on the 14th there were approximately 1,000 Indians gathered on Bois Blanc Island and that they were addressed on that day by Tecumseh, in the presence of General Brock. On the same day Lieutenant Forbush, who was a prisoner at Fort Malden, counted 600 Indians passing by Malden toward Sandwich, some on foot and some mounted. Colonel Anderson wrote from the River Raisin on the 4th of August that the Indians were passing the river in great numbers and soon would number in the thousands. Colonel Cass admitted that the exact number of Indians within striking distance of Detroit could not be stated and Colonel Wallace referred to them as "a countless number". The band of 500 savages which captured Mackinac from Lieutenant Hanks departed for Detroit under command of a Major Chambers and forty-eight hours before the surrender were only 125 miles away, at Delaware. All the Canadian tribes, with possibly one exception, were hostile to Hull. Captain Eastman, an American soldier and at this time a prisoner, remained in Detroit twenty-four days after the capitulation. He stated that on the third day following the surrender, 250 Indians came from Saginaw, and on the 10th or 11th of September, 1,100 or 1,200 more came from Mackinac. It was intended by the British to have had these Indians aid in the attack on Detroit, but the siege ended so quickly and unexpectedly that the services of the savages were not required and, consequently, their presence became unwelcome alike to the Americans and to the British. Had Hull, with his depleted force, resisted this horde of Indians he could have held out for many days, but the cost would have been too great.

Hull's army was hopelessly in a corner. A land movement was impossible and the British fleet in the river prevented a movement by water. Communication with the Ohio country could not be maintained owing to the impossibility of keeping open and guarding 200 miles of army road through the wilderness and a hostile country. No aid was being secured, either in men or supplies. The American Army was decreasing in size, through desertion and sickness, while the British was constantly growing. Hull and his officers repeatedly wrote to Governor Meigs and the secretary of war, but their requests were unheeded. As hereinafter shown, Hull was grossly neglected by his commanding general, Dearborn, and the official orders of the administration were seldom carried out during the whole campaign.

This situation of the Detroit Army under Hull is one of the main points advanced by the many historians and army officers who have defended Hull. Some students of the campaign state that he made tactical mistakes: that he should not have crossed into Canada, that he should have assaulted Malden with his artillery, that he should have held the bridge at Aux Canards River, and that he shoud not have allowed Cass and McArthur to leave the fort with so many men at such an important time, although the necessity of opening communication with the expedition at the Raisin was paramount. It is certain that Hull exhibited bad generalship at times, but when the accusations are couched in such terms as "treason" and "cowardice", the subject becomes one open to discussion. There is nothing in the way of reliable or unbiased evidence which indicates that he deserved the first term or that his procedure merited the latter appellation. The court martial which convicted General Hull was a clever bit of legal trickery, the result of which has subsequently reflected more upon others than upon Hull himself.

Regarding the military career of General Hull prior to the Detroit cam

paign much could be written, but without comment the facts are given as follows: Letters of General Washington, Generals Schuyler, Gates, Heath, Brooks, McDougall and Wayne, and resolutions of Congress, all testify graphically of the courage of this veteran of the Revolution and a participant in most of its battles; he was with the detachment which rescued Lafayette when surrounded by the British at Philadelphia, and in spite of his dishonor, Lafayette visited the old soldier at his home in Newton, Massachusetts, in 1825, leaving the reception ceremony at Boston to do so; Hull was wounded at Chatterton Hill; acted as field officer at Trenton; was in the battle of Princeton; was with St. Clair at Ticonderoga and with the Americans on the retreat; was in the Saratoga battles; commanded the advance lines during the winter at Valley Forge; commanded the 8th Massachusetts Regiment in the Battle of Monmouth; lead one of the divisions in the bayonet charge at Stoney Point; led the assault which captured Morrissana; commanded Washington's escort to Frances Tavern and Paulis Hook when Washington bade his officers farewell; and subsequently commanded the left wing of General Lincoln's forces in suppressing Shay's Rebellion. In many of these engagements, Hull's command was decimated, particularly in Schuyler's retreat and at the battles of Saratoga. He was twice promoted for bravery during the war. Hull's march to Detroit in 1812, the cutting of a road through the wilderness, constructing of three block-houses and a fort, and disciplining the raw and unruly militia, was a military achievement and even won the admiration and aroused the fear of the British commanders.

After arriving at Detroit, the militia colonels implored Hull to cross immediately into Canada, but he at first refused because his orders were to remain in Detroit until otherwise directed. Once in Canada, he offered at one time to lead an attack on Malden without artillery, but the militia colonels at this time refused to guarantee the services of their men. These two incidents are given simply to show that, whichever way Hull turned, he encountered opposition from his officers.

Upon the day of the surrender, according to Col. Robert Wallace, an eye witness, Hull was everywhere about the fort, restless, nervous, fatigued from loss of sleep, depressed, and chewing great quantities of tobacco. His fort was crowded with men, women and children, he had seen several of his men killed and wounded by the enemy shells, no word came from Cass and McArthur, and the enemy's ring of steel was gradually drawing tighter. Finally, he surrendered, with the remark: "I have saved Detroit and the territory from the horrors of an Indian massacre". (Testimony of Major Munson.) The massacre at Chicago (Fort Dearborn) on the 15th, the day before Hull surrendered and the subsequent Indian atrocities of the war show what might have been.

Some of the young and inexperienced officers who sat in judgment upon Hull at the trial in 1813 conceived that his agitation upon the 16th of August, his excessive tobacco chewing and his nervous condition, all indicated fear, but this conception was not shared by the old officers who had experienced actual battle. Colonel Miller believed the fact of surrender indicated fear, but that there was nothing else in Hull's appearance or conduct which led him to believe his general afraid. We have the statements of the bravest officers, from the Revolution to the World war, that fear is a common emotion among the most intrepid warriors. Fear is not cowardice. Colonel Miller's idea that the surrender indicated fear and cowardice is not borne out by the history of military warfare. No historian has thought of accusing Washington of cowardice

for surrendering Fort Necessity to the French and Indians, when his situation was even superior to Hull's. The military acts of General Hull prior to August 8th, and which were universally opposed by his antagonistic officers, were either ordered or approved by the President or the secretary of war. As stated in a later part of this chapter, the reprehensible conduct of General Dearborn was one of the principal factors in the disaster at this time and success was unknown until he was removed for senility and incompetence.

General Hull, with the Fourth United States Regiment, and a part of the First Regiment, were held prisoners in Canada until the close of the year 1812. While in Canada, Hull sent his report of the surrender to the secretary of war, assumed all the blame and eulogized his officers, also begged for an investigation of his conduct.

HULL'S TRIAL

After the surrender, Col. Lewis Cass journeyed to Washington and issued a letter for the press, dated September 10, 1812, in which he advanced facts which were later used as the principal basis for the various charges against Hull. General Hull having requested an investigation, a court martial was appointed by the following order:

"General Orders.

"Adjutant General's Office, Washington City 19th Jan'y. 1813.

"A general court martial of which Brigadier General Wade Hampton is appointed President and Alexander I. Dallas, Esqr., Judge Advocate, will sit at such place in Philadelphia as may be provided for the purpose, on the 25th day of February next at 12 o'clock for the trial of Brigadier General William Hull. Brigadier Generals Joseph Bloomfield, Henry Burbeck and John R. Boyd, Colonel George Izard, Alexander Macomb, James Burn, Jacob Kingsbury, Jonas Simonds, Thomas Parker, Peter F. Schuyler, William H. Winder and Hugh Brady, Lieutenant Colonels Winfield Scott, John Christie and Richard Dennis are to attend as members and supernumeraries.

"By Order of Secretary of War."

Gen. Wade Hampton was president of the court and A. J. Dallas was judge advocate. The fact is shown by Hull's "Memoirs" and Clark's history of the 1812 campaign that Hull appeared before this court martial at Philadelphia for trial. The war records indicate that there were no charges or specifications, or any minutes of the proceedings of the court. They also show that the court was never dissolved. The members of the court were veterans of many battles and were ably fitted to try Hull on any charge.

During this time the indignation and anger of the people had been directed at General Dearborn, commanding general of the army. Also, at this time, military law gave authority to the commanding general to appoint such courts martial as were necessary, which, as may be seen very plainly, placed the power directly in Dearborn's hands. That a powerful influence arose to abolish this first trial court is indicated by the following order:

"The meeting of the General Court Martial for the trial of Brigadier General