had been placed in the sugar house by the Altagracia Company or of the other assets of the corporation, but that he was merely a secured creditor. The sum of the secured debt was fixed after making allowances for some not very material credits which the corporation was held to be entitled to. Second, that the judgment in favor of Nevers & Callaghan was valid and that that firm by virtue of its execution and levy upon the machinery had a prior right to Valdes. Third, the sums due to various creditors of the corporation were fixed and the equities or priorities were classified as follows: a. Taxes due by the corporation and the sum of the receiver's certificates and certain costs; b. The judgment of Nevers & Callaghan, and c. The debt of Valdes; d. Debts due the other creditors. Without going into details it suffices to say that for the purpose of enforcing these conclusions the decree directed a sale of all the rights of the Central Altagracia in and to the lease, machinery, contract, etc., and imposed the duty upon Valdes, if he became the purchaser, to pay enough cash to discharge the costs, taxes, receiver's certificates and the claim of Nevers & Callaghan.

These appeals were then prosecuted, the one by the Central Altagracia and the other by Valdes. We shall endeavor as briefly as may be to dispose of the contentions relied upon to secure a reversal.

I. The Central Altagracia Appeal.—The alleged errors insisted on in behalf of that company relate to the asserted arbitrary action of the court in forcing the cause to trial without affording the time which it is insisted the corporation was entitled to under the equity rules applicable to the subject, and, second, the refusal of the court to grant a continuance upon the affidavit as to the absence of material witnesses.

We think all the contentions on this subject are demonstrated to be devoid of merit by the statement of the case which we have made. In the first place, it is mani

fest from that statement that the proceeding leading up to the appointment of a receiver and the power given to administer the property was largely the result of the assent of the corporation. In the second place, when the unsuccessful financial issue of the receivership had become manifest we think the statement makes it perfectly clear that the steps taken by the court for the purpose of bringing the case to a speedy conclusion, and thus avoiding the further loss which would result to all interests concerned, were also acquiesced in by all the parties in interest who complied with the terms of that order and took advantage of the rights which it conferred. We think also the statement makes it apparent that the refusal on the part of the corporation to proceed with the trial, upon the theory that the time to plead allowed by the equity rules had not elapsed, was the result of a change of view because of the action of the court in refusing the continuance on account of the absent witnesses—a change of front which was inconsistent with the rights which the corporation had exercised in accord with the order setting the cause for trial and with the rights of all the other parties to the cause which had arisen from that order and from the virtual approval of it, or at least acquiescence in it, by all concerned.

Considering the assignments of error in so far as they relate alone to overruling of the application for continuance based upon the absence of witnesses, it suffices to say that the elementary rule is that the granting of a continuance of the cause was peculiarly within the sound discretion of the court below, a discretion not subject to be reviewed on appeal except in case of such clear error as to amount to a plain abuse springing from an arbitrary exercise of power. Instead of coming within this latter category, we think the facts as to the refusal to continue and the conduct of the parties make it clear that there was not only no abuse but a just exercise of discretion.

Opinion of the Court.

225 U.S.

II. As to the Appeal of Valdes.-Two propositions are relied upon, first that error was committed in treating Valdes merely as a secured creditor, and in not holding him to be the absolute owner of the rights and property alleged to have been transferred by the so-called conditional sale. Second. That in any event error was committed in awarding to Nevers & Callaghan priority over Valdes.

The first proposition is supported by a reference to the Porto Rican Code and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and the opinions of Spanish law writers. But the contention is not relevant, and the authorities cited to sustain it are inapposite to the case to be here decided, because the argument rests upon an imaginary premise, that is, that the ruling of the court below denied the right under the Spanish law to make a conditional sale or held that such a sale if made would not have the effect which the argument insists it was entitled to. This is true because the action of the court was solely based upon a premise of fact, viz., that under the circumstances of the case and in view of the prior sale with the equity of redemption, the cancellation of that sale and the transfer made by the corporation to Valdes and the immediate transfer of the same rights by him to the corporation in the form of a conditional sale, the failure to register any of the contracts, and the relation of Valdes to the corporation at the time the contracts were made it resulted that whatever might be the mere form, in substance and effect no conditional sale was made but a mere contract was entered into which the parties intended to be a mere security to Valdes for money advanced and to be advanced by him. This being the case it is manifest that it is wholly irrelevant to argue that error was committed in not applying the assumed principles of the Porto Rican and Spanish law governing in the case of a conditional sale, when the ruling which the court made proceeded upon the conclusion that there was no conditional sale.

The contention that under the Porto Rican law the form was controlling because proof of the substance was not admissible seems not to have been raised below, but if it had been is obviously without merit, as the case as presented involved not a controversy alone between the parties to the contract, but the effect and operation of the contract upon third parties, the creditors of the corporation. The contention is additionally without merit, since it assumes that the mere form of the contract excluded the power of creditors to inquire into its reality and substance even although the contract was never inscribed upon the public records so as to bind third parties. That its character was such as to require inscription we shall in a few moments demonstrate in coming to consider the second proposition, that is, upon the hypothesis that Valdes was but a secured creditor, was error committed in subordinating his claim to the prior claim of Nevers & Callaghan under their judgment and execution.

To determine this question involves fixing the nature and character of the property from the point of view of the rights of Valdes and its nature and character from the point of view of Nevers & Callaghan as a judgment creditor of the Altagracia Company and the rights derived by them from the execution levied on the machinery placed by the corporation in the plant. Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real) property, not only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to property of a movable nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is applied. "Things," says § 334 of the Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own nature or by their destination or the object to which they are applicable." Numerous illustrations are given in the fifth subdivision of section 335, which is as follows: "Machinery, vessels, instruments or

implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the industry or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works." See also Code Nap., articles 516, 518 et seq. to and inclusive of article 534, recapitulating the things which, though in themselves movable, may be immobilized. So far as the subjectmatter with which we are dealing-machinery placed in the plant-it is plain, both under the provisions of the Porto Rican law and of the Code Napoleon, that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having only a temporary right. Demolombe, Tit. 9, No. 203; Aubry et Rau, Tit. 2, p. 12, § 164; Laurent, Tit. 5, No. 447; and decisions quoted in Fuzier-Herman ed. Code Napoleon under articles 522 et seq. The distinction rests, as pointed out by Demolombe, upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the property of another. It follows that abstractly speaking the machinery put by the Altagracia Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did not lose its character of movable property and become immovable by destination. But in the concrete immobilization took place because of the express provisions of the lease under which the Altagracia held, since the lease in substance required the putting in of improved machinery, deprived the tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost of such machinery, and it was expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of the plant belonging to the owner without compensation to the lessee.