2. Over bankruptcy matters.
A bill in equity attempting to seek an adjudication on matters within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court cannot be sus-
tained as to matters dependent upon the principal matters alleged
and which could not have been made the subject of a separate bill
within the jurisdiction of that Circuit Court. Ib.
3. Under 8 of act of March 3, 1875; existence of property; burden of
proof as to.
The burden of proof as to the existence of property to be affected by
the decree within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in order to
give it jurisdiction under § 8 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18
Stat. 472, is on the complainant. Chase v. Wetzlar, 79.
4. Burden of proof of fact essential to jurisdiction.
While averments of some jurisdictional facts may prima facie be taken
as true where the questions do not address themselves to want of
all foundation of jurisdiction, and in such cases the burden is on
the one assailing sufficiency or verity, the burden of proving an
averment of a fact absolutely necessary to the exertion of the power
of the court to render a binding decree is on the party pleading. Ib.
5. Basis of jurisdiction under act of 1875.
The jurisdiction conferred by § 8 of the act of 1875 rests upon a real
and not an imaginary or constructive basis. Ib.
6. Of suit against absent executor; existence of property essential.
The Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction of a suit against an ab-
sent executor in the State where the will was probated, unless the
property to be affected by the decree is actually within the juris-
diction of the court. Ib.
7. Of suit against absent executor; effect of jurisdiction by state court.
The fact that the state court might by virtue of its authority in a
particular contingency exert jurisdiction over an absent executor
of a will probated in the courts of that State as to the disposition
of property beyond its territorial jurisdiction does not clothe a
Circuit Court of the United States with jurisdiction under § 8 of
the act of 1875. Ib.
See BANKRUPTCY, 10;
JURISDICTION, C 1, 2.
1. Under § 207, Judicial Code; complaints as to orders of Interstate
Commerce Commission.
Subdivision 2 of § 1 of the act creating the Commerce Court, now § 207
of the new Judicial Code, giving the Commerce Court jurisdiction
of cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, confers on that court jurisdic-
tion only to entertain complaints as to affirmative orders of the
Commission. Procter & Gamble v. United States, 282; Hooker v.
Knapp, 302.
2. Complaints not within.
Under the act, the Commerce Court is not given jurisdiction to redress
complaints based exclusively, as in this case, on the ground that
the Commission has refused the relief asked on the ground that it
could not award it. Ib.
3. Interpretation of administrative features of Interstate Commerce Act not
within.
To construe the act creating the Commerce Court so as to give it juris-
diction to originally interpret the administrative features of the
Interstate Commerce Act and to construe a refusal of the Com-
mission to grant relief as an affirmative order would frustrate the
legislative policy which led to the adoption of the act and would
multiply the evils which it was designed to prevent. Ib.
4. Over orders of Interstate Commerce Commission; limitation of.
The act creating the Commerce Court was intended to be a part of
the existing system for regulating interstate commerce. While
originally the duty of determining whether an order of the Com-
mission should be enforced carried with it the obligation to consider
both the facts and the law, it had come to pass prior to the adop-
tion of the act creating the Commerce Court that the jurisdiction
of courts over orders of the Commission is confined to determining
whether they were in violation of the Constitution or failed to
conform to statutory authority, and to ascertaining whether power
had been arbitrarily exercised beyond the power conferred. Ib.
5. Independent claim of constitutional right denied by Interstate Commerce
Commission not within.
Under the express reservation in the last paragraph of § 207, Judicial
Code, a claim that a constitutional right asserted in a petition to
the Interstate Commerce Commission has been denied by that
body, if independent of all questions of rights and remedies under
the Interstate Commerce Act, is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Commerce Court. Ib.
6. When constitutional question is dependent upon provisions of Interstate
Commerce Act.
Where the constitutional question is dependent upon provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, it is subject to the precedent action of
the Commission, as to which the Commerce Court only has juris-
diction in case of a prior affirmative order of the Commission. Ib.
The Commerce Court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by the
owner of private cars to recover on a money demand based on the
illegality of charges alleged to have been wrongfully exacted by
the railroad companies and which the Commission had refused to
allow. Ib.
8. To restrain order of Interstate Commerce Commission and determine
its enforceability.
The Commerce Court has jurisdiction of a petition of a carrier to re-
strain an affirmative order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
that it desist from paying allowances for lighterage to one shipper
unless it pays the same to other shippers, and also has power to de-
termine whether such order was entitled to be enforced. United
States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 306.
9. To allow preliminary injunction against enforcement of order of Com-
mission.
The Commerce Court has power to allow a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission directing the carrier to desist from paying allowances
for lighterage. Ib.
10. To enjoin enforcement of orders of Commerce Commission.
Under § 210 of the Judicial Code, injunction orders can be issued by
the Commerce Court restraining the enforcement of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in the following classes of cases:
First. A temporary restraining order staying in whole or in part
VOL. CCXXV-49
the operation of the order for not more than sixty days to be
allowed by the court or a judge thereof.
Second. A preliminary injunction to restrain or suspend in whole or in
part the operation of the Commission's order pendente lite to be
granted by the court.
Third. A perpetual injunction upon entry of final decree. Ib.
11. To enjoin pendente lite order of Commerce Commission.
In this case, held, that there was no abuse of power in issuing the order
for an injunction pendente lite and the order is affirmed and the case
remanded so that there may be opportunity to dispose of it in the
forum selected by Congress for that purpose. Ib.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.
G. OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
H. OF FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY.
1. Determination of grounds of jurisdiction.
Whether jurisdiction depends alone on diverse citizenship or on other
grounds as well, must be determined from complainant's own state-
ment in the bill of his cause of action, regardless of what may be
brought into the suit by answer or in subsequent proceedings.
Shulthis v. McDougal, 561.
Jurisdiction of the Federal court can only rest on grounds distinctly
and affirmatively set forth; grounds of jurisdiction, other than
those of diverse citizenship alleged, cannot be inferred argumenta-
tively from statements in the bill. Ib.
3. Where controversy might have arisen under laws of United States.
The fact that the controversy might have arisen under the laws of the
United States does not give the Federal court jurisdiction, if the
bill does not allege the facts in that particular, and the controversy
might have arisen in another way independent of those laws. Ib.
4. Of suit on contract by foreign corporation not complying with statutes of
State where contract made.
Where the contract of a corporation of one State not complying with
the statutes of another State where the contract is made, is not
void, the corporation can maintain its action, if jurisdiction other-
wise exists, in the Federal courts. David Lupton's Sons v. Automo-
bile Club, 489.
5. In cases of intervention in foreclosure suits and in original proceedings
to protect exercise of jurisdiction.
In cases of intervention in foreclosure suits, where jurisdiction depends
upon diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the intervening petition is
determined by that of the original case, but petitions in original
proceedings to enforce rights and protect the exercise of the juris-
diction of the court take their jurisdiction from that of the original
case. (St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. R. Co. v. Wabash R. R. Co., 217
U. S. 247.) Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 101.
See CORPORATIONS;
CRIMINAL LAW, 12;
FEDERAL QUESTION.
JURY AND JURORS.
Objections to drawing; when available.
An objection that the jury was not lawfully drawn must be availed of
at the trial; it cannot, under § 919 of the District Code, be made
the basis for setting aside the verdict on appeal. Johnson v. United
States, 405.
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