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obligation of an action constitutes a motive for the performance of it; and therefore it has been somewhat strangely assumed that the converse is true; and that any motive to which all the different species of good actions might, by any possibility, be traced, may be safely regarded as the cause why we reckon all such actions good. Thus, self love, regard to the will of the Deity, vanity, desire of the esteem and sympathy of others, has, each in its turn, been represented as the prevalent motive of all those actions called good; and consequently the cause why we perform them, or approve of their performance. Several writers of the highest eminence have, unaccountably, as

it seems to me, fallen into this confusion of thought.

The first principles of morals, then, will not otherwise explain why we perform or avoid any action, than merely as shewing that that action is one that ought or ought not to be performed.But of this more afterwards.

To the question, whether, from the principles to be stated, any definition or description can be given of virtue in general, it is to be replied, that such definition is, in the nature of the thing, an impossibility: the term virtue being applied to a variety of qualities, not from any thing that they have in common-the only circumstance on which a definition can be founded-but from certain peculiar relations in which they stand to one ano

ther. An action which has the effect of promoting happiness, is fit to be done: whatever is in itself fit, is obligatory on an agent: the regard paid by an agent to the sense of obligation, is the virtue of that agent. So far, virtue, in its more strict and proper meaning, is defined. The name however which properly belongs to a quality or character of the agent, is often, in ordinary language, transferred back to that quality of the act, in relation to which we ascribed to him the character in question; that is, we called the agent virtuous, in respect of his performing an obligatory action, we now call the action a virtuous one, because it is the act of a virtuous agent, and one the performance of which made him so. The relation of agent and act gives the same term to the peculiar quality of each. We speak in the same way of an ingenious man, an ingenious machine. The ingenuity of the man, is the quickness, comprehension, and judgment, displayed in contriving the machine: the ingenuity of the machine, is the simplicity and aptitude of the means by which it is made to answer the intended ends. This simplicity and aptitude, being the objects which the ingenuity of the contriver was exerted to produce—we ascribe ingenuity to them. But no one would try to form a definition of ingenuity, which would be applicable alike to the mental qualities of the engineer, and to the efficiency of a mechanical engine.

It is to be observed, too, that the terms obliga

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tion and fitness are expressive of ideas entirely simple, and do not consequently admit of definition. It might be supposed, that, if every action productive of happiness is fit to be done, it would be a correct definition of a fit action, to call it an action productive of happiness; but this is no more the case than it would be a correct definition of an equilateral triangle, to call it a triangle with three equal angles. That it has three equal angles is true of an equilateral triangle, but not what expresses our very notion of it to which the office of a definition is confined. So, the fitness of a beneficent action is a truth perceivable in regard to this action; but can by no means be considered as merely expressing what we mean by its possessing such tendency. Obvious as the truth of this remark must appear, it is the neglect of it, the confounding of the benevolent quality of an action with the moral goodness of that quality, as one idea, that has led to one of the most material fallacies connected with the present subject.*

These observations, defining the particular kind of moral truths which, in the dispute regarding the nature of the moral faculty, reason is maintained to discover, will, it is hoped, still farther vindicate the instrumentality of that faculty, by confining such instrumentality within those precise limits beyond which its employment need not be contended for.

* See pages 50 and 122.

187

SECT. II.

Parallel between Moral and Mathematical Truths.

The views which I entertain as to the source of moral distinctions, naturally lead me to offer an opinion on the question, whether morality is capable of demonstration, after the manner of mathematics.

If this question meant, whether there are any truths in morals that are necessary and immutable, as opposed to uncertain, contingent, or merely probable, I could of course have no hesitation in answering in the affirmative.

Or, if the question meant, whether there are any of the necessary truths in morals that are the subjects of deduction, as opposed to intuition; or, which comes to the same purpose, whether we can reason from necessary first principles of morals to other necessary truths, (which is the strict notion of demonstration,)-it seems to me that instances of such demonstration may very easily be shewn. But, in these, the conclusions are so little removed from their premises, that the statement of such demonstrations, like that of some of the elementary theorems of Euclid, seems little better than ingenious trifling.

And therefore, if the question means (as I imagine it ought to be understood) whether we can, by direct reasoning from necessary principles,

solve practical difficulties in morals; whether we are indebted to demonstration - to reasoning by progressive steps-for any conclusions in morals which lay hid until such progressive reasoning was employed; whether, in short, morals is a demonstrative science, in the sense that demonstration (in the strict import of the term) ever is, or will be an instrument in ordinary use for ascertaining its truths,-then I can have as little hesitation in saying that morals is not a demonstrative science; for all ordinary and practical difficulties in morals have reference to matter of fact-which, of course, is not subject of demonstration.

But still, the difference between the necessary truths of mathematics, and those of morals, in regard to the application of each to cases of fact, differ only in degree, not in kind.

The moralist tells us that an action which produces fit effects is obligatory. But how, it is asked, are we profited by knowing this, unless we are informed whether any particular action, about which a question may exist, does produce fit effects or not?

Well, but what more does the mathematician teach us, in regard to any particular point connected with his science? His information, so far as it is demonstrative, is really as hypothetical as that of the moralist. Suppose there is a triangular field, on each of the sides of which is a four-sided field. The two smaller four-sided fields belong to

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