An inspection of each of the above plans will show that transportation is not treated in any detail beyond the airport boundaries other than to effect highway connections to the existing road system. The 1968 master plan for Friendship Airport is, we think, typical of this type of report. That report devotes a paragraph to an extension of the proposed rapid transit system to the airport, and states that provision for a station can be made in the future Transportation Center Building. It is noted that the transit system is being planned by the Baltimore Regional Council. This is almost identical with the approach followed by the FAA in the preparation of the Kling Master Plan Report for Washington National Airport (WNA).

We think that the limitations imposed on our consultant in regard to the study of metropolitan-wide transportation is the accepted practice in the preparation of airport master plans. This is not to say that we, as airport operators, are not vitally interested in overall area transportation. We are, in fact, very active in cooperating with those bodies that have the primary responsibility for development of the highway and rapid transit systems. We have worked very closely with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority (WMATA) in planning for future rapid transit connections to both WNA and Dulles International Airport (DIA). The Authority is presently studying the various routes of the system in great depth and currently retains expert consultants who are specialists in the field of mass transit.

Since the coordination of airport planning with area-wide transportation planning requires extensive contact with local planning authorities, we considered it only appropriate that such coordination be done by ourselves. We did not think it wise to delegate this basic responsibility to a consultant, nor did we think it appropriate to direct our consultant to conduct a simultaneous investigation of rapid transit beyond the environs of the airport, when such work was underway in the Transit Authority. We are in constant contact with the WMATA and continuously furnish them all available planning information, and have strongly advocated mass transit service to both Dulles and National airports. We think the enclosed letter of April 2, 1969, from William E. Downes, Jr., Commissioner of Aviation for the City of Chicago, is very germane to this issue. Mr. Downes points out that "airport planning restricts itself to the immediate area of each facility" but further points out that the Department of Aviation cooperates with all other planning groups and that overall airport accessibility is the responsibility of the transportation planning agencies of the

area.

Our planning for WNA, in connection with the Kling Study, is entirely consonant with this principle. We are active in cooperating with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG), which is the planning group charged with overall area transportation planning through its Transportation Planning Board. COG is currently in the process of preparing a long-range air facilities plan for the Washington area under joint sponsorship with the Regional Planning Council of Baltimore. This will be part of a comprehensive long-range plan for the area's physical development.

Also enclosed is a copy of an engineering report for the 1968 improvements program for the Dade County Port Authority which was used in connection with a $50 million bond issue. This presentation is representative of the treatment of area transportation in airport planning reports.

CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION,
CITY HALL, CHICAGO, ILL., April 2, 1969.

Mr. ARVIN H. SAUNDERS,

Director, Bureau of National Capitol Airports,
Falls Church, Va.

DEAR MR. SAUNDERS: Reference is made to discussions concerning planning for airport access, as it has been accomplished in the Chicago area.

The Chicago airport system consists of Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Chicago Midway Airport and Merrill C. Meigs Field. O'Hare Field is the world's busiest airport, and is our principal airline terminal. Chicago Midway Airport also serves as an airline terminal, but, to a lesser degree, and for relatively short stage distances flown by aircraft up to and including the Boeing 727. Merrill C. Meigs Field is situated on the lake front, adjacent to the Loop, and serves principally as a business and executive airport in close proximity to the

downtown business district. Meigs Field also receives a considerable volume of third level airline operations.

The basic responsibility for the planning for Chicago's airport system is vested in me as Commissioner of Aviation, but, it is undertaken with the full cooperation by and coordination with, other departments of the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois, as well as the Department of Planning of the City of Chicago, the Northern Illinois Planning Council and the Chicago Area Transportation Survey. Airport planning restricts itself to the immediate area of each facility. Through ample coordination we are aware of the general transportation planning in the area, and, likewise, those agencies responsible for transportation planning are given an input as to the planned load that will be generated by each airport.

Examples of planning include:

A. The 1957-1958 planning for the expansion of O'Hare Field into the present facility, which is handling passengers at an annual rate of thirty million, arriving and departing. At the time that this planning was undertaken, transportation agencies adapted plans for expressway, toll road and inter-State highways, so that all of these facilities enhanced the access to O'Hare Field. The Kennedy Expressway, which ties the airport to downtown Chicago, was planned with a median strip for rapid transit, the operation of which is now under construction. Within the airport, the road network continues the expressway concept and provides for any future rapid transit system to serve the terminal area.

B. After some years of airline inactivity at Chicago Midway Airport, a revitalization program was undertaken, which was completed early in 1968. Concurrently, the Crosstown Expressway was being planned. The plans for this expressway recognized the importance of Midway Airport, and construction which is expected to begin this year, will greatly facilitate access to downtown Chicago and to O'Hare Field, thus assisting passenger interchange when required.

C. In planning for Chicago's fourth airport, which will be needed in the period 1975-1980, all affected agencies have made an input, so that accessibility by road, highway and rapid transit have been weighed, along with other factors in evaluating the quality of each proposed site.

D. In planning for the immediate expansion of O'Hare Field to provide for the ultimate capacity of the facility, an intra-airport transportation system is being planned. In addition, this intra-airport system is being coordinated with rapid transit plans, so that there can be a future rapid transit connection to the terminal.

In summary, the Department of Aviation considers overall airport accessibility to be the responsibility of transportation planning agencies in the Chicago area. We are highly pleased with the results of our system of planning, since each facet of airport, City and area planning is undertaken by experts in each of the involved disciplines.

We are enclosing appropriate planning documents, which are currently available. We are constantly reviewing our planning with our airport consultants, Landrum and Brown of Cincinnati. We constantly coordinate our efforts with the concerned planning groups in the area in order that our planning will not be totally airway oriented, and more important, in order that area plans recognize the needs of the airport system. Thus the airports and the area can grow in harmony, one with the other.

Yours very truly,

WILLIAM E. DOWNES, Jr.,
Commissioner of Aviation.

(The master plans and planning documents referred to may be found in committee files.)

Mr. SAUNDERS. Perhaps a matter of timing would be of interest if you want to discuss this in depth.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SAUNDERS. If the time of the Kling contract negotiation and signing would be helpful, the date was May 5, 1966.

At that time planning studies prepared by the National Capital

Planning Commission called for a rapid transit stop in the vicinity of National Airport on the extension of the Pentagon line south of Alexandria. The plan went to Pentagon City at the time, as I recall. Therefore, it was our conclusion that rapid transit would be provided in the basic transportation system and we worked toward that change.

However, in December 1967, after we had contracted for a study with Kling, the WMATA released its proposed regional rapid transit plan which did not provide for a stop at the airport. Shortly thereafter hearings were held.

The FAA requested that the subway be routed through Washington National with a stop in the terminal building. The final regional system, the WMATA adopted March 1, 1968, was revised to include the airport stop.

At the time of negotiating the Kling contract we saw no particular reason for any extensive study of the subway since the planning at that time provided for an intermediate stop at Washington National as part of the metropolitan system and did not involve the economics of extending a line that would have terminated at the air terminal. In other words, Washington National was simply to be an intermediate stop on the planned line to Alexandria.

The CHAIRMAN. How can you come up with a plan for air transportation that does not go deeply into the vital area of moving people economically and swiftly to and from the airport; particularly when you are going to try to expand the airport? I don't see how any plan can be made today which does not take into consideration, not just the distance between the location of the airport to downtown Washington, but the length of time it takes an individual to leave his office and arrive at Washington National Airport, the time it takes to get the 6 p.m. commuter shuttle and the time it takes to actually get off the ground after waiting around and the final traveltime he takes to get to his final destination in New York.

That is what you are talking about. In my study of this report, at least its written portion, I do not think it gives proper consideration to the problem of movement of people by rapid transit.

Let us go on to another area, Mr. Saunders. In the report they suggest the possibility of putting the control tower on a platform 600 feet into the Potomac or on Haines Point. Does the FAA think that that is a proposal which is meritorious?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Mr. Chairman, the charge to Mr. Kling, in general, was to study all alternatives open in providing for the public use of National in 1980 or thereabout. That is why there was a brief discussion of the possible relocation of the control tower. As you stated, the report mentions two locations that might be worth considering as against a new structure on top of the terminal building.

There may be some advantages to these locations, but in our estimation they are more than offset by the disadvantages. Obviously a control tower should be so located that it gives the controllers the best possible view of the airport on a day-to-day basis regardless of the runways and use, and the location on the top of the terminal building would best serve in that respect, in our judgment. So I would regard this as mention of an alternative that we would probably not take too seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. The National Capital Planning Commission, I believe, publicly has requested the FAA to consider one of two policies with regard to Washington National-either maintain it at the present rate of traffic or phasing it out. Has the FAA seriously ever considered either of these proposals?

Mr. SAUNDERS. As I have checked the record, Mr. Chairman, I do not find any evidence that the National Capital Planning Commission asked us to consider phasing out the airport.

The CHAIRMAN. They asked Mr. Kling to consider it in his study. Mr. SAUNDERS. That is correct and the question was asked of me when I presented the summary of the Kling report. They asked whether we considered the alternative of phasing out the airport. The answer was no, because of our charge from Congress in operating these airports and in meeting with the Appropriations Committees each year and in seeking and receiving funds, it was clear the intent of Congress was that we continue to operate Washington National Airport. Therefore, there were no instructions given to Mr. Kling and his associates to consider phasing out Washington National Airport.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the maintenance of National Airport as it is and the better utilization or the strengthening of the other regional airports, Friendship and Dulles? Did you ask Kling to consider that?

Mr. SAUNDERS. No, sir; the charge to Mr. Kling was to study Washington National Airport and its future alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Without regard to the other airports in the region? Mr. SAUNDERS. That is correct. It was a Washington National study alone, exclusively.

Senator SPONG. This is one of the most disturbing things about the report, Mr. Saunders. You made it very clear that Mr. Kling did his study within the terms of his contract and under the instructions he had. So this is in no way an indictment of how he proceeded, but I must think, in view of the existence of these three airports and their proximity to each other and the fact that the problem is upon the entire area, that it was quite unrealistic to do this study without more regard to the future of the other two airports as their development related to the future of National.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on that? The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Senator Spong, as you know, Dulles is the other National Capital Airport. It is an airport of the future, with a master plan already developed, with almost unlimited expansion capability, and with everything going there for the future.

So, there was no particular need to study the master plan for Dulles. It had already been done in an admirable way and the future of Dulles was pretty well set out. All that was needed was to meet the landmarks of traffic and demand and go ahead with facilities as needed in accordance with the master plan.

The situation at National is entirely different. There was not a master plan available and there was a need to develop concepts which would lead to a master plan.

Senator SPONG. One of the first questions I asked you earlier, Mr. Saunders, and you were going to furnish the figures, had to do with

projections for Dulles. Implicit in that question was "Has Dulles developed to the degree projected?" A factor in all of this is what has been done at National has an effect upon the development of either Dulles or Friendship. So regardless of airports of the future we are faced with a situation where whatever is done at one has some effect on the development of the other.

Mr. SAUNDERS. That is right. May I call your attention, Senator Spong, and the chairman's attention, to exhibit 1 attached to my statement. It shows the relationship of the traffic of the three airports and the declining participation by National.

Incidentally, one correction on the coordination with Mr. Kling. Of course, we made available to him all of the traffic figures and forecasts for all three airports as well as for National. He was aware of the fact that National was probably declining as to participation in the total market.

The chart which accompanies this exhibit shows very clearly that the percentage of participation in the market at National has been declining over the years. Dulles and Friendship have had increasing business and that will continue to increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saunders, I have expressed my concern over the failure of the report to include the rapid transit system properly, but I have another major problem with the Kling report. It provides approximately 2,000 more parking spaces under this plan. At the same time it proposes to increase the passenger traffic from 10 million to approximately 16 million. That seems to me to be way out of line. Then, although the Kling report has some delightful details on autos and circulation of autos within the airport grounds, it gives no consideration at all to the impact of the enlargement of the airport or the access roads, the movement of traffic on the George Washington Expressway, the 14th Street and Memorial Bridges, the Southwest Freeway, nor the traffic schedules engendered or the flight schedules at that time. What are these 6 million passengers going to mean to the access roads, to the George Washington Parkway, to the 14th Street and Memorial Bridges, and the Southwest Freeway?

Mr. SAUNDERS. First, on the parking, if you wish, the parking figures developed by Kling attempted to set a middle ground between a general rule of thumb in airport management and design as to the ratio of parking spaces per passenger enplaned.

At many airports, including Friendship International, the ratio recommended is 1,000 parking spaces per 1 million passengers per year. That, incidentally, is the plan of Friendship and many other airports, and it is a very good design standard for the future.

Incidentally, the Friendship master plan indicates that this number of parking spaces, this rule of thumb, would only decline to 800 parking spaces per million passengers in and out per year, even if rapid transit were available at Friendship. Recognizing the serious limitation of space at Washington National, the Kling report set a middle ground of something less than 500 spaces per million passengers per year. In many places this would be considered a less than desirable figure.

The number of spaces reflects to a degree the fact that the Washington area is a large multicar area—