power of alienation is itself implied in the grant, and the trustees perform the trust by the proper exercise thereof. Ib.

WILLS.

1. Decision in Wheeler v. Wheeler, 1 R. I. 361, reaffirmed, that revocation of a will by marriage, under our statutes, is presumptive only. Miller and others v. Phillips, Executor. 2. Evidence that the testratrix, who wrote a will before her marriage, spoke of her will after her marriage, held to be properly admitted. Ib.

3. Evidence of parol declaration is admissible to rebut the presumption of revocation from marriage, to be weighed by the jury in connection with other evidence. Ib.

4. John D'W., by the third clause of his will, provided as follows: "I give, bequeath and devise unto my son John D'W., Jr., during his natural life, the use and improvement of the farm where I now live, with the live stock and farming utensils belonging thereto, and after his decease I give, devise and bequeath the same estate, both real and personal, to my grandson, Algernon S. D'W., his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, forever. Provided, however, that if the said A. S. D'W. should die without lawful issue living at the time of his death, then, in that case, I give, bequeath and devise the same estate, both real and personal, unto his surviving sisters, Susan A. D'W., Elizabeth V. D'W., and Maria G. D'W., or such of these as may survive the said A. S. D'W., their heirs and assigns forever." Held, John D'W. being dead, Amelia D'W. having died previously to John, leaving children, Algernon living and having issue, Elizabeth and Maria both living, and Elizabeth being married;- First, that the estate given to Algernon S. D'W. was a fee simple, subject to the conditions expressed in the will;-Secondly, that the gift over referred to issue living at his death, and was not void as referring to an indefinite failure of issue, but was good as an executory devise; and, Thirdly, that the sisters of Algernon, who survived him, would take the estate in fee (if he died without leaving issue living), but that the issue of his sister Amelia, the sister who died before him, took no interest in the estate, and that, if no sister of Algernon should survive him, the fee, once vested in him, would not be divested. D'Wolf v. Gardner.

5. A mere naked possibility or expectancy cannot be assigned at law, but a contingent right, founded on an executed instrument, where the contingency does not depend on the existence at a particular time of a person now in existence, can be released to the terre tenant, or person in possession by a rightful title (although, quære, whether it can be so released to strangers). Hence, it was held, fourthly, that the sisters of Algernon D'W. might pass their interest in said estate to him, by any instrument operating by way of estoppel or release, the power being given to his married sister to release her interest jointly with her husband, by chapter 726 of the statutes, even if it did not exist under the provisions of 26 of chapter 136 of the Revised Statutes. Ib.

WORDS ACTIONABLE. See Actionable Words.

DECISIONS BY THE U. S. SUPREME COURT. The following decisions were rendered by the U. S. Supreme Court on the 14th inst.:

The Justices of the Supreme Court of the Third Judicial District of New York v. The United States, ex rel. Murray and Buckley-The questions presented for decision in this cause were, whether the act of Congress providing for the removal of a cause for new trial in the Federal Court, after judgment by a State Court, is constitutional; and, second, whether the provision of the Constitution, which declares that no fact tried by a jury shall be re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law, applies to facts tried by a jury in a State Court. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court, holding substantially that the clause of the act of 1863, which provides for the removal of causes after judgment from the State to the Federal Court, was not in pursuance of the Constitution, and was, therefore, void. The conclusion arrived at in respect to the second question stated above amounts to an answer in the affirmative. The cause is remanded, with directions to dismiss the writ of error, to the State Court, and all proceedings under it. This is the false imprisonment case of Patrie v. Murray, and one of his deputy marshals, and which, after judgment against the defendants, it was attempted to remove to the Circuit Court of the United States by writ of error under the act in question, supported by a writ of mandamus, the Judges of the State Court declining to send up the record of judgment.

BOUNTY UNDER THE PRESIDENT's call for VOLUNTEERS, 1861. The United States v. Henry J. Hosmer.-Appeal from the Court of Claims.-A judgment was given below for the claimant for $100 bounty for enlistment under the President's call for volunteers in 1861, he having been discharged for disability upon a surgeon's certificate. The question was whether, under the act of Congress ratifying the act of the Executive, the claimant could recover, the act providing that two years' service should have been rendered to entitle the soldier to the bounty, unless discharged for wounds. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court, holding substantially that the proclamatíon of the President and the general orders of the War Depart

ment stipulating to pay $100 for each volunteer, followed by the enlistment of the claimant, constituted a valid contract between the Government and the claimant, upon which he was entitled to the bounty, he having been honorably discharged, even though he did not serve two years nor was discharged for wounds. The judgment was affirmed.

THE LEGAL TENDER DECISION.

Mr. Wallace, Reporter of the United States Supreme Court, recently wrote the following letter to the Philadelphia Ledger relative to the recent legal tender decision: To the Editor of the Money Article of the Ledger:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 9, 1870. When the decision in what is called the legal tender case was made, the Supreme Court of the United States consisted of eight judges, the number then fixed for it by law. And the decision that notes of the United States, when tendered in payment of a contract made previously to the passage of the legal tender act of February, 1862, was no lawful tender, was concurred in by five judges, not by three, as assumed in the paragraph quoted. These five judges were the Chief-Justice and the Justices Nelson, Grier, Clifford and Field. Judge Grier had left the bench before the opinions were delivered, but he was on it when the case was argued in conference, and when the judg ment of affirmance of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which had decided the tender bad, was irrevocably and perfectly agreed on. And this, in substance, is stated in the opinion of the court as officially printed, though not in others that I have

seen.

While on the subject, and since I have seen it stated that the decision does not apply to interest which has accrued since the legal tender acts on obligations given before them, and that, under the decision, interest on such obligations may be paid in paper, I may take leave to add that the decision did apply to interest just as much as to principal. Part of the tender made in the case was exactly for interest; interest, I mean, which had accrued after the passage of the legal tender act. The Court of Appeals made no distinction between principal and interest, but held the tender bad in toto. And so the Supreme Court held it.

I may add that on no great constitutional question, where professional and public opinion has been largely divided, do I recall a case for many years where the judges were unanimous, or nearer to unanimity than in the present one. That the case was not hastily adjudged may be believed not more from its importance than from the fact that the question involved in it was, in one case or in another, and with more or less fullness, argued at the bar not less than six different times, and was held very long under advisement. I am your obedient servant, J. W. WALLACE.

The Ledger, from which we take this, adds: We have yet to learn that there is any case now on the docket which involves the legal tender question. All have been disposed of, as we hear. It would take two or three years before a new case could be got up, in the present crowded state of the Supreme Court docket; and a case raised up now, and in the face of the late emphatic decision, would look so much like a case raised for delay of payment that the party taking an appeal would probably be considered as coming within the rule of the court which allows the bench to add ten per cent interest above the legal rate on any case which they believe is brought for delay. The rule, as the reported decisions of the court show, has been twice enforced lately, and it is a dangerous one to trifle with. It shows, as we have sought to show, that there is nothing for our State or for our large corporations, owing money on bonds issued prior to February, 1862, to do, but to look the matter in the face and conform to the solemnly settled law of the land.

SUPREME COURT.

THE CORN EXCHANGE INSURANCE COMPANY v. ARMINA BABCOCK, impleaded, etc. Where a married woman, possessed of separate real estate, indorsed a note as surety for her husband, without consideration and without benefit to her separate estate, and the indorsement purported in terms to charge her separate estate, with payment; held, 1st. That an action at law seeking an ordinary pecuniary judgment, as upon a personal contract, was not maintainable on such notes against the married woman. 2d. That, in order to make an indorsement, in such case, a charge upon her separate estate, a specific description of the property in the instrument creating the charge, executed according to legal formalities, and enforced in equity under a complaint seek. ing as relief the satisfaction of the charge out of the specific property subjected thereto, is essential,"

APPEAL from a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.

The action was brought upon three promissory notes, having upon each the special indorsement of the defendant, Armina Babcock, substantially in the following form: "For value received, I hereby charge my individual property, with the payment of this note.

"ARMINA BABCOCK."

At the time the notes were executed and indorsed by the appellant, Armina Babcock, which was in 1863 and 1864, she was a married woman (being the wife of the defendant, Edward Babcock), and the owner of a separate estate, consisting of real property. The other defendants were insolvent. The referee found that she made the indorsements for the benefit of the other defendants, Stephen E. and Edward Babcock, and that she had no interest in the transaction; but made no finding that she intended to charge her separate estate. The action was in the ordinary form against makers and indorsers of a promissory note, except that the above indorsement was literally copied, and the complaint alleged in Armina Babcock the possession of separate estate and her intent to charge said estate.

The appellant raised by exception a number of objections to the plaintiff's recovery, and also moved to dismiss the complaint as asking a personal judgment against a married woman; as being improperly joined with the other defendants; as not liable in such an action, but only, if at all, in equity; as not proving an intent to charge her separate estate, etc.

The judgment was the usual general judgment in an action at law for a pecuniary sum as damages (the amount of the notes), and the costs of the action.

R. A. PARMENTER, for plaintiff.

J. A. MILLARD, for defendant.

By the Court, HOGEBOOM, J.-In this case the learned referee gave a personal money judgment against the appellant, a married woman, in an action at law for a debt of her husband, not benefiting her separate estate, upon a note of which she was simply indorser or guarantor for him. And in the proceedings in which action her separate estate was not specifically described, and to which separate estate the judgment made no allusion. The complaint was in the ordinary form against the maker and indorsers of the note, except that it described in hæc verba the appellant's indorsement, and by amendment embraced the further allegation that the appellant was the wife of the defendant Edward Babcock, "and at the time of making her said indorsement had and still has a separate estate, and intended to charge her separate estate by her said indorsements." The only proof of such intent produced at the trial was the character of her indorsements, which was as follows:

"For value received I hereby charge my individual property with the payment of this note. "ARMINA BABCOCK.”

And the fact that at the time she had, and still owns as her separate estate, a house and lot in the city of Troy worth several thousand dollars, and that her co-defendants were insolvent. The referee does not find any such intent, nor that the indorsement was for the benefit of her separate estate, but on the contrary finds that" such notes were indorsed by the said Armina for the benefit of the said Stephen E. and Edward Babcock, she having no interest in the transaction."

Under these circumstances, I do not think this judgment can be sustained, for reasons which I proceed to give: 1st. The common law disability of the wife to bind herself in any such way as is claimed to have been done by these indorsements is conceded. A question is raised whether the writing of the appellant upon the back of the notes amounts to an indorsement, but for the purposes of this case I assume that it does. One of them clearly is so, because it directs the payment to be made to the secretary of the plaintiff. The disabilities attaching to coverture are not to be regarded as any further removed than they are so by the married women's acts of 1818, 1819, 1860, 1862, and the question is, whether these acts justify the judgnent given in this case. While they are, perhaps, to be construed liberally to promote the objects intended, it must not be forgotten that their leading object was to benefit and protect married women, and not to expose their separate estate to new and increased dangers and liabilities. 2d. Prior to the acts of 1860 and 1862, it was not supposed, so far as I know (even under the acts of 1848 and 1819), that married women could be made liable under an instrument like that now under discussion; certainly they could not be charged personally. In the leading case of Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y., 265 (repeatedly before the courts), it was held, that the capacity of married women to bind themselves by their contracts is not enlarged by the acts of 1848 and 1849, and a married woman having a separate estate, does not bind it by signing a promissory note as surety for her husband. This case came again, and finally before the Court of Appeals, 22 N. Y., 450, where the court reached this conclusion, that in order to create a charge upon the separate estate of a married woman, the intention to do so must be declared in the very contract, which is the foundation of the charge, or the consideration must be one going to the direct benefit of the estate. The court did not decide in what manner (otherwise than that it must be in the contract itself) this intention must be made to appear whether by a specific mortgage, pledge or appointment of property, specifically described, which was in force, in equity, in a direct proceeding to sell such separate estate, as had long been the practice of courts of equity (the common law courts not assuming jurisdiction of such a proceeding), or whether a general declaration of an intent to charge, or of an actual charge upon her separate estate, without in any

way describing it, was sufficient. This decision was made in 1860, but without any reference to the act of that year, and of course without any to the subsequent act of 1862. The act of 1860, ch. 90, sec. 3, as amended in 1882, ch. 172, p. 344, empowered married women to bargain, sell, and convey such real estate as they possessed as their separate property, and to enter into any contract in reference to the same with like effect in all respects as if they were unmarried. I observe in the statute no like provision in regard to personal property, but assuming that her power was equally operative over her personal estate, one question would be whether a general judgment affecting all her property, as well as that of her husband, in which she an interest by reason of the conjugal relation as her own separate property, would be proper. I think this is not answered by saying that the execution of the judgment can be controlled so as to limit its enforcement to her separate property; the judg ment itself should be such as not apparently to cover or affect any property other than that on which it is a lawful lien.

The broader and more important question, however, is, whether the authority given to enter into any contract in reference to her real estate is practically carried out in accordance with the intention of the law makers by an indorsement of a note saying that she charges her individual property with the payment of the note. If she attempted to make a deed or conveyance of her property in such a way it would be plainly illegal, and I think neither of the acts of bargain, sale, or conveyance, which in the previous part of the same sentence she is empowered to make, would be well executed by a simple statement in writing, saying: "For value received I hereby bargain (or sell or convey) my individual property to A B.' It appears to me it would be rejected for indefiniteness as well as for non-compliance with the forms of law, and I am strongly inclined, to think the loose and indefinite language contained in this instrument is a decisive objection to its validity. "For value received" may possibly answer however wholly untrue it in fact is. "1 hereby (that is upon the back of a promissory note) charge (that is mortgage, pledge, or make liable) my individual property (without describing it, without acknowledging the instrument, without recording it, without letting any body know what property it covers or whether it covers any) with the payment of this note." If she indorsed a hundred notes to different persons in the same way, which is to have preference, according to the date they were given or according to the date when judgment is obtained? No man, I think, could legally mortgage or pledge his property in that way, and I doubt whether any woman can.

3d. But it is said we are controlled by authority on this subject which we are bound to respect. In Barnett v. Lichtenstein (39 Barb. 194) the majority of the court went far enough to sustain the liability of the wife in the present case, putting it upon the ground that the words and intent of the statute were complied with by a charge made in this way and in this general form. But Justice INGRAHAM dissented, holding that, according to well settled rules of courts of equity, when a wife wishes to charge her real estate as security for her husband's indebtedness, she must do so by a mortgage or other proper charge of specific property, which is to be enforced as such. That she cannot contract a personal liability for her husband and for his benefit upon her note without any consideration to herself, and that the effect of sustaining the doctrine of her liability in the case under consideration, would be to place her in a worse condition than if sole, and to deprive her of the safeguards which the law has thrown around her to protect her property from the debts of her husband. Although this is a General Term decision it was made by a divided court, and cannot claim absolute authority in a condition of the law so new and unsettled and so much the subject of conflicting decisions.

It is directly opposed by a still later general term decision in the 4th district, made also by a divided court (Justice Rosecrans dissenting) not yet reported in the case of Kelso v. Tabor, where the attempt was made to recover upon the wife's note given for her husband's debt, and charging her estate in the same form as in the present case. Justice Potter, delivering the opinion of the court held, that though not in terms, yet in principle, the case was decided by the case of Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, and 22 N. Y. 450. That the contract of a married woman is absolutely void at law; that the statutes of 1848 and 1819 have taken from the wife no disability of her coverture, because the consideration of the contract in question has no relation to her separate estate, and the note is no conveyance of any interest therein; that the question is not what she might do with money on hand, or by an executed instrument, under seal, in a form to bind real estate, but by an executory contract, not given for her benefit, in which she has no interest, which is void at law, and for the enforcement of which there is no adequate inducement in equity to step aside from the well established rules prevailing in that court; that the question is whether the writing which would be void at law as a contract, is made valid and binding, by a direction that the indebtedness be charged upon her separate estate; that the action also is one at law, seeking a money judgment, and not equitable relief, and cannot succeed in that form nor be turned into an equitable action without violating the

principles of pleading. (Heywood v. The City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 540.)

I feel inclined to adopt the reasoning of the last mentioned case rather than that of Barnett v. Lichtenstein, as more in accordance with the spirit of equity and the intent of the legislature, and to grant a new trial in this cause substantially for the following reasons:

1st. That an action at law seeking an ordinary, pecuniary judgment as upon a personal contract consummated by a judgment of that character, in the ordinary form, is not maintainable against a married woman, who, without consideration and without benefit to her separate estate, and simply as the surety of her husband, and for his accommodation, indorses his note.

2d. That the plaintiff, having received these notes upon a pre-existing indebtedness, is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration.

3d. That as the attempted charge upon the wife's separate real property in this case was not founded upon any benefit to such estate, or upon any matter in which she had any interest, or on account of which she had received any consideration, there is no occasion or justification for any departure from the established principles and proceedings of a court of equity, which require, in order to make and enforce a valid charge, a specific description of the property in the instrument creating the charge, executed according to legal formalities, and enforced in equity under a complaint seeking as relief, not a general judgment, but the satisfaction of the charge out of the specific property subjected thereto.

4th. That section 3 of the act of 1862, empowering a married woman, possessed of real estate as her separate property, to bargain, sell, and convey the same, and to enter into any contract in reference thereto with the like effect in all respects as if she were unmarried, refers to such modes and forms of bargain, sale and conveyance of real estate and contracts relative thereto as were recognized as legal, and were in conformity with the law as expounded in judicial tribunals at the time, and does not sanction a contract or charge of the kind now under investigation.

5th. That section 7 of the act of 1862 authorizes a married woman to sue or be sued in all matters having relation to her sole and separate property in the same manner as if she were sole refers mainly to her right and liability to sue and be sued without having her husband joined with her, and does not intend to confound or overthrow the rules of law or legal proceedings which theretofore obtained in regard to the essential characteristics of such actions, or the kind of relief to be sought, or the mode of in which it is to be reached.

6th. That the weight of authority is against the maintenance of the action in its present form.

I am therefore of opinion that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs, to abide the event.

TERMS OF SUPREME COURT FOR MARCH. 4th Monday, Special Term, White Plains, Tappen. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Yates, J. C. Smith.

4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Herkimer, Mullin.

4th Tuesday, Special Term, Erie, Talcott.
Last Monday, Special Term, Monroe, Dwight.

Last Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Tompkins, Parker.

Last Tuesday, Special Term, Albany, Miller.
Last Tuesday, Special Term, Cortland, Murray.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE GOVERNOR,

BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE. Notaries Public confirmed March 16, 1870:

Chautauqua County.- Geo. W. True, J. E. Mayhew, Timothy Judson, John Francis, Charles Holcomb, Henry Kidder, Fred'k F. Driggs, Leveret R. Johnson, Edward L. McCullough, Wm. L. Lester, James Fenner, George W. True, Jr., Austin L. Wells, Josias P. Kent, William Green, David Barwell, Orson Stiles, Wm T. Coleman, Jabez B. Archibald, Almond Z. Maison, Langley Fullager, William Zimmerman.

Ulster County.-Charles R. Adkins.

Albany County.- Wm. T. Dodge, Seth F. Owens, Edwin Ellis, Wm. Reid, T. S. Van Hoevenberg, Louis Dreyer, Cornelius Glen, Peter Veeder, H. J. Boyle, Murray Hubbard, Stephen W. Whitney, Dwight King, John C. Nott, John L. Van Valkenburgh, Thomas B. Morrow, William Kimmey, Wm. D. Field. Wm. N. Sanders, Thomas Whitheck, Calvin W. Eaton, John Templeton, Hiram Griggs, Henry G. Radcliffe, Verplanck Colvin, Thos. W. Stevens, Joseph F. Winne, Theo. Papen, John Gurney Fine, Gerrett Van Allen, Geo. G. Davidson, Norman W. Falk, Chas. Van Arnam, Alston Adams, Wm. R. Prentice. Franklin County.-John C. Hollenbeck, Julius D. Beckwith, Putnam B. Fisk, James C. Sawyer, Clark J. Lawrence, George Trimble, Eli B. Smith, Samuel A. Beman. Broome County.-Joseph B. Chaffee, William E. Abbott, Stephen C, Willard, Martin Rockwell, Orville E. Coure, John B. Berry, Peter Schafer, George P. Sibley, Peter J. S.

Coon, Aaron Delano, Francis B. Smith, Cornelius Reynolds.

Chemung County.-Daniel F. Pickering, Edward C. Van Duser, Jas. M. Edsall, Platt V. Bryan, Hosea N. Rockwell, Wright P. Sherman, Curtis C. Gardiner, Samuel C. Taber, Lewis M. Smith, John E. Stowell, Oliver C. Herrington, George H. Richards.

Tompkins County.- William W. Hare, Philip J. Partenheimer, Ransom Howland, Silas S. Montgomery, Marcus Lyon, Edward J. Moore, Garry E. Chambers, Asa B. Clark, Cyrus H. Howe, David Nichols.

Kings County.-J. J. Vail, John Kleinlein, Dudley W. Hayes, C. J. Jack, Oliver G. Carter.

Allegany County. - David R. Stillman, Benjamin C. Brundage, A. Perry Carter, Gabriel Bishop, Rufus L. Colwell, Samuel M. Russell, Abijah J. Wellsman, John S. Minard, Ezekiel R. Clarke, Alban A. Lewis, Hiram York, Woodward Willis, George S. Jones, William C. Bingham. Delaware County.-John M. Olmstead, Daniel M. Dibble, James F. Scott, Charles Noble, George E. Marvine, James A. Huntly, A. Taylor, Henry Welsh, David H. Gay, Isaac Maynard, Marshall J. Bailey, Charles J. Knapp, Lemuel Sines.

Fulton County. —J. McLarren, Nathan P. Wells, Lester Getman, James P. Rosa, Jr., C. J. Mills, H. D. Smith. Herkimer County. - Albert M. Mills, Watts T. Loomis, William Getman, Josiah A. Steele, Chester Crim, Floyd C. Shepard, Dennis R. Keeler, John A. Pitcher, William Vanderbergh, John D. Henderson, Morris Fikes.

Jefferson County. George M. Hopkinson, George F. Paddock, John C. McCartin, Justin W. Weeks, John F. Moffat, Frederick Lansing, Nathaniel P. Wardwell, Silas W. Wilson, Andrew C. Cornwall, Hugh Maccandía, Richard H. Huntington, E. H. Myen, John Q. Adams, Charles W. Jennings, Charles W. Hubbard, Anson E. York, Herbert J. Barton, G. B. Barney Whipple, Joseph W. Reade, John T. Connell, John C. Fulton, Orrian S. Lewis.

Lewis County.- David T. Martin, Jr., John G. Marvin, Nicholas Gawdel, Alfred H. Kellogg, Edward McCarty, William R. Wadsworth, Isaac A. Warmuth, Edward A. Brown, Jr., Leon Talcot, D. A. Blinn, Alva L. Nichols, David T. Martin, William McCullock.

Montgomery County. - George Yost, Norman S. Brumley, Earl S. Gillett, David D. Cassidy, Joshua Vedder, William N. Johnson, Joseph Maxwell, Hicks B. Waldron, Abram V. Morris, John D. Serviss, H. Bleekman.

Ontario County. - James R. Heartwell, Thomas A. Wenkley, Alfred Franklin, John Wirde, Isaac W. Runyan, D. A. Lisk, George E. Pritchett.

Richmond County. - Theodore Frean, Frederick Groshen, John J. Clute, George J. Greenfield, Webley J. Edwards, Francis Hamilton, Frederick Cassner, Edward B. Merrill, Abram H. Wood, E. H. Murdock, Lewis McSorley.

St. Lawrence County.-James C. Armstrong, Edwin M. Hosbrook, Chipman S. Martin, George R. Myers, Delos McCurdy, Horace Moody, Edward W. Thomas, Stillman Foote, John G. McIntyre, George Z. Erwin, Milton Brown, Watson J. Ferry, John T. Rutherford, Charles R. McClelland, James M. Spencer, Charles Anthony, Morell D. Beckwith, James Miller, Nathaniel P. Hayes, Enos Beach, George A. Dillingham, Emory W. Abbott, Allen Wight, Peter Robertson, George B. Shepard, Samuel C. Crane, Charles C. Montgomery, Thomas S. Hall.

Saratoga County. — Aaron R. Olmstead, David R. Oakley, S. H. Richards, John J. Hornibrook, John Peck, A. Ä. Palmer, Edward C. Bullard, Lemuel B. Pike, N. R. Prentiss, John J. Lee, George B. Martin. Lawrence Vandermark, Henry White, John H. de Ridder, Silas P. Briggs, Patrick H. Cowen, Perry C. Parker.

Schenectady County.- Wm. L. Goodrich, John A. Decre. mer, Frederick L. Richwine, John Sanders, Robert Payne, James Fuller, Charles E. Palmer, Jacob W. Clute.

Schoharie County. -John B. Grant, Seymour Boughton, Jr., John Van Schaick, Robertson J. Roscoe, Tiffany Lawyer, James H. Brown, David Relie, John H. Griffin, Stephen J. Hitchcock, John W. Russell, Henry Kingsley, Thomas Collins, John Reed, Wm. Mackey, Chauncey W. Hinman, Lewis C. Holmes.

Schuyler County.-Chas. M. Woodward, Orville Pattison, George Bradley, Hull Fanton, Theo. Squires, Adam G. Campbell, Henry M. Hillerman, Simeon L. Rood, D. Elbert Sears, Gaylord G. Whitman, Augustus W. Moore, John F. Stilwell, Jeremiah McGuire, James M. Kelley, Henry C. Van Duzer, Martin D. Hall, Andrew Cornell, Byron Sunderlin.

Wayne County.- Lyman Lyon, John L. Crane, Henry R. Taber, Francis C. Reed, Henry P. Knowles, Charles McLouth, John H. Camp, George O. Baker, Chas. H. Dennison, Merritt Purdy, John L. Cole, Aaron M. Winchester, Stephen P. Seymour, Lucien T. Yeomans, Charles H. Boyce, William O. Charch Wm. H. Clark, Pardon Durfee, Riley Hill, William D. Wylie, Silas N. Gallup, Charles D. Law ton, George W. Tilotson.

The above appointments for Notaries Public will take effect March 30, 1870, and will continue two years.

It was a long while ago that a New Hampshire judge, in charging a jury, said: "The counsel for the State and for the prisoner have talked of law, as was right; but, gentlemen, you and I have something else to consider it is not law we want, but justice."

NEW YORK STATUTES AT LARGE.*

CHAP. 59.

AN ACT to enable non-resident guardians to obtain property in this State belonging to their wards residing in other States or Territories of the United States. PASSED March 10, 1870.

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. In all cases where any guardian and his ward may both be residents of any other State or Territory of the United States, and such ward may be entitled to property of any description in this State, such guardian, on producing to the Surrogate's Court or other court of competent jurisdiction of the county, in which such property or the principal part thereof is situated, a full and complete transcript from the records of a court of competent jurisdiction in the State or Territory in which he and his ward reside, duly exemplified or authenticated, showing that he has been appointed guardian of such ward, and that he has given a bond and security, in the State or Territory in which he and his ward reside, in double the value of the property of such ward, and also showing to such court that a removal of the property of such ward will not conflict with the terms or limitations attending the right by which the ward owns the same, then such transcript may be recorded in such court, and such guardian shall be entitled to receive letters of guardianship of the estate of such minor from such court, which shall authorize him to demand, sue for and recover any such property, and remove the same to the place of residence of himself and his ward. And such court may order any resident guardian, executor or administrator having any of the estate of such ward to deliver the same to such non-resident guardian: Provided, all debts known to exist against such estate have been first paid, and provided also, that the benefit of this act shall not extend to any citizen of any State or Territory in which a similar law to this, does not now exist, or may not hereafter be passed.

CHAP. 60.

AN ACT relative to certain documentary evidence. PASSED March 10, 1870. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section four of the act passed April thirteen, eighteen hundred and fifty-five, entitled "An act to authorize the recording of Charters of colleges and academies, and alterations and amendments thereto, by the Regents of the University, in the office of the secretary of the board of Regents," is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

24. Copies of and extracts from any and all records, books, papers, documents, files and manuscripts in the possession or custody of the Regents of the University, as such, or as trustees of the State Library, or otherwise, in their official capacity, and duly authenticated under the hand of the Chancellor or Secretary, and under the common seal of the said Regents, as a true copy of such original and of the whole thereof as aforesaid, may be used and read in evidence in all courts and places in this State, with the same force and effect as the originals might be, if produced.

2. The fees for recording applications as to colleges and academies, and for other services mentioned in the second section of the said act hereby amended, are hereby abolished.

23. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 74.

AN ACT in relation to the records of Surrogates' Courts.

PASSED March 16, 1870. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. All acts, hitherto, of surrogates, and officers acting as such, in completing, by signing, in their own names, the unsigned and uncertified records of wills, and of the proofs and examinations taken in the proceedings of probate thereof before their predecessors in office, are hereby confirmed and declared to be valid and in full compliance with the pre-existing statutory requirements.

22. For greater certainty, and to avoid all doubt, it is hereby declared to be lawful for any surrogate, or officer acting as such, hereafter, in like manner and under like circumstances, in hisownname, to sign, certify and complete all unfinished records of wills, and of proofs and examinations, taken by and before his predecessor in office, adding to his signature the date of so doing; and

*These laws have been carefully compared with the originals, and may be relied upon as accurate. We have not thought it necessary to take up space by attaching to each the certificate of the Secretary of State which is attached to the copy from which we print. ED. L. J.

which shall have the like effect as in the preceding section mentioned.

3. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 69.

AN ACT to increase the powers of supervisors. PASSED March 14, 1870. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The supervisor of a town, or any ward in any of the cities of this State, shall have power to administer oaths to persons necessary in relation to any matter or thing which may come before such supervisor, or the board of supervisors of which such supervisor is a member, in his or their official capacity.

2. Any person guilty of false swearing to any oath or affidavit which may be lawfully required and administered under this act shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and on conviction be punished the same as in other cases of perjury.

23. This act shall take effect immediately.

LEGAL NEWS.

Jno. G. Williams, a prominent lawyer of Richmond, Va., died on the 14th inst.

The members of the Bar in Virginia are organizing a State Law Society.

Judge Strong, just elevated to the bench of the Supreme Court, left a law practice of $23,000 a year for a salary of $6,000.

A trespass suit is on trial in Buffalo which only involves $25, and on which the costs already amount to $600, and promise to become double that amount.

James A. L. Wittier, librarian of Harvard Law School, has been appointed non-resident lecturer on law in Norwich University.

A constable in Kentucky, in publishing some personal property for sale, put up a notice with the following clause: "I wyll xpose fr sail the 5 day 1870 uv Jan won lytle rone horse, or so much tharof as ma be nesary to satisfi sed gugment."

In the circuit court of Kane county, Illinois, Frank Jackson obtained a verdict of $18,000 against the Chicago and Northwestern Railway. He was an employee of the company, and while coupling cars, last November, was run over, and lost both his legs. A motion has been made for a new trial.

In the case of the Cincinnati Mutual Health Insurance company against Rudolph Rosenthall, to recover a sum agreed to be paid for insurance, the Recorder's court of Chicago held that the plaintiff could not recover, the contract being made by a foreign insurance company without the authority of the State of Illinois.

Another vacancy on the Bench of the United States Supreme Court is soon to be created by the resignation of Justice Samuel Nelson, of New York, and of the Second Circuit. There is great interest among legal circles as to the succession, for which Wm. M. Evarts and Ward Hunt, of Utica, are prominently spoken of.

A man was recently arrested in Schuylkill county, who made a pretended confession that he had committed a murder in Pittsburgh. He was taken to that city where he was recognized as an "old offender,' and the confession was a confidence dodge to obtain free transportation. He will work his fare out in the city prison.

In the celebrated case of the bark Grapeshot, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the Provisional Courts established by President Lincoln in the South were valid, but on the merits of the case the judgment below was reversed, with directions to refer the account for repairs to commissioners to act under instructions of the court.

The United States Supreme Court has just decided a point which has long been mooted, but never before legally determined. The point was brought up in several cotton cases, and was, in brief: When did the war close? The court fixed it as the 17th day of August, 1866, that being the date of President Johnson's proclamation to that effect.