things. The relation depends on the nature of the things. We must know so far the nature of the things before we can discover their relation. In Identity we know the object as at one time and again at another time, and looking at each of the things, and comparing them, we discover them to be the same. In Comprehension we have before the mind an object, and also a part or parts, say a house and a window, and we decide the window to be part of the house. In Resemblance we perceive a quality in each of the objects, and pronounce it the same. It should be noticed here that while the quality is the same, this does not make the objects identical. In Space we discover relations of extension and position, say of the angles of a triangle to one another. In Time we have always a present perception, and we remember the past or anticipate the future, and declare their relations of priority and posteriority. In Quantity we look at the muchness of objects, as being less or more, and at their proportions. In Quality we contemplate objects as affecting each other, say as attracting one another. In Causation we discover a power in one object to affect another.

A judgment is usually defined as a comparison of two notions. Upon which Mr. J. S. Mill remarks, that "propositions (except where the mind itself is the subject treated of) are not assertions respecting our ideas of things, but assertions respecting things themselves," adding, "My belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the things" (Logic, I. v. 1). There is force in the criticism, yet it does not give the exact truth. In propositions about extra-mental objects, we are not comparing the two notions as states of mind; so far as logicians have proceeded on this view, they have fallen into confusion and error. But still, while it is true that our predications are made, not in regard to our notions, but of things, it is in regard to things apprehended, or of which we have a notion, as Mr. Mill admits: "In order to believe that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the idea of gold and the idea of yellow, and something having reference to those ideas must take place in my mind."

According to Locke, "Perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds" (Essay, II. x. 15). According to the view I take, perception is knowledge. According to Locke, "Knowledge is nothing but the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy, of any of our ideas" (IV. i. 1). See King's and Reid's review of this doctrine of Locke, supra, p. 45. Hamilton says: "Consciousness is primarily a judgment or affirmation of existence. Again, consciousness is not merely the affirmation of naked existence, but the affirmation of a certain qualified or determinate existence" (Metaph. Lect. 24. See, also, Notes to Reid's Works, pp. 243, 275). Dr. Mansel says: "It may be laid down as a general canon of Psychology, that every act of consciousness, intuitive or discursive, is comprised in a conviction of the presence of its object, either internally in the mind, or externally in space. The result of every such act may thus be generally stated in the proposition, This is here.'" He is obliged to distinguish between such a psychological judgment and a logical one. "The former is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness. The latter is the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other" (Proleg. Log. Chap. ii.). What he calls a psychological judgment seems to me to be a cognition, which may be explicated into a judgment, which judgment will be a logical one. Hamilton and Mansel carry out still further their doctrine of comparison being involved in knowledge. Dr. Mansel quotes J. G. Fichte: "Alles, was für uns Etwas ist, ist es nur inwiefern es Etwas anderes auch nicht ist; alle Position ist nur möglich durch Negation." This doctrine is in perfect consonance with Fichte's idealism, but does not consort so well with Scottish realism. And yet Hamilton says: "The knowledge of opposites is one; thus we cannot know what is tall without knowing what is short ; we know what is virtue only as we know what is vice; the science of health is but another name for the science of disease " (Metaph. Lect. 13; see, also, 34). So, also, Dr. Mansel (Lim. of Relig. Thought, Lect. 3), "To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." This seems to me a doctrine wrong in itself, and of very doubtful tendency. True, there are some ideas confessedly relative, such as the ideas of tall and short. But, on the other hand, there are cognitions, and there are ideas which are positive; thus we know self as thinking, we know

virtue as good, without reference to anything else, and it is because we are thus able to know things separately that we are able to discover relations between them. We do not first discern differences and then know the things: we first know the things and then observe points of resemblance or difference.

Both Locke and Kant give the mind a power of intuition, but they bring it in at different places. Locke confines it to our judgments; we perceive intuitively the relation of ideas (Essay, B iv. 1). Kant gives the mind an intuition of phenomena under forms which it imposes, but withholds from the mind any intuition in judgment or understanding. I give the mind, within rigid limits, an intuition both of things and the relations of things.

Locke speaks of relations as being infinite, and mentions only a few. He specifies Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, Proportion, and Moral Relations (Essay, II. xxviii.). Hume mentions Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, Cause and Effect. Kant's Categories are,(I.) Quantity, containing Unity, Plurality, Totality; (II.) Quality, containing Reality, Negation, Limitation; (III.) Relation, comprising Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community of Agent and Patient; (IV.) Modality, under which are Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and Non-Existence, Necessity and Contingence. Dr. Brown arranges them as those of, — (I.) Coëxistence, embracing Position, Resemblance or Difference, Proportion, Degree, Comprehension; (II.) Succession, containing Causal and Casual Priority. Of late there has been a tendency among British psychologists to narrow the relations which the mind' can discover. Sir W. Hamilton's account (Metaph. Lect. 34) is a retrogression in science. In comparison, — (1.) We affirm the existence of the ego and the non-ego; (2.) We discriminate the two; (3.) We notice resemblance or dissimilarity; (4.) We collate the phenomena with the native notion of substance; (5.) We collate them with the native notion of causation. Prof. Bain says (Senses and Intell. p. 329), "What is termed judgment may consist in discrimination on the one hand, or in the sense of agreement on the other we determine two or more things either to differ or to agree. It is impossible to find any case of judging that does not, in the last resort, mean one or other of these two essential activities of the intellect." I wish my readers to compare these views of Hamilton and Bain with those of the older thinkers quoted above, and with those expounded in this work. Both seem to me to narrow the

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mind's power of discovering relations among things, which in fact is the highest intellectual power which the mind can exercise. Hamilton's account seems to me to be an unnatural one, especially what he says about a collation with "native notions" of substance and causation. We discover the relations in looking at things. Bain's account in confining the mind's power to the discovery of agreement and difference is miserably meagre.

CHAPTER II.

RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED BY THE MIND.

I.

Relation of Identity. We have seen that every object known by us is known as having being; I do not say an independent being, but a separate and individual being. This being, continuing in the object, constitutes its identity. This identity every object has as long as it exists, and this whether the identity does or does not become known to us or to any other created being. An object has identity not because the identity is known to us; but an object having continued being, and therefore identity, intelligent beings may come to discover it. We are so constituted as to be able to know being, that is, that the object known to us possesses being, and we look on the object as retaining that being as long as it exists. We are prepared to decide then that if we ever fall in with this object again, it will have retained its identity. We may fall in with the same object again without discovering it to be the same, because of a defect of memory, or because the object was disguised in a crowd. But in regard to certain objects, we cannot avoid observing the sameness, and cannot be deceived in pronouncing them the same.

So far as self is concerned, we discover the identity intuitively as we look on the objects presented in selfconsciousness and memory. We have an immediate knowledge of self in every exercise of consciousness. We have a recollection of self in some particular state