of cargo, without contributing to the general average sacrifices and expenditures of the shipowners made for the same purpose. Ib.
4. Contribution in general average; essence of.
The essence of general average contribution is that extraordinary sacrifices made and expenses incurred for the common benefit are to be borne proportionately by all who are interested. Ib. See PILOTAGE.
An alien is one born out of the jurisdiction of the United States and who has not been naturalized under its Constitution and laws. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 460.
2. Women; effect of marriage to citizen; law governing.
The effect of the marriage of an alien woman to a male citizen of the United States is not determined by the common law. That matter is regulated by statute. Ib.
3. Naturalization; effect of marriage of alien woman to citizen.
Under § 1994, Rev. Stat., a woman who could be naturalized becomes by her marriage to a citizen of the United States a citizen herself. See Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496. Ib.
4. Naturalization; effect of marriage of alien woman; quære as to. Quare, whether a woman, incapable under the laws of the United States of being naturalized, can become a citizen of the United States by marriage to a citizen thereof. Ib. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25;
NATURALIZATION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 8.
AMBIGUITIES.
See STATUTES, A 4.
AMENDMENT.
See STATUTES, A 1.
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION. Fourteenth.-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Sixth. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13, 22.
APPEAL AND ERROR.
1. Appeal from Circuit Court; questions open on.
Where in rendering a decree on the merits the court necessarily decided the constitutional question expressly alleged in the bill, the issue on that subject is open in this court, whether the jurisdictional ques- tion be certified or not. Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R R. Co., 272.
2. Scope of inquiry on direct appeal from Circuit Court; question of comity between courts not within.
A mere conflict between courts concerning the right to adjudicate upon a particular matter growing out of a priority of jurisdiction in another forum involves a question of comity, which there is no right to consider on a direct appeal to this court under § 5 of the act of 1891. (Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89.) Ib.
3. Appeal from interlocutory order of Commerce Court; right to, under § 210, Judicial Code.
An appeal to this court from an interlocutory order of the Commerce Court allowing a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an affirmative order of the Interstate Commerce Commission lies under § 2 of the act creating the court, now § 210 of the new Judicial Code. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 306.
4. When writ of error runs to highest state court, notwithstanding its refusal to grant writ because of opinion that judgment below is right. Where the highest court of the State refuses a writ of error because, in its opinion, the judgment below is plainly right, doubt exists as to whether it is a refusal to take jurisdiction or an exercise of juris- diction and affirmance; under the circumstances of this case, how- ever, the Chief Justice of the state court having allowed the writ of error for review by this court, held that the judgment was on the merits and the writ of errors run to the highest court. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, distinguished. Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 264.
5. When writ of error runs to lower court; effect of refusal of highest state court to take jurisdiction.
Where the refusal of the highest court of the State to allow a writ of error is also a refusal to take jurisdiction the writ of error from this court runs to the lower court. Ib.
6. Refusal of highest state court to allow writ of error as refusal to take jurisdiction.
Hereafter this court will regard the refusal of the highest court of the State to allow a writ of error to review the judgment of a lower court as a refusal to take jurisdiction and not as an affirmance unless the contrary plainly appears on the face of the record. Ib. See JURISDICTION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3, 4, 6. TRIAL, 1.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3;
WORDS AND PHRASES.
ATTACHMENT.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3; LIENS.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. See IMMIGRATION, 7; INDIANS, 3.
1. Preferences; what prohibited.
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 preventing preferences, apply not only to mortgages and voluntary transfers but also to preferences obtained through legal proceedings; but the act was not intended to lessen rights already existing nor to defeat in- choate liens given by statute of which all creditors were bound to take notice. Henderson v. Mayer, 631.
2. Preferences; liens obtained through legal proceedings; lien under Georgia law held not to be.
The general lien given by the laws of Georgia to the landlord on the property of the tenant is the equivalent, as to goods levied on by distress warrant, to the common law distress; while it does not ripen into a specific lien until the distress warrant is issued, it exists from the time of the lease, and the lien of the distress warrant is not one obtained through legal proceedings within the meaning of the anti-preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Ib.
3. Preferences; effect of bankruptcy proceedings on statutory attachment for rent.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 a statutory attachment for rent
in the nature of a landlord's distress warrant levied within the preference period was not nullified or discharged by the bank- ruptcy proceedings and there is nothing in the act of 1898 opposed to this conclusion. Ib.
4. Preferences; effect of act of 1898 to preserve landlords' liens given by local law.
The general provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 indicate a pur- pose and intent, as against general creditors, to preserve rights such as those given by the Georgia statute to landlords even though not enforced until within four months of the bankruptcy. Ib.
5. Preferences; indirect transfer as.
To constitute a preference under the Bankruptcy Act it is not neces- sary that the transfer be made directly to the creditor; it may be made to another for his benefit, and if preferential circuity of ar- rangement will not avail to save it. Newport Bank v. Herkimer Bank, 178.
6. Preferences; diminution of bankrupt's estate as test.
Unless, however, the creditor takes by virtue of a disposition by the insolvent debtor of his property for the benefit of the creditor so that the estate is diminished the creditor cannot be charged with receiving a preference. Ib.
7. Preferences; effect of payment by endorser of bankrupt's note secured by endorser's collateral.
Where the endorser of the bankrupt's note, which is under discount at a bank and secured by the endorser's own collateral, pays the note, thereby recovering his collateral and charges the payment to the bankrupt to whom he is indebted in a larger sum on open account,
there is no preferential payment to the bank which the trustee can recover from it as such, it not appearing that the bank was con- cerned with, or had any knowledge of, the relations between the endorser and the maker of the note. Ib.
8. Preferences; delivery of securities by broker to customer as. Under the decisions of this court, and the courts of New York, a cus-
tomer has such an interest in securities carried for him by a broker that a delivery to him after the insolvency of the broker is not necessarily a preference under the bankruptcy law. (Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365.) Sexton v. Kessler, 90.
9. Tribunals contemplated by Bankruptcy Act.
A distinct purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to subject the adminis- tration of estates of bankrupts to the control of tribunals having authority and charged with the duty of proceeding to final settle- ment and distribution in a summary way, as are bankruptcy courts. United States Fidelity Co. v. Bray, 205.
10. Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court; scope of.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in all proceedings in bankruptcy is intended to be exclusive of all other courts; such proceedings include matters of administration, such as allowance and rejection of claims, reduction of the estate to money and its distribution, preferences and priorities to be ac- corded to claims and supervision and control of the trustee. Ib.
11. Trustee's title to escrow of securities held by bankrupt acting as agent. The conduct of business men acting without lawyers and in good faith, attempting to create a personal security for an actual debt, should be fairly construed as actually effecting what the parties meant; and so held, in this case, that an escrow of securities made by a banking firm in New York to secure its drafts upon a foreign bank amounted to a lien on the securities to be preferred to the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy, notwithstanding that the New York firm retained physical power over the securities, as agent for the foreign house, and had the right to substitute other securities for those withdrawn and sold. Sexton v. Kessler, 90.
See JURISDICTION, A 13; C 1, 2.
BANKS AND BANKING.
See BANKRUPTCY, 7.
BILLS AND NOTES.
See BANKRUPTCY, 7.
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