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COMMON LAW.

Conformity of practice in Massachusetts in determining mental capacity
of jurors.

The practice of the Massachusetts courts in this case was not incon-
sistent with the rules of the common law in regard to determining
the mental capacity of jurors. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 167.

CONDITIONAL SALES.
See CONTRACTS, 3.

CONFISCATION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

1. Federal and state; what considered in determining.

In determining whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire
scheme must be considered and that which needs must be implied
has no less force than that which is expressed. Savage v. Jones,
501.

2. Federal and state; when Federal statute supersedes exercise by State of
police power.

The intent of Congress to supersede the exercise by the States of their
police power will not be inferred unless the act of Congress, fairly
interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the State. Ib.

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1. Commerce clause; exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce;

state interference.

Under the Constitution of the United States, the National Govern-

ment has exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce,
and any attempt by the State to regulate rates for interstate
transportation is void. (Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v.
Eubank, 184 U. S. 27.) Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthing-
ton, 101.

2. Commerce; power of State to burden.

While the State cannot, under cover of exerting its police power, di-

rectly regulate or burden interstate commerce, a police regulation
which has real relation to the proper protection of the people, and
is reasonable in its terms, and does not conflict with any valid act
of Congress, is not unconstitutional because it may incidentally
affect interstate commerce. Savage v. Jones, 501.

3. Commerce clause; due process of law; revenue measure beyond power
of State; conflict of laws; validity of Indiana statute regulating sale
of concentrated commercial food-stuffs.

The statute of Indiana regulating the sale, and requiring formula of
ingredients of, concentrated commercial food for stock is a proper
and reasonable exercise of legislative police authority for the
protection of the people of the State. The act is not unconstitu-
tional as depriving a vendor of such food who lives in another
State and ships it therefrom to Indiana either as a regulation of,
or burden upon, interstate commerce, as depriving any vendor
thereof of his property without due process of law, or as a revenue
measure beyond the power of the State, nor does the requirement
for publishing the ingredients conflict in any manner with the
Food and Drugs Act of 1906. Ib.

4. Commerce with Indian tribes; power of Congress over traffic within
State.

Under 8 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, conferring upon

Congress the right to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,
Congress may regulate traffic with Indians although within the
limits of a single State. Ex parte Webb, 663.

5. Commerce with Indian tribes; power of Congress to maintain existing
law.

Under § 8 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, Congress has the

same power to maintain an existing law in regard to Indian traffic
so as to keep it in force in a new State as it has to enact new laws
in the future on the same subject. Ib.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 11, 12.

6. Criminal law; effect of constitutional provisions.

The Constitution of the United States is not intended as a facility

for crime, but to prevent oppression; its letter and its spirit are
satisfied if where a criminal purpose is executed that criminal
purpose be punished. The criminal himself makes the venue of
his trial. Brown v. Elliott, 392.

7. Due process of law implies what; effect of refusal of state court to set
aside verdict because sanity of juror determined according to state
procedure.

Due process of law implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally
competent to afford a hearing; but due process is not denied when
a competent state court refuses to set aside a verdict because the
sanity of one of the jurors which has been questioned is established,
after an inquiry in accordance with the established procedure of
the State, only by a preponderance of evidence. Jordan v. Massa-
chusetts, 167.

8. Due process of law; determination of sanity of juror according to
established procedure of State.

In this case held, that one convicted by a jury and sentenced to death
was not denied duc process of law because after the verdict one of
the jurors became insane and the court, after an inquiry had in ac-
cordance with the established procedure of the State, found by a
preponderance of evidence that the juror was of sufficient mental
capacity during the trial to act as such and therefore refused to set
the verdict aside. Ib.

9. Due process of law; taking of property; effect of state statute making
repair of toll roads a condition to right to collect tolls; Virginia
statute sustained.

A State does not take property of a turnpike company by opening the
gates when its road is out of repair; nor is the enforcement of a
statute which makes the keeping of a toll road in repair a condition
precedent to the right to collect tolls an unconstitutional taking of
property without due process of law; and in this case so held as to
the enforcement of such a statute which has been in force in the
State of Virginia since 1817. Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia,
264.

10. Due process of law; deprivation of property; quære as to what con-
stitutes.

Quare, and not determined, whether an ordinance cutting the earnings

of a telephone company down to six per cent per annum, would,

under the circumstances of this case be confiscatory and uncon-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Louisville v. Cum-
berland T. & T. Co., 430.

11. Due process of law; taking of property; power of State to regulate sale
of food-stuffs; validity of Indiana statute of 1907.

Regulating the sale of food for domestic animals is properly within
the scope of the state police power, and the vendors of such food
are not deprived of their property without due process of law by a
regulation requiring disclosure of ingredients and minimum per-
centage of fat and proteins, disclosure of the formula for combina-
tion not being required; and so held as to the statute of Indiana
of 1907. Savage v. Jones, 501.

12. Due process of law; taking of property; power of State to regulate sale
of food-stuffs.

Savage v. Jones, ante, p. 501, followed to effect that it is within the

police power of a State to prevent imposition upon the public and
to that end to require the disclosure of ingredients of food for
stock. Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 540.

13. Due process of law; revenue measure beyond power of State; validity
of Iowa statute of 1907 regulating sale of concentrated commercial
food-stuffs.

The Iowa statute of 1907 regulating the sale of concentrated commer-
cial feeding stuff is not unconstitutional as depriving vendors of
such stuff of their property without due process of law, or because
it is a revenue measure in disguise. Ib.

14. Due process of law; equal protection; effect to deny, of ordinance pro-
hibiting keeping of billiard halls.

An ordinance prohibiting the keeping of billiard halls is not unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, either as depriving
the owner of the hall of his property without due process of law
or as denying him the equal protection of the laws. Murphy v.
California, 623.

15. Due process of law; equal protection; reasonableness of classification;
validity of municipal ordinance regulating keeping of billiard halls.
The ordinance of South Pasadena, California, passed in pursuance of
police power conferred by the general law of the State, prohibiting
the keeping of billiard halls for hire, except in the case of hotels
having twenty-five rooms or more for use of regular guests, is not
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment either as

depriving the owners of billiard halls not connected with hotels
of their property without due process of law, or as denying them
equal protection of the laws. Ib.

See SUPRA, 3;

IMMIGRATION, 2.

16. Equal protection of the law; reasonableness of classification relative to
keeping of billiard halls.

A classification in a statute regulating billiard halls based on hotels
having twenty-five rooms is reasonable; and the owner of a billiard
hall, not connected with a hotel, is not denied equal protection of
the laws by an ordinance prohibiting keeping billiard halls for hire
because hotels having twenty-five rooms can maintain a billiard
hall for their regular guests. Ib.

17. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of operation of police
ordinance.

The fact that one of a class excepted from the operation of a police
ordinance on complying with a condition, does not comply there-
with, does not render the statute unconstitutional as against the
classes upon which it operates, but renders the person violating
the condition subject to the penalties of the ordinance. Ib.
See SUPRA, 14, 15.

18. Ex post facto laws; scope of inhibition against.

The ex post facto provision of the Constitution is confined to laws
affecting punishment for crime and has no relation to retrospective
legislation of any other description. Johannessen v. United States,
227.

19. Full faith and credit clause; effect of judgment of dismissal of suit as
to one joint tort-feasor as bar to suit against another joint tort-feasor
in another State.

One of two joint tort-feasors was sued in the Circuit Court of the
United States for New York, jurisdiction being based solely on
diversity of citizenship, and the bill was dismissed; the other
joint tort-feasor, who resided in Massachusetts, and was not, and
could not, be made a party defendant in the New York suit, having
been sued in the state court of Massachusetts, set up the New
York judgment, claiming that under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution of the United States the judgment dis-
missing a suit based on the same cause of action against one al-
leged to be his joint tort-feasor was a bar to the suit, and that the
Massachusetts courts were bound to give to the judgment the

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