For the comparatively limited extent of team work which is necessary among the animals, nature, as we say, has provided them with impulses that are adapted to such dovetailing of overt activity. Some of these impulses have been inherited by man, but such limited natural impulses, which in part constitute the original nature of man, are not adequate to bring about the proper motivation of the vastly greater team work required in the populous societies of man." Consequently inner strife will ensue unless the original nature of man is modified, his will becoming socialized in order that there may thus be a concert of purpose and will to direct and supervise the necessary concert of effort and activity in the social order. We may call these forms of organized activity social processes. Such social processes, the processes of producing, dividing, deciding, or controlling, need for their supervision social aims or ideals as distinguished from personal attitudes and impulses. The social problems arising in a social order, as contrasted with the natural problems arising in the natural environment, require for their solution social values, ideals, and principles, as contrasted with the inadequate natural impulses that constitute the original nature of man but are apparently well adapted to the natural environment. Conscious social endeavor within a social order should be guided by known and explored social values and social ideals, as contrasted with primitive reactions within a jungle, guided by blind impulses and attitudes. The people and the officers of a society, in so far as they are directing these social processes, should not be guided by immediate personal impulses but should suppress them and be guided by the social ideas and ideals of justice, democracy, welfare, and efficiency. We sometimes speak of such officers as having the judicial temperament, refers to the difference between being governed by fear or favor, or by the impulse of the moment, and being governed by certain more stable social feelings and ideas. It is not necessary of course that the conception of these ideals should be identical among the members of society. It is not the judgment but the will that is involved, the attitude, the aimwhether or not one wants to be just, wants to be democratic, wants the other person to have a say-that makes for strife or for the team work of wills, the common aim. Given the common aim, the members of society will work out the ways and means of moving toward the realization of their common purpose to be just, to be democratic, to'promote their best welfare, etc. This process of working out ways and means requires the development and use of social machinery and technical information and judgment. Throughout the social order in all its various institutions questions will arise which will be decided, not by the expert, but by the laity involved. Among them, even among those guided by a unity of purpose and a willingness for unity of action, differences in information and judgment are inevitable. But all action cannot be halted until a unanimous opinion is formed, for the loss due to paralysis of activity while the form of action was being debated would be too great. It is often better to have action, perhaps not the wisest, than to halt endeavor. Since some sacrifice is necessary under these conditions, after first threshing out the problem for a time in public debate and discussion for the purpose of forming public opinion, the question may then be submitted to a vote. This device serves to keep the social machinery going without unanimity of judgment. A majority judgment prevails on the ground of least sacrifice, not on the ground of better efficiency in judgment. The presumption that the more efficient or correct judgment would have a greater appeal and win over more voters is hardly supported by the facts of social life and the registered decisions of the voters. It is not always true that it would be less sacrifice for a minority of voters to forego having their judgment prevail than for a majority. Among the people imbued with the spirit of democracy, if such a condition arose the majority would not say, "Well, we have the votes, what are you going to do about it?" but would consider the relative sacrifice that would be incurred by the minority if the decision went against them. If the majority perceived that the minority felt keenly that their sacrifice would be the greater, the majority would then arrange a middle or less severe course, or would give in until a further period of educational campaigning had taken place and then submit the question again for a vote. Perhaps public opinions would, during this period, undergo a change. Within the small, face-to-face groups in society, for instance in the family, democratically minded people often differ in judgment upon matters that come up for mutual consideration. Such persons consider the sacrifice it would mean to the other if the decision went against the other and give in if the sacrifice of the other is perceived to be felt more keenly. This act of giving in, either in part or altogether, may then be reciprocated by the other when upon another occasion the situation is reversed. Such persons defer to the judgment of others involved even when this is quite contrary to their own judgment, provided it does not offend against the attitude or will to be just, democratic, etc. One's attitude toward justice and the democratic spirit is not to be compromised; but one can differ with another upon the best ways and means of attaining justice, democracy, etc., and can forego his judgment in part and arrange with others for some modified method of attaining social welfare, justice, and democracy. There is no reason why this same spirit of democracy may not pervade a larger group. The ideal of democracy as the rule to govern participation in the control and supervision of the social order may not of course be the goal toward which society is moving. It may be in some entirely unseen direction, our segment of the movement toward the great goal being so insignificant that it is after all too small to disclose the true direction of the entire movement. Yet the ideal of democracy has the earmarks of a great social goal, for it has infinite possibilities of development, and there are always at hand ways and means of making it workable in the successively unfolding conditions arising in the social order. NEWS AND NOTES THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY The meeting this year was held at Richmond, Virginia, Friday and Saturday, December 27 and 28, in the Jefferson Hotel. The meetings were very well attended considering the war-time conditions which have prevailed during the past year. The Jefferson Hotel, in the words of President Cooley, was "just the right sort of a place for our purpose." We missed the familiar faces of some of our members, namely Giddings, Ross, Small, Vincent, Howard, Dealey, Blackmar, and Lichtenberger. The meetings were unusually spirited in impromptu discussions. President Cooley refused re-election for a second term. In his stead Professor F. W. Blackmar, of the University of Kansas, was elected. The other officers for the year 1919 are First Vice-President James Q. Dealey, Brown University; Second Vice-President, Edward C. Hayes, University of Illinois; Secretary-Treasurer, Scott E. W. Bedford, University of Chicago; members of the Executive Committee, Cecil C. North, J. E. Cutler, F. Stuart Chapin, Wm. J. Kerby, E. L. Earp, and Miss Grace Abbott. President Cooley read a message of greetings from the Institut International Sociologie, René Worms, secretary. The business meeting instructed the President to send the greetings of our society to our sister society in France, and suggested an effort at co-operation between our Society and similar organizations in France, England, Italy, and Belgium. A Committee was appointed to "inquire into what is and what may be done in teaching sociology in the grades and in the high schools." The meeting next year will perhaps be held in Lexington, Kentucky. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI Among the five extension courses of lectures on problems relating to war and reconstruction arranged by the University are the courses "Race Psychology" offered by Professor Ernest L. Talbert, and "Principles and Methods of Social Service" given by members of the faculty and by local and national social workers. COLGATE UNIVERSITY Professor Roy W. Foley has leave of absence for the year and is serving as district educational director for the National War Work Council of the Y.M.C.A. in the camps around Baltimore. LAFAYETTE COLLEGE James H. S. Bossard, M.A., Ph.D., has joined the faculty of Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, as professor of sociology and economics. Professor Bossard received his Doctor's degree at the University of Pennsylvania, and during the past year has been engaged as editorial and civic writer on the staff of the Allentown Morning Call. Before that he had been head of the department of history and social science at Muhlenberg College. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA Professor E. C. Branson has been invited to go to France as agriculture specialist in rural life for the Army Overseas Educational Commission. UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO Professor G. S. Dow, formerly professor of sociology in Oberlin College, is head of the department of sociology and economics. The establishment of the department of sociology in this developing western university is indicative of the growth of interest in sociology in the Southwest. RICE INSTITUTE The curriculum has been enlarged by the establishment of a lectureship in civics and philanthropy. Courses for credit and public lectures, designed to train professional and lay workers for social service in the South, are being given this year. If the interest of Houston and environs justifies it, the lectureship will be continued. The present incumbent is Herbert Knight Dennis, Ph.D., Harvard, 1918, formerly assistant in sociology at the University of Illinois and a former undergraduate pupil of Professors Ward and Dealey at Brown University. |