tomize all these circumstances, and examine, by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame. You never will come to any issue or conclusion. Reason judges either of matter of fact or of relations. Inquire then, first, where is the matter of fact which we here call crime; point it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or nature."-" Does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other? How? after what manner? specify the relation. more particular and explicit in your propositions, and you will easily see their falsehood."

Be

This passage may be given as a fair sample of the way in which the different moral qualities of actions, as for instance the obligation of the action, and the virtue of the agent, have generally been confounded together. Does Mr. Hume here make reference to the ungrateful disposition, as something in the mind of the agent; or to the obligation or duty lying on that agent, whatever his individual disposition might be? or, which of these soever he may have in view, what is the proposition, the affirmation, regarding ingratitude, that we are called to consider? "Examine the crime of ingratitude" - Examine, one might as well say, the figure called a triangle. Is the triangle, one might ask, a relation or a matter of fact?

-

- But without meeting in detail the somewhat captious, and not always intelligible challenges here offered, I would at once state, that to ascribe

blame or demerit to ingratitude, may be to affirm one or other or all of these propositions :

First. An agent who has received kindness from any being, ought not to do hurt to that being in

return :

Second. An agent who does what he ought not to do, in hurting one who has benefited himself, is an ungrateful or morally bad agent :

Third. Such an agent deserves punishment for his ungrateful conduct:

Fourth. We view such an agent with dislike and

resentment.

Now I am prepared to shew that the first and third of these propositions are strictly deducible from one or more intuitive truths discovered by reason ; and this, in relation to the present instance, is all that the,advocates of reason would maintain: the second is simply a definition: the fourth may be allowed, though it is not so, to be mere matter of fact. But did not reason perceive the truth of the first affirmation, the others would never have been formed.

It occurs to me also to mention here, that Mr. Hume, somewhere in his works, finds an argument for the truth of the theory which he espouses, in this circumstance, that, while in speaking on other subjects, such as reason is cognizant of, we employ, as the copula of our propositions, some part of the verb to be—is, was, will be,—we, on the contrary, whenever we introduce a moral

notion, must adopt the word ought, or some other quite different from the verb to be. On this I would merely observe, that the use of the verb to be takes place as much in morals, when we say is right, is wrong, as when we say, in mathematics, is equal, is unequal; and that the expression, ought to be, expressing fitness or obligation, is not more remote from the mere indicative mood of the substantive verb, than is the expression, may be, expressing possibility; or must be, expressing necessity. Indeed the three several notions of what may be,—what must be,—what ought to be,—carry, on the face of them, so plain an appearance of belonging to one family, that stronger grounds would seem to be required for attributing them to different origins, than merely (the only plausible ground assigned) that we feel a satisfaction when what ought to be done is done-a satisfaction not experienced from the difference of their specific nature-in regard to either of the other perceptions.

RECAPITULATION -ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLEX NOTION OF A MORAL ACTION.

WITH the preceding section terminated the discussion of the first of the two questions stated at the outset, as forming the principal divisions of the present inquiry, or that which relates to the nature of the moral faculty. The discussion of the second is now to be entered upon to which the remaining chapters of this Part are but preliminary.

It has already appeared, however, that we must treat this question not as asking simply-wherein does the goodness of an action consist, but wherein does its fitness, its obligation, its virtue, its merit consist.

We have seen that, when we come to analyze the notion of an action in morals, we find it to be a complex one, separable into several different parts. There is, in the first place, an effect produced by such action—a sentient being, the object of the action, receiving pain or pleasure from

it; or, if there are more than one object, the pain or pleasure distributed in particular proportions to each. This effect viewed by itself, and without any regard whatsoever to the character, conduct, or intention of an agent, nay even though we suppose it produced by a blind undesigning cause, we judge to be fit or unfit to take place. That any being should be happy rather than miserable; that, if there are more than one, a pleasure should be shared by all rather than enjoyed by one, is what we are pleased with in itself. So far the action, i. e. the effect of it, is fit. Obligation is a certain state, situation, or condition, in which an agent is placed in relation to this effect: he is under an obligation to produce the effect: there exists a certain reason or cause why he should produce it. No ideas can be more dissimilar than that of an effect or end, fit in itself to be produced, and that of the relative situation of an agent, who is bound or ought to produce it. We can conceive different agents to be each under a different degree of obligation to produce an effect of the same fitness. Among agents similarly situated, the fitness of the effect of an action is the measure of its obligation; but the obligation does not depend on this alone. The same effects, considered as proper to an action, will follow the performance of that action, whether the agent has promised to perform it or not; but it may be, in the highest degree, obliga