These propositions will be considered in their order. And first as to the conclusiveness and binding force of the judgment of the district court of the parish of Natchitoches, in the matter of the succession of Lettrieus Alrio.

The constitution of the United States provides that, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such records may be proved, and the effect thereof." (Art. IV, Sec. I). In execution of this express power conferred by the constitution, Congress passed the act of May 26, 1790 (1 Stat., 122), which provides in effect, That the judicial records in one State shall be proved in the tribunals of another, by the attestation of the clerk, under the seal of the court, with the certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form. 2. That such records so authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court of the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records were or shall be taken." In the construction of this act the Supreme Court of the United States has laid down the rule, That where the State court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction, both of the cause and of the parties, such judgment is binding and conclusive everywhere in the courts of the United States, unless impeached for fraud. Thompson v. Whitman (18 Wall., 457), and cited cases. Upon principle, therefore, the same rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments should obtain in the executive departments of the United States as in the courts of the several States, or of the United States.

There has been no suggestion of fraud either on the part of Sompayrac or of the court which rendered the judgment; hence our inquiry must be restricted to the question of the jurisdiction of the district court for Natchitoches parish, in the State of Louisiana. The general rule in relation to this subject is: That where the court is one of general and unlimited jurisdiction its jurisdiction of the causes tried therein is always presumed, unless the contrary be shown. Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy (5 Cranch, 173); Dred Scott v. Sandford (19 How., 401). In considering this question therefore, the constitution and powers of the court, in which this judgment was rendered must be inspected, in order that an intelligent conclusion may be arrived at.

As before stated, the proceedings in the matter of the Alrio succession were had in August and September, 1882. They were therefore under the State constitution of 1879.

Article 80 provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, in courts of appeal, in district courts, and in justices of the peace." Article 107. "The State shall be divided into not less than twenty, nor more than thirty judicial districts, the parish of Orleans excepted." Article 108: . "The parishes of Natchitoches and Sa

bine shall compose the eleventh district.

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Article 109: "District courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil matters when the amount in dispute shall exceed fifty dollars, exclusive of interest. They shall have unlimited original jurisdiction in all criminal, probate and succession matters, and when a succession is a party defendant."

Article 872, Louisiana Civil Code declares: "Succession signifies also the estates, right and charges which a person leaves after his death, whether the property exceeds the charges or the charges exceed the property, or whether he has only left charges without any property."

It is thus seen from the above quoted provisions of Louisiana law that the district court of the eleventh judicial district of Louisiana, sitting as a court of probates in and for Natchitoches parish, has original unlimited jurisdiction in probate and succession matters. Having assumed and exercised jurisdiction in the Alrio succession, the law will therefore presume that it did so rightfully. Having jurisdiction, it had a right to decide all questions arising in the cause, and its judgment not having been appealed from, and having not been annulled by direct action, is binding and conclusive in the courts of the United States, and also in its executive departments, unless want of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be affirmatively shown. Harvey v. Tyler (2 Wall., 328); Florentine v. Burton (ib., 210); and Grignon v. Aster (2 How., 319).

I pass to the second question raised by the appeal of Sompayrac.

It is conceded that the claim of Lettrieus Alrio has been confirmed, that it is yet unlocated, and that certificates of location under the act of 1858 are due to his legal representative. It thus becomes necessary, as a preliminary question, to determine which of the two applicants herein, if either of them, is such representative. This question must be determined by the laws of Louisiana. That is to say, the legal representative of the confirmee Lettrieus Alrio is he, who, under the laws of Louisiana, would be considered the owner of the claim. Sims v. Irvine (3 Dallas, 425, 457); Waring v. Jackson (1 Peters, 570); Davis v. Mason (ib., 503); Miles v. Caldwell (2 Wall., 35); and many other reported cases.

Now, what are the laws of Louisiana, and what are the rules as expounded by her courts, which are applicable to this question?

The record of the succession proceedings in the matter of this claim represents "that Lettrieus Alrio died intestate in the parish of Natchitoches, about the year 1850." His succession was then legally open, and the place for disposing of his effects and settling up his estate was Natchitoches parish. Civil Code of Louisiana, Arts. 934 and 935.

It has been shown above that the court, a copy of whose record is here produced and relied upon, had "unlimited original jurisdiction in all criminal and probate and succession matters" in the parish of Natchitoches. It is further shown by the record that the Alrio succession had never

before been opened, either in the parish of Natchitoches or Sabine; that it was an unclaimed succession for over thirty years, and that the heirs were unknown and absent. This state of facts renders it what in the State of Louisiana is termed "a vacant succession." Civil Code, Arts. 1095 and 1097.

The record further shows that the aforesaid administrator G. L. Trichel, appointed by the court to manage this succession, complied with the law as to notice, bond, oath, inventory, and appraisement of effects, and final sale of the property. Civil Code, Arts. 1114 and 1115. Under Art. 1162, it is the duty of the court to sell the perishable movable property, even before the appointment of a curator. Art. 1163: "The curator is bound, in ten days affer his appointment, to demand that all the remaining movable effects found in the succession intrusted to his administration be sold."

If there are debts against the estate, it is the duty of the curator to sell first the movables for their payment, if they be insufficient, he then sells enough immovables to pay them. Arts. 1164 to 1168. But under Arts. 1169 to 1189, he must, at the end of the year, convert all property into money, and pay the net proceeds to the Treasurer of the State.

The provisions of the Civil Code of Louisiana, relating to successions, have been for many years essentially as they exist to day. And for many years it has been considered a fundamental principle of law in that State that the purchaser of real estate at a succession sale is bound to look to the jurisdiction of the court and its order directing the sale, and if they are sufficient he is protected. This claim for scrip is in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament and is therefore descendible as realty. In the case of Lalanne's Heirs v. Moreau (13 La., 431), the heirs brought an action of ejectment against the purchasers at a succession sale of the real estate of their ancestor, relying upon several alleged nullities in the proceedings by which the property was sold, and had judgment in their favor below. The supreme court of Louisiana, on appeal, reversed the judgment below, and held, citing numerous authorities:

"Sales directed by the court of probates are judicial sales to all intents and purposes, and the purchaser is protected by the decree order ing them. A purchaser under a decree of the orphans court is bound to look to the jurisdiction, but the truth of the record concerning matters within that jurisdiction can not be disputed. The decree of the court is to be received as conclusive evidence, not to be impeached from within, and like all other acts of the higest judicial authority, impeachable only from without; and a judgment, decree, sentence, or order, passed by a competent jurisdiction, which creates or changes a title, or any interest in an estate, is not only final as to the parties themselves, and all claiming under them, but furnishes conclusive evidence to all mankind, that the right or interest belongs to the party to whom the court adjudged it."

This doctrine was afterwards affirmed in Beale et al. v. Walden (11 Robinson, 67); again in McCullough v. Minor (2 La. An., 466); and in

Wright v. Cummings (19 ib., 353), which was a suit to test the valid ity of the title to certain real estate, acquired at a succession sale under the order of the court of probates, the court say:

"It will not be necessary to examine objections taken to the proceedings prior to the date of the order of sale. A purchaser at a probate sale is not required to look beyond the decree recognizing its necessity."

See also Sizemore v. Wedge (20 id., 124); Wisdom v. Buckner (31 id., 52); and Thompson v. Tolmie (2 Pet., 157).

A careful examination of the decisions just cited leads to the conclusion that in the courts of Louisiana the title of Sompayrac could not be questioned, unless it should be shown affirmatively that the district court in assuming to settle up the succession of Alrio was without jurisdiction as to the subject matter. As I have before shown, if such is the effect of this judgment in Louisiana, under the provisions of the United States constitution, above quoted, and the said act of 1790, such would be its effect in the United States courts and also in the executive departments of the government. That is to say, at the said succession sale in 1882 Sompayrac purchased the interest, right, and title to this claim of which Alrio died seized, and none other. In other words, he (Sompayrac) merely stands as the representative of Alrio and can claim nothing more than Alrio could were he alive.

Mrs. Reynolds's claim herein, as before stated, has as an initial point the alleged sale of this property by Alrio in 1837. Basing her claim as she does upon a private sale, it will be necessary for her to establish it by satisfactory evidence. If so established, then the scrip in question should be authenticated in her name; if not, then it should issue to Sompayrac. As already stated, your office has not rendered a final decision as to her claim. Questions relative to its validity are therefore not now before me for consideration, and no opinion is expressed concerning them.

I am aware that the conclusion herein arrived at, in reference to dig. nity of succession sales in Louisiana is at variance with that expressed by Mr. Secretary Schurz in the "Garrett" case, (supra), which has since been followed by this Department as a guide in such matters. But that was merely an opinion upon a state of facts certified by the Commissioner to be correct; and that opinion overruled that of the Commissioner, and also that of the U. S. District Attorney for Louisiana, who had investigated the subject thoroughly in the light of Louisiana law. (See Land Office Report for 1880, p. 195.) The error in the "Garrett" case consists in this that it requires the applicant for scrip who claims under a succession sale to show to this Department all the facts that he was required to show to the court which rendered a judgment in his favor. In other words, it in reality gives no force and effect to such judgment. This, as has been shown by the decisions of the courts before referred to, is clearly erroneous, and should not be allowed to obtain longer here. See also Comstock v. Crawford (3 Wall., 396).

Said "Garrett" case and all other cases in so far as they conflict with the views herein before expressed are accordingly overruled.

The decision of your office upon the questions raised by the appeal of Sompayrac is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded to you that a final decision may be rendered by you in the matter of Mrs. Reynolds' alleged title, and for such further proceedings as may then be rendered necessary and proper in consonance with this decision.

SETTLERS ON RESTORED RAILROAD LANDS.

CIRCULAR.*

Commissioner Sparks to registers and receivers, April 30, 1886.

I have to call your attention to the following act of Congress :

AN ACT for the relief of certain settlers on restored railroad lands.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons who shall have settled and made valuable and permanent improvements upon any odd-numbered section of land within any railroad withdrawal in good faith and with the permission or license of the railroad company for whose benefit the same shall have been made, and with the expectation of purchasing of such company the land so settled upon, which land so settled upon and improved may, for any cause, be restored to the public domain, and who, at the time of such restoration, may not be entitled to enter and acquire title to such land under the preemption, homestead, or timber-culture acts of the United States, shall be permitted at any time within three months after such restoration, and under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of the General Land Office may prescribe, to purchase not to exceed one hundred and sixty acres in extent of the same, by legal subdivisions, at the price of two dollars and fifty cents per acre, and to receive patents therefor.

Approved January 13, 1881.

In accordance with the provisions of the foregoing act, you are instructed as follows:

1. The act applies to settlements upon odd-numbered sections embraced within railroad withdrawals, whether such settlements and withdrawals shall have been made before or after passage of the act.

2. In order to bring a purchaser within the provisions of the act, he must have actually settled and made valuable improvements upon the land,

3. The settlement and improvement must have been made before the restoration of the land to the public domain.

4. Such settlement and improvement must have been made in good faith and with the permission or license of the railroad company for whose benefit the withdrawal was made, and with the expectation of purchasing from said company the land so settled upon.

5. Only lands settled upon can be purchased under this act, and only the actual settler at the date of restoration can be permitted to make

* Omitted from IV L. D.