(148 N.E.) The benefited. Likewise, prior to the enactment | term 'street' has been reached by the authoriof the act of 1921 and after the passage of ties, the most generally accepted definitions are the act of 1917, this court recognized the those which confine a street to 'a public highright of the village of Glencoe to widen and way within an incorporated municipality.' 3 alter a portion of the same street here in Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.) § 1121. question and to levy a special assessment question would be to confine it to the control of most natural construction of the statute in upon the property benefited thereby. Village bridges and roads by cities and villages where of Glencoe v. Stone, 296 Ill. 177, 129 N. E. such roads are outside of the limits of other 700. cities, villages or incorporated towns. See Peoria and Pekin Union Railway Co. v. People, 144 Ill. 458; Snell v. City of Chicago, 133 Ill. 413; City of Joliet v. Drainage District, 222 Ill. 441. The general rule is, that one municibe made within the limits of another municipal pality cannot levy a tax for an improvement to corporation. Town of Ottawa v. Walker, 21 Ill. 605; People v. La Salle County, 111 Ill. 527; Loeffler v. City of Chicago [246 Ill. 48]. The statute conferring authority, in general terms, upon commissioners of highways in country districts to maintain and control roads and bridges within their respective towns will not the territorial limits of incorporated cities and be construed to authorize its exercise within villages in such towns. People v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 118 Ill. 520; Shields v. Ross, 158 Ill. 214; People v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co., 172 Ill. 71. This same rule would necessarily be applied in the construction of a statute which gave, in general terms, the power to one municipality to construct and maintain roads in another municipality." In 1877 the Legislature passed an act (Laws 1877, p. 61) to enable cities and villages to acquire, by purchase, lease, or gift, and to establish, maintain, and regulate, ferries, bridges, and the approaches thereto, within their corporate limits and within five miles thereof. In 1879 this law was amended (Laws 1879, p. 71), giving to the purchasing city control of the bridge, ferry or approach located outside of the city when purchased. Under the provisions of this act, the city of Peoria purchased a bridge across the Illinois river, together with the approach thereto for a distance of more than sevensixteenths of a mile. This approach was within the corporate limits of the village of East Peoria and was known as West Washington street. The village passed an ordinance for the paving of this street, and it was contended that the street was owned by the city of Peoria and not by the village of East Peoria, and that the city of Peoria was liable to improve the street. In passing upon this contention this court, in Mushbaugh v. Village of East Peoria, 260 Ill. 27, 102 N. E. 1027, said: "In the United States, township, county or other local authorities usually have control or supervision over ordinary public highways in the country, while the corporate authorities of cities, villages and incorporated towns usually have such control within their respective limits. Whether such jurisdiction and power in the one are exclusive depends upon the intention of the Legislature. As a general rule, however, a grant to a city, incorporated village or incorporated town of power to control and regulate the streets confers exclusive authority over the streets, and vests in such authorities the power and jurisdiction to regulate and control highways which have heretofore been under the control of township or county organizations and transfers to such city or village the duty of maintaining and repairing them, unless the statute otherwise provides. (3 Dillon on Mun. Corp. 5th Ed.) § 1138, and cases cited. It is conceded that the village of East Peoria was incorporated under the general City and Village Act, which grants exclusive jurisdiction over the streets of the municipalities incorporated thereunder, unless otherwise specially provided by statute. The statute under which the city of Peoria purchased the bridge and road in question provides for the control of bridges and roads but does not in any way refer to streets. The word "road" is now commonly used as denoting a public way in the country rather than the street of a town or city.' Elliott on Roads and Streets (2d Ed.) § 7. While no satisfactory and generally accepted definition of the "The highway commissioner of each town or road district shall have power and it shall be his duty: (1) To lay out, alter, widen or vacate roads as hereinafter provided. * * (5) To direct the construction, maintenance and repair of roads and bridges within the town or district, to let contracts, employ labor and purchase material and machinery therefor. (6) To have general charge of the roads and bridges of his town or district, to keep the same in repair and to improve them so far as practicable." * * * made clear. The judicial construction becomes a part of the law, as it is presumed that the Legislature in passing the later law knew the judicial construction which had been given to the words of the prior enactment. People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 314 Ill. 373, 145 N. E. 731; 26 R. C. L. 992. It must therefore be presumed that the Legislature did not intend by the act of 1913 or 1917 or the enactment of section 9a in 1923, by the use of general terms with reference to roads and public highways, to take from cities and villages the special and exclusive powers of altering and widening streets by special assessment upon the property specially benefited under the Local Improvement Act. a public highway extending north from the city of Chicago to the state line, following generally the contour of the west shore of Lake Michigan. That part of Sheridan Road north of the city of Chicago is by the Hard Road Act of 1917 designated as "Route No. 42." The road enters the corporate limits of the village of Glencoe from the east at a point about 40 rods north of the south limit of the village and extends through the village in a northwesterly direction. That part of the road within the village is improved by a pavement laid in 1893, varying in width from 18 feet to 22 feet. The road runs through the residence portion of the village and is used largely by motor vehicles traving from and to Chicago. The state, through its Department of Public Works and Buildings has taken over the road and has constructed three bridges within the limits of the village. The floor of one of these is about 2 feet higher than the floor level of the bridge which it replaced, and the floors of the other two are approximately 10 feet higher than the floors of those which they replaced. The plan of the Department of Public Works and Buildings is to widen the street at narrow points so that it will have a uniform width of 66 feet and to relocate the road at certain points in order to avoid sharp turns and steep grades. The width of the roadway on the bridges being constructed by the state is 30 feet, and the plan provides for a pavement through the village 30 feet in width. Glencoe is a village hav der the statute the state is required to bear the cost of improving and constructing the section of Route No. 42 within the village limits the same width and of the same materials as other sections of the route outside the corporate limits. [15-17] From a consideration of the provisions of the various road and bridge acts, the Local Improvement Act, and the powers granted to the village of Glencoe, and in the light of the authorities, we find that there is no such inconsistency or repugnancy between them as would cause, by the general terms of any of the road and bridge acts, the re, peal, by implication, of the specific and exclusive powers granted to the village of Glencoe to alter and widen its streets by special assessment upon the property specially benefited. To hold otherwise would cause great inconvenience, absurd consequences, and endless confusion in almost every city or village in Cook county having less than 20,000 inhabitants, and in cities and villages having a population of less than 7,500 in other counties, with reference to the granting a population of less than 7,500, and unof power by the village to public utilities, would greatly hamper the village in its sanitary measures, and would prevent, no matter how great the necessity, such city or village from ever altering, widening, paving, or improving a street upon which a hardsurfaced road had been laid by the state, by special assessment. It is a well-established rule, in construing statutes, that when great inconvenience or absurd consequences will result from a particular construction, that construction should be avoided unless the meaning of the Legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is impossible. When the literal enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead to consequences which the Legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended and will adopt a construction which it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated by the Legislature. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 290 Ill. 142, 124 N. E. 842. The superior court of Cook county properly overruled appellants' objections, and the final order and judgment of the court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THOMPSON, J., DUNCAN, C. J., and FARMER, J. (dissenting). Sheridan Road is The first legal question arising is whether the village of Glencoe has the authority to initiate and prosecute proceedings to condemn private property for the purpose of relocating, straightening, and widening a street which is a section of the system of state highways. The determination of this question requires the consideration of all the pertinent provisions of the laws of this state regarding public roads and streets. The system of state highways established by the act of 1921 includes all durable, hardsurfaced roads in the state improved by the state or by any county, or jointly by the state and any county, or jointly by the state and the federal government. By an act passed at the same session of the General Assembly, the Department of Public Works and Buildings is given full power and authority to construct the durable, hard-surfaced roads of the state under plans and specifications approved by it and to take by eminent domain proceedings such private property as it finds necessary for providing roadways or mate (148 N.E.) to connect or complete by the most direct route any hard-surfaced road forming a part of the system of state highways constructed or being constructed to the corporate limits of such city or village; the cost of such road for the same width and of the same materials as outside the corporate limits to be paid entirely by the state. Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 1785. This act merely fixes the minimum amount which must be paid by the state, but does not prevent the state from paying more if, as provided by section 7 of the Hard Road Act of 1917, an extreme case is presented which in the opinion of the department requires the construction of the road of greater width than 18 feet. By reading together the provisions of the road laws of this state hereinbefore mentioned, it is clear that the system of state highways which is placed under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Department of Public Works and Buildings includes all of the routes designated that are not within the corporate limits of cities and villages having a population of more than 7,500. rials for use in the construction of the state highway. Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 1849. This act authorizes the department to delegate its power to construct, under its supervision, hard-surfaced roads to the counties of the state, but nowhere in this act or in any other is the department given power to delegate any of its authority to cities or villages. In 1913 there was a general revision of the law of this state in relation to roads and bridges, and by section 3 of the general act the Department of Public Works and Buildings is given general supervision of all highways and bridges which are constructed, improved, and maintained, in whole or in part, by the aid of state money, and the power to approve and determine the final plans and specifications for all state aid roads and to let all contracts for the construction of the same. Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 1783. Section 6 of the act in relation to state highways gives to the Department of Public Works and Buildings, in addition to and not in limitation of its general powers, power to determine and adopt rules, regulations, and specifications and to enter into contracts covering all matters and things incident to the The section of Route No. 42 within the location, relocation, construction, repair, re- corporate limits of the village of Glencoe is construction, improvement, and maintenance by the laws of this state placed under the of state highways. Section 8 of the act pro- general supervision and control of the Devides that when a part or portion of a high-partment of Public Works and Buildings, way is taken over by the state as a part of and it follows that the village authorities the system of state highways, it shall there- have no power to make any improvements after be constructed, reconstructed, repaired, on this highway without the consent of the improved, and maintained by the state. Sec- department. The authority to improve the tion 9 gives the Department of Public Works highway must be vested either in the state and Buildings the right to acquire any land or in the municipality, otherwise there will necessary for the construction, relocation, be a conflict of jurisdiction and the interests widening, or straightening of a state high- of the public will suffer. If the authority to way. Section 15 of the act gives the depart- open, alter, widen, and vacate streets given ment power to restrict and regulate the use to cities and villages by section 65 of the by public utilities of highways forming a Cities and Villages Act is not modified by part of the state system. Smith's Stat. 1923, the Road and Bridge Act, then a city or vil pp. 1850, 1851. Sections 2, 7, 11, and 12 of lage could vacate and close a street desigthe Hard Road Act of 1917, which provides nated by the state authorities, or by the for the issuance of $60.000,000 worth of county authorities with the approval of the bonds for the purpose of constructing a state- Department of Public Works and Buildings, wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads, as part of the state highway system, and which system includes the street in question, thereby destroy the continuity and servicegives to the Department of Public Works ability of the system. If the control of and Buildings full authority to construct, a street designated as a part of the state maintain, supervise, and regulate the use of highway system remained with the city or roads built pursuant to the provisions of the village, then the state might establish one act. Section 9 gives the department power grade and the local authorities another, or to make minor changes in the location of the the local authorities might destroy the secroutes designated by the act, and limits the tion as a serviceable unit of the state highright of the department to the construction way system by granting a franchise to a of highways, within the corporate limits of public utility for a use incompatible with cities and villages to such as are permitted the use of the highway as a part of the by the General Road Act of 1913 (Smith's state-wide system. In the case at bar the Stat. 1923, p. 1834). Section 9a of the gen- Department of Public Works and Builderal act provides that a road, or part there- ings is relocating, straightening, and widof, lying within the corporate limits of any ening Sheridan Road within the corporate city or village having a population of 7,500 limits of the village of Glencoe, and in its or less, as shown by the last federal census, construction of bridges it has raised the shall be improved or constructed by the state grade substantially above that theretofore 1921, which establishes a system of state highways and places the same under the general supervision and control of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. What is said in the opinion in that case was said with reference to the question then before the court. The questions presented there were decided correctly. The section of highway now before us has been designated by a public act of this state as a part of the state highway system, and it has been taken over by the state and is now being improved under state supervision. It follows that what was said in the Brookfield Case has no application to the question presented in the case at bar. established by the village. It is impossible | authorities had the right to improve by speto carry out the provisions of the Road and cial assessment a road which had been desBridge Act establishing a state-wide system ignated by the county of Cook as a state-aid of improved highways without holding that road, but which had not been taken over by the Department of Public Works and Build- the state. The street under consideration ings has exclusive control and supervision there had not been designated by the state of all units of the state highway system out- as a part of a state-wide system of durable, side of cities and villages having a popula-hard-surfaced roads, and the decision was tion of more than 7,500. If in the discretion rendered prior to the adoption of the act of of the department it is necessary to complete the system, it has authority to extend its jurisdiction over connecting units within the corporate limits of cities and villages in Cook county of a population of 20,000 or less. The conclusion we have reached does not mean that the city or village may not by general taxation, or by special assessment or special taxation, improve the street which forms a part of the state highway system by paving a portion of it not paved by the state, by laying sidewalks along the street, by installing a system of drainage, or otherwise, provided it secures the consent and approval of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. Section 9a of the act of 1913 provides that the state highway may be improved for a greater width and of different materials through a city or village, provided the Department of Public Works and Buildings agrees with the local authorities to make the change; but whatever the width of the improvement or the materials used, the improvement is made by and under the supervision of the department, the excess cost, if any, of the improvement made under such an agreement to be paid by the city or village. If the improvement is local in character, the cost of it may be paid wholly or in part by special taxation or special assessment, in accordance with the law governing methods of making local improvements. The provisions of the Road and Bridge Act to which reference has been made do not repeal any of the provisions of the Local Improvement Act, but the two acts must be construed together with respect to those portions of the state highway system which lie within the corporate limits of cities and villages where the state shall or may improve the highway, and where the authority granted by the two acts conflicts, the Local Improvement Act is modified to the extent necessary to carry out the provisions of the acts providing for the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of a state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads. In Village of Brookfield v. Ricker, 295 Ill. 316, 129 N. E. 100, we held that the local The right to acquire land for relocating, straightening, and widening the section of the system of state highways here under consideration being by law vested exclusively in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, the village of Glencoe had no authority to institute these proceedings, and the legal objection challenging its right should have been sustained. (317 Ill. 263) VILLAGE OF GLENCOE, Appellee, v. Albert Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Morton T. Culver, of Chicago, for appellants. PER CURIAM. This appeal is from a judgment of the superior court of Cook county in a local improvement case instituted by the village of Glencoe. All questions presented for decisions in this case have been decided in an opinford (No. 16362) 148 N. E. 69, and for the ion this day filed in Village of Glencoe v. Hurreasons there given the judgment of the superior court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (317 II. 302) (148 N.E.) examination on March 10, in the course of LINCOLN PARK COAL & BRICK CO. v. which X-ray pictures were made by the docINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. tor. March 12, the day the application was set for hearing, and after the parties had received the report of the doctor who made the examination, an agreement was made between the parties for a settlement of the claim upon the payment of $200, which was approved by the Industrial Commission. About three days later plaintiff in error discovered he had been burned on the abdomen by the X-ray machine, and went to Dr. Metcalf, who was not the doctor who made the 2. Master and servant 374-Employee held entitled to compensation for X-ray burns re-examination, and Dr. Metcalf began treating ceived while being examined at request of employer. Where employee filed petition for review under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, subd. h, alleging increased disability, and employer demanded that employee be examined by doctor as permitted by section 12, and during such examination employee received X-ray burns, held that injury was so related to and connected with original injury as to authorize award of compensation therefor. him for the burn. The evidence discloses the burn caused a rather serious condition for plaintiff in error, and he has been in a hospital a considerable time under treatment of Dr. Metcalf and Dr. Milligan. April 24, 1922, and while plaintiff in error was under treatment for the burn, he filed a petition for review under paragraph (h) of section 19 of the Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd, Rev. St. 1923, c. 48, § 156), alleging his disability had increased and recurred. In June, Error to Circuit Court, Sangamon County; 1922, the doctor who caused the burn in makE. S. Smith, Judge. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Otto Drengwitz, employee, opposed by the Lincoln Park Coal & Brick Company, employer. From a judgment of the Circuit Court, reversing and setting aside award made by the Industrial Commission to the employee, said employee brings error. Judgment reversed, and award modified and affirmed. A. W. Kerr, of Chicago, and Joseph A. Londrigan, of Springfield, for plaintiff in error. Andrus, Trutter & Crow, of Springfield, for defendant in error. ing the examination told plaintiff in error calf said he would be all right in 10 days. (so plaintiff in error testified) that Dr. MetThe doctor told him he would be well by the 15th, and paid him $224 compensation up to that time, and also paid a bill to Dr. Metcalf of $150. The doctor testified the payment was a settlement of the damage resulting from the burn. Plaintiff in error testified he signed some kind of paper when the doctor paid him the money; that he could not read English, did not read the paper, and it was not read to him. The doctor testified he read the paper to him, but the paper itself was not offered in evidence. The petition filed under paragraph (h) of section 19 was heard by the Industrial Commission in January, 1923. Plaintiff in error was then in a hospital under treatment for the burn and unable to appear at the hearing, but his deposition was read. An award was made, which not being acceptable to plaintiff in error, he secured a review of it by the circuit court, where the award was set aside and the case remanded to the Industrial Commission for further hearing. It was again heard by the commission. An award was made finding that the disability had recurred and increased and that plaintiff in error was wholly and permanently incapable of work, and defendant in error was ordered to pay him $12 per week for 230.57 weeks, commencing April 24, 1922, and thereafter a pension for life of $23.33 per month, and the further sum of $382.75 on account of medical and hospital services. Defendant in error secured a review of the award by the circuit court, and that court set aside and reversed the finding and award of the Industrial Commission. This court granted a FARMER, J. This writ of error was issued to bring into review before this court the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon county reversing and setting aside an award made to Otto Drengwitz, an employee of the Lincoln Park Coal & Brick Company. Drengwitz (hereafter called plaintiff in error) was accidentally injured in the course of and in the line of his employment with the Lincoln Park Coal & Brick Company (hereafter referred to as defendant in error) February 24, 1921. He was voluntarily paid by defendant in error compensation to the amount of $533.07. He returned to work but claimed he had only partly recovered, and that he was entitled to further compensation. This was not agreed to by defendant in error, and plaintiff in error filed an application for adjustment of his claim. It was set for hearing before an arbitrator March 12, 1922. Before the hearing, defendant in error demanded that plaintiff in error be examined by a doctor selected by defendant in Plaintiff in error submitted to the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes error. |