SUCCESSFUL ATTACK BY CATALAN TROOPS. 489

aide-de-camp of the Baron d'Eroles announced the actual arrival of the French at Cambriles from Tortosa (having left Valencia after its surrender) amounting, according to a letter previously received, to about 3,000 men. A las armas' cried the Baron of Eroles, with an animation which seemed to have a suitable effect on all the officers present; and I do not believe more than half an hour had elapsed before the whole of the division, consisting of between 5,000 and 6,000 men, were on the ground and ready to march. As I had ordered a boat to Salou with twenty barrels of powder for the army, and as I was anxious to render what assistance might be in my power, I made an attempt to regain my ship, accompanied by an orderly-dragoon. But after proceeding about three iniles, we were chased back by a party of French cavalry, which we met at the crossing of the road. Upon my return I found the troops advancing on the road to Tarragona, in order to cut the enemy's line of march; the Baron of Eroles putting himself at the head of about seventy cuirassiers, to reconnoitre their strength and position, whilst General Lacy directed the movements of the respective corps in readiness for the intended attack. We had scarcely reached the road from Cambriles to Tarragona when the Baron brought in prisoners two French cuirassiers, who stated that their general (Lafond) had reached the latter place in safety, accompanied by some dragoons, leaving the infantry (amounting to about 800) just by in Villa Secca. General Lacy ordered the Regiment of Busa to attack them immediately, and directed other corps to surround the town and prevent their escape. The enemy being advantageously posted behind the walls of the village, and that single regiment being much inferior to them in numbers, after considerable loss in killed and wounded, including amongst the latter, and very severely, their gallant Colonel Reding, they were obliged to retire; but the regiment intended for their support coming up, forced the French who had advanced in a compact body, to retire in their turn; and being attacked in their rear by the Baron, they could never effectually rally, notwithstanding the effort they made, accompanied by a general cheer. Despair was now visible in their conduct, and one or two discharges from a field piece which just then reached the ground, occasioned the surrender of all who remained alive, amounting to above 600. I judge the number of the enemy dead and dying which I saw in the field to amount to 200, that of the Spaniards bearing no proportion whatever. It seems that, having information by some spy of our landing, at the time one party of the dragoons chased me, another proceeded to Salou, where they made

prisoners of Captains Pringle and Flin, who were walking near the beach, and of Lieutenant Castle, belonging to this ship, who was waiting on shore with the powder, the boats and boats' crews having effected their escape. These officers, who were guarded close in the rear of the French during the whole of the battle, after being plundered even of part of their clothes, bear witness to their extreme pusillanimity on the approach of danger, and to their severe loss, both in the field and in the houses in which they sought refuge, owing to the superior dexterity of the Spanish fire. I have given you this little affair in detail, because it evinces considerable improvement in the discipline and organisation of the Catalan army; and I can vouch for the cheerfulness with which they proceeded to the attack, under the belief of the enemy's force being much nearer their equivalent in numbers. The arrangements made by General Lacy appeared to me well calculated to keep up the mutual support requisite on such an occasion, and the whole conduct of the Baron of Eroles particularly animating and exemplary. Nor shall I readily forget the delight he expressed upon liberating my brother officers from the grasp of our mutual enemy.

Notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, the General still expressed his intention of attacking Tarragona on that night, and we were therefore escorted to our ships about 5 o'clock, and weighed immediately. I stationed the Sparrowhawk' off the mole to keep up the communication with the army on that side, and the Merope' to the eastward for the same purpose, whilst the 'Blake' was to occupy the attention of the enemy opposite the Milagro. We had scarcely reached the town and opened our fire, when the wind increased to a gale at N.W., and prevented all communication by boats with the shore. We persevered, however, under a press of sail, standing off and on so as to keep up the bombardment until daylight; but the assault was not made, nor could we see any of the Spanish troops in the neighbourhood in the morning. Anxious to afford every encouragement in an enterprise which, besides being of material service to the general cause, would, if successful, have produced me individually such particular satisfaction, we continued to work up under as much sail as we could carry, the next day, in order to communicate, if possible, with the army; until at length, by the mainsail blowing entirely out of the boltrope, other sails splitting, and the barge sinking before we could get the carronade and ammunition out of her, I was driven to the necessity of anchoring for shelter just without range of shot to the eastward of the

town.

I am still uninformed of the particular cause which

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491

prevented the attack being made either on the 19th or the following night, having had no direct communication with any of the chiefs but by short requests for assistance circuitously conveyed, in consequence of the arrival of various divisions of the enemy in those parts, amounting to 7,000

men.

A few significant lines from General Lacy, which I received on the 23rd, induced me to push for Mataro, which I had nearly reached on the 24th, when a very severe gale from the N. eastward necessarily reduced me to storm staysails; and whilst persevering off Barcelona, in an endeavour to hold our own by keeping the ship's head to the eastward, she was struck by a sea which has started all the timbers and rail of the head, ledges, and carlings, bent the iron rail close in to the bowsprit, drew the chock in the stem which receives the bolt for the bumpkin shroud, carried away the roundhouse and head-door, and filled the main deck with water, so that the officers were up to their knees in the wardroom. Although both our spars and ropes stood this severe trial without injury, I bore up for shelter at Villa Nueva, where we were about to anchor at 6 P.M. on the 25th, when the Merope' made the signal for the enemy upon the road to the westward, and shortly afterwards opened her fire upon them. The gale being over and the wind light, we made all sail and soon began firing also. We observed three waggons disabled and abandoned, and considerable discomfiture amongst the troops, notwithstanding the difficulty we were under from the heavy swell setting directly on shore. Arriving opposite Vendrill, we perceived another party coming from the westward, with cavalry, artillery, &c., amounting to some thousand men, which directed their course inland upon our approach. We were, however, enabled, by giving the guns the greatest elevation, to discharge two or three broadsides before dark, which I trust did them material damage. Since this they have never appeared upon any part of that coast; and I know nothing more of the movements of either army than from the reports of desperate battles having taken place, the result of which is so variously stated that it is impossible to venture an opinion without more authentic intelligence.

&c. &c. &c.

From Don Luis Lacy, to the Commander of the English Naval Forces on the coast of Catalonia.

[Page 258.]

Head Quarters, Areñs de Mar: November 1, 1811.

Should the enemy attempt to occupy part of the coast for the purpose of preventing assistance being given to the Medas islands, I hope your Excellency will consider it right for the forces under your command to fire upon the villages which are occupied by the enemy whenever there is a favour able opportunity; for I have no doubt that this will be one of the most efficacious means of preventing the enemy from establishing himself on some points by which he could impede our communication with other provinces.

I communicate this resolution to the authorities and justices of the villages, in order that they may abandon them in time.

Head Quarters, Areñs de Mar, November 1, 1811,

LUIS LACY.

From Captain C. to Sir Edward Pellew.

[Page 260.]

'Blake,' off Mataro: February 2, 1812.

On the 29th, whilst watering at Areñs, I received informa tion that the whole French force which had lately traversed this Principality, amounting to 7,000 men, 4,000 of which were collected from the Ampurdan, and the other 3,000 from the garrison of Barcelona, were about to make a movement along the coast; I therefore directed Captain Tower, instead of returning immediately to the Medas, which he had lately supplied with provisions and water, and which could not be in any other danger whilst the whole of the army was in this quarter, to proceed with the 'Merope' to Mataro, and concert with the Governor, Colonel O'Ryan, the most advisable means for its defence. On the morning of the 30th, the French appearing determined to occupy the town of Mataro, and the inhabitants having had notice of their approach the preceding evening, and consequently sufficient time to remove their most valuable effects, I felt myself called upon to comply with the desire of the CaptainGeneral, repeated by Colonel O'Ryan; and opened the fire of

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the squadron upon such parts of the town as appeared to be most occupied by the enemy, and which was suffering by indiscriminate plunder. The tops of the mountains were as usual covered by the irregular Spanish forces acting in guerrilla, and I was in hopes that our united efforts had inclined the enemy to quit the place. They returned, however, at night, and have continued to occupy the town partially ever since, and I judge by their movements giving each part of the army an opportunity to plunder in its turn.

We have reports from Areñs of their having lost 600 men, and the evident effects of our shot upon the houses, in the parts to which they have been directed, induces me to give credit to the assertion. In the meantime I am made very uncomfortable by the apparent necessity of continuing this disagreeable warfare, without any communication whatever with the Spanish authorities, or knowledge of the movements of their principal military force. This nar

rative added to my preceding letter, will afford you the best means I can procure to enable you to judge of the critical state of affairs in this Principality. From the interior I get no information whatever. It appears to me, however, that the Spanish army has increased its exertions in proportion to the difficulties it has had to contend against. General Sarsfield was actually taken prisoner a few days ago, but was rescued by a Swiss grenadier of the regiment of Basa, who killed the Frenchman that had got possession of him, and recovered even the sash that he had just stripped from him. And amongst the losses which they have suffered in the late battles, I am sorry to find the names of some of those rising young men most distinguished for their gallantry. Besides Colonel Reding, severely wounded on the 19th, Colonels Villamil and Creuft, also of the division of Eroles, were wounded in the late hard-fought battle of the 24th, in which the French are said to have left 600 dead on the field; and Colonel Jalon, who has so often distinguished himself with the cuirassiers, and was left at Mataro to recover from an accidental wound he received at Belpouig, was killed at the head of a guerrilla party on the 31st. I have received information that the enemy have fortified Cadagues, and have occupied Palamos for the same purpose; they have also erected a battery upon Mongat, and are, I suspect, about to fortify a convent at Mataro, without the reach of our shot. And by their present movements I am led to believe they expect reinforcements which will enable them to secure partially, or overrun at will the towns on this part of the coast.