had computed and ascertained the damages at the sums stated in their report. Upon application to the court, the report was confirmed, and the order of confirmation has been unanimously affirmed.

Many interesting and important questions were discussed in the opinion of the Appellate Division and in the arguments of counsel. They are not open to consideration here. The mandate of the Constitution enforces upon us the presumption that the finding of damage, unanimously affirmed, is supported by the evidence, and that, upon the application for the intermediate order, there was a showing of injury sufficient to justify the appointment of commissioners. Constitution, art. 6, § 9. Objections to the admission and exclusion of testimony have been considered, and have been found to be unsubstantial. There is nothing else to be reviewed.

The order should be affirmed, with costs.

HISCOCK, C. J., and CARDOZO, POUND,

CRANE, ANDREWS, and LEHMAN, JJ., concur; MCLAUGHLIN, J., not sitting. Order affirmed.

(240 N. Y. 614)

SALM v. BLEAU.

(Court of Appeals of New York. May 5, 1925.) Highways 175(1)-Plaintiff not imputed with negligence for failure to grant right of way to vehicle approaching from his right.

Plaintiff's noncompliance with General Highway Traffic Law, § 12, subd. 4, requiring a driver to grant right of way to a vehicle approaching from his right, held not negligence, in view of obstructions to the view and defendant's negligence.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by John E. Salm against Joseph

Bleau, doing business under the name of Joseph Bleau & Son. From a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department (210 App. Div. 554, 206 N. Y. S. 415), affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant, appeals. Affirmed.

P. C. Dugan, of Albany, for appellant. Edward J. Halter, of Albany, for respond

right of way. We think that it was permissi ble for the jury to find as it did that owing to obstructions to the view and the negligence of defendant, plaintiff was exonerated from the imputation of negligence because of noncompliance with that provision of the General Highway Traffic Law (Cons. Laws, c. 70, § 12, subd. 4), which says:

"Every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right; provided, that wherever traffic officers are sta tioned they shall have full power to regulate traffic."

We desire to make it plain, however, that this conclusion is based on the particular facts of this case, and that we do not at all

abandon or recede from the rule laid down Y. 94, 97, 145 N. E. 751, 752. We said there, by this court in Shirley v. Larkin Co., 239 N. where it appeared that the offending party could perfectly well see the car approaching on his right:

"If it appears that the relative positions of the two cars, taking into account distances from the point of intersection and speed, is such that danger of a collision may reasonably be apprehended if the car on the left proceeds, it is the duty of its driver to slow up or stop and give to the car on the right the precedence which is guaranteed to it by the statute."

HISCOCK, C. J., and CARDOZO, POUND, MCLAUGHLIN, CRANE, ANDREWS, and LEHMAN, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with costs.

(240 N. Y. 616)

2 POWELL et al. v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBERS AND STEAMFITTERS OF UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

(Court of Appeals of New York. May 5, 1925.) I. Corporations 665 (3)-Relief seldom ex. tended beyond call of emergency in contro. versies touching internal management of for. eign corporations.

Courts are reluctant to interfere by injunction in controversies touching internal management of foreign corporations, and, though reluctance may be overcome by urgent need, relief is seldom, if ever, extended beyond call of emergency.

2. Trade unions 9-Injunction against consolidation of local unions granted only pending appeal to convention of members.

Threatened disruption of local unions, functioning in state, by resolution of foreign corporation consolidating them, makes injunction proper to preserve status quo pending appeal

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

that of the Special Term should be modified, The judgment of the Appellate Division and by striking from the latter judgment the declaration that the resolution therein described and all acts thereunder are null and void, and` by providing that the injunction shall continue until the determination by the convention of plaintiffs' appeal thereto, and, as so modified, the said judgments should be affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

Sydney A. Syme, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Humphrey J. Lynch, of New York City, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The complaint, read in its entirety, exhibits a cause of action to stay the enforcement of the defendant's resolution consolidating the local unions during the pendency of the appeal already taken by the plaintiffs to the convention of the members. The judgment goes farther, and, upon a finding that the resolution was passed in violation of the constitution and the by-laws, declares it illegal and restrains its enforcement forever.

[1] Courts are reluctant to interfere by injunction in controversies that touch the internal management of foreign corporations. Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 363, 115 N. E. 1001; Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259, 263, 109 N. E. 250, L. R. A. 1916A, 542, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 387; Kimball v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 7, 8, 31 N. E. 697, 34 Am. St. Rep. 250. Their reluctance may be overcome by the presence of some urgent need, but relief is seldom, if ever, to be extended beyond the call of the emergency.

[2] The threatened disruption' of local unions, functioning within the state, made it proper, so far as an injunction could avail, to preserve the status quo pending appeal to the convention. Brown v. Order of Foresters, 176 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145. Relief beyond that time, if granted at all, should wait up on the exhaustion of the remedy within the corporation and the result of the appeal. Hickey v. Baine, 195 Mass. 446, 452, 81 N. E. 201. If the merger is then annulled, resort to the courts will be unnecessary. If it is sustained, there will be need to consider the fitness of going farther, and the curative effect of subsequent approval in respect of prior irregularities. Problems of this order are in

plaint not defective because note is for part of purchase price of lands sold on executory agreement to convey, unless showing on face that vendor deferred action until time for conveyance.

chase price of lands, sold on executory agreeThat note sued on represents part of purment to convey in future, does not render complaint defective, unless it shows on face that vendor deferred action until maturity of last installment, on payment of which conveyance is due.

3. Pleading 51-Allegations in cause of action for possession of realty should not be incorporated in separate cause of action on purchase-money note.

Allegations in cause of action for possession of realty, sold by plaintiff on executory agreement to convey in future, should not be read into separate cause of action on purchasemoney note in determining its sufficiency. 4. Vendor and purchaser 189-Vendee held not estopped to dispute vendor's title.

be in third person, and it does not appear that Where contract of sale shows legal title to vendor is entitled to a deed, vendee in possession, when sued in ejectment, is not estopped to dispute vendor's title.

Ejectment based on purely equitable title will not lie.

6. Vendor and purchaser

280(1)-Vendor's complaint not containing offer to convey does not state cause of action for foreclosure.

Complaint containing no offer to convey does not state cause of action to enforce by foreclosure plaintiff's equitable rights in land sold by him on executory agreement to convey in future.

7. Appeal and error 1178(8)-New trial to enable plaintiff to allege and prove matter omitted from complaint held proper.

Though objection that complaint, in action to enforce by foreclosure plaintiff's equitable rights in land sold by him on executory agreement to convey in future, contains no offer to convey, could not have been obviated by trial · amendment, new trial should be granted, instead of dismissing complaint for insufficiency, on reversal of judgment for plaintiff, to enable him to allege and prove such offer. 8. Vendor and purchaser 287-Vendor's equitable rights enforced by sale of vendee's equitable interest in land, not by sale of contract.

Vendor's equitable rights under executory agreement to convey in future will be enforced by sale of vendee's equitable interest in lands conveyed, not by sale of contract.

[2, 3] (b) The fact that a promissory note represents a portion of the purchase price of lands sold on an executory agreement to convey in the future does not render the complaint defective, unless it appears on the face thereof that the vendor has deferred action until the maturity of the last installment, upon the payment of which a conveyance is due. Ewing v. Wightman, 167 N. Y. 107, 111, 60 N. E. 322. The court should not read the second cause of action in order to incorporate the allegations thereof into the first cause of action, which stands on its own footing.

[4, 5] 2. The complaint does not sufficiently state a separate cause of action to recover possession of real property. It appears from the contract of sale, which is made a part of the complaint, that the legal title to the premises is in a third party, and it does not appear that plaintiff is entitled to a deed thereof. The vendee in possession is therefore not estopped to dispute the plaintiff's title. Ejectment will not lie when based on a purely equitable title.

[6, 7] 3. The complaint does not sufficiently state a cause of action for the purpose of enforcing plaintiff's equitable rights by foreclosure. No offer to convey is made in the complaint. Freeson v. Bissell, 63 N. Y. 168;

PER CURIAM. [1] 1. The complaint sufficiently states a separate cause of action on a promissory note.

cific objection was not made on the trial, it is evident that the objection could not have been obviated by an amendment of the complaint to meet the difficulty. But on a new trial it may be that plaintiff will be in a position to allege and prove such an offer.

[8] 4. The judgment of the Special Term was not in proper form. Plaintiff's equitable rights would be enforced by a sale of defendants' equitable interest in the lands and property conveyed, not by a sale of the contract of sale. But the complaint should not have been dismissed for insufficiency.

The judgment should be modified by granting a new trial and as so modified affirmed, with costs to abide the event.

LEHMAN, JJ., concur.

Judgment accordingly.

PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Wendell T. BUSH, Appellant, v. John F. GILCHRIST et al., Constituting the State Tax Commission of the State of New York, Respondents.

(Court of Appeals of New York. May 5, 1925.)

Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (206 App. Div. 800, 201 N. Y. S. 513), entered March 28, 1924, which confirmed, on certiorari, a determination of the State Tax Commission disallowing a de

Div. 802, 203 N. Y. S. 937), entered April 9, 1924, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term which vacated and set aside, on the ground of fraud, an arbitration agreement between the parties, the award in favor of defendant purporting to have been made thereunder, and the judgment in favor of defendant theretofore entered upon said award.

See, also, 240 N. Y. 562, 148 N. E. 705. both of New York City, for appellant. Kenneth M. Spence and Charles M. Travis,

William D. Guthrie, Isidor J. Kresel, and

relator under the Income Tax Law (Laws 1919, c. 627). Real property owned by relator was seized by the government for war purposes in 1918. In 1919 an award was made in excess of the original cost to relator but less than the appraised value of the property. Relator claimed a deduction in his income tax return for 1919 for the difference between the appraised value and the amount received. The Tax Commission contended that the determination was proper for two reasons: First, that the loss claimed by relator was not a loss sustained within the meaning of the taxing act, being article 16 of the Tax Law of New York State; and, second, that if there was any loss it occurred in 1918 and prior to the inception of the said law, and, therefore, was not a proper deduction from income accruing subsequent to that

date.

Jackson A. Dykman and Arthur E. Goddard, both of Brooklyn, for appellant.

for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

HISCOCK, C. J., and CARDOZO, POUND, ANDREWS and LEHMAN, JJ., concur.

the findings do not sustain the judgment. CRANE, J., dissents, on the ground that MCLAUGHLIN, J., absent.

3

In the Matter of the Claim of William PAS

TERNACK v. FEDERATION OF JEWISH CHARITIES et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

(Court of Appeals of New York. May 5, 1925.)

Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (211 App. Div. 826, 206 N.