that one action is right, another wrong, without their being actually performed, as we can judge that all the parts are equal to the whole, without making the experiment of dividing material bodies and reuniting the parts. Talk, as an abstract case, of inflicting pain or misery in any living being: on merely understanding what this means we pronounce the action wrong. This is a moral determination perfect in itself; and it is quite unmixed with emotion. We behold this wrong action performed, and we then feel a painful emotion because the wrong action is performed. If we have thought of it before performance, the act of judgment has taken place by itself;* if only upon seeing the performance, the act of judgment is immediately followed by the emotion; the emotion takes full possession of the mind, and we are apt to overlook the judgment: but the judgment, the judgment alone, is the distinctive operation ;† the emotion is but consequent upon the perception of the distinction. * The desire to perform or avoid performance of an action perceived to be good or bad (or the desire that it should be performed or avoided by another agent) though it is what must take place before the action is performed, has always relation to the actual performance, and only springs up where actual performance is likely, or at least possible. The judgment that an action is right or wrong, may be formed regarding an action the actual performance of which is impossible. + Let me not be taken as meaning, by the distinctive operation, that which distinguishes the primary quality of the action A man hears that a particular occurrence has taken place, which, though he is not directly affected by it, he perceives will be, in its consequences, extremely prejudicial to him he pronounces it an unfortunate occurrence, and feels much regret that it has happened. In this case, his contemplation of the occurrence includes both "a perception of the understanding and a sentiment of the heart." But surely the sentiment or emotion of regret has nothing to do in characterizing the occurrence as unfortunate. He could have pronounced that it would be unfortunate without its happening at all - of course without any sentiment of regret, and also without any sentiment of fear, if the occurrence had been unlikely to happen. It is not unfortunate because of his regret, nor does his regret attend the perception that it is unfortunate-as that perception exists by for which it is determined to be right or wrong. This is a separate act from both of those which I have described, and precedes both. It is generally neither emotion nor judgment, in the strict sense, (though judgment may sometimes be employed) but perception or knowledge. I see a man receive a wound from another. This is the action. I perceive or know that it creates pain and inconvenience. This is the quality of the action which makes it the subject of a moral judgment. Reason pronounces that, as inflicting pain, the action is wrong. The actual performance of this wrong action moves in me a painful emotion. The instinctive feeling of pity or compassion again is different from all those, and what we have here no concern with. itself; the feeling of regret arises because what is perceived to be unfortunate-has happened. A man's judgment that an action is morally good or bad- his judgment that an event will have consequences beneficial or prejudicial to himself— are, as judgments, entirely different. But in the manner in which each is attended with an emotion, in the manner in which each exists independently of that emotion-they are precisely similar. - It is at all events to be observed in extension of Bishop Butler's analysis, that neither the judgment, nor the emotion, of which the act of moral approbation consists, is one, or indivisible, but each twofold. We judge, first, that an effect is fit, secondly, that an action is obligatory. We feel an emotion, first of, satisfaction, at the view of a fit effect, secondly, of attachment and admiration, towards a virtuous agent. Our perception that an agent is under an obligation to do any thing, must presuppose that something is, in itself, fit to be done. The judgment of the understanding in each case precedes the affection or emotion; or that affection or emotion is not moral approbation. I morally approve that the end or effect should be produced, only when I have judged that it is fit and proper to be produced; and my moral approbation of the agent on account of his virtue, presupposes that there was something, in my judgment and his, perceived to be obligatory, in a regard to which his virtue consisted. SECT II. Of the Natural Affections. Along with that regard to moral fitness and obligation which constitutes virtue, and which must, in some degree, however small, belong to every intelligent being, man possesses several benevolent desires or affections, by which he is directly impelled to promote the happiness of other beings, and to relieve their misery. These affections correspond so entirely, in some instances, with the principle of virtue, that some of the best writers have taken them for the same. Nothing however can be more different. Some benevolent affections are general, as sympathy or compassion; some particular, as filial, and parental love but all of them are mere desires, not having any necessary relation to their particular objects, but of a kind which we could easily suppose, at least, to be connected with other objects. We desire to render such a one happy, to relieve another from being miserable, and we act accordingly; not having in view any fitness in the effect that is to be produced; we merely desire it: we might have desired the contrary in each case; and should as readily and naturally have sought to gratify the one desire, as the other. It is with these desires as with our desire of food, which is quite independent of any view to the support of life, and would of itself equally impel us to swallow poison as wholesome victuals, did they chance to be equally agreeable to the taste. But when we act as virtuous agents, the case is quite different; and we promote happiness, and relieve misery, because it is fit or right that such should be done, and not merely because we desire it. It is true such desire exists; but it does not exist primarily, or by positive constitution; but in necessary connection with the object, as conceived by a rational mind. If we desire such effect to take place, it is only because it appears to be, in its own nature, a fit effect: one which is naturally proper to be desired, and would not cease to be fit, even should we possess contrary desires. Did we not desire it, indeed, we should not promote it; but did it not, in our judgment, possess an intrinsic fitness, we should not even desire it. Happiness and misery, as exciting the mere natural affections, are in the mind, not as objects of reason, but of sense or imagination. In vain you tell me that thousands lie dead or wounded in the field, or are perishing by shipwreck, by the earthquake, or the pestilence. I may hear all this, and comprehend what it means, and yet my feelings of compassion remain unmoved. But let me behold the agonies, let me hear the groans of a single sufferer; nay, fill my imagination with the vivid conception of them, and my heart is |