"Fifth: Utilizing masters or assistant judges to aid in the dispatch of non-contentious business or to frame the issues in contested causes."

I was very much interested this morning to have one of your distinguished Federal Judges say he had been contemplating trying out that scheme in law cases, so that much of the non-contentious matter might be eliminated.

"Sixth: An improvement in the method of selecting and returning judges."

As to results brought about by that change, I think it is going to take more time to get into that particular phase of it than I want to give, but I will say briefly, that the results, since 1873 in England have been such under those general changes I have enumerated, that with rare exceptions there is no complaint as far as dispatch of business is concerned. There is still a general feeling that the costs are too great and sometimes, that the results are not all that could be wished, from a social standpoint, but so far as the speedy, expeditious taking care of the business is concerned, the bar are very well satisfied.

It is now accepted by those who have studied the English system and have made a study of our system, that the first step in any reform of our procedure must be to locate power for self-government in the court, or judicial department, by conferring upon it the rule-making power in all respects except as to a short practice act, which should be a sort of charter, or constitution, for the courts, reserving to the people, through their legislature, the control of the fundamental rights in procedure. All the rest should be delegated to the court, subject to the power of the legislature to intervene.

In Illinois we have gone through a long and acrimonious discussion over the reform of our practice, and we have not gotten very far. About four years ago there was pending in our legislature an act for the reform of procedure. The bar had gotten at loggerheads over it and there were five of us appointed by the Bar Association to read the Act through and to take such action before the legislature as was deemed wise. That particular act comprised nearly four thousand sections and was a book about as large as the average statutes, and after going through it, though much of the material in it seemed to be de

sirable, it seemed to all of us it proceeded along the wrong lines altogether. There was no reason to suppose that its provisions would last longer or be satisfactory longer than the rules which had been adopted heretofore, and so it was the opinion of that committee that the act should comprise not more than thirtyfive or forty sections, which is the size of the English act, and that everything else should be put in the hands of the Court to promulgate as rules which could be considered by a committee of the Bench and Bar, and be changed from time to time as need be.

But if an attempt is made to confer rule-making power at present, we find at present no organized body to which it can be entrusted with the prospect that it will be expertly and wisely exercised.

By providing such an expert central authority upon which this power, absolutely necessary to a proper exercise of judicial authority, can be imposed we virtually organize the state courts into a unified system, for there must be power to enforce rules, as well as to make them, and there must be definite individuals upon whom responsibility for proper working of rules will rest. This power should be conferred upon a judicial council, or executive committee, composed of judges, probably with representation by the Bar and possibly also representation by the executive branch, as through the attorney general. The judicial council has then sole power to make rules.

The daily administration of these rules must rest with the head of this council, who would be the chief justice of the state, He may or may not preside over the appellate branch or the trial division.

To make the Chief Justice the actual custodian of this administrative power, he should be the one to whom all clerks and judges will report as often as once a month, and he should compile these reports once or twice a year, under five heads:

(1.) Judicial (proper.)

(2.) Personal efficiency.
(3.) Criminal

(4.) Social, and

(5.) Financial.

Then, and only then can there be intelligent criticism of the department by the public.

Having such an administrative head, the system is entirely altered from its present condition. Now a litigant sustaining prejudice through the imperfect machinery of the courts (faults arising from administrative defects, rather than judicial, not depending upon mistaken construction of law) has no power to which he can appeal. To object to the judge who seems to be at fault may be contempt of court, bringing at once upon the head of the deserving litigant further prejudice. There is no place now where one can make effective complaint. This is one reason why the legislature is constantly besieged by persons seeking the enactment of more compulsory rules. Under the proposed plan the complaint goes to the administrative officer, the chief justice. It is important to have an outlet for faultfinding, even though it may not be well founded.

Out of this unification grows,

(a) Solidarity of the court, (b) Independence,

(c) Mutual interdependence, (d) Responsibility.

And by lodging administrative power in the judicial council (the assignment of judges and causes) the court becomes able to do what it now wants to do, but has slight opportunity to do, that is, to administer justice efficiently as well as impartially. It becomes necessary as a natural consequence, that the judicial council possess power to enforce its administrative orders, and out of this power grows self discipline and successful self-government. There is none at all now. Each judge is independent, he does what he pleases. He may or he may not achieve the highest efficiency for his own court, or for himself.

Under the new plan the judicial freedom of all judges is fully preserved, it should be noted. There can be no compulsion in any instance, of the individual judge in the exercise of his true judicial power. If he errs, the correction comes through review, as now.

Such an organization as is suggested, would do for the Courts, what the modern efficiency movement has done for business management. Oftentimes people used to say that a business

man knows how to run his business best. We hear now that a judge knows how to run his court best. Neither is the truth. I have a client in Chicago who spent two hundred thousand dollars for a concern to come in and make a study of their business which knew nothing about the business in question, but were efficiency experts, and though it was the most successful in that line, the very first year the system went into operation, the company saved the entire expense, and the annual saving, of course, represents for them a very handsome profit. So it is in court matters, modern system will greatly facilitate the operation of the Courts and outside thought will bring to it a freshness of vision greatly needed.

I am going to give you briefly a synopsis of an act that would embody these provisions and you will notice it does not comply with the recommendations you made with reference to an additional court, for under this scheme, we believe there should be but one court in the state, that an intermediate court is a mistake, and that you are simply piling up trouble for yourselves when you adopt it.

All the judicial power of the state is to be vested in a unified state system, comprising the following courts:

1. Supreme Court.

Which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction, and all such original jurisdiction as shall be needed to permit of receiving additional evidence, on appeal, to sustain judgment.

We have a situation where sometimes the cause reaches the Supreme Court and has to be reversed, for the case is not in such shape that, even though the appeal is a proper one, the court can sustain the verdict of the court below. We believe the power to take necessary evidence ought to exist, and that in a state where the business is too large in the Supreme Court for a single court to handle, the act, as contemplated, provides for a Court of Appeals of seven or more members, the first division of which would be known as the Supreme Court Division, and other divisions of three judges each, depending upon the number of divisions you want to add to this appellate court. Still maintaining it as one court, you could have several divisions of three judges each, each of which should be presided over by justices appointed from the Supreme Court Division and

the decisions in each of these divisions would be final, unless the Court that heard the matter on the review decided to have it go up to the Supreme Court Division for final decision so that you would have but one appeal. I do not know whether the condition is here what it was in our state when I came to the bar, some sixteen years ago when a case was three or three and a half years old before it was tried in the lower court, and more than six years old before the decision was had in the Supreme Court. Ordinarily if a case be started today, it will be reached in twenty-two months in one court and twenty-nine in another, and it still means oftentimes three or four years before it is reached in the Supreme Court for final decision.

2. The court of original jurisdiction for all amounts, which may be known as Superior Court, District Court or Circuit Court.

The personnel of this court at its inception to be identical with that of the existing circuit or district courts. The entire state to constitute one judicial circuit. All circuit court judges subject to assignment in any part of the district or state. Presumably there would be few changes as to the counties served by the respective judges, at least at the start. Such changes would be made as appeared consistent with the idea of equalizing the service. Instead of having this working force kept in separate jurisdictions, able to co-operate but slightly, it would become a fluid body preventing congestion at any point, obviating haste, and giving an equal share of work to all judges.

Court to be held in every county a certain number of times a year, probably four times, and as many more times as might be needed. In the most populous counties, court might be in session practically all the time. There would probably develop a measure of specialization, so that those especially adapted, would specialize to some extent, in special branches of law, the most prominent of which would be criminal, equity and common law. The larger and more numerous the cities, the more such specialization would there be. At the same time, every such circuit judge would have all the judicial power of the court. 3. The County Court.

In every country, there would be a county court and a county judge. Counties exceeding forty thousand would have