificate of citizenship that is under attack. No criticism is made of this mode of procedure. The views above expressed render it unnecessary for us to go into the question whether on general principles and without express legislative authority, a court of equity, at the instance of the Government, might set aside a certificate of citizenship or restrain its use, for fraud or the like. In United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. Rep. 417, it was declared that the Government could sue in a Federal court for the cancellation of a certificate that had been procured by fraud in a state court, but it was held that the facts set forth in the bill did not make out a sufficient case of fraud. In United States v. Gleason, 78 Fed. Rep. 396, 90 Fed. Rep. 778, the contrary conclusion was reached upon the main question. These two cases arose prior to the act of 1906. Since the passage of that act, the district courts have quite generally sustained the action for a cancellation of fraudulent certificates. United States v. Nisbet, 168 Fed. Rep. 1005; United States v. Simon, 170 Fed. Rep. 680; United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. Rep. 671; United States v. Meyer, 170 Fed. Rep. 983; United States v. Luria, 184 Fed. Rep. 643; United States v. Spohrer, 175 Fed. Rep. 440. In the latter case Judge Cross used the following pertinent language (at p. 442): “An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist, and if they do not he takes nothing by his paper grant. Fraud cannot be substituted for facts." And again, at p. 446: “That the government, especially when thereunto authorized by Congress, has the right to recall whatever of property has been taken from it by fraud, is, in my judgment, well settled, and, if that be true of property, then by analogy and with greater reason it would seem to be true where it has conferred a privilege in answer to the prayer of an ex parte petitioner." The contention that the act of June 29, 1906, in authorizing the impeachment of certificates of naturalization theretofore issued for fraud consisting of the introduction of perjured testimony, is unconstitutional as an exercise of judicial power by the legislative department, is in effect disposed of by what has been said. The act does not purport to deprive a litigant of the fruits of a successful controversy in the courts; for, as already shown, the proceedings for naturalization are not in any proper sense adversary proceedings, but are ex parte and conducted by the applicant for his own benefit. The act in effect provides for a new form of judicial review of a question that is in form, but not in substance, concluded by the previous record, and under conditions affording to the party whose rights are brought into question full opportunity to be heard. Retrospective acts of this character have often been held not to be an assumption by the legislative department of judicial powers. Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222, 239; Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160, 175; Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196, 202; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 413; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478. An alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or the like, an imposition has been practiced upon the court, without which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been issued. As was well said by VOL. CCXXV-16 |