error, (148 N.E.) (317 Ill. 191) lips, Harry T. Sheetz, and Owen Stover with PEOPLE V. STOVER. (No. 16495.) burglary and larceny. The defendants were arrested, and, after motions to quash the in(Supreme Court of Illinois. April 24, 1925. dictment had been overruled, entered pleas Rehearing Denied June 9, 1925.) of not guilty. On the day of the trial three 1. Criminal law Omw 528 - Admission of code of the defendants withdrew their pleas of fendants' written statements in evidence over not guilty and entered pleas of guilty, and defendant's objection held erroneous. the trial proceeded against Stover alone, Where written statements of codefendants resulting in a verdict finding him guilty of concerned, not only burglary and larceny which larceny, fixing the value of the stolen prop defendant was charged with, but other criminal erty at $80, finding his age to be 20 years, offenses with which he was not concerned, their and recommending that clemency be shown admission in evidence over his objection was him. After a motion for a new trial had been overruled the defendant asked to be ad2. Criminal law Ow1169 (7) - Admission of co. | mitted to probation, and his request was redefendants' written statements in evidence ferred to the probation officer, who subseheld without prejudice to defendant. quently made a report recommending admisWhere defendant, by his own statement, sion of the defendant to probation. The was guilty of larceny, error in admission of state's attorney objected to the report, and written statements of his codefendants, as to the court sustained the objection and denied crimes in which defendant was not concerned probation, overruled a motion in arrest of was without prejudice to defendant. judgment, and entered judgment on the ver- state reformatory under the indeterminate On Sunday night, March 2, 1924, the build- was conducting a junk business under the name of Sycamore Iron & Metal Company, was broken open and an acetylene welding When Levin and his employees came to the tiff in error were arrested. The plaintiff in error lived with his father at Maple Park, a worked in a plant of the Bowman Dairy the plaintiff in error's parents found two revolvers--one in Stover's automobile, and Error to Circuit Court, De Kalb County; the other in the haymow. He also found the torch and regulators-a part of the property William J. Fulton, Judge. taken from Levin's building, which Stover Owen Stover was convicted of larceny, and had taken in his automobile and hid in the he brings error. Affirmed. barn. He brought the torch and regulators and brought him back to jail. volvers; and that he stayed on the outside. He said he did not know just what he was An indictment of five counts doing—he was there to be a guard of some em For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes and Johnson asked him to take the gun he, ment would have to be reversed for this and had—the .45 army revolver-and asked him other errors occurring on the trial. The verif he would not hide it for him; so he took | dict, however, does not rest on this evidence, the torch and the gun and took them down but is amply supported by other competent, to Maple Park to his father's barn and hid unquestioned evidence from the mouth of them for him. William Joslyn, who accom- | the plaintiff in error himself. His statement panied the sheriff on this trip to Maple Park made to the sheriff, whose testimony is corwhen Stover was arrested, also testified to roborated by Joslyn and is in no way conthis conversation. tradicted, was that on the Sunday night of After returning to the county jail the the burglary, about 9 o'clock, he was at home state's attorney and his assistant talked with when two of the defendants came to the all four of the defendants in the jail in the house and told him that the defendant presence of the sheriff and Joslyn. The as- Sheetz, who was his cousin, wanted to see sistant state's attorney asked him questions him over at Sycamore; that he went to Sycaand took notes about what had happened more and first saw Sheetz in the restaurant; on the night of the burglary. He questioned that he had one of the revolvers in his autoeach of them, and on the completion of the mobile that night and had it with him down conversations the questions asked of each de- at Levin's; that he went there and stood outfendant were laid on the sheriff's desk and side of Levin's place and acted as a guard; separated, and the assistant state's attorney that he took a part of the stolen property then left the jail, and in about half an hour home with him that night in the automobile came back with a typewritten form of every- and concealed it. These must be taken as thing that the defendants had said during facts proved, and they establish the guilt of the conversation. The assistant state's at the defendant of burglary and larceny. torney read each paper that he had in his [3, 4] The object of the review of judg. hand to the defendants, one at a time, and ments of trial courts by courts of appellate asked each of them if there were any cor- jurisdiction is not to determine whether the rections that might be made in the statement record is free from error, but is to ascertain before he signed it. Each of the defendants whether a just conclusion has been reached, signed the paper, and so did the sheriff. No founded upon competent and suflicient evipromise or threat was made to secure the dence, after a trial in which no error has signing of the statements, and the state's at- occurred which might be prejudicial to the torney told the defendants that if there were defendant's rights. This defendant on his any things misstated or incorrect in the state-own statement was guilty of burglary. There ment he was about to read he wanted them was no evidence of a single fact tending to to stop him from reading and he would make raise any doubt of his guilt except evidence the correction. of his good character, and this, in face of his [1] The statement concerned, not only the own admission as to the facts, could not posburglary of Levin's building by the four de- sibly raise a doubt of his guilt. Therefore fendants, but other criminal offenses com- the incompetent evidence, which would have mitted by Stover's three codefendants in been sufficient to reverse the judgment if which he was not concerned. This state- there had been any attempt to show a valid ment was admitted in evidence on Stover's defense, was not prejudicial to the defendant, trial against his objection. The objection who did not attempt to present a defense. to it should have been sustained, for while, A defendant who is fully -prored guilty by so far as it was Stover's own statement, it his own confession, which he does not deny was competent against him, it was incompe- or attempt to invalidate, has no right to comtent so far as the statements of his codefend- plain of error in the trial where the verdict ants were concerned. Their statements were of guilty has nothing to do with the fixing mere hearsay, not made under the sanction of the penalty or the grade of the crime. of an oath or subject to cross-examination, Error is also assigned on certain instrucand were not admissible against Stover ei- tions given, but the same answer applies to ther as to the burglary, which was the sub-this assignment of error as the assignments ject-matter of the indictment or the other in regard to the admission of evidence. The crimes mentioned in the statement. confession of the defendant, which was com[2] The statement was offered as a whole petent, required a verdict of guilty, and this and objection was made to it. A part of it record contains no error which could reverse was incompetent, and therefore the objection the judgment under such circumstances. should have been sustained. No offer was [5] It is argued that the court should have made of such part of the statement only as admitted the defendant to probation, and was competent. The overruling of the objec- that the refusal to do so was an abuse of tion to this statement and its admission in discretion. The right to admit to probation evidence are assigned as error. If there were rests in the discretion of the judge hearing the slightest doubt of the defendant's guilt or the case. The defendant on the trial proved, any conflict in the evidence as to any ma- without contradiction, an excellent character terial matter affecting his guilt, the judg- for honesty and as a peaceable, law-abiding (148 N.E.) citizen. He was only 20 years old, and his fits diffused by it throughout the municipality, codefendants were about the same age. On being a "local improvement." the application for probation it appeared that [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words he was the third of a family of nine chil- and Phrases. First and Second Series, Local dren, all of whom were living with their par Improvement. ] ents except the oldest daughter, who was 3. Appeal and error 901-Court of review married. He had always lived at home ex will not search record for error not disclosed cept one year when he was working for the by abstract, Bowman Dairy Company at Pingree Grove. While a court of review will sometimes His wages were $39 a week, and he helped search the record for the purpose of affirming willingly, right along, with the support of | a case, it will not search the record for error the family. His father had no other income not disclosed by the abstract, but his wages. Both he and his wife testified 4. Statutes aw 184, 205--Construction requires that without the aid of the plaintiff in error determination of legislative intention from they could not get along and support the language of act as whole, considered with obchildren. He had never been charged with ject of statute. any violation of the criminal law, and the It is the duty of a court in construing a legsuperintendent of the Bowman Dairy Com- islative act to attempt to determine legislapany, for which he had been working for two tive intention from the language of the act, years, testified that he would continue to em- when all of its provisions are taken together ploy him if he were paroled. The statute and considered with reference to the purpose for which the act was enacted. provides that applications for release on probation may, in the discretion of the court, be 5. Highways Om 105(1)-Only public highways granted, if it shall appear to the satisfaction outside of corporate limits of municipality are of the court, both that there is reasonable to be taken over by state department of pubground to expect that the defendant may be lic works and to remain under its sole control reformed, and that the interest of society and jurisdiction. shall be subserved. Whatever might be our Only public highways outside of corporate judgment on these questions, the determina- limits of municipality are to be taken over by tion of them is not left to us but to the dis- under its sole control and jurisdiction, in view state department of public works and to remain cretion of the trial court, which we have no of Laws 1913, p. 534, § 32, section 9 as amendpower to review. ed by Laws 1921, p. 786, and section 11 as The judgment will be affirmed. amended by Laws 1923, p. 561, and Bond Issue Judgment affirmed. Act 1917, § 12, and State Road and Bridge Act, $ 9, and State Highway System Act 1921, $$ 7, 11, 12 6. Eminent domain Om 19—When right of emi(317 Ill. 203) nent domain conferred on state department of VILLAGE OF GLENCOE v. HURFORD. public works and buildings m be exercised, (No. 16362.) stated, The right of eminent domain conferred up(Supreme Court of Illinois. April 24, 1925. on the state department of public works and Rehearing Denied with Modification buildings by State-Aid Act 1913, Bond Issue June 9, 1925.) Act 1917, and State Highway System Act 1921, to alter and relocate roads. may be exercised 1. Municipal corporations +269(1) Park only for purposes public in their nature and commissioners held not to have succeeded to where the benefits derived by its exercise are jurisdiction over road when consents not ob- diffused by it throughout the community. tained. Lincoln Park commissioners held not to 7. Eminent domain Ow55–When city or village have succeeded, under Laws 1913, p. 413, § 1, may exercise right of eminent domain conto jurisdiction of the village of Glencoe, as to ferred upon it under Local Improvement Act, stated. that part of Sheridan Road running through the village, where the required consent of the The power of eminent domain conferred upproperty owners abutting on the road was not on a city or village by the Local Improvement obtained and the commissioners never assumed Act may be exercised only where the public control of and management over the road. improvement enhances the value of adjacent property, as distinguished from benefits diffused 2. Municipal corporations Enw 282(2)-Widen throughout the municipality. ing of street held "ocal improvement.” Widening of street held a local improve- 8. Eminent domain Ewa 121-Property acquired ment, as distinguished from a general improve by eminent domain exercised by department of ment, where such widening, while improving the public works and buildings is to be paid for street for general travel, would be a particular by state, and that acquired by city or village advantage to the immediate locality and in by special assessment. crease the value of the property specially as Property acquired through the exercise of bessed; an improvement enhancing the value of eminent domain by the state department of pubadjacent property, as distinguished from bene- lic works and buildings pursuant to Eminent Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Domain Act and State-Aid 'Act 1913, Bond Is-116. Statutes om 212–Courts bound to presume sue Act 1917, State Highway System Act 1921, Legislature did not contemplate unjust conis to be paid for by the state, and property ac sequences literal enforcement of statute en. quired by the exercise of that right by a city or tailed, and will construe statute accordingly. village is to be paid for by special assessment When a literal enforcement of a statute upon the adjacent property benefited. would result in great injustice and lead to con sequences which Legislature could not have con9. Statutes a 158—Repeal of laws by impli-templated, courts are bound to presume that cation not favored. such consequences were not intended, and will Repeal of laws by implication is not fa- adopt a construction which it may be reasonavored. ble to presume was contemplated by the Leg islature. 10. Statutes on 161(1)-When earlier of two 17. Highways Om 105(2)-Village held not di. statutes relating to same subject does and vested of authority to widen street constitute does not continue in force, stated. ing state highway by special assessment. Where two statutes are enacted which re Village held not divested by State-Aid Act late to same subject, the earliest continues 1913, Bond Issue Act 1917, State Highway in force, unless the two are clearly inconsistent System Act 1921, read in connection with Loc. with and repugnant to each other, or unless in cal Improvement Act, and Cities and Villages the later statute some express notice is taken Act, and Road and Bridge Act, § 50, of auof the former plainly indicating an intention to thority conferred by special charter, to widen repeal it. and alter street by special assessment though constituting a section of a state highway. 11. Statutes Cow 159—Acts seemingly repugnant Thompson, J., Duncan, C. J., and Farmer, are to be construed, if possible, to avoid re J., dissenting. peal by implication. Where two acts are seemingly repugnant, Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; they should, if possible, be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the E. M. Moogan, Judge. former by implication. Petition by the Village of Glencoe for wid ening and altering of street, and for condem12. Highways Om 105 (2)—Authority of com- nation of property. From a final order and missioners of highways not exercisable within judgment, overruling objections of Samuel cities and villages. R. Hurford, he appeals. Affirmed. Statutes conferring in generai terms authority upon commissioners of highways to Morton T. Culver, of Chicago, for appellay out, open, maintain, or vacate roads do not lant. authorize them to exercise that authority with George I. Hicks, of Chicago, for appellee. in the cities and villages. 13. Statutes C22534–Rules for interpreting HEARD, J. This is an appeal from a final terms in statute construed and subsequently order and judgment of the superior court of carried into amendment or re-enactment Cook county under the Local Improvement stated. Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 24, 8 698 et Where terms used in a statute have ac- seq.), overruling objections of appellant to quired a settled meaning through judicial in the entry of such order and judgment after terpretation and the statute is changed by proceedings had, in conformity with the act, amendment or re-enactment and the terms in upon a petition filed by appellee for the widterpreted remain in the law, they are to be un- ening and altering of a street in the village derstood in the sense theretofore attributed to of Glencoe called Sheridan Road, and for them, unless by qualifying or explanatory addi- the condemnation of certain private property tion a contrary intention of the Legislature is to be taken for use as a public street in such made clear. widening and alteration. The parties whose property was sought to be taken by the con14. Statutes om 22534 Judicial construction demnation proceeding have not appealed. becomes part of law, [1] It is contended by appellant that the Judicial construction becomes part of law, village of Glencoe had lost its jurisdiction of it being presumed Legislature, in passing later Sheridan Road and that the Lincoln Park law, knew the judicial construction given to the commissioners had succeeded to such juriswords of the prior enactment. diction. In 1913 the General Assembly passed 15. Statutes 181(2)-Construction of stat. an act which, among other things, provided ute resulting in great inconvenience or absurd that the commissioners of Lincoln Park, of consequences is to be avoided, if possible. the county of Cook, are authorized to take, regulate, etc., the public street, thoroughA particular construction of a statute resulting in great inconvenience or absurd con fare etc., known as Sheridan Road running sequences should be avoided, unless the mean through Glencoe, provided the consent in ing of the Legislature is so plain and manifest writing of the owners of a majority of the that avoidance is impossible. frontage of the lots and lands abutting on For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (148 N.E.) Sheridan Road in each municipality or park ( distinguished from benefits diffused by it district, or in that portion of each township throughout the municipality, it is a local imnot within any city or village, shall first be provement. City of Springfield v. Consoli: obtained, and that the consent, expressed by dated Railway Co., 296 111. 17, 129 N. E. 580; resolution or otherwise, of the authorities of Northwestern University v. Village of Wileach municipality, park district, and town- mette, 230 Ill. 80, 82 N. E. 615. Under the ship shall first be obtained. Laws of 1913, evidence in the present case, the court prop$ 1, p. 443. Before the Lincoln Park commis- erly held the improvement to be a local imsioners could acquire any rights in Sheridan provement. Road in the village of Glencoe, it was neces [3] It is contended by appellant that the sary that both the consent in writing of the description of parcel 21, said to be described owners of a majority of the frontage of the in the petition and ordinance, is so indefinite lots and lands abutting thereon and the con- that it cannot be located. We have carefully sent of the authorities of the village of Glen- examined the abstract in this case and find coe should be first obtained. The village of in neither the abstract of the recommendaGlencoe on July 7, 1914, passed an ordinance tion of the board of local improvements, the giving consent to the commissioners of Lin- assessment roll, the objections filed, the order coln Park to take, regulate, etc., Sheridan overruling the objections, the judgment apRoad in Glencoe according to the provisions pealed from, nor in the abstract of any of the of the act of 1913, provided the commis- proceedings set forth in the bill of exceptions, sioners should accept the same within 60 any description of any of the property sought days. The commissioners accepted in writ- to be taken or any description of parcel 21. ing the provisions of the ordinance in accord- The abstract consists of 591 pages, and the ance therewith. The consent in writing of record, together with the exhibits, constitutes the owners of a majority of the frontage of volume of over 2,000 pages. While a court the lots and lands abutting on Sheridan Road of review will sometimes search the record *in the village not having been obtained, in for the purpose of affirming a case, it will not August, 1922, the village board passed an or- search the record to hunt for error not disdinance in which it was recited that the closed by the abstract. The description of requirements of the act necessary to be ful- | parcel 21 as set forth in the petition is such filled to make the ordinance giving consent to that the property can be located by a compethe Lincoln Park Commissioners effective had tent surveyor. not been fulfilled; that the necessary consents The first point in appellant's brief is: and permissions had not been acquired by the "Subdivider has the right to make reservacommissioners; that the commissioners had tions and to limit the use of dedicated streets. never in any manner assumed or exercised Village of Bradley v. N. Y. C. Rr." any authority, control, or supervision over Sheridan Road; that the village of Glencoe We assume that by the reference appellant had at all times maintained control and su- wishes to call attention to the case having pervision over it, and repealed the ordinance that title reported in 296 Ill. 383, 129 N. E. of July 7, 1914. The consent of the property 744; but our attention is not called in the owners abutting on Sheridan Road in the vil: argument to any facts to which either that lage of Glencoe never having been obtained case or this point in appellant's brief might and the Lincoln Park commissioners never have reference. having assumed control and management The village of Glencoe is a municipal corover the road, the village of Glencoe never poration in Cook county having a population, lost jurisdiction over the road, and this ob- according to the last federal census, between jection of appellant was properly overruled. 2,500 and 3,500, and is operating under a [2] It is contended by appellant that the special charter granted by the General Asimprovement in question is a general and not sembly in 1869. By its charter it was granted a local improvement, and that for this rea- the power to lay out, open, alter, widen, exson the judgment should not have been en- tend, establish, vacate, abolish, grade, pave, tered. The petition herein is for the purpose or otherwise improve and keep in good repair of widening Sheridan Road and taking off all roads, streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, sharp angles at certain intersections. The squares, commons, parks or other public eridence in the record shows that while the grounds or places in the village and to have widening of the street would improve it for exclusive control of the same. It was also general travel, it would be a particular ad-given the power to pass all ordinances which Fantage to the immediate locality and in the council may deem necessary and proper crease the value of the property specially as for the carrying into full effect of the prosessed. The fact that the improvement will visions of the charter and for the regulation be of advantage to the city does not change of the municipal government of the village. its character as a local improvement if pri The recommendation of the board of local marily it is a material advantage to the adja- improvements for this improvement was filed cent property. 'Where the improvement en November 13, 1922, the ordinance for the imbances the value of adjacent property, as provement was adopted by the village board |