Legislature did not contemplate unjust consequences literal enforcement of statute entailed, and will construe statute accordingly.

Domain Act and State-Aid Act 1913, Bond Is- [ 16. Statutes 212-Courts bound to presume sue Act 1917, State Highway System Act 1921, is to be paid for by the state, and property acquired by the exercise of that right by a city or village is to be paid for by special assessment upon the adjacent property benefited.

9. Statutes 158-Repeal of laws by implication not favored.

Repeal of laws by implication is not fa

vored.

10. Statutes 161(1)—When earlier of two statutes relating to same subject does and does not continue in force, stated.

Where two statutes are enacted which relate to same subject, the earliest continues in force, unless the two are clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other, or unless in the later statute some express notice is taken of the former plainly indicating an intention to repeal it.

11. Statutes 159-Acts seemingly repugnant are to be construed, if possible, to avoid repeal by implication.

Where two acts are seemingly repugnant, they should, if possible, be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former by implication.

12. Highways 105(2)-Authority of commissioners of highways not exercisable within cities and villages.

Statutes conferring in generai terms authority upon commissioners of highways to lay out, open, maintain, or vacate roads do not authorize them to exercise that authority within the cities and villages.

When a literal enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead to consequences which Legislature could not have contemplated, courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended, and will adopt a construction which it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated by the Legislature.

17. Highways 105(2)-Village held not divested of authority to widen street constituting state highway by special assessment.

Village held not divested by State-Aid Act 1913, Bond Issue Act 1917, State Highway System Act 1921, read in connection with Local Improvement Act, and Cities and Villages Act, and Road and Bridge Act, § 50, of authority conferred by special charter, to widen and alter street by special assessment though constituting a section of a state highway. Thompson, J., Duncan, C. J., and Farmer, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; E. M. Moogan, Judge.

Petition by the Village of Glencoe for widening and altering of street, and for condemnation of property. From a final order and judgment, overruling objections of Samuel R. Hurford, he appeals. Affirmed.

Morton T. Culver, of Chicago, for appellant.

George I. Hicks, of Chicago, for appellee.

13. Statutes 22534-Rules for interpreting HEARD, J. This is an appeal from a final terms in statute construed and subsequently order and judgment of the superior court of carried into amendment or re-enactment Cook county under the Local Improvement stated. Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 24, § 698 et Where terms used in a statute have ac-seq.), overruling objections of appellant to quired a settled meaning through judicial in- the entry of such order and judgment after terpretation and the statute is changed by proceedings had, in conformity with the act, amendment or re-enactment and the terms in- upon a petition filed by appellee for the widterpreted remain in the law, they are to be un-ening and altering of a street in the village derstood in the sense theretofore attributed to of Glencoe called Sheridan Road, and for them, unless by qualifying or explanatory addi- the condemnation of certain private property tion a contrary intention of the Legislature is to be taken for use as a public street in such made clear. widening and alteration. The parties whose property was sought to be taken by the condemnation proceeding have not appealed.

Judicial construction

14. Statutes 22534
becomes part of law.
Judicial construction becomes part of law,
it being presumed Legislature, in passing later
law, knew the judicial construction given to the
words of the prior enactment.

15. Statutes 181 (2)-Construction of statute resulting in great inconvenience or absurd consequences is to be avoided, if possible.

A particular construction of a statute resulting in great inconvenience or absurd consequences should be avoided, unless the meaning of the Legislature is so plain and manifest that avoidance is impossible.

[1] It is contended by appellant that the village of Glencoe had lost its jurisdiction of Sheridan Road and that the Lincoln Park commissioners had succeeded to such jurisdiction. In 1913 the General Assembly passed an act which, among other things, provided that the commissioners of Lincoln Park, of the county of Cook, are authorized to take, regulate, etc., the public street, thoroughfare etc., known as Sheridan Road running through Glencoe, provided the consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting on

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(148 N.E.)

distinguished from benefits diffused by it throughout the municipality, it is a local improvement. City of Springfield v. Consolidated Railway Co., 296 Ill. 17, 129 N. E. 580; Northwestern University v. Village of Wilmette, 230 Ill. 80, 82 N. E. 615. Under the evidence in the present case, the court properly held the improvement to be a local improvement.

[3] It is contended by appellant that the description of parcel 21, said to be described in the petition and ordinance, is so indefinite that it cannot be located. We have carefully examined the abstract in this case and find in neither the abstract of the recommendation of the board of local improvements, the assessment roll, the objections filed, the order overruling the objections, the judgment appealed from, nor in the abstract of any of the proceedings set forth in the bill of exceptions, any description of any of the property sought to be taken or any description of parcel 21. The abstract consists of 591 pages, and the record, together with the exhibits, constitutes a volume of over 2,000 pages. While a court of review will sometimes search the record for the purpose of affirming a case, it will not search the record to hunt for error not disclosed by the abstract. The description of parcel 21 as set forth in the petition is such that the property can be located by a competent surveyor.

The first point in appellant's brief is:

Sheridan Road in each municipality or park district, or in that portion of each township not within any city or village, shall first be obtained, and that the consent, expressed by resolution or otherwise, of the authorities of each municipality, park district, and township shall first be obtained. Laws of 1913, § 1, p. 443. Before the Lincoln Park commissioners could acquire any rights in Sheridan Road in the village of Glencoe, it was necessary that both the consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting thereon and the consent of the authorities of the village of Glencoe should be first obtained. The village of Glencoe on July 7, 1914, passed an ordinance giving consent to the commissioners of Lincoln Park to take, regulate, etc., Sheridan Road in Glencoe according to the provisions of the act of 1913, provided the commissioners should accept the same within 60 days. The commissioners accepted in writing the provisions of the ordinance in accordance therewith. The consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting on Sheridan Road in the village not having been obtained, in August, 1922, the village board passed an ordinance in which it was recited that the requirements of the act necessary to be fulfilled to make the ordinance giving consent to the Lincoln Park Commissioners effective had not been fulfilled; that the necessary consents and permissions had not been acquired by the commissioners; that the commissioners had never in any manner assumed or exercised any authority, control, or supervision over Sheridan Road; that the village of Glencoe had at all times maintained control and supervision over it, and repealed the ordinance of July 7, 1914. The consent of the property owners abutting on Sheridan Road in the village of Glencoe never having been obtained and the Lincoln Park commissioners never having assumed control and management The village of Glencoe is a municipal corover the road, the village of Glencoe never poration in Cook county having a population, lost jurisdiction over the road, and this ob- according to the last federal census, between jection of appellant was properly overruled. 2,500 and 3,500, and is operating under a [2] It is contended by appellant that the special charter granted by the General Asimprovement in question is a general and not sembly in 1869. By its charter it was granted a local improvement, and that for this rea- the power to lay out, open, alter, widen, exson the judgment should not have been en-tend, establish, vacate, abolish, grade, pave, tered. The petition herein is for the purpose or otherwise improve and keep in good repair of widening Sheridan Road and taking off all roads, streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, sharp angles at certain intersections. The squares, commons, parks or other public evidence in the record shows that while the widening of the street would improve it for grounds or places in the village and to have exclusive control of the same. It was also general travel, it would be a particular ad-given the power to pass all ordinances which vantage to the immediate locality and in the council may deem necessary and proper crease the value of the property specially as for the carrying into full effect of the prosessed. The fact that the improvement will visions of the charter and for the regulation be of advantage to the city does not change of the municipal government of the village. its character as a local improvement if pri- The recommendation of the board of local marily it is a material advantage to the adja-improvements for this improvement was filed cent property. Where the improvement en- November 13, 1922, the ordinance for the imhances the value of adjacent property, as provement was adopted by the village board

"Subdivider has the right to make reservations and to limit the use of dedicated streets. Village of Bradley v. N. Y. C. Rr."

We assume that by the reference appellant wishes to call attention to the case having that title reported in 296 Ill. 383, 129 N. E. 744; but our attention is not called in the argument to any facts to which either that case or this point in appellant's brief might have reference.

"And, provided further, that a road or part It is to be noted that the provisions of secthereof lying within the corporate limits of any tion 12 are almost identical with the provicity, village or town having a population of sions of section 32 of the act of 1913, and that twenty-five hundred (2,500) inhabitants or less, as ascertained as aforesaid, in any county, they are couched in almost identical lanshall be improved or constructed with state aid guage, and that the maintenance by the state to connect or complete by the most direct route, after the state-wide system has been coma state-aid road already improved or construct-pleted is to be in accordance with the proed, to the corporate limits of such city, village visions of section 32. It follows, therefore,

(148 N.E.)

that if section 32 has no application to streets within cities and villages, section 12 of the Bond Issue Act can have no such application.

In 1921 the Legislature passed an act (Laws 1921, p. 790) for the establishment of a system of state highways, which system, among other things, included state-aid roads and roads constructed under the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act. Section 11 of this act provided:

"Any part or portion of the state highway system, not taken over by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, shall remain under the jurisdiction and control of the proper local authorities."

Section 12 provided:

"All highways which have heretofore been or may hereafter be designated under article IV of 'An act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,' as highways which may be laid out, improved or constructed at the joint expense of the state and any county within the state, or by any county of the state, until such time as the said highways are taken over, excepting therefrom such portion of such highways in any county, for the repair, maintenance and marking of which the state is responsible, shall be under the direct control and supervision of the county board of the county in which said roads are located, and the county board shall improve, maintain and repair by patrol system or otherwise said roads from county funds as provided herein."

While section 12 of the Bond Issue Act provides for the maintenance of a road after it has been taken over by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, it does not specify when or in what manner it shall be so taken over; but the inference is, from the connection in which the words are used, that it is to be after its completion. Section 7 of the State Highway System Act of 1921 does make such specification. It provides:

considered together, that the only roads which were to be taken over by the Department of Public Works and remain under its sole control and jurisdiction were public highways outside of the corporate limits of municipalities. The notice to be given preparatory to the taking over is to be given in writing to the commissioner of highways of the town or road district and not to some officer of a city or village, and it is specified that the highways are to be taken over from the several towns and road districts, and no provision is made for taking them over from cities and villages. No attempt was ever made by the department of public works to take over the portion of the street involved from the village of Glencoe, or to prevent the making of this improvement by the village.

In 1923 the Legislature passed an act, entitled "An act to amend section 9 of article IV of 'An act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,' approved June 27, 1913, as amended, and to add section 9a thereto." By this act section 9 was amended by striking out the last proviso therein quoted and inserting in lieu thereof section 9a, which is as follows:

"Sec. 9a. A road or part thereof lying within the corporate limits of any city, village or town having a population of seven thousand five hundred inhabitants or less, as shown by the last preceding federal census, or that portion of any street or road along which the residences average more than two hundred feet apart, shall be improved or constructed by the state any hard-surfaced road forming a part of the to connect or complete by the most direct route state highways system as defined in 'An act in relation to state highways,' approved June 24, 1921, already improved or constructed, or being improved or constructed to the corporate limits of such city, village or town. The cost of such road for the same width and of the same materials as outside of the corporate limits, shall be paid entirely by the state. By agree

"The highways designated in this act as statement between the Department of Public Works highways shall be taken over from the several towns, and road districts by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, in its discretion, as rapidly as the appropriations made for repair, improvement and maintenance thereof permit, provided the department, shall first take over the state bond issue roads. Before any highway, or part thereof, forming a portion of the state highway system is taken over, the Department of Public Works and Buildings shall notify in writing the commissioner of highways of the town or road district, of its intention so to do, and of the date when it will assume the maintenance and care thereof."

[4, 5] In construing an act of the Legislature, it is the duty of the court to attempt to determine the intention of the Legislature from the language of the act when all of its provisions are taken together and considered with reference to the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. It is evident, when all provisions above quoted are read and

and Buildings and the common council or board of trustees, a road or street of greater width and different materials may be constructed through such city, village or town by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, such city, village or town to pay the excess cost, if any, for the greater width or different material, but the state shall thereafter maintain such road within the corporate limits. Provided, that in case any such city, village or town has constructed or has started to construct such a road since January 1, 1922, the state shall upon the completion thereof thereafter maintain such road and shall refund to such city, village or town the cost of constructing same for the same width as the road outside the corporate limits. The money so refunded shall be paid into the general corporate fund in case the cost of constructing the road was paid out of such fund or if the cost of constructing the road was paid by special taxation or special assessment the money shall be distributed to each person who owns such assessed or taxed property at the time such distribution is made

This amendment was not an amendment of the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act, but was

in proportion to the amounts assessed or tax-| go v. Blair, 149 Ill. 310, 36 N. E. 829, 24 L. ed against such property." R. A. 412; Carlyle v. Bartels, 315 Ill. 271, 146 N. E. 192. In the former case the payment for the property acquired under the Eminent Domain Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 47) is to be paid by the state, while in the latter case the property acquired is to be paid for by special assessment upon the adjacent property benefited.

Neither the State-Aid Road Act of 1913,

the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act of 1917, nor the State Highway System Act of 1921, refers in any way to the Local Improvement Act for making improvements in municipalities in this state, and while these acts repeal directly many road and bridge acts, in so doing they refer neither to the Local Improvement Act nor to the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. c. 24).

an amendment of the law providing for the building of state-aid roads. Section 12 could have no application to a road built under the provisions of section 9a. The provisions of section 12 with reference to the control of the Department of Public Works and Buildings over the roads are entirely different from the provisions of section 9 and section 9a. By section 12, the Department of Public Works and Buildings is given jurisdiction and control over the $60,000,000 bond issue roads, and no public utility company or person can be granted any right, privilege, or franchise in, on, or along any such highway without the consent of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. No such provision is found in section 9 or section 9a. There is no provision in section 9a that a road built un-repugnance between two laws and the provider its provisions shall, after being built, be under the jurisdiction and control of the Department of Public Works and Buildings, or that no public utility company shall be granted any right, privilege, or franchise in, on, or along any such highway without the consent of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. Section 9 as it was at the time of the commencement of these proceed-tinues in force unless the two are clearly in

ings read:

"But such city, village or town shall thereafter maintain said road or street within the corporate limit."

The only reference in section 9a to the future is, "but the state shall thereafter maintain such road within the corporate limits." The fact that this provision was placed in section 9a is evidence that neither section 12 of the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act nor section 11 of the law of 1921 had reference to streets in municipalities.

[6-8] While by the State-Aid Act of 1913, the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act of 1917, and the State Highway System Act of 1921, the right of eminent domain is given to the Department of Public Works and Buildings for the purpose of altering and relocating roads, yet the purpose for which such right is given is an entirely different purpose from that for which the right is given to cities and villages under the Local Improvement Act to alter and widen streets. The Department of Public Works and Buildings can only exercise this right for purposes which are public in their nature and where the benefits derived by its exercise are diffused by its throughout the community. A city or village cannot exercise this right under those conditions, but only where the public improvement, by reason of its being confined to a locality, enhances the value of adjacent property as distinguished from benefits diffused by it throughout the municipality. City of Chica

[9-11] Repeal of laws by implication is not favored, and it is only where there is a clear

sions of both cannot be carried into effect that the later law must prevail and the former be considered repealed by implication. Dingman v. People, 51 Ill. 277; People V. Faherty, 306 Ill. 119, 137 N. E. 506; People v. Burke, 313 IN. 576, 145 N. E. 164. Where two statutes are enacted which have relation to the same subject, the earliest con

consistent with and repugnant to each other, or unless in the latest statute some express notice is taken of the former plainly indicating an intention to repeal it, and where two acts are seemingly repugnant, they should, if possible, be so construed that the later may not operate as a repeal of the former by implication. Town of Ottawa v. County of La Salle, 12 Ill. 339; People v. Burke, supra.

[12] The power given to the village of Glencoe by its charter to alter and widen streets is specific and exclusive, and it has long been the doctrine in this state that statutes conferring, in general terms, authority upon commissioners of highways to lay out, open, maintain, or vacate roads do not give authority that can be exercised within the territorial limits of cities and villages, although such roads are located within the towns for which such commissioners of highways are elected. Commissioners of Highways v. Baumgarten, 41 Ill. 254; People v. Board of Supervisors, 111 Ill. 527; Shields v. Ross, 158 Ill. 214, 41 N. E. 985.

Prior to the enactment of the law establishing a state highway system, in 1921, this court, in Village of Brookfield v. Ricker, 295 Ill. 316, 129 N. E. 100, held that in no place in the act of 1913 was there anything that repealed, directly or by implication, the authority of a municipality, under the Local Improvement Act, to make a pavement to be paid for, according to the provisions of that act by special assessment on the property