cumstances; whether we suppose that there are bounds to possibility undiscoverable by us, which (as the supposition would involve a contradiction) even omnipotence itself cannot pass;-or whether we suppose that the Deity has voluntarily and purposely confined himself within a limited circle of means, a definite range of possibilities, in order to manifest his power and wisdom to his creatures; (for how, it might be asked, could wisdom appear in contriving means, where the end was to be attained without means? how could power be shewn where no opposing tendencies or obstacles were permitted to exist?) or whether we suppose that, as regards the case of a created being, an experience of evil is necessary for an otherwise unattainable relish for future good; that happiness which is not increasing, ceases to be happiness; or that victory over trials and difficulties, in the exercise of free agency, is necessary to the perfection of a species of moral excellence, and felicity springing from it, not otherwise to be acquired; or that the perfect justice of the Deity cannot dispense happiness to those who have not deserved it by patience, fortitude, diligence, superiority to temptations, (all supposing the existence of evil,)—whatever of these solutions we adopt, whether we adopt them all, or a part of them, or adopt others, we shall never adopt the supposition that it could have seemed to the Deity morally right to inflict pain simply for the sake of doing

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so: more easily than we could suppose this, indeed, we could suppose the Deity but imperfectly bent on doing what was morally fit, imperfectly able to contrive, or imperfectly able to fulfil. The existence of the question, then, why was pain or evil permitted, fortifies the truth of the proposition, that happiness is essentially fit, misery unfit; the difficulty or impossibility of answering the question does not affect the truth of that proposition. We can perhaps suppose that happiness might be so excessive as to become uneasiness; we unavoidably perceive that the degree and extent of happiness must be finite; but this can never cease to appear morally fit, that happiness should be, rather than misery; happiness great, rather than small in degree; happiness widely, rather than narrowly distributed. This much at least is certain and indisputable, that whatever might be the divine purpose in permitting or occasioning the existence of evil, there is no principle in our intellectual or moral constitution that teaches us, in any case, that evil as evil, and for the sake of its being evil, ought by us to be permitted or occasioned -no principle which, if it teaches any thing, does not teach the contrary. So far as our reason or our conscience informs us, so far as we can penetrate into the intentions of God and nature, so far as the will of God has been explicitly revealed to us, there is, in every case, a moral fitness in the promotion of happiness, as such, in the preven

tion or removal of misery, as such. To human agents at least, these must always be ends; ends which, with human means, can never be pursued to excess. Even if there may be other ends besides these, and by which these may occasionally be interfered with or superseded, these can never cease to be ends; even if there be cases in which pain ought to be inflicted or happiness withheld, it cannot be for the sake of inflicting pain, for the sake of withholding happiness. That happiness, simply as such, ought to be promoted rather than misery, that happiness should, simply as happiness, be promoted in a great degree, to a great extent, rather than in a small degree or to a small these are propositions which must of necessity be received as at least among the first principles of morals, under every system, every theory which man can possibly form.

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The question has sometimes been put, whether the promotion of virtue is not in itself something fit, as distinct from the promotion of happiness? But the promotion of virtue must always be the promotion of happiness; since virtue, both as a subject of contemplation and a source of conduct, necessarily produces happiness. To put such a question then is really to ask whether the promotion of virtue is not fit, as distinct from that from which it yet can never be made distinct.

This much, at all events, seems certain, that the perception that the promotion of happiness is

fit, must necessarily precede the perception that the promotion of virtue is fit; because without the former perception, we could not so much as form a notion of what virtue is; and the subsequent perception that the promotion of virtue is itself fit, is another instance of that sort of reproductive sequence in our moral sentiments that has already been observed.

CHAPTER III.

OF OBLIGATION OR DUTY AS LYING UPON AN AGENT.

SECT. I.

Of general Obligations, as arising from the proper and immediate Effects of Actions.

IN the last chapter, I treated of the fitness of actions, or of that quality which belongs to the end, result, or effect of an action, without reference either to any duty, conceived as lying upon an agent, or to any approvable or rewardable conduct in such agent. That a living being should be happy rather than miserable, does not merely mean, that it is the duty of a moral agent to render him happy, or that this is what a moral agent would be praised or rewarded for. The first proposition is true, absolutely, and in itself, and presupposed in those that follow. Immediately connected with the notion of fitness, however, and arising out of it, is that of obligation or duty, which the mind at once forms on conceiving of some fit or unfit effect, as what a moral agent may produce.

Our notion of the obligation of any action is