While the exception of mineral lands from the grant to said company is clear and explicit, yet it does not appear from a careful consideration of the language of said grant that Congress intended to grant only such lands which may after the lapse of an indefinite number of years prove to be agricultural in character.

A careful examination of the whole record shows no error in the decision appealed from, and it is accordingly affirmed.

HOMESTEAD ENTRY-SINGLE WOMAN.

MARIA GOOD.

The right acquired by the original homestead entry of a single woman is not affected by her marriage prior to final proof.

Secretary Lamar to Commissioner Sparks, October 22, 1886.

I have considered the appeal of Maria Good, nee Wilcox, from your decision, dated July 14, 1886, holding for cancellation her homestead entry, No. 15,552. Said entry, it appears, was made September 28, 1880, and covers the NE. 4 of Sec. 22, T. 3 S., R. 23 W., Kirwin, Kansas. November 7, 1885, claimant made final proof before the clerk of the district court, which proof was on the 11th of the same month rejected by the local office "because of insufficient residence."

From that action appeal was taken to your office.

Your decision sets out the following facts as shown by the record in the case, to wit, that claimant was a native born citizen of the United States and a single woman over twenty-one years of age at date of entry, soon after which she married; that her husband was a mechanic and worked in Norton, three miles distant; that claimant's statements are that she staid in Norton during the bad weather in winter, aside from which she resided continuously on the land; that the testimony of her witnesses make it appear that she staid in Norton winters and on the homestead summers; that she was never absent for more than three months at a time; that she has never moved her household goods from the land, and that the improvements, which are valued at $600, consist of a house, a well, wind-mill, sheds, an orchard of one hundred and twenty-eight trees, and fifteen acres under cultivation. Without passing upon the question of residence further than to say that "the testimony as to residence is not very clear, except that it was established in November, 1880," your decision proceeds to rule the case upon the fact of the marriage of appellant after having made her entry.

On this question you hold that "a woman who makes a homestead entry and subsequently marries before completing the same, forfeits her right thereby to acquire title to the land," and for that reason you dismiss the appeal from the action of the local office and hold the entry for cancellation.

Section 2289 of the Revised Statutes contains the following provis ions as to who may enter public lands under the homestead laws:

"Every person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who has filed his declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws, shall be entitled to enter one quarter section, or a less quantity, of unappropriated public lands, upon which such person may have filed a pre-emption claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, be subject to pre-emption at one dollar and twentyfive cents per acre," &c.

Your decision tacitly admits that the applicant, as a single woman, over twenty-one years of age, and native born, was at the date of her entry qualified under the law quoted to make said entry.

The sole question before me for consideration, therefore, is, whether the fact of her marriage after entry and before final proof of itself worked a forfeiture of such rights as she acquired by her entry.

I am unable to concur in the conclusion arrived at by you on this proposition. The original homestead act of May 20, 1862, was entitled "An Act to secure Homesteads to actual settlers on the Public Domain." That act, which is substantially embodied in the Revised Statutes-Sec. 2289, et seq.,-prescribed certain prerequisite qualifications which must exist in settlers under that law. Those qualifications have already been mentioned. If found to exist, then what?

Actual continuous residence and cultivation must follow, and no certificate shall be given or patent issued until the expiration of five years from date of entry, and then, or within two years thereafter, proof may be made showing continuous residence and cultivation, and that no part of the tract with reference to which the proof is offered has been alienated, except as provided in section twenty-two hundred and eightyeight of the Revised Statutes. (2291, R. S.)

From the foregoing it seems clear that when once legal qualification to make homestead entry is established, and the land applied for is subject to such entry, then the only remaining questions for the Land Department to consider are those relative to residence, cultivation and alienation.

This being true, the fact of the marriage of the claimant in this case after she made her entry can not of itself work a forfeiture of any right which she may have acquired by virtue of said entry.

It only remains for her to show compliance with the positive requirements of the homestead law, which are conditions subsequent, in order to entitle her to full legal title by patent. Her marriage did not of necessity prevent her remaining upon and improving the tract. The mar riage of a woman who has made homestead entry may result in her leaving the land which she has entered and establishing a residence elsewhere, and thus indirectly furnish a reason for forfeiture, but the ground of forfeiture in such case would be abandonment and not the fact of marriage. I am clearly of the opinion that the fact of Maria

Good's marriage did not in any degree impair the right which she acquired under her entry.

Upon reference to the decisions of your office on the question here involved, I find that the practice has, so far as I have been able to discover, heretofore been uniform in recognizing the right of a married woman to complete a homestead claim, initiated by entry before mar riage.

On the 10th of February, 1874, your office, in passing upon this question, ruled that a single woman who makes an entry under the Domestead laws "does not forfeit her rights under the homestead laws by marriage, provided she fulfils the requirements of the statute as regards settlement and cultivation of the land embraced in her homestead entry." (1 C. L. O. 3). See also the following cases: Mary Latt, decided by your office August 25, 1877 (4 C. L. O., 103); Eda M. Carnochan, decided September 29, 1881 (8 C. L. O., 121); Herman L. Phelps, decided January 9, 1883 (9 C. L. O., 196). In the case of Rosanna Kennedy (10 C. L. O., 152) my predecessor, Secretary Kirkwood, having under consideration the effect of a pre-emption entry and discussing the difference between that and a homestead entry, held, as to a homestead entry, that "the marriage of a single woman subsequent to her entry is not a waiver or forfeiture of her rights." Believing, as I do, that the practice as indicated by the decisions cited has been in accordance with the law, and that appellant by her marriage lost no right acquired through her homestead entry, I must reverse your de cision.

I do not pass upon the proof made as to residence and cultivation, as that has not been acted upon by your office.

APPLICATION TO ENTER-POST OFFICE ADDRESS-RESIDENCE.

CIRCULAR.

Commissioner Sparks to registers and receivers, October 25, 1886.

The returns from many district land offices show that the regulations of this office requiring applicants under the homestead, pre-emption, timber-culture, and other laws, to state in their applications the place of their actual residence and their post-office addresses are not being satisfactorily complied with, particularly in cases in which residence upon the land or residence within the State or Territory is not required.

It is often impossible, and in timber-culture, desert land, and timber land entries especially so, to ascerfain from the papers in the case the place of residence of claimants, and personal service of notice cannot be obtained, for this reason, in many cases in which it is important that personal service should be had. Necessary investigations are also seri ously impeded for want of this essential information.

You will hereafter see, in all cases, that the place of the actual residence and post-office addresses of applicants are properly stated in their applications. It is not sufficient to state that the place of residence is in a certain county. If the residence is in a town or city the same must be stated, and if in a city, the street and number must be given. If the residence of the applicant is in the country in any of the public land States or Territories, the section, township, and range upon which applicant resides must be given.

You will not hereafter receive timber-culture, desert land, or other applications in which this requirement is not complied with, but all such applications will be returned for correction to the parties presenting or transmitting the same, and will not be placed on record until the omis sion is supplied.

Applicants will also be advised that changes of residence subsequent to allowance of application must be reported to the local officers, and, when so advised of such change of residence you will make proper note of the same.

In connection with the above, you are directed to hereafter note upor the paper itself, in case of every filing, declaration, or application, (where the same is not executed before you and presented by the applicant in person), the name of the party by whom the same was presented or transmitted.

You will strictly enforce the foregoing.

Approved:

L. Q. C. LAMAR,

Secretary.

MINING CLAIM-APPLICATION-SURVEY.

S. F. MACKIE.

An application for patent or the survey of a claim may embrace several contiguous locations.

In accordance with statutory requirement, the survey should exhibit the boundaries and conflicts of each location covered by the application,

Acting Secretary Muldrow to Commissioner Sparks, October 25, 1886. I have before me a letter from S. F. Mackie, of Salt Lake City, Utalı, stating that the surveyor-general has made certain rulings relative to an application for the survey of a mining claim, which he regards as erroneous, and requesting the opinion of this Department thereon. To render an opinion upon such a presentation of a question is neither customary nor proper, and I would therefore be compelled to dismiss the request were it not accompanied by a communication from yourself asking a ruling for the benefit of the Land Office.

The questions presented arise out of departmental decision in the case of the Good Return Mining Co. (4 L. D., 221), which was also promulgated through circular of December 14, 1885 (Id., 374). Therein it. was ruled that, where there is an application for patent for a "mining

claim" consisting of several mining locations, the applicant may show for the consolidated claim the expenditure specified in section 2325, R. S., but that he must show upon each location the expenditure specified in section 2324, R. S.; and that "an adverse claimant may prove abandonment of any one of such locations by failure to make annual expenditures upon it or upon a common claim for its benefit." This decision manifestly recognized the legality of an application for patent for a mining claim consisting of several locations, and such an application was afterwards expressly ruled to be legal in the case of the Champion Mining Company (4 L. D., 362), upon appeal from a decision of your office made prior to the rendition of the Good Return decision. Since your communication above referred to suggests a doubt concerning the import of said Champion decision, I may add that it was intended to rule only that a single application, either for patent or for the survey of a mining claim, is required when the claim includes several contiguous locations. It was not intended to and does not rule in relation to the mode or the expense of surveying such claims. These questions arise upon the alleged decision of the surveyor-general of Utah to the following effect, to wit:

"First. That each location must be considered as a separate lot, be separately surveyed, its boundaries marked by posts set at each corner, and the conflicts with all other lots (howsoever owned) shown.

"Second. That the deposits properly required by him are $27.00 for each location and $5.00 for each conflict."

In respect to the first question, the statutes seem to be plain. Section 2325, R. S., provides that a person, who has complied with the terms of the mining laws, and who applies for patent on a lode claim, must file in the local office a plat and field notes of his claim, which are described as follows, to wit:

"A plat and field notes of the claim or claims in common, made by or under the direction of the United States surveyor general, showing accurately the boundaries of the claim or claims, which shall be distinctly marked by monuments on the ground.

Sec. 2331. Where placer claims are upon surveyed lands, and conform to legal subdivisions, no further survey or plat shall be required." The purpose of the requirement of plats in certain cases is manifestly twofold, namely, to inform the Land Department, as well as conflicting locators or protestants, of all the material facts concerning the claim which can be shown by plat and field notes. The Land Department must be advised that the claim, discovery, etc., are located on the pub. lic domain, and therefore the plat must show all conflicting locations or claims, patented or unpatented. The applicant must also show that he has complied with the law in respect of the annual expenditure on each location, and consequently the survey must identify each location. The applicant must give notice of his claim to the world, in order that conflicting locators may file adverse claims; by such claims the issue raised is priority or maintenance of possession, and, as possessory rights