Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

Opinion of the Court.

which the article so manufactured receives a different name." So the one who raises the cane is undoubtedly entitled to be considered the producer of the cane, but he is not the producer of the sugar. That appellation is reserved for him who turns out the finished product.

Neither can Mrs. Allen, nor the heirs of her husband, be said to be the direct producers of the sugar. Neither of them was the owner of the crop, which belonged to the plantation while growing, and would, as hereinafter stated, have passed to the purchaser, had a sale been made while the cane was still uncut. One half of the plantation passed under the will to Mistress Bettie, and the other half to the heirs of her husband.

There remain only the executors who, as between the estate of Allen and the Government, must be deemed the producers of the sugar. By the will they were authorized to rent or work the plantation as they pleased, to pay all taxes and other charges, and to put the residue to the credit of Mrs. Allen. The inchoate right to the bounty obtained by Allen before his death was a personal asset, which undoubtedly passed to the executors, who subsequently perfected that right and received the money.

Of course this money did not belong to the executors personally. They held it for the benefit of the estate and as agents for all persons interested therein; and the question as between the different heirs and legatee who shall be deemed the producer of the sugar remains to be settled. We are all of opinion that this question must be answered in favor of Mistress Bettie. If the cane when cut had been sold, the proceeds, over and above all expenses incurred since her husband's death, would have belonged to her, but not the bounty eo nomine, since the sugar had not been produced nor the bounty earned. But if such sale had been made, the cane undoubtedly would have fetched a price largely increased by the fact that the purchaser would receive a bounty upon the manufacture of the sugar. It is impossible to suppose that the price of the cane would not be seriously affected by the promise of the bounty, though perhaps not to the full amount of such

Opinion of the Court.

bounty. In this way Mrs. Allen would have received indi. rectly the benefit of the bounty, although she did not produce the sugar. On the other hand, if the cane bo converted into sugar, it is equally just that she should receive the bounty. To deny it to her would place her in a worse position than she would have been in if the executors had sold the cane when it was cut. Whether she received it directly or indirectly makes no difference in principle.

The difficulty with the position of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is this: That if A should raise the cane and sell it to B, who manufactured it into sugar, A and B would be entitled to share in the bounty, although A may have received a much larger price for his cane than he would have received if there had been no bounty. Under the terms of the will Mistress Bettie was entitled to receive the entire proceeds of the crop, over and above the expenses, taxes and other charges; and whether these came from a price received from the cane increased by the offer of a bounty, or from the bounty actually received upon the production of the sugar, is wholly immaterial. To give to one who raises the cane and sells it to a manufacturer any part of the bounty, is in reality to give him a double bounty, since he must necessarily receive one in the enhanced price given for the cane. On the other hand, the manufacturer of the sugar is entitled to the proceeds of his sugar and to whatever the law has annexed thereto as an incident.

To return to the illustration of manufactures. Can it be possible that, if a bounty were offered for the manufacture of furniture, the manufacturer of the finished product would be obliged to share such bounty with the owner of the trees, or the manufacturer of the lumber cut from such trees, from which the furniture was made? Or, under similar circumstances, would the manufacturer of watches be compelled to share the bounty with the scores of prior manufacturers who contributed directly or indirectly to the production of the various articles of mechanism which go to make up the finished watch? To state this question is to answer it; and yet, if the producer of the cane be entitled to any portion of the

VOL. CLXXIII-26

Opinion of the Court.

bounty, why are not the manufacturers of the constituent parts of a finished product?

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the widow was not chargeable with any part of the expense of the crop incurred prior to her husband's death, but that does not change her attitude to the sugar as its actual producer, nor deprive her of the benefit of the bounty; nor do we think that her right to such bounty is affected by the fact that the bounty law in existence when Allen applied for his license was repealed before his death, and another law passed in the following spring renewing the bounty applicable to the crop of the previous year. Such act was passed, as was held by this court, in United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, in recognition of a moral obligation to those who had put in their crop the previous year upon the faith of the bounty law then in existence. It was not so much a gift by the Government as a reward paid in consideration of expenses incurred by the planters upon the faith of the Government's promise to pay a bounty to the manufacturers and producers of sugar. As applied to this case, we think the act of 1895 should be construed as a continuation of the prior bounty. To say that it is an "unwilled asset" is practically to hold that it is a gift from the Government "without anything in the nature of a consideration," and that the amount of sugar produced is only to be considered as the measure of the bounty. This dissociates the bounty altogether from the motive which actuated Congress in granting it, and turns it into a mere donation of so much money, which it cannot be presumed to have made, even if it had the power. Bounties granted by a government are never pure donations, but are allowed either in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered, objects of public interest to be obtained, production or manufac ture to be stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized. To grant a bounty irrespective altogether of these considerations would be an act of pure agrarianism; and to determine who is entitled to the benefit of the bounty is but little more than to determine who has rendered the consideration.

Opinion of the Court.

The act giving the supplementary bounty to replace that which should have been paid under the original act clearly did not contemplate giving a bounty to any other producer than the one designated by the original act. That act plainly gives the bounty only to the manufacturer and not to the grower. It follows, therefore, that the court, accepting its construction of the will as unquestionable, declared that although Mrs. Allen was a manufacturer of the sugar and the successor of Mr. Allen in that regard, was yet not entitled to the whole bounty, because, under its construction of the act of Congress, the grower of the cane was the primary person intended to be benefited by the act. As it is obvious that the person intended to be benefited by the act of Congress was the manufacturer, it follows that the Supreme Court of Louisiana, after finding that Mrs. Allen was the manufacturer, has taken from her a portion of the bounty to which she was entitled under the act of Congress, on the erroneous theory that that act gave the bounty to the grower of the cane instead of to the manufacturer.

We do not undertake to say that the crop of growing or maturing cane passed to Mrs. Allen at the date of her husband's death, since if the executors had chosen to sell the plantation the next day, this cane would have passed to the vendee. In this the common law and the civil law, agree. (1 Washb. on Real Prop. 5th ed. 11; Code Napoleon, art. 520.) The same principle is incorporated in the Civil Code of Louisiana: "Art. 465. Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered, and trees before they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and are considered as part of the land to which they are attached. As soon as the crop is cut, and the fruits gathered, or the trees cut down, although not yet carried off, they are movables." But what she did own was the proceeds of the crop; the right in case the plantation was not sold to have this crop harvested for her benefit, and if manufactured into sugar, to have the proceeds of such sugar and all the incidents thereto placed to her credit.

For the reasons above given, we think she must be considered as the producer of the sugar, and that it is immaterial that she

Statement of the Case.

was not the producer of the cane, since the two are distinct and separate articles of production.

It results from this that the decree of the Supreme Court of Louisiana must be reversed, and the cases remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.

ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN AND
AND ST. PAUL
RAILWAY COMPANY v. PAUL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.

[blocks in formation]

The act of the legislature of Arkausas of March 25, 1889, entitled an act to provide for the protection of servants and employés of railroads, is not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

THIS action was commenced in a justice's court in Saline Township, Saline County, Arkansas, by Charles Paul against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arkansas, and owning and operating a railroad within that State, to recover $21.80 due him as a laborer, and a penalty of $1.25 per day for failure to pay him what was due him when he was discharged. The case was carried by appeal to the Circuit Court of Saline County and there tried de novo. Defendant demurred to so much of the complaint as sought to recover the penalty on the ground that the act of the general assembly of Arkansas entitled "An act to provide for the protection of servants and employés of railroads," approved March 25, 1889, Acts Ark. 1889, 76, which provided therefor, was in violation of articles five and fourteen of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and also in violation of the constitution of the State of Arkansas. The demurrer was overruled, and defendant answered, setting up certain matters not material here, and reiterating in its third paragraph the

« ForrigeFortsett »